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Preface 
This project was begun in 1980 as part of a four-year teaching and research assignment at the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands, after I had graduated in the fall of 1980 on 
a comparative study of Kazin's On Native Grounds and Bright Book of Life. One of its con-
clusions was that little had been published about him, which certainly merited a more compre-
hensive project such as a critical monograph. When preparing for special collections research in 
the United States on a Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies in the 
summer of 1982,1 was informed by the curator of the Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection 
of English and American Literature of the New York Public Library, Lola Szladits, that Kazin 
had just then deposited his notebooks (1933-1980) there as well as substantial portions of his 
personal correspondence. Herbert Mitgang, reporting in the New York Times of 12 August 1981 
on the Berg Collection's acquisition of the Kazin material cites Szladits: "Alfred Kazin is [now] 
back on native grounds." From July 1982 till February 1983,1 was in New Haven with a Yale 
affiliation, travelling to New York City to study the Kazin archive and combining this with the 
reading of background material in Yale University's Sterling Memorial Library. The notebooks 
in particular have proved to be an extraordinarily rich source of cultural material reflecting on 
work in progress, registering Kazin's frank response to contemporary public issues, the extent 
of his relations with the New York Intellectual community and beyond, and containing miscel-
laneous notes on a personal metaphysics. Talks with Kazin, his sister Pearl Kazin Bell, Daniel 
Aaron, and Alexander Bloom, who had just finished a Ph.D. dissertation on the emergence of 
the New York Intellectuals, indicated that my project met with Kazin's approval, that no 
scholarly publication giving an integral account of Kazin's career existed to date, that such a 
publication had long been expected, and that my project would be unique in taking account of 
unpublished materials. Owing to a turn in my career in the mid-Eighties, for some years the 
project led a very intermittent life, but it was resumed on a full-time basis in April 1996, when 
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research awarded me a nine-month grant-in-aid. 
This also enabled me, in November 1996, to study the most recent addition to the Kazin 
archive, being the notebook material 1980-1990, additional correspondence, and the manuscripts 
of several of Kazin's memoirs and historiographical books, which figure particularly in my 
"Epilogue." 
This project could not have been completed without the generous cooperation of many individ-
uals and organizations. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Alfred Kazin for giving me permission 
to study his papers in the Berg Collection, a service which, so he has told me, he has by no 
means extended to just anyone applying for access. He has continued to put his faith in my 
project even during the years when little progress was made. 
1 
The American Council of Learned Societies granted me a Fellowship enabling me to carry 
out a substantial portion of my research on location in the United States. In its final stage, the 
research was also funded by the Foundation for Literary Studies, Musicology and Drama 
Research, which is subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. 
Over the years, a number of people have generously shared their knowledge of Alfred Kazin 
with me, including Pearl Kazin Bell, Alexander Bloom, Daniel Aaron, R.W.B. Lewis, Robert 
Towers. Others have assisted me in different ways, and I would like to mention Lola Szladits 
and Rodney Phillips, curators of the Berg Collection of the New York Public Library, the staffs 
of the New York Public Library Main Circulation Desk, of Columbia University's Butler 
Library and of Yale University's Sterling Memorial Library. I am particularly grateful to John 
Heasley, wherever he may be now, for providing me with articles from American periodical 
sources when they were hard for me to come by. Thanks is due also to the English Department 
of the School of Translation and Interpreting of the Hogeschool Maastricht, who never com-
plained about the increased workload caused by my absence, and to the Board of Directors for 
giving me official leave. Irene Custers, Han van de Staay and Geer Hoppenbrouwers advised me 
on matters relating to the electronic versions of the manuscript. But most of all I owe my 
gratitude to Lidy, Stijn, Noud and Marij, whose patience with me has occasionally bordered on 
the obscene. 
I dedicate this book to Anneke and Bertus. 
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Introduction 
A decade ago, as one commentator has recently observed, the historiography of the so-called 
New York (Jewish) Intellectuals became a well-established cottage industry. Justly famous for 
their ungiving polemical style in intellectual matters and their zest for criticizing political and 
cultural fashions, Harold Rosenberg conferred upon them the soubriquet "Herd of Independent 
Minds." The group's cohesion was mainly founded on their shared experience of the Great 
Depression, when the crisis went beyond politics to pose fundamental questions about both the 
intellectual life and the culture. They derived their identity as a self-conscious avant-garde from 
their determination to safeguard their version of liberal society — or at least its indispensable 
ingredients — from the doctrinaire ideologies of their formative age. A significant section of the 
New York Intellectuals-to-be were of immigrant-ethnic background, the majority of them Jews, 
and the poignant experience of assimilation had primed them for the clash of political and 
intellectual systems during the events leading up to the Second World War. It must be borne in 
mind, however, that membership was not elective and that it was not granted on the basis of 
signing up to a well-established political platform or manifesto (though many manifestoes were 
signed by many of its members): the group's collective identity was a conspicuous label most 
of all to outsiders and opponents. Still, it was an entity in spite of itself: a diversity of personali-
ties, sensibilities and viewpoints originally unified in the cause of promoting independent 
political commitment and a radical bias. 
For practical purposes, but certainly also in recognition of Partisan Review's decisive role in 
opposing Stalinism and cultural Communism in the Thirties and Forties, much current literary 
scholarship identifies the New York Intellectuals with the Partisan Review ambience. The 
consensus has been that there is no New York Intellectual who has not written for Partisan 
Review or been favourably reviewed in its pages. One additional requirement has been domicile. 
In many a member's view, New York City formed the hub of the intellectual world from the 
late Thirties, when the refugees from European totalitarianism arrived in droves, to some time 
in the Sixties, when Partisan's influence waned appreciably. Alfred Kazin stands elected on 
both criteria, but he has never identified with the group's ethos to the extent that literary 
scholars and historians have claimed he has. In the early Forties, for instance, when young 
Kazin gradually gained credit for his work on an ambitious book on American prose literature 
since the Civil War, he met with a settled attitude of intellectual caste-mindedness at Partisan 
Review. His relations with certain members of the group were warm and mutually supportive, 
but in other cases he came up against what he has described as a style of personal attack and a 
strategy of interpersonal power politics: "This avant-garde gnawed on each other, lived on each 
other," but he was aware that he shared their loyalty to a great cultural tradition.1 
In many respects, Kazin's concerns as a writer and critic have paralleled theirs, though his 
analysis and frame of reference have differed. An octogenarian now, having survived most of 
them and still planning — and actually completing — book-length projects on his favourite 
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subject of writers and writing in America, he has made a career that is best described as the 
development of a sensibility. Ideological positions, he has argued, are not and have never been 
of the slightest interest to the literary critic. Accordingly, he has been a particularly wary and 
equable observer and critic of both American doctrinaire radicals unswervingly faithful to the 
Soviet Union's official Comintern line in the Thirties, who effectively silenced themselves when 
it was no longer possible to ignore Stalin's ulterior motives, and those reformed and 'chastened' 
ex-radicals and opportunists who after the war became rabid supporters of the triumphant global 
ideology: American capitalism and its values. Kazin's autobiographical series — he prefers to 
call them "personal histories" — A Walker in the City (1951), Starting Out in the Thirties 
(1965), New York Jew (1978), and most recently A Lifetime Burning in Every Moment: From 
the Journals of Alfred Kazin (1996), records his encounters with scores of writers and intellec­
tuals in the service of one cause or another before and after the war. The causes range from the 
literary to the political, from the quest for an enduring aesthetics to social engagement, from 
critical opinion and literary performance as an expression of status politics to exploring compre­
hensive cultural issues within a distinctly moral interpretation of history. 
To qualify Kazin's career as the development of a sensibility means to defend his creative 
achievement as a literary critic and historian from the still common view that his work is 
primarily a statement of liberal radicalism in America. That view does not do justice to the 
magnitude of Kazin's achievement, which has rested on a catholic and deeply personal concern 
with the free expression of the mind rather than supporting the radical political fashions of the 
day. Indeed, when he wrote a letter to Henry Allen Мое of the Guggenheim Foundation in 1940 
applying for a grant-in-aid, he made clear that his literary-critical position was quite independent 
of his political. His forthcoming project On Native Grounds (1942), he declared, took its 
inspiration from Charles A. Beard's and Vemon Louis Partington's activist historical studies of 
democratic radicalism in American thought, but the primary source of his fascination with 
America, as he was to explain later, was actually the "makers, movers and thinkers" who made 
America over into an idea. These ranged from the paintings of colonial and Revolutionary 
figures in the Metropolitan Museum and what Constance Rourke was to call the "poets of 
American nationality," from Cope, James, Peirce, Dickinson and Roebling in Lewis Mumford's 
The Mauve Decade, to Emerson and Whitman. It was a period that exerted a natural appeal over 
the young immigrants' son finding an appropriate theatre for his Socialist sensibility in reliving, 
while writing On Native Grounds, the nineteenth century in radical minds and historians of the 
American spirit such as Twain, Dreiser, Henry Adams, Jane Addams, Abraham Cahan, and 
Thorstein Veblen. But a major presumption that Kazin based his book on was that the end of 
the nineteenth century had seen the all-out challenge of religious belief by "scientific" 
determinism. Writing to Мое, he argued that the Twenties aesthete's ultra-cosmopolitanism and 
the stultifying influence of the business ethos during the Harding and Coolidge Administrations 
had effectively obscured the vital strength of the national literary heritage, which was a complex 
set of responses to the emergent social reality in America. American literary consciousness, he 
claimed, had been determined by the modem American writer's troubled relation to his society, 
his often fumbling attempts at accommodation and understanding, and the general poverty of his 
aesthetic experience. His book would address the contemporary age as an era of disillusionment 
in the established American post-Civil War cycle of disillusionment alternating with reform, and 
would express the sense of promise which had been "the keynote of American literature in that 
time..." Kazin admitted he drew on Pamngton's political idealism but rejected his critical 
method. For Partington had been insensitive to the aesthetic, '"belletristic"' aspects of literature 
and focussed on those militant tracts in the history of American writing whose major effect had 
been as political and moral manifestoes. Kazin boldly stated his own preference for Henry James 
as a critical ideal. Equally, Starting Out in the Thirties features the fledgeling reviewer and critic 
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Kazin's homily on the Promethean rebels in the cause of the free spirit — Blake, Emerson, 
Whitman, Nietzsche, Lawrence: no political activists here. In the course of the Fifties, when he 
assessed his development away from secular idealism, he would conclude in his notebooks that 
he had lost his "instinctive, true, spiritual home" and that "Socialism is meaningful only when 
conceived as one aspect of our creativity." Kazin has never been a spokesman for any particular 
official political or cultural programme.2 
Indeed, the reversals of the postwar intellectual experience and his personal situation at the 
time brought him face to face with the extraordinary difficulty of recovering a spiritual home 
and the sense of freedom lost during the eclipse of a historically idealistic age. The first of his 
personal histories, A Walker in the City, was long in coming; it was a troubled quest for new 
resources to substitute for his lost secular hopes. The resolution of this troubled period for Kazin 
personally took the form of memoir, of intellectual and cultural reminiscence aiming to reveal 
the foundations of his present condition. Walker did not see radicalism as a guide to political 
action — that cause had been lost — but traced a saving remnant of intellectuals using radical-
ism as a personal style, a badge of intellectual and moral honour. 
It was around this time that Kazin reports being spiritually cleansed — he spoke of a 
"healing, astringent effect" — by reading Albert Camus's L'Etranger, a copy of which he had 
picked up in Paris in 1945 on a government mission to promote American literature to the 
liberated French. Camus's protagonist Meursault defines a comprehensive moralist-existentialist 
position reducing Hemingway's clipped style to "mere romantic disillusionment" and constitut-
ing "the record of a conversion away from the old humanism." To Kazin, L'Etranger was about 
the possibility of belief and "a protest against the socialized obligation to close our eyes to the 
abyss where we really live..."3 This type of hard-bitten spiritual radicalism had been totally 
absent from the literary era covered in On Native Grounds, which had indeed focussed on 
American writers' traditional attraction to progressive politics and humanism. Camus's creative 
skepticism addressed Kazin's crisis of belief in a way that only American writers engaging the 
decay of the religious culture they were reared in — Melville, Whitman, Dickinson — could. 
In a country whose Constitution was based on sterling political-philosophical ideas and guaran-
tees of individual integrity and liberty, the democratic individual primarily located any con-
straints to his freedom within himself. The great nineteenth-century agonists in American 
literature accordingly explored the perils and prospects of homo Americanus1 condition, but it 
is one of Kazin's achieved insights that they had trouble accounting for the world outside the 
self, viz. society and the State in particular. European writers have had a different quarrel with 
existence, Kazin has argued, and have continued to deal with the problem of belief in a culture 
that since the Enlightenment has gone through a series of relentless attacks on religious faith. In 
addition, the ravages of totalitarian politics in modern Europe — which produced a gruesome 
picture of modern man's universal bondage and spiritual impotence — inspired a moral fatigue 
which they have attempted to remedy by their willingness to explore philosophical absolutes. In 
precisely this respect, the potential some American Romantics perceived in the powers of the 
isolated self — and Melville features most prominently for Kazin here — has proved to be 
prophetic. They were lonely travellers navigating a Godless universe. 
Camus's philosophy solidified a tendency already manifest in Kazin's literary thinking. After the 
publication of On Native Grounds, when he felt literally stunned by its acclaim, he rose to 
prominence, and at twenty-seven he was given a literary editorship at The New Republic. But 
it was clear to him already then that he had based the book on an untenable premise, viz. that 
the historical development toward a humane and equitable social order in the world's first 
democratic experiment would be completed, and that this would be expedited by a principled 
commitment to literary radicalism. Deeply aware that the totalitarian experience had put an end 
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to the nineteenth-century ethos of progress, he turned to a major poet and philosopher of radical 
libertarianism in the history of the Western mind: William Blake. By the end of 1944, he was 
studying the Blake literary estate at Stanford University, writing "An Introduction to William 
Blake," which was to be included in successive editions of Viking's The Portable Blake and 
widely anthologized. Kazin presents Blake as an apostle of integral human vision castigating 
modem man for his self-inflicted inner divisions. Blake was a liberator breaking down encrusted 
superstitions and the power of moral-theological institutions. He redefined our experience of the 
world, interposing the unified vision of the imagination for the insufferable discrepancy between 
the real and the ideal, and lambasting the Christian interpretation of human existence, which 
only served to breed guilt, bigotry and righteousness. Other reviews and essays Kazin wrote 
around the mid-Forties — again on Blake, on William and Henry James, Whitman, Melville, 
Dostoevsky and Georges Bernanos — confirm this growing interest in writers as insurgent 
moralists and thinkers. 
Kazin sees the need for a new morality as the singlemost important legacy of the Holocaust. 
Fascism abrogated all humanisms, he believes, and the experience of the Holocaust will never 
be rendered as literature for the simple reason that literature exists by dint of moral transactions, 
considerations and choices which the Nazis had eradicated from the ghettos and the concentra-
tion camps they set up. Whereas Jewish-American intellectuals did not start the debate about the 
Holocaust until the late Fifties, culminating in the 1963 Dissent symposium about Hannah 
Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, which ended in a major 
controversy and was to split the New York Jewish intellectual community forever, already in 
Walker Kazin had explored the creative potential of the moral mysteries of the Jewish identity. 
The memoir broached issues of identity that most Jewish intellectuals were not to engage for 
years to come. It was a rare and early instance in American writing of the dilemmas of Jewish 
cultural accommodation. Fifty years after the fact, Kazin is still concerned to complete the work 
tentatively begun by Hannah Arendt and which the Jewish community has never successfully 
completed, viz. to bring Fascism to trial before the Western moral tradition. 
Walker first and foremost established Kazin's reputation as a writer. As a critic, he was 
increasingly concerned to reveal the specific and integral human situation presented in a 
particular work of art using a quick integration of partial insights and perspectives rather than 
formal, textual analysis. This was characteristic of the course Kazin's career took: he produced 
his major work outside academia, and when, after the Second World War, he moved on to 
teaching positions at universities at home and abroad, he very much remained an independent 
figure within it, working at the writer's trade rather than the scholar's. He was at Black Moun-
tain College in North Carolina, in 1944, where he was by many accounts an extraordinarily 
dedicated lecturer in Blake and Melville. He was overwhelmed by the experience of existential 
loneliness and despair among his students, however, and he believed this was a sure sign that 
American culture was bearing down increasingly hard on its more sensitive creative individuals. 
Their urgent demand for spiritual instruction brought Kazin face to face with the limitations of 
On Native Grounds's secular bias and leftist idealism, and he began to address the wider 
spiritual and philosophical issues broached by modems such as Gorki, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, 
Tolstoy, Kafka, Thomas Mann and Arthur Koestler, balancing this with work on Emerson, 
Whitman, Thoreau, Melville, Henry James, and Faulkner. He made a mark as a radical in 
matters of sensibility rather than politics, motivated by the recognition that the social translation 
of leftist theory — vide the recent history of the Soviet Union — faced horrible political and 
intellectual pitfalls. 
Three foreign experiences record his rapid development after On Native Grounds. In London 
towards the end of the war, reporting for Fortune on the effects of the war experience on the 
political preferences of the British, Kazin cultivated an eloquent and classically leftist indigna-
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tion at the hardships and poverty endured by primarily the English working-class. He was 
simultaneously moved by their stoic acceptance and persistent Whitmanesque faith in social 
reconstruction. He reports trying repeatedly to meet George Orwell, the moral hero of his still 
radical literary conscience, but never succeeding. This was a major disillusionment of his leftist 
days, and Kazin was to remember his failure for decades to come, lionizing Orwell as the 
tribune of the Left in the free West who stood up for his ideological convictions even as he was 
dying of cancer of the throat. Kazin's fruitless attempts to meet this first-rate radical mind took 
place even before the Labour Party secretary dismissed Orwell as "Not One of Us!," and before 
1984 made him world-famous. 
In 1947, Kazin was at the Salzburg Seminar on a Guggenheim Fellowship, expounding 
American writers' classical libertarian visions to a European audience whose recent political 
history had made them ideologically committed to the idea of freedom. The triumphant moment 
was when F.O. Matthiessen, a fellow American critic and a friend of Kazin's, spellbound the 
eager Europeans with an original and bold critical interpretation of Henry James's The Portrait 
of a Lady. The significance of the event for Kazin personally was to see the radical Matthiessen 
— though a formalist critic, Matthiessen planned a book on Theodore Dreiser and was to be 
among the last staunch defenders of the Communists' mission in the U.S.S.R. — evoke the 
lasting moral drama in James's novel. For once, radicalism and sensibility were united: 
Matthiessen on The Portrait was "the perfect critic of what James sought technically for his 
book."4 Was not this perhaps proof that the two radical traditions and formative influences on 
Kazin's and Matthiessen's sensibilities — both political and literary — could work towards a 
similar hopeful vision of the future? 
The next testing ground for Kazin's secular faith was in Cologne, Germany, where he was 
"Gastprofessor für Amerikanistik" in 1952. Asked to dinner by a university official, he encoun-
tered stultifying moral obtuseness among the German guests about their own individual responsi-
bility when serving in the German army during the war. One professor informed him that 
discussion of the concentration camps was considered "vulgar." Kazin concluded that even 
among responsible democratic German intellectuals, so close to the worst episode in recorded 
human history, there was still little incentive to account for the moral abyss in modem life 
created by the Holocaust. He was to encounter a similar attitude in American literary intellect-
uals, notably Lionel Trilling, whose concern with the moral tradition under attack from the 
individual modern will seeking to break free from social and cultural constraints carefully 
skirted situations where the moral life had been so utterly abrogated. Trilling's cultural analysis 
focussed on the informed choice of moral options in a social setting where manners constituted 
final proof of a person's authentic being. It was barely equipped to furnish historical justice for 
Hitler's Jewish — and other — victims, who in the last analysis had never had any options to 
exercise. 
In the "Postscript" to the 1955 edition of On Native Grounds, Kazin traced the recent vogue 
of American literature abroad to the imminent break-up of the European tradition, which had 
teetered under the impact of post-1914 cynicism, nationalism, social revolution and the barbar-
ism of the Fascist terror after 1933. American writers were seen to perpetuate the romantic 
tradition, suggesting to both Americans and Europeans that they had "wrought their own way 
through language," celebrating "man's awareness of himself moving through an utterly new 
situation." Even a Black writer such as Ralph Ellison owed his education as a novelist to "a 
vision of a universal condition, beyond the plight of the Negro, that he [has] found in Melville 
and Faulkner." This to Kazin characterized the American literary situation in the mid-Fifties, 
and his own work has included exemplary studies of the universal dimensions of the human 
situation, taking its stand against the partial view. A collection of articles, reviews and essays 
entitled The Inmost Leaf (1955) featured the "Introduction to William Blake" and a major 
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revaluation of William Faulkner, whom he had rather slighted in On Native Grounds, a com-
parative study of William and Henry James's moral interest in the imagination, and a ringing 
protest against ransacking Melville for moral justification of contemporary liberalism. Other 
essays and articles, on Gorky, Turgenev, Lawrence, Thoreau, Flaubert, Dostoevsky and Dreiser 
rounded out the picture of the critic seeking to dramatize the writer's particular individual 
genius, vision and animus within his cultural settling. They in fact confirmed that aspect of his 
sensibility which had formed during the Thirties, when, tired of competing economic and 
political theories, he came to admire "the rebels of literature, the great wrestlers-with-God... the 
poets of unlimited spiritual freedom..."5 These had asserted their individual vision in the teeth 
of overwhelming cultural constraints. Few living writers ranked among them, but Kazin believed 
that the quality of their perceptions made them luminous presences in contemporary life, 
blighted as that was by narrow economic theories of social reality and post-liberal theories of 
human nature stressing guilt. 
The Fifties saw Kazin accepting a lectureship at Harvard in 1952, at Smith as William Allen 
Neilson Professor in 1953-54, and as professor of American Studies at Amherst College from 
1955 to 1957. Never having completed a Ph.D., he was an anomaly within academia, and his 
ambitions as a young Jewish intellectual and independent writer unrelated to any literary-critical 
school conferred rogue status on him in a still predominantly genteel, WASP-ish environment. 
He believed it was for these reasons that he was not allowed to stay on at Smith, though he was 
certainly willing.6 Fully a decade after their celebrated acceptance into the world intellectual 
community, New York Jewish Intellectuals were occasionally still having to fight for official 
recognition in their own country. The episode recalls Lionel Trilling encountering academic 
conservatism, hypocrisy and racial prejudice in the English Department of Columbia University 
in 1936 but arguing successfully against his impending dismissal and being given an assistant-
professorship. 
During the late Fifties and early Sixties, Kazin further developed the themes already laid out 
in The Inmost Leaf. His essays and reviews increasingly took contemporary literary practice for 
their subject, and in 1962 he published a compilation entitled Contemporaries. It contained a 
number of appreciations of again Faulkner, of Edmund Wilson, whom he had in several respects 
come to see as a model and a prime historical imagination in literature, of the relevance of 
American writing from Emerson and Thoreau to John Jay Chapman and William Dean Howells, 
and of "The Background of Modem Literature," criticizing Eliot and Pound for deflecting the 
revolution of personal consciousness that came in with modernism and encouraging "an 
unhistorical piety about the past" while dismissing the present. Its main effect, however, was to 
focus his pugnacious opposition to what he considered contemporary novelists increasingly 
abjuring the public realm and their tendency to cultivate worlds of purely private sensation in 
opposition to it. Truman Capote, for instance, in Breakfast at Tiffany's (1958), was "a writer for 
whom the world is all society or self, public vice or private tears." Even his deep admiration for 
Saul Bellow was modified by his sense that, unlike the Biblical Jacob, the Jewish protagonists 
in Bellow's novels, even his best to date, Seize the Day (1956), "give up to life a little too 
eloquently, that they do not struggle enough with the angel" in their complex desire to become 
conscious of God. His assessment of the Beat Generation was devastating, stating that theirs was 
a case of wholly self-willed and narcotic exile from the existing social order. In "The Alone 
Generation," he complained that "we [currently] get novels in which society is merely a 
backdrop to the aloneness of the hero." Contemporary protagonists were rarely seen against a 
clear public backdrop to their personal crises, aiming for compassion and emotional authenticity 
instead. The hero's self-pity typically furnished the novel's presiding situation. It was a rare 
writer indeed — Bellow, Malamud, and brilliant Southern writers like William Styron and 
Flannery O'Connor — who escaped Kazin's censure. The rest vitiated their work by their 
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"uncertainty... about their connection with that part of reality which other novelists include in 
their work simply because they are always aware of it," displaying a basic escapism. Even so, 
Kazin never despaired of the novel, believing it capable of "the open representation of experi-
ence that is its passion and delight..."7 Contemporaries left a disgruntled readership curious to 
know if Kazin himself could oppose some vision to the alleged flatness and paltriness of 
contemporary culture. 
An interview with Horizon's Robert B. Silvers in 1962 provided a tentative answer. Kazin 
explained the historical shift supplanting the "rebel" in literature, inspired by the revolutionary 
sense of fraternity captured in the native American tradition of Protestant radicalism, by the 
"stranger," the originally European disaffected thinker "unable to believe in any of the tradi-
tional hopes for man," embodied in Louis-Ferdinand Céline. To restore consciousness of a 
sustaining public domain, and so join the writer to the classic civic hopes for his society, was 
the critic's appointed task. Thus, he might possibly stem the nihilism in "so many hipster 
American works."8 
The radicalizing Sixties, however, embittered Kazin. Bright Book of Life: American Novelists 
and Storytellers from Hemingway to Mailer (1973) featured a revaluation of American modern-
ists such as Hemingway, Fitzgerald and Faulkner, but again came down hard on the contempor-
ary scene. Kazin praised Saul Bellow, James Gould Cozzens, Thomas Pynchon, Isaac Bashevis 
Singer, and Ralph Ellison, and the Southerners Walker Percy, William Styron and Flannery 
O'Connor, but he excoriated many more, including John Updike, Truman Capote, J.D. Salinger, 
William Burroughs and Kurt Vonnegut. A compilation of the Ewing Lectures he had given at 
the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1969, the book evidently suffered from fuzzy 
thematization, and some of its capsule judgments, while occasionally brilliant, baffled comment-
ators. It was a book by a bitter and disappointed observer of the contemporary literary scene, 
but it has nevertheless remained a useful critical survey of American fiction since the Second 
World War and a popular coursebook. 
Starting Out in the Thirties (1965), the second instalment in his autobiographical series, was 
indisputably a more balanced achievement. An intellectual memoir, it came out just when, after 
the heyday of political anti-Communism in the Fifties and early Sixties, the conditions for a 
revaluation of Thirties radicalism were improving. With History to bear him out, Kazin painted 
a harsh picture of the pretentiousness and self-righteousness on the part of a number of Marxist 
ideologues he knew who gloried in their certitude of the coming apocalyptic class war, and who 
were essentially remote from the hardships and the hopes of the democratic masses. The book 
was a spirited defence of the native democratic experience, of a particular vision of history 
embodied in American working-class writers seeking emancipation from their individual back-
grounds of squalor and spiritual meanness and from corruption by the generally middle-class 
intellectual turned Marxist pundit. Walt Whitman's poetic concern with the creative genius of 
the American experience is a subliminal presence here. The moral nature of Kazin's interest in 
the succession of personalities he dealt with gives History the almost tactile quality of experie-
nce, contrasting with the abstract blueprints of the Marxist intellectual cadres. 
Starting Out clearly formulated a cultural complaint, indirectly condemning McCarthyite 
Red-baiting and offical ideological warfare on leftist ideas. Most of all, it pointed out that the 
intellectual Left in America had turned bad from within: the Partisan Review writers had by 
now evidently exchanged their originally radical idealism for an unsparing style of intellectual 
analysis taking apart causes and personalities alike as evidence of their own strength of mind. 
Mary McCarthy in particular showed a "readiness to total skepticism." By the mid-Sixties, 
Kazin recalled that even in the formative decade all he had in common with the Partisan Review 
group was his sense of working in the same radical tradition. 
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New York Jew (1978), the third part of the autobiography, is the first to deal wholly with the 
postwar scene. It covers a vast amount of material from the time Kazin was the recent author 
of On Native Grounds to the present age. Kazin has successfully completed his journey — 
anticipated in mythic terms in Walker — from immigrant Brownsville across the Brooklyn 
Bridge to Manhattan, the intellectual heartland of America. But he has made an uneasy conq-
uest: the sense of a world opening up through a writer's creative identification with it has given 
way to a fascination with the power relations — political, intellectual, sexual — dominating 
postwar Midtown and the Village. Identity and personality are no longer cherished objects but 
instruments for doing battle. New York Jew fails to add to the triptych Walker — Starting Out 
— On Native Grounds, in which issues of emergent selfhood and sensibility combined to 
produce a compelling account of a literary-cultural homecoming. 
In 1984, Kazin published An American Procession. It is without a doubt his magnum opus 
to date and his first book-length study of his favourite subject, the nineteenth century in 
American literature. It is a complex and vivid rededication of the classical canon in American 
writing, predicated on individual authors' rhetorical strategies — their style — as their defence 
of the self from the unsettling impact of accelerating historical events and the distortions 
generated by modern culture. Procession negotiates the unsolved dilemmas Kazin faced from On 
Native Grounds to Bright Book, when he witnessed the increasing erosion of the public experi-
ence in American fiction leading to alienation and privatism. Its author has no definite secular 
cause to promote, and Procession's protagonists have no comprehensive world-view or theory 
to defend. They are annunciators of a particular calibrated consciousness expressing the reversals 
of the American experience during the revolutionary century 1830-1930. They set up an 
argument with their age, either confidently working from within the culture of their time, like 
Ralph Waldo Emerson's paean to self-reliance, or in determined opposition to it, like Henry 
Adams, to unravel the vicissitudes of the once unique opportunities for the American self based 
on untrammeled consciousness. Indeed, Kazin's chronicle features the "Emersonian ecstasy and 
self-exaltation" of the American self as both a natural treasure and a cultural sickness, because 
many a Transcendentalisms radiant conviction of his unity with the universe eventually soured 
on the power of social and existential fact filtering into the framework of his thought, causing 
dismay and retreat.' 
The achievement of Procession is to have rescued the power of artistic vision from the abyss 
of civic inconsequence. The critic performing this act of grace produces a "myth of American 
consciousness... capacious enough to include himself." Henry Adams, the spider in the web of 
the American historical imagination, is the singlemost dominant presence in the book, and 
evidently Kazin seeks to set up a rival myth to Adams's idea of "Unity" in The Education of 
Henry Adams (1907). Adams's creative animus, as Kazin explains in Procession, was the artist's 
alienation from a sustaining creative tradition to back him up, and in Kazin's case there is 
evidence that his situation towards the end of the twentieth century parallels that of Adams at 
the end of the nineteenth, and that he is working from a similar artistic — not merely critical 
— need to counter the experience of dissolution felt on all hands. Kazin incorporates himself in 
the myth of American consciousness, making its modulations the very heart of his critical and 
appreciative self, and projecting this as the culmination of its complex discourse. Procession 
completes the development of Kazin's sensibility, emancipated from liberal-political expectations 
about the culture and much chastened, like Adams a superb image maker not of History as 
science but of the power of the American inward sense of divinity between 1830 and 1930. He 
effectively duplicates what he believes was Adams's sole objective in The Education: to 
articulate the predicament of the artist facing the decline of "the sense of tradition that makes 
possible the art of history."10 The Emersonian tradition of self-reliance has suffered major set-
backs since 1914, and possibly even since the economic crisis of 1893, but Kazin is a sympath-
10 
etic and eloquent historian and judge of a peculiarly American tradition: the selfs sense of its 
divinity. Even so, at age 81, he is still aiming for the "inmost leaf' in the development of his 
critical sensibility: his next book, which will be published this year, will be entitled God and the 
American Writer. 
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Parti 
NEARER MY LAND TO THEE 

On Native Grounds: Stewards of America 
Who is there to deny that for fifty years the ethos of American literature at its 
best has been resignation, attack, escape, but so rarely acceptance? Who is there 
to deny that the very frame of American literature in the modern era... rests upon 
a tradition of enmity to the established order, more significantly a profound 
alienation from it?1 
Writing On Native Grounds, as Kazin testifies in Starting Out in the Thirties, he "could not feel 
that 1938 was so far from 1912." Conceiving his book, Kazin obviously felt close to the avant-
garde movement in culture, politics and literature before the First World War, whose most 
significant forum was The Seven Arts (1916-1917).2 That resurgence, which is commonly 
known as the Little Renaissance in American art and letters, was a comprehensive and radical 
inquiry into the conditions of the national life which, Progressive liberals believed, was seriously 
deficient, though remediable. The remedies they proposed were intended to ameliorate the ethos 
of "enmity to the established order" which had been the reflex psychology of Western agrarian-
ism and populist radicalism ever since the first depressions of nineteenth-century capitalism. The 
liberals derived their optimism about the national culture from the recent developments in the 
philosophy of pragmatism and from a criticism of the materialist ideology which was commonly 
believed to be the "hidden" force in the American Constitution. They promoted a revisionist 
attitude to the traditions of the past and sought to rekindle the hopes for America's early ideals. 
They believed these comprised in their germinal state many of the "disintegrative dualisms" 
which crippled contemporary culture. Should they be able to correct them, they might free 
modern American culture of its worst deficiencies. On Native Grounds reveals to what extent 
they raised their sense of reality to an ideology. I shall therefore argue that Kazin's literary 
historiography restates the liberal tradition in American culture. I shall also argue that On Native 
Grounds is a defence of that tradition during its moment of crisis slightly more than two 
decades after its flowering during the Little Renaissance in American life and letters of 1910-17. 
Despite its violent contradictions and excesses, the liberal intellectuals considered modem reality 
a vast reservoir of creativity, provided it was tapped in the right spirit. A combination of 
rhetorical strategy and faith allowed them to regard the work of Sherwood Anderson as evidence 
of "emerging greatness," suggesting that Anderson had delivered crude but vibrant testimony of 
a perfect cultural synthesis at hand.3 Kazin, however, distrusts this prophetic element in the 
liberal view of culture. He finds that progressive liberalism exerted a stimulating but ill-directed 
and tragic influence on the contemporary literary sensibility, because it favoured a revision of 
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"the existing order" rather than undertaking a critical investigation of the reasons for the 
"enmity" extended to it by early generations of naturalists and realists. The progressive outlook 
of liberalism annexed literature as part of a social and political programme and established no 
connections with it as the expression of a spiritual culture. 
On Native Grounds, so Kazin claims, is an effort at "moral history, which is greater than 
literary history and which is needed to illuminate it" (NG, x). It is an attempt, made necessary 
by the crisis of the Thirties, to resolve the dualism of the outer and the inner histories of modem 
American literature. Kazin's account of the outer history focuses on the heady climate of liberal 
intellectual insurgence, of revisionist, voluntarist philosophies and experimental science towards 
the tum of the century, and the resulting spirit of radical cultural inquiry just prior to the First 
World War. The inner history records the tragic process of "learning America," of the literary 
imagination in America slowly and tentatively breaking down the ideological matrix of "reality 
in America." It argues against the progressive notion that life in America has historically 
reflected a perpetual intellectual dawning. Kazin believes that the glaring contradictions of an 
emergent modem democracy can be negotiated only if the spiritual life can bring itself to 
embrace them. The Progressive mentality was basically unequipped for this, because it tended 
to rationalize them as the dialectical extremes masking the democratic and libertarian genius of 
the mainstream of American thought. 
Kazin's instructor at Columbia University, Mark van Doren, had suggested that he try an 
ambitious project, a book-length counterstatement to the genteel Victorianism and arid academ-
icism which still dominated the American literary departments at the time. He was delighted by 
the result: 
"On Native Grounds" is one of the richest tragedies I have ever read... You write the story... of 
fifty — of five hundred failures without moralism: without accusing those who failed of missing 
the wrong kind of Tightness, namely your own or anybody else's pet Tightness. All this really very 
terrible collapse, author after author and generation after generation, of the original promise — 
you seem to find in it some sort of necessity which hushes blame. I suppose some perennial 
blunder keeps being made, and I assume that you, if anyone does, knows what it is. But you don't 
say so glibly, and I admire you for that; as, to be frank, I look to you in some future to be more 
explicit. 
Also Oscar Cargill and Robert Flint, besides praising the book, were struck by Kazin's inability 
to work out the catharsis of his tragic concept. Flint remarked on the "air of finality about the 
last chapters", while Cargill found the affirmative ending "a little dithyrambic. I, too, believe in 
the essential strength of America — I think it will see us through the awful jamb we are in now, 
though like the hero in the ballad we may have to lie down and bleed a good many times to rise 
and fight again."4 
Kazin develops this motif of necessary failure in order to elicit a positive moral commitment 
in what had to an overriding extent been a literature of alienation. He points to the urgent need 
for modern writing in America to escape from its entrapment within "a tradition of enmity to 
the established order," to transcend nostalgic Jeffersonian philosophy and to formulate an answer 
to the disruptive forces of modernity. Modern American writing, Kazin explains, has been a 
literature of "realism and realization." Many factors conspired to turn reality in America into a 
baffling metaphysical problem, whose tensions and ambiguities were recorded in their full 
magnitude in works of the imagination. They form the immediate background to the "moral 
history" of modem American writing, and Kazin the literary historian illuminates their effects 
on the contemporary literary sensibility. Writing On Native Grounds, he claims, he educated 
himself in "the mind of modem America"(M?, 518). 
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The introduction to On Native Grounds specifies the post-Civil War emergence of industrial 
capitalism as the prime circumstance affecting contemporary writing. The postwar period saw 
the "moving and perhaps inexpressible moral transformation of American life, thought, and 
manners" (NG, viii), suggesting that the scope of that revolution has not been understood fully 
as yet. Historically, literary consciousness in America has played a fugitive role in regard to the 
forces modernizing American society, and "it was this same conviction that American 
'modernism' grew principally out of its surprise before the forces making a new world that led 
me to understand a little better what is for me the greatest single fact about our modem Ameri-
can writing — our writers' absorption in every last detail of their American world together with 
their deep and subtle alienation from it" (NG, ix). New York Jew (1978) features a compelling 
account of just what "modernism" in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries meant. It included among other things the "yellow" thrill of The Chap-Book along with 
Henry Blake Fuller's ethical despair over boomtown Chicago, the public outrage over Dreiser's 
immorality and that of Henry James's heroine Daisy Miller, the social hopes projected by the 
aesthetics of liberal cultural criticism just before the First World War, as well as the spread of 
Socialism and syndicalist radicalism. It was a continuous drama of clashing intellectual and 
ethical cultures. The tenacity of the genteel, old order, which had pledged allegiance to America 
as expressing God's special favour to late Puritan ethical orthodoxy, confronted the modem 
spirit of radical democracy with the aggressive political consciousness of drought-stricken 
farmers in the West and the intellectual and social aspirations of the immigrant city proletariat. 
A structural idea in On Native Grounds is that democracy had by the end of the nineteenth 
century come to generate deeply pluralist and even conflicting sentiments. Kazin deals with the 
experience of "democracy" as the most inclusive and most meaningful metaphor for the glaring 
contrasts of modem American life: 
"There is my Middle West", Fitzgerald crooned in the last slow movement of The Great Gatsby. 
Years before I saw Chicago, I learned what hope, élan, intellectual freshness came with those 
pioneer realists out of the Middle West who said there was no American literature but the one 
they were rushing to create. My subject had to do with the "modem" as democracy; with America 
itself as the modem; with the end of the nineteenth century as the great preparation...5 
The enduring quality of the modem democratic mind — and conscience — was forged in the 
1880s and 1890s, which were a time of "unconscious tragedy" and of "arrested energies." 
Newton Arvin referred to that era as the crisis of democracy, when the libertarian outlook of 
Transcendentalism, "rooted in a deeply poetic sense of the dignity, even the sacredness, of 
personality," anticipated "democratic affection for the plain man" and harmonization with "the 
naturalistic view of things." As a literary man's plea for democracy, Arvin's view was 
programmatic rather than explorative like Kazin's. He declared that "the democratic program 
need not be defended on theological or rationalistic or transcendental grounds but is harmonious 
with what we know of physics and biology..." The revelatory powers of modem science 
compelled writers "to see at last how bogus a thing democracy is until it has been given a firm 
material base [in] the honest substance of economic freedom and equality."* 
Arvin's advocacy of evolutionary naturalism voiced the leftist sentiment characteristic of 
radical polities in the Thirties. Kazin, however, though a contemporary and a fellow literary 
radical, kept a low profile on his political viewpoints in On Native Grounds. He recalls that 
Arvin did not respond favourably to the last chapters of his book. He was at a loss to account 
for this, but his criticism of the evolutionary assumptions central to liberal radicalism may well 
have inspired Arvin's reticence. Arvin was looking for a political interpretation of the literary 
heritage, while Kazin identifies the evolutionary assumptions of liberal thought as the dog in the 
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manger of the imaginative life. Arvin's reservations about On Native Grounds, as perhaps also 
Edmund Wilson's, may suggest that these men supported more unqualifiedly liberal views of the 
relation between literature and society than Kazin did. He may have sounded the tragic note too 
insistently for them to be persuaded of the quality of his radicalism.7 
Kazin deals with the idea of the tragic development of American literary history convincingly 
enough to carry persuasion. He accounts for the primitive sensibility of the early realists — the 
pioneers of modem literature — in terms of their nostalgia for preindustrial society. "The only 
dissent" which the early realists knew "was rhetorical, 'Jeffersonian,' bound to a preindustrial 
and precorporate way of life" (NG, 18). The grimness of life under industrial capitalism made 
them "Jeffersonian hearts plagued by a strangely cold and despotic America" (NG, 17). They 
believed that their experience of a finance-capitalist plutocracy and a centralized government 
crushing their yeoman ideal of America provided the very framework of their lives. It shaped 
their very idea of existence. Much as Edmund Wilson was later on to feel totally estranged from 
the America which he saw "depicted in Time Magazine," so they, too, felt they had sustained 
a dramatic loss of identification. The sense of tragedy is prominent here. The early realists felt 
profoundly alien to the new order. To Kazin, they were in fact pioneers in more than a circums-
cribed, local, or even national sense: "The cleavage between the artist and capitalist society that 
runs all through the history of modem Western literature found its first expression in America 
in people who were themselves, as citizens, stricken by industrial capitalism and frightened by 
it; citizens who did not so much rebel against the new order as shrink from it" (NG, 18). 
Democracy Between Nationalism and Realism 
The above observation characterizes On Native Grounds's position on literary nationalism. 
Towards the end of the Thirties, the problem of a native tradition in letters since 1880 became 
a topical issue. The cultural debate featured the controversial version of nationalism advocated 
by Van Wyck Brooks, Archibald MacLeish and Lewis Mumford. Particularly Brooks had for 
some time been making explicit overtures to an orthodox reading of democratic culture, urging 
that a literature of "primary", affirmative values should boost democratic morale and resist 
Fascism. When he described these values and went on to disparage their feeble counterparts in 
so-called "coterie" literature, which he considered the product of moral defeat and mental 
irresponsibility, he provoked Dwight Macdonald into an acidulous rejoinder with the telling title 
"Kulturbolschewismus Is Here".' 
Kazin takes issue with Brooks's sentimental, affirmative nationalism and his view that 
literature must not feature doubt and scepticism, or any forms of cultural heterodoxy in general, 
that writers who do build their creative insights on them represent the "death drive" typical of 
modem literature and culture. He postulates that the American literary tradition is based on the 
experience of alienation expressed by generations of writers whose major creative achievement 
it was to have struggled to establish the terms of their precarious relation to modem "reality." 
The idea of alienation in On Native Grounds, however, bears no resemblance to the intellectual 
disgust over slackening democratic mores which Brooks detected in such avant-garde writers as 
Eliot, Pound, Joyce, Proust, Valéry, or even in Hemingway and Dos Passos. Nor is Kazin 
concerned with the writer as an intellectual avant-gardist per se. The historical conditions 
governing the emergence of the avant-garde in Western literature generally did not apply in 
America. There the cause of "high" art required no defence from the vapidity and complacency 
of the bourgeois establishment. Kazin rather argues that modem literature in America faced 
existential questions about its own identity. For one thing, it was chiefly motivated by the 
reflexes of social and political protest. It displayed none of the violently antisocial sentiment and 
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often hermetic ethos of the bohemian artistic avant-garde of nineteenth-century Europe. It was 
not the product of an élite seeking to create a social environment more receptive to the modula-
tions of its intellectual life. Kazin emphasises that modem literature in America is a literature 
of realism and that it owes both its existence and its moral outlook to an elementary struggle on 
the part of the classical American democratic ethos for its legitimacy in a democratic society 
rapidly discarding its traditional values. The literature of realism was primarily interested in 
salvaging the moral appeal of a specific political and social idea, namely democracy. 
Its outstanding feature, so Kazin argues, is its social conscience. Any purely aesthetic 
function for literature was only marginally considered. Writers were driven by their distrust of 
modem finance-capitalism and the formation of special interest groups in government. They held 
that these compromised the American citizen's democratic destiny, if not his constitutional 
rights. Realism in America, so Kazin concludes, was part of a political ethos: 
Populism represented the first great challenge to the modem era. Out of the suffering of the 
farmers who saw themselves cheated on every hand with the rise of monopoly capitalism streamed 
a new and aggressive political consciousness... without which the liberalism of the future would 
have foundered, and upon which its aggressive drive toward economic democracy had an incalcu-
lable influence.... But the significance of Populism to the slowly forming modem literature is that 
its protestantism helped partly to shape or to adumbrate the social thinking — the general and 
pervasive view of American life — in terms which many writers were to borrow as a matter of 
course .... But in a deeper sense the true importance of Populism is that it represented the slow 
groping into a new world, the persistent swelling nostalgia for the old, the hurtling passion without 
direction, that were to be so characteristic of the "new" American literature for years to come. 
What this means is not only that Populism molded the experience of many writers who came out 
of the Middle West, but also that the agrarian tradition of dissent in general was the first great 
force in the modem period to crystallize the over-all conception of a social order to which so 
many American writers were to feel alien. (NG, 30-1) 
The early — prairie — realists were spokesmen and activists for democracy rather than artists. 
What typifies this realism to Kazin is its courageous defence of the democratic idea amidst 
accumulating evidence of its erosion. It was precisely their sense that they were on a joint 
mission to combat a common enemy, he claims, which made their writing significant as a 
nationalist literature.' 
Realism in America was a focal point for those forces which aimed to rescue the idea of 
democracy from the social and political plutocracy. For this reason, Kazin argues, it was liable 
to develop a defective sense of reality. The realists' persistent antagonism to "the established 
order" caused them to adopt the reflexes of liberal politics as if by osmosis. That, as Kazin 
maintains, has been both the source of the vigour of American social literature in the early 
twentieth century as well as the reason for some of its anachronisms, because it relied upon an 
emotive, rather than intellectual, analysis of the state of modern democratic society. What this 
means to Kazin's attempt in On Native Grounds to write literary historiography as democratic 
evolution is suggested by Lionel Trilling in his introduction to The Liberal Imagination: 
If this is so, if between sentiments and ideas there is a natural connection so close as to amount 
to a kind of identity, then the connection between literature and politics will be seen as a very 
immediate one. And this will seem especially true if we do not intend the narrow but the wide 
sense of the word politics. It is the wide sense of the word that is nowadays forced upon us, for 
clearly it is no longer possible to think of politics except as the politics of culture, the organization 
of human life toward some end or other, toward the modification of sentiment, which is to say, 
the quality of human life. The word liberal is a word primarily of political import, but its political 
meaning defines itself by the quality of life it envisages, by the sentiments it desires to affirm. 
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Jules Chametzky maintains that On Native Grounds is "a critic's, and perhaps a whole decade's, 
effort to see American life and culture clear and whole from a liberal point of view and to 
become integrated with it." Kazin himself has repeatedly admitted that he was inspired by a 
cross-fertilization of literary radicalism and political liberalism. He claims that "intellectual 
insurgence and radical hope bedrocked my book," but he plays down any political overtones the 
book may have with the reminder that he had been overconfident of its relation to history. The 
Thirties were "those days of our easy radicalism before the war — and only the war — ended 
the Great Depression." Writing On Native Grounds had been possible because of the 
"unexpected intellectual assurance that floated my book home on the radical confidence of the 
1930s." In New York Jew, Kazin admits: "My book was building itself. The age was with 
me. 
Two considerations obtrude. First, there is the caesura between the historical faith expressed 
in On Native Grounds and the decay of Marxist scientific historicism. The aggression of 
international fascism under Mussolini, Franco, and Hitler had thrown progressive morale on the 
defensive, causing Paul John Eakin to observe that Starting Out in the Thirties derives much of 
the careful modulation of its conclusions from the realization that the spiritual premises of On 
Native Grounds were being sacked: "If the protagonist of Starting [who is the young man who 
wrote On Native Grounds] shares with its author a heightened sense of history, it is only the 
younger of the two Kazins who believes that history promises to redeem his personal and 
cultural condition." In 1962, Kazin confessed that contemporary reviews of On Native Grounds 
had made it "clear that the leftish idealism of the book, and its grand historical design, 
expressed the confidence of a period that had ended." With it, there had disappeared a sounding 
board for liberal sentiments in literature." 
Secondly, Kazin postulates a historical resolution to On Native Grounds: his book was 
"floated home." The word "home" is overtly symbolical, the reference being to a critical and 
historical narrative about the experience of alienation dominating the native literature. "Home" 
is the final stage of a telic evolution towards a comprehensive and tragic awareness of the 
reality of modern democracy. The main concern in the quest for "native grounds" is lining the 
experience of alienation. Kazin's argument that this may be achieved only through acceptance 
of an apparently hostile world, through a primary effort at empathie identification with it, 
updates D.H. Lawrence's classical analysis of a vital dilemma of nineteenth-century American 
literature. Lawrence had described the sense of nationality as the instinct for freedom merging 
with the need for some primary commitment to be asserted in exercising that freedom: 
Men are free when they are in a living homeland, not when they are straying and breaking away. 
Men are free when they are obeying some deep, inward voice of religious belief. Obeying from 
within. Men are free when they belong to a living, organic, believing community, active in 
fulfilling some unfulfilled, perhaps unrealized purpose. Not when they are escaping to some wild 
west.12 
Lawrence had been aware that the tragic dimensions inherent in the nationalist sentiment applied 
equally to liberalism. He was an anti-liberal. Kazin, however, aims to disengage literary 
expression from the political objectives of contemporary liberal opinion and cautions that 
liberalism has traditionally proved ineffectual vis-à-vis the experience of Darwinian mechanisms 
of modem American life. Liberal sentiments may usually have reflected the reflex psychology 
of Populist economic egalitarianism reacting against plutocratic domination. That was precisely 
why, as writers, the early realists and naturalists had been unaware of "fulfilling some unful-
filled, perhaps unrealized purpose." Kazin makes much of their failure to recognize that their 
social ethos, crudely defined as a protracted struggle to roll back the tide of modernity, blocked 
20 
a "fundamental belief in [art and a] conscious knowledge of what its responsibilities could 
mean" (NG, 33). What was generally forgotten in the atmosphere of social militancy was "the 
reality of a spiritual life" (NG, 34). The reconstruction of the social environment took preced-
ence over the cultivation of the spirit. The early American realists and naturalists had a limited 
conception of literature as a sociopolitical instrument and thus copied the typical misconceptions 
of contemporary liberalism in their treatment of American social reality. 
Coining Home to America 
On Native Grounds elicited considerable response. Reviews by Cleanth Brooks, Fred Dupee, and 
Granville Hicks in particular formed the keynote of its critical reception. Brooks marked the 
fuzziness of Kazin's nationalist concept, and charged that Kazin was "chary [of] first princi-
ples." He was eager to expose Kazin's dilemma, for he had himself been chided in On Native 
Grounds as having taken an overpositive stand on his 'native ground.' He resents Kazin's charge 
that he, Allen Tate and Donald Davidson had been involved in creating a cultural mythology of 
the South, and that this had made them "anti-democratic obscurantists." He turned the tables on 
Kazin and asked if Kazin himself was not committed to the recovery of a national mythology 
whose first stirrings in the course of the Thirties he traced with such evident enthusiasm? He 
charged that Kazin was being inconsistent when he dubbed Allen Tate's Stonewall Jackson "a 
literary apotheosis of the South" but wrote affectionately about Carl Sandburg's biography of 
Lincoln and V. W. Brooks's of Emerson. Brooks concluded that if the South he knew was a 
literary myth, then the "America" Kazin portrays in On Native Grounds is one, too.13 
Fred Dupee, who was then an editor at Partisan Review, expressed his doubts about On 
Native Grounds' thesis from the point of view of anti-Stalinist radical opinion. He criticized the 
historical rationale of Kazin's liberal outlook. Like the recent spate of affirmative cultural 
studies, particularly Van Wyck Brooks's, On Native Grounds was "occasionally guilty of... 
consolatory rhetoric and overdramatization." The book gave a strong impression of continuity 
and synthesis, obviously a placebo for the experience of disintegration and estrangement which 
Kazin spotted with so much assurance all over the history of modem writing in America. Dupee 
believes Kazin failed to furnish "an adequate basis for significant literature in our time, as Mr. 
Kazin's concluding chapter seems to imply." 
Indeed On Native Grounds is a triumph not so much of fundamental historical penetration as of 
a great good sense and good will. It is written in a generous spirit, which, I take it, Mr. Kazin 
conceives to be appropriate to the America that has always been celebrated today in connection 
with the War. But his shrewd and responsible critical faculty works to keep him from the radiant 
mysticism of many literary Jeffersonians. And thus he has achieved a kind of temperamental 
adjustment by virtue of which he, at least, need not feel himself a fugitive.14 
This view comes close to dismissing Kazin's thesis as a species of whistling in the dark. Of 
course, Dupee was voicing majority opinion at Partisan Review, which had only recently 
established itself as a forum for the independent radical Left: when, in 1937, the Communist 
Party sponsored the League of American Writers and laid claim to a historical affinity with the 
liberal heritage in national politics and letters, the break with the Communists had become 
inevitable. 
Granville Hicks' criticism of On Native Grounds actually restated the popular type of 
misconception liberals entertained about the relation of the literary experience to reality that 
Kazin sets out to correct. He wished Kazin "had looked more resolutely at the whole problem 
21 
of the writer's behavior in a diseased civilization," thus inviting him, however indirectly, to take 
a political view of things. He believed Kazin should have made the seriously defective frame-
work of American society the object of his "violent emotion[s]", and blamed him for putting "a 
blind faith... in the importance of literature."15 
A large section of independent radical opinion towards the end of the Thirties believed the 
question of nationalism was fraught with political meaning and Partisan Review quite 
predictably launched a symposium on what it was pleased to call the "Brooks-MacLeish thesis." 
It did so at a time, 1942, when patriotic sentiment ran high. It asserted its political and intellec-
tual identity by espousing vanguard notions of culture in an atmosphere of nationalism and war 
hysteria. Yet, as Stephen Longstaff has remarked, the questionnaire introducing the subject at 
hand typically overstated its case. Eliot, Trilling, Ransom, and Tate, among others, did not agree 
with Dwight Macdonald's representation of the cultural liabilities of the "new nationalism": 
Were the editors... not straining to uncover in the fulminations of some disgruntled rivals for 
literary priority the repression their Marxism had led them to expect? Perhaps they believed too 
implicitly in the idea that printing or otherwise encouraging avant-garde writing was ipso facto a 
revolutionary act... To others in any case Brooks's enormous stake in America's traditional literary 
culture was explanation enough for his animus against the avant-garde. They did not find it 
necessary to hypostasize him into a repressive demiurge.16 
Nor did Kazin. In fact, Christopher Lasch has observed that On Native Grounds "retains the 
best of Van Wyck Brooks" while it "remorselessly reveal [s]" the inadequacies of Brooks's views 
on a national cultural tradition. Indeed, Kazin considered the successive phases of Brooks's 
literary career symptomatic of the ideological orthodoxy which "the search for America" in 
modem literature was becoming identified with and which culminated in the "new nationalism" 
on the eve of the Forties. Unlike Partisan Review, however, Kazin argued that Brooks's 
approach of selective historical criticism revealed the dilemmas proper to an indigenous, native 
culture. He also noted that these were equally distinct in the entire liberal tradition of American 
social literature. For this reason, Kenneth Lynn ranks On Native Grounds with Perry Miller's 
The New England Mind (1939) and F.O. Matthiessen's American Renaissance (1941) as "the 
most concentrated moment" in the "era of rediscovery" in American literature. Lynn is more 
specific in a review oí Starting Out in the Thirties. There he maintains that Kazin's protagonist 
registers "a devastating sense of personal isolation": 
reading novels and going to newsreel theatres defined his relationship to the forces of history... 
With a truly Hawthomesque evasiveness, Kazin says it was during this period (1938-9) that he 
began work, at the instigation of Mark van Doren, on a book on modem American writing. No 
other motive for the creation of On Native Grounds is offered — and subsequent allusions to the 
book cast no light whatsoever on what was surely the most important intellectual and emotional 
commitment of Kazin's young life, involving the profoundest issues of personal and social 
identity. 
The "tragic vulnerability" of F.O. Matthiessen, Perry Miller, Newton Arvin and Van Wyck 
Brooks, so Lynn points out, may testify that the generation of rediscoverers of American 
literature, which began with Mencken and culminated in 1939-1942, was motivated by more 
than intellectual curiosity or literary taste. Lynn relies too explicitly on the power of allusion, 
but he does suggest some of the anxiety of an eagerly acculturating young second-generation 
Jew. He concludes that Starting Out in the Thirties is a poignant evocation of the alienation 
which Kazin experienced at the time of On Native Grounds's inception and which was also 
22 
afflicting the national consciousness itself. Yet, Kazin fails to tell us "how the dream of On 
Native Grounds originated in and drew sustenance from the desire to transcend that alienat-
ion."17 
Lynn's remarks reinforce Dupee's somewhat wry observation that in On Native Grounds 
Kazin achieved a "temperamental adjustment" absolving him from his fugitive experience as a 
Jew and a critic of American literature. A Partisan Review editorial associate, Dupee felt highly 
ambivalent about devising a national framework for cultural and literary affairs. Very soon after 
their break with Stalinist centralism, Philip Rahv and William Phillips, Partisan Review's 
principal editors, had decided that any tradition of independent, creative thought must necessar-
ily maintain a radical distance from political and cultural doctrine. Their cosmopolitan, intellec-
tual views compensated for the marginal role which their Jewishness, both as a "sentiment" and 
as a "cultural source", played in their conscious experience. By the latter half of the Thirties, 
Jewish intellectuals generally had begun to rise to prominence after an incubation period of 
several decades in emancipatory socialist movements, and it is therefore hardly surprising that 
they were now loath to give in to ethnic affirmation. Their bridge to America was their intellec-
tual and socio-cultural radicalism, not their ethnic experience as Jews. As Irving Howe put it: 
"They meant to declare themselves citizens of the world and, if that succeeded, might then 
become writers of this country."18 
By 1940, Partisan Review was still deeply committed to an internationalist orientation. The 
larger process of home-coming to America, of national rediscovery, among its contributors and 
readership was not to occur until after the war. When it occurred, it turned out to be a process 
of piecemeal realignment with the historical mainstream of the national culture rather than an 
unconditional acceptance. Anyway, Cold War politics dictated a shift away from the cosmop-
olitan, universal radicalism of anti-Stalinist origin in the direction of a rapprochement with 
America. 
On Native Grounds was an early statement of that process. While the older generation of 
Jewish intellectuals such as Rahv, Sidney Hook, and Morris Cohen stuck to their politically 
determined radical outlook of the Thirties, the second generation found the field of political 
radicalism virtually pre-empted and turned to the study of culture. Kazin was fed up with 
ideological position-taking, which he believed ill served a literature which had not been able to 
achieve a fixed identity for more than half a century. The consensus at Partisan Review, 
however, seems to have been that a literary-historical study such as On Native Grounds was 
premature and that it came suspiciously close to nationalist affirmation. The history of its 
reception at Partisan Review is recorded with much gusto by Norman Podhoretz: 
When Rahv, of the first generation [of New York intellectuals at Partisan Review], wrote about 
American literature... it was with the eye of the learned outsider. When the twenty-five-year-old 
Kazin, of the second generation, turned his amazingly precocious attention on the same subject in 
On Native Grounds, it was with the aggressive conviction that this literature was his... The story, 
in fact, is told of Kazin's extreme irritation with another member of the family (second genera-
tion) who once teased him about a phrase he had used in a piece on Parkman's Oregon Trail in 
Partisan Review: "Our forests, Alfred?" — which suggests that not everyone of the second 
generation, not even Kazin himself, had so assured a feeling of at-homeness in America. 
Podhoretz does not mention the teaser, but Schwartz's biographer James Atlas identifies him as 
Delmore Schwartz. Personally, Kazin minimized the significance of Schwartz's hostility to his 
book. His diary hints that Atlas's interest in the controversy was purely academic and far from 
elucidating. But Atlas had broached a vital issue and one which frayed a number of tempera-
ments in the early Forties. In a letter of February 11, 1943, to John Crowe Ransom, Schwartz 
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was explicit about his objections to On Native Grounds. He was then planning to review it and 
he faulted it on two grounds: 
I've accumulated ten cards of notes and want to do a thorough job because... the very fact that 
Kazin is so good, in some ways, makes it important that in admitting his critical giñs, his whole 
point of view be attacked as sharply as possible. The burden of his attack on you, Winters, Burke, 
etc., appears to be that it is infamous to analyze the structure of a poem. Yet there is no sign in 
his chapter on criticism between the poles [in On Native Grounds] that he has read the poetry of 
which the new criticism is an elucidation. But more than that, it seems to me that the success of 
the book is a sign that it is part of the New Philistinism, which of course always grows up in 
times of crisis, but which seems especially dangerous when it has the authority of someone like 
Van Wyck Brooks behind it." 
If Schwartz identified Kazin as "the chronicler of Jewish cultural ambition," he did so out of 
his own aggravated, ethnically bred, cultural insecurity. William Barrett, Schwartz's one-time 
friend and colleague at Partisan Review, claimed that "Delmore had the least grasp [of all young 
and upcoming writers around Partisan Review] on his own Jewishness — he knew neither how 
far out nor how deeply he was committed. And yet, perhaps for this reason, he was the most 
haunted by it." No doubt, such ambivalence about ethnic Jewishness helps to explain the 
conscious mythologizing on the part of many Jewish intellectuals and their anxious belief in the 
universal relevance of the experience of exile in the Diaspora. Schwartz's philosophical gifts and 
literary passion compensated for the erosion of Judaism as a cultural and religious tradition. His 
anxieties as a Jew, his fascination with the idea of exile as a permanent historical condition, 
were reflected in his early stories, which are trenchant evocations of the cultural pathos of 
Jewishness. Precisely Schwartz's combativeness and acrimoniousness with respect to orthodox 
Jewishness appealed to Kazin, and privately he affirmed the importance of "Delmore the agonist 
as my mythology."20 
The idea of agon, of existence as an ineluctable struggle for meaning and of life's inscrutable 
pattern to be gauged through the experience of catharsis, features prominently in On Native 
Grounds. In 1949, Richard Chase gave the name of "ordealist criticism" to this interest in the 
experience of suffering, impotence and estrangement. But he quotes Hawthorne, who was 
himself "the true essence of estrangement," to the effect that the artist "excels his fellows in 
nothing save the knack of expression." There is, he asserts, a viable field of study for the 
ordealist critic so long as he does not project hyperbolical versions of the artist as an estranged 
and aborted genius. The critic ought to evoke the nature of the artist's interaction with his 
cultural environment. Art focuses the larger cultural backdrop which the estranged artistic 
sensibility should become integrated with. Chase argued that the artist's ordeal must always lead 
to an enhanced sense of his cultural role. The ordealist critic is under an obligation to show the 
multiple cultural processes that feed artistic creation. He faults ordealist criticism on one point: 
The Ordealists speak of art as a cry of pain rather than as a moral utterance; and some of the 
weaker Ordealist epigoni have seized on the idea of estrangement in order to put art safely behind 
bars, where its moral consciousness cannot ask embarrassing questions about one's conduct, 
political and otherwise. 
Ordealism has probably outlived its time. The usefulness of such books as Kazin's On Native 
Grounds and [Newton] Arvin's Hawthorne, brilliant as both books were, is in the past. But 
Ordealism leaves a legacy we still very much need. 
The relation between "ordealist" criticism and Schwartz's antagonism to On Native Grounds is 
that Schwartz saw in Kazin's book a denial of the contemporary Jewish intellectual's effort to 
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find an alternative to his own troubled experience of ethnic and religious Jewishness. Schwartz 
considered Kazin's book a denial of the pretensions to cultural cosmopolitanism then fashionable 
among large segments of the Jewish intellectual class.21 
Schwartz raised the Jewish sense of outsiderdom to an intellectual virtue. Although his well-
to-do origins provide little enough of an explanation, he illustrated his generation's need to 
break away from the inbred experience of the ghetto as well as to declare themselves partisans 
of the radical sensibility of international, usually European, modernist culture. Irving Howe has 
observed that among Partisan Review writers "there was a conscious intent, not without touches 
of grandiosity, to capture the idea of Europe for America." The idea involved intellectual assent 
to the experience of cultural dislocation and the function of the avant-garde in this connection. 
It cut across On Native Grounds's objective. Kazin was highly doubtful about the historical role 
of the alienated avant-garde in American culture, whether literary or otherwise. In an interview 
with the author, he pointed out that it was the bolshevist arrogance of their intellectual style that 
made him train his guns, in Starting Out in the Thirties, on the Partisan critics. He described 
them as self-styled experts at the cultural psychology of the deradicalizing intelligentsia. Far 
from advocating a "Europeanization of American Literature" in the vein of the fledgeling 
Partisan Review — which was in effect their way of substituting the radical sensibility of 
literary modernism for their political deracination — Kazin looked for and found the experience 
of intellectual authenticity in his reading of American literature. It was through his critical 
appreciation of American writers that he sought to establish a continuity beyond the constricted 
scope of Brownsville, the neighbourhood where he grew up. On Native Grounds is an act of 
critical recovery, of repossessing an "America" from which the Jewish radical of the Thirties felt 
excluded. In "The Useful Critic" (1965), Kazin recreates the experience of discovery and of 
intellectual satisfaction that resulted from his inquiry: 
I fell in love with it because in a sense this literature was mine — I felt part of it and at home 
with it. I reacted with intellectual affection to the tone of certain American writers... I felt that I 
really understood them. I felt... authentic in my critical reactions to certain American writers.... I 
was at home with certain texts; I responded with intellectual kinship and pleasure. I knew the 
modulations of their language; I could see their landscapes. And very important indeed, I shared 
much of their belief in the ideal freedom and power of the self, in the political and social visions 
of radical democracy. I felt I had started from the same human base and was accompanying some 
writers to the same imaginative goal.22 
Kazin convinced himself that many American writers of the past had experienced cultural 
anxiety and entertained intellectual ambitions similar to his. In A Walker in the City, he con-
fessed to being attracted to the great "aliens" in nineteenth-century American literature such as 
Whitman and Dickinson. The national literature confirmed the Jewish literary radical seeking to 
outgrow his marginal relation to American culture, but does not use the motif of alienation in 
modem American literature to rationalize a radical stance. Arguably, On Native Grounds is the 
self-critical component of the larger movement of national self-discovery which occurred toward 
the end of the Thirties. In another sense, Kazin's evocation of his "authentic" response to 
American writing anticipated the post-war polemics about "authentic" Jewishness. Drawing so 
heavily on the interpreted historical design of American literature rather than on the intellectual 
radicalism of Jews in the Diaspora, Kazin's personal definition of authenticity may have 
reflected his later wish to be exempt from the postwar polemics about the Jewish identity. 
Kazin's reading of the native literary heritage established much more substantial links with a 
creative future than Irving Howe thinks was usual among their generation: 
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The automatic part of all my reading was history. The past, the past was great: anything Americ-
an, old, glazed, touched with dusk at the end of the nineteenth century, still smoldering with the 
fires lit by the industrial revolution, immediately set my mind dancing. The present was mean, the 
eighteenth century too Anglo-Saxon, too far away. Between them, in the light from the steerage 
ships waiting to discharge my parents onto the final shore, was the world of dusk, of iron, of 
gaslight, where, I thought, I would find my way to that fork in the road where all American lives 
cross.... 
I felt then that I had stood outside all that, that I would be alien forever, but that I could at 
least keep the trunk open by reading. And though I knew somewhere in myself that a Ryder, an 
Emily Dickinson, an Eakins, a Whitman, even that fierce-browed old German immigrant 
Roebling... were alien, too, alien in the deepest way, like my beloved Blake, my Yeshua, my 
Beethoven, my Newman — nevertheless I still thought of myself then as standing outside 
America. I read as if books would fill my every gap, legitimize my strange quest for the American 
past, remedy my every flaw, let me in at last into the great world that was anything just out of 
Brownsville.23 
Kazin's quest for "America" clearly reflects the need for a mythology of origins. He is 
looking to recreate the America that his parents confronted when they disembarked, separately, 
at New York around the turn of the century and significantly locates his roots outside the pale. 
To him, as Kenneth Lynn acutely observed, the question of a national cultural identity which he 
addresses in On Native Grounds legitimizes his own search for a social and intellectual identity. 
Its thesis of alienation articulates a highly personal need to relieve the experience of marginality 
through a sympathetic study of analogues in the literature of the post-Civil War era. Thus, the 
sense of estrangement and marginality reinforces the desire for integration. It is virtually an act 
of appropriating "the [American] past [which] was great" and so declare himself the custodian 
of the American tradition of self-realization.24 
The Uncertain Design: American Reality between Dreiser and Trilling 
Kazin's working hypothesis is that the nineteenth-century postbellum — Lewis Mumford's 
'Brown Decades' — was the formative era of modern American literary history. He thinks the 
culture of that period dramatized the transcendent power of the modern naturalist experience in 
America. Explaining to the Virginia Quarterly Review the tenor of an article slated for public-
ation, he said that the 1890s are central to "the political and esthetic significance of modern 
American thought and literature." Later on, he elaborated his view of laie nineteenth-century 
literature: 
one has a sense of new forces — of "fate" — taking over humanity at large. All the real books 
of the end of the century are really about this unconscious sense of tragedy on a universal scale, 
about a mass movement, like a vast sleepwalking, to a new destiny. One has a sense of a trem-
endous, half-understood involvement, of a radical change in the sense of life.25 
This is an unambiguous statement of the theme of alienation on native grounds. The Brown 
Decades witnessed a radical transformation of public life in America. This necessitated an 
equally drastic moral reorientation in order to cope with the experience of drift within a 
mechanistic universe. The interest in design shown by early naturalists such as Frank Norris and 
Stephen Crane, Kazin explains, did not reflect the Flaubertian tradition of the artist as moraliste 
so much as express the Zeitgeist. Design suggested constriction and denial, ruthless progress and 
the block universe. 
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Particularly in the writings of Crane, naturalism disclosed itself as a "grim finality of mind, 
in its way an astounding capacity for tragedy.... the surest thing one can say about Crane is that 
he cared not a jot which way the world went. No one was ever less the reforming mind" (NG, 
68). Kazin took his cue from Crane for some conceptual work: the classical expression of 
American naturalism is an abashed wonder before the majestic drama of a national destiny 
manifesting itself, however much molded in tragic circumstance. But he bristles at Crane's 
unrelieved fatalism. He notes that the realism of The Red Badge of Courage was remarkably 
deficient on the point of ethical values when compared to its reputed models, Stendhal's La 
Chartreuse de Parme and Tolstoy's War and Peace. These novelists had been concerned to 
present the experience of war as an initiation and an education. Nor did Crane, like Henry 
Barbusse after him, condemn the "morality of war" for its assault on the common man: "Crane's 
hero is Everyman, the symbol made flesh upon which war plays its havoc" (NG, 70). When 
Kazin dubs Crane "the first great tragic figure in the modern American generation" (NG, 72), 
he has in mind the general erosion of historical faith among writers of the late nineteenth 
century. Crane's aesthetics is a touchstone for Kazin's belief in the teleological aspect of the 
naturalist frame of mind: in 1950 he called Crane a "manipulator" of tragedies rather than a 
naturalist.26 
Kazin's diary entry for November 13, 1968, states his view of the relationship between the 
historical sense and the literary imagination: 
I am haunted by some master image, for I am writing history, and history can exist by dint of 
image. This is what it means to resurrect the past. The master image is of difficulty defined: of 
some complex radical novelty to [be] met: of the thinker's desperate need to think out the new 
situation. All images from the eighties are of crisis: i.e. is the human bean up to this? Can it 
define these new forces? And what will the outcome be like? 
Kazin wrote this passage in preparation for an article about Henry Adams. It addresses Adams's 
belief that the meaning of history consists in the ongoing attempt to give form to a disordered 
sensibility in retreat from the chaotic epistemology of the modem world. Only the creative mind 
may identify the redemptive patterns of history.27 By implication, the imagination becomes the 
antagonist of interpretations of history. Kazin was aware of this at the time of writing On Native 
Grounds and was aiming to enhance awareness of it. Kazin's principal objective in linking 
literature and history, however, is to suggest that the writer, as a maker of images ruling our 
sense of reality, may to some extent create the dimensions of America's historical destiny. 
Theodore Dreiser was a seminal figure in this connection, and Dreiser's early career formed 
"the battleground of naturalism in America." The history of Sister Carried publication testifies 
how reluctantly respectable literary opinion accepted the naturalist view of life and society. Yet, 
Kazin emphasises that Dreiser came to naturalism not out of admiration for its "continental" 
theory, like Norris, or as the literary equivalent of a sardonic temperament, like Crane, but 
because it was "his instinctive response to life." Precisely this marked him out as an authoritat-
ive interpreter of life and reality in America, untainted by the ulterior motives of other contem-
porary naturalists: 
For naturalism has always been divided between those who know its drab environment from 
personal experience, to whom writing is always a form of autobiographical discourse, and those 
who employ it as a literary idea.... Naturalism was the classicism of the nineteenth century. 
Flaubert, Zola, Stephen Crane, and Frank Norris were all suckled in the romantic tradition; they 
turned to naturalism to disown romantic expansiveness, lavishness of color, and the inherent belief 
that man is capable of molding his own destiny. To a Flaubert and a Stephen Crane the design 
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became all: it was the mark of fatality in human life rather than life as a seamless web of impon-
derable forces that interested them. (NG, 87-8) 
To Kazin, Dreiser's work is a compelling record of modem American experience. Dreiser was 
so intent on capturing his own experience and identified it so strongly with life in America that 
he virtually created it. He could not bear to see his work in a parasitic relationship to the 
experience of his own life: it was his life and his life displayed the randomness, the openness, 
and directness of reality in America itself: 
The cruelty and squalor of the life to which he was bom suggested the theme of existence; the 
partem of American life was identified as the figure of destiny. It was life, it was immemorial, it 
was palpable as hunger or the caprice of God. And Dreiser accepted it as the common victim of 
life accepts it, because he knows no other, because this one summons all his resources. (NG, 83) 
Here we see Kazin running the motifs of naturalism and nationalism seamlessly together. If, 
as he observes elsewhere in On Native Grounds, the new writing of the late nineteenth century 
became fixed in "a tradition of opposition against the established order" and rarely managed to 
see that an acceptance of that order must be the necessary first step toward creating a meaning-
ful life within it, then Dreiser was surely the great exception. Dreiser reflected the chaotic, 
massive burgeoning of the "new" America. The nation was in the process of making itself over. 
Established traditions, including the ethical and religious orthodoxy which had clung to tradi-
tional interpretations of America's exceptionalism, were disintegrating. Dreiser's was a lifetime 
of immigrant hardship, family instability, professional and sexual recklessness, and violent 
antipathy to religious dogma. He was a confirmed anti-supematuralist, himself seemingly the 
very negation of tradition. But Kazin argues that precisely for that reason he was the first artist 
to give a comprehensive view of the "new," secular America. For Dreiser impressed his 
contemporaries with his own sense of what "reality" in America was like. His point of view 
reflected the experience of an ever increasing majority of the American population who were, 
like him, outsiders to America's historical exceptionalism. Perhaps unwittingly, he transcended 
the pessimistic determinism which had become a fixture in the contemporary naturalist sensi-
bility. Dreiser finally freed the classical nineteenth-century American idea of society from its 
totally metaphysical cast. His work showed society as an autonomous character with an inde-
pendent psychology and replaced the classical American selfs solipsistic consciousness with the 
irreducible mechanisms of society. He, too, like Whitman, saw America as a faltering but 
majestic process of becoming. 
Kazin's affinity with Dreiser suggests the personal dimensions of the nationalist thesis of On 
Native Grounds. Since he would himself be trying to redefine the notion of cultural centrality, 
Kazin was to call Dreiser America's first great non-WASP writer and a distinct "exception to 
the American consensus." He must have identified strongly with Dreiser the writer, whom he 
considers a stalwart of the tradition of realism-naturalism and the classic embodiment of the 
issues that beset its emergence and triumph. In this respect, Kazin is quite untypical of the vast 
majority of Jewish literary intellectuals. Philip Rahv, for instance, argued in "Paleface and 
Redskin" (1939) that the national literature was currently "deficient in intellectual power," 
voicing the general feeling of ambivalence about it at Partisan Review. The demagogues of 
nativism pounced on the anti-intellectual, populist aspect of the redskin ethos and its mystical 
assertions of a national purpose to be achieved. Though far from promoting the cause of literary 
nationalism, Rahv found him an anti-traditionalist and a cultural liability. As an intellectual 
nonentity and deficient in articulate personal culture, he is liable to be picked up suddenly by 
the forces of the Zeitgeist only to be discarded by it with equal arbitrariness: "Lacking the 
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qualities of surprise and renewal, already Dreiser and Anderson, for example, have a 'period air' 
about them that makes a rereading of their work something of a critical chore." Conversely, 
Hawthorne, the typical paleface, had developed his characteristic qualities in response to the 
general dearth of experience in a retrenched, religious but still vigorously moralistic culture. He 
characteristically shunned the liberal-democratic, muscle-flexing demagogy of redskins. Ideas 
were his natural habitat. The paleface, so Rahv argued, could bring the staying power to 
American literature which it had so disastrously lacked since 1930. Only he took a holistic view 
of past, present and future. Of course, the timing illustrated Rahv's reservations about the 
revival of naturalism since 1930. In Rahv's analysis, the redskin-naturalist was proof of the 
disintegrative forces released by uncoordinated experience while the paleface-modernist might 
only be charged with a certain "fetishistic attitude to tradition," presumably a compensation for 
his queasiness about assertions of raw, untutored experience. Yet, Rahv was willing to exonerate 
him, because "the paleface, being above all a conscious individual, was frequently able to 
transcend or to deviate sharply from the norms of his group, and he is to be credited with most 
of the rigors and charms of the classic American books."28 One could argue that Rahv pro-
jected his experience of the intellectual satisfactions of modernist literature, and the protection 
it offered from the cultural shock troops of Stalinism, on the heritage of classic American 
literature. As a result, the writing of the redskin-naturalist variety was stigmatized as the 
medium of a false American mythology, not least because of its affinity with liberal radicalism. 
Rahv admired the paleface's tenacious intellectual independence vis-à-vis expressions of 
nationalist sentiment. The naturalist, he implied, was likely to confuse his indiscriminate taste 
for experience with evidence of its moral substance. Accordingly, Dreiser ranked very low in 
Rahv's estimation. 
More particularly, On Native Grounds defends Dreiser against the charges levelled at him by 
Lionel Trilling. Trilling's "Reality in America" (1940, 1946) argues that Dreiser epitomizes the 
shortcomings of liberalism in that he sanctioned virtually any transcription of experience, no 
matter how shambling or undisciplined, as proof of the libertarian-progressive genius of "reality" 
in America. Trilling's view of "reality" will be dealt with below; we are concerned here with 
the motives of Kazin's defence of Dreiser.29 
It is remarkable that Kazin should have portrayed Dreiser as a writer of experience rather 
than an imaginative artist. In Dreiser's case, he implies, the writer possessed "knowledge" which 
the man Dreiser never did. Assessing Dreiser's stature in 1955, Kazin points out that reading 
him hurts: 
It hurts because it is all too much like reality to be art. 
It is because we have all identified Dreiser's work with reality that... he has been for us not a 
writer like other writers, but a whole chapter of American life. From the very beginning... Dreiser 
was accepted as a whole new class, a tendency, a disturbing movement in American life, an 
eruption from below. The... dreaminess of his prose, the stilted but grim matter-of-fact of his 
method, which betrayed all the envy and wonder with which he looked at the great world outside 
— all this seemed to say that it was not art he worked with but knowledge, some secret and new 
knowledge.30 
Dreiser's perception of American social reality was so unsparing that it outraged traditional 
pieties about the state of the native democracy; nevertheless, he achieved an inclusive, 
Whitmanesque sense of nationality. Although Kazin deals circumspectly with the political 
implications of Dreiser's work, he treats him as a libertarian. Apparently, Dreiser captured the 
larger determinants of modern American social consciousness the implications of which the 
genteel mind would not face and which residual Puritanism had suppressed. Dreiser contributed 
immeasurably to the modern American's understanding of his environment. 
29 
Dreiser was a major exception to the liberal intellectuals of his day, the Progressives. They 
proposed large-scale programmes of political and social reform in order to bring the quality of 
American life in agreement with the promise held out by the classical rhetoric of American 
democracy. As early as 1942, Kazin had doubted the relevance of any political criticism of 
Dreiser, no matter if, as in Trilling's "Reality," such criticism promoted the cause of the "liberal 
imagination". He concedes, however, that Dreiser, as the witness of Darwinian social epic, failed 
to conduct his portrayal of social evolution in the spirit of moral discovery. Dreiser identified 
his own existence with the experience of Darwinism but he did not manage to project the 
"necessary future" as the product of the moral intelligence. Carrie's rise in the world is 
unaccompanied by moral or spiritual enlightenment. Similarly, Hurstwood's remorse does not 
prevent his downfall. 
There was stamped upon Dreiser from the first a sense of the necessity, the brutal and clumsy 
dispensation of fate, that imposed itself upon the weak. He hated something nameless, for nothing 
in his education had prepared him to select events and causes; he hated the paraphernalia of fate 
— ill luck, the shadowy and inscrutable pattern of things that ground effort into the dust. He did 
not rebel against it as one who knows what the evil is and how it may be destroyed; he was so 
overpowered by suffering that he came to see in it a universal principle. (Ms, 84) 
The Dreiser whom Kazin resurrects in On Native Grounds is not the purveyor of that slip-
shod liberalism which Lionel Trilling, in "Reality in America", attributed to both Dreiser and 
his aficionados. Trilling had taken exception to the latters' claim that Dreiser's faults "had 
always been those of America anyway." Liberal interpretations of contemporary American 
literature, so Trilling argued, had characteristically touted a militant and rather undiscriminating 
social realism and shown a proportionate distrust of the motivations of the mind in its perception 
of reality: 
[The] belief in the incompatibility of mind and reality is exemplified by the doctrinaire indulgence 
which liberal intellectuals have always displayed toward Theodore Dreiser, an indulgence which 
becomes the worthier of remark when it is contrasted with the liberal severity toward Henry 
James.... To James no quarter is given by American criticism in its political and liberal aspect. 
But... it treats Dreiser with the most sympathetic indulgence. Dreiser's literary faults, it gives us 
to understand, are essentially social and political virtues. 
Trilling traced the liberal mind's instrumental view of reality to the historical thinness of 
intellectual life in America, to "the fear of the intellect" first noted by Tocqueville. It diffused 
the moral and political relevance of James's discriminations. Trilling held liberalism responsible 
for the depressed status of ideas in the current literary ethos. 
In the American metaphysic, reality is always material reality, hard, resistant, unformed, impene-
trable, and unpleasant. And that mind alone is felt to be trustworthy which most resembles this 
reality by most nearly reproducing the sensations it affords.... Dreiser is to be forgiven because his 
faults are the sad, lovable, honorable faults of reality itself, or of America itself huge, inchoate, 
struggling toward expression, caught between the dream of raw power and the dream of morali-
ty.3' 
Trilling argued that any writer's style reflects the quality of his understanding of reality, hence 
Dreiser's enormities could hardly be said to furnish a representative picture of the majestic but 
occasionally wasteful and lumbering process of America's self-realization. One could argue that 
this way of representing things would, without any warrant, support the Communists' claim that 
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they alone, on the strength of the Marxist interpretation of the political economy, promoted the 
cause of radical, libertarian democracy in America. 
Kazin does not fault Dreiser for the quality of his ideas. He deflates the myth that Dreiser's 
home-baked philosophizing and his realistic method illustrated the invincible logic of Marxist 
social analysis. For one thing, Dreiser had never shown the slightest interest in dialectical 
materialism and his belated membership of the Communist Party in 1945 caused the Commu-
nists a good deal of embarrassment. On Native Grounds marks the transcendental and pro-
foundly non-political sources of his naturalism, albeit tentatively as yet. In the introduction to 
The Stature of Theodore Dreiser, Kazin grants that Trilling had quite justifiably addressed the 
"disregard of human complexity" in the liberals' understanding of Dreiser. He proceeds to note, 
however, that Dreiser's significance lies beyond liberalism: 
The basic mistake of all the liberal critics was to think that he could ever see this world as 
something to be ameliorated. They misjudged the source of Dreiser's strength. This is the point 
that David Brion Davis documents so well in his study of what Dreiser and the early naturalists 
really believed. For as Mr. Davis shows, these writers and painters were "naturalists" only in the 
stark sense that the world had suddenly come down on them divested of its supernatural sanctions. 
They were actually obsessed with the transcendental possibilities of this "real" world; like 
Whitman, they gloried in the beauty of the iron city. In their contemplative acceptance of this 
world, in their indifference to social reform, in their awe before life itself, they were actually not 
in the tradition of political "liberalism" but in that deeper American strain of metaphysical wonder 
which leads from the early pietists through Whitman to the first painters of the modem city. (NG, 
86) 
Trilling's condemnation of Dreiser had been off the mark. Trilling had asked liberal critics to 
consider seriously of what use Dreiser's "moral preoccupations" might possibly be vis-à-vis "the 
disasters that threaten us" when they had themselves been so blind to the uses of the Jamesian 
sensibility. Kazin counters that Dreiser's morality was not the point. His true importance was 
that he challenged contemporary radical-progressive social doctrine. Dreiser was not a 
reconstructionist in the current progressive and radical-experimental vein: as an imaginative 
artist he transcended the naturalist analysis of the modem world and its related sense of 
determinism.32 
Kazin and Trilling and the Culture of Liberalism 
On Native Grounds makes the transcendental aspect of Dreiser's work the cornerstone of the 
national sense in literature. 
To have accepted America as he has accepted it, to immerse oneself in something one can neither 
escape nor relinquish, to yield to what has been true and to yearn over what seemed inexorable, 
has been Dreiser's fate and the secret of his victory.... no other [writer] has affirmed so doggedly 
that life as America has symbolized it is what life really is. He has had what only Whitman in all 
the history of the American imagination had before him — the desire to give voice to the Manifest 
Destiny of the spirit, to preserve and to fulfill the bitter patriotism of doing what one knows. All 
the rest have been appendages to fate. (NG, 89-90) 
America's homecoming, the realization of a native identity, has very much borne the aspect of 
a tragic rite of passage. Dreiser was the first American writer to paint unflinchingly, and free 
from the strictures of any political or cultural ideology, a comprehensive picture of native 
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democratic reality. His work proved that democracy was the grand culmination of an idea, a 
reality greater than and independent from the individual consciousness. The transference from 
Dreiser's personal experience to the national has symbolical reference: in accepting his 
"American fate," Dreiser linked his own experience to the widening native consciousness. He 
captured the social logic of modem American society and the promise it held for citizens of 
average democratic aspirations. 
Kazin's championship of Dreiser in On Native Grounds is an argument against the experience 
of alienation and establishes the problem of "reality" in America as a teleological motif in the 
national literature. It also testifies that literary nationalism in America was incompatible with the 
intellectual culture of the radical anti-Stalinist avant-garde. Kazin does not subscribe to Trilling's 
serious allegation that the failure of liberalism is its belief that there exists "an opposition 
between reality and mind and that one must enlist oneself in the party of reality."33 
Trilling's view hinted at a major literary controversy. Partisan Review increasingly ques-
tioned the Communists' cultivation of social realism and a militant naturalism as the twin pillars 
of a Marxist reality and as instruments for the liberation and emancipation of the proletariat. The 
theory of proletarian literature, they held, had virtually been indistinct from the revolutionary 
objectives of Third Period Communism. When the Party switched to the Popular Front politics 
of anti-fascist democratic alignment, revolutionist theory was abandoned and proletarian 
literature subsided. Such pathetic proof of expendability convinced Rahv that naturalism had 
sold out to ideology and was now in decline. With the rational ideals of radical ideology being 
shattered by historical events, Rahv felt compelled to plead for a more inward sense of "reality," 
less apt to be reduced to postures of social militancy. Most of all, Rahv refuted scientific notions 
of reality and replaced these with James's insight that for the "real" to be relevant it must create 
the sense of "correspondence with life." Analyzing the significance of verisimilitude and 
determinism in naturalist writing, Rahv concluded that it is not 
primarily the means employed to establish verisimilitude that fix the naturalist imprint upon a 
work of fiction. A more conclusive test... is its treatment of the relation of character to backg-
round. I would classify as naturalistic that type of realism in which the individual is portrayed not 
merely as subordinate to his background but as wholly determined by it — that type of realism... 
in which the environment displaces its inhabitants in the role of the hero. Theodore Dreiser-
comes as close as any American writer to plotting the careers of his characters strictly within a 
determ ¡native process. 
Rahv did not deny naturalism a "moral content," but he claimed it was a "strictly functional 
morality" devoid of "any elements of gratuity or transcendence and devoid of personal 
freedom.... It also removes the possibility of a tragic resolution of experience." Rahv admitted 
that "Dreiser is still unsurpassed as far as American naturalism goes," but his assessment of 
Lewis, Farrell, and Dos Passos may suggest that these writers owed their ongoing relevance to 
their ability to compensate in some way for the reductive design of their basic naturalism. Most 
of all, naturalism in American writing was backsliding because it tended to take reality for 
granted. This meant that it had "lost the power to cope with the evergrowing element of the 
problematical in modern life [which is] magnetizing the imagination of the true artists of our 
epoch."34 
Rahv's early involvement with revolutionary Marxism had alerted him to its intellectual and 
cultural hazards. The proletarian writer, he concluded, was under an obligation to make reality 
conform to the specifications of revolutionary social theory. Naturalism apparently met that 
requirement by reducing reality to the logic of socioeconomic determination. Its present state of 
exhaustion, Rahv explained, illustrated the need for a more immediate grasp of the "creative 
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contradictions" of twentieth-century experience and the complications of modern consciousness. 
Kafka's work, if anything, had reflected this modern sense of an unstable reality. 
Rahv's argument about the status of reality in modem fiction interferes in several respects 
with Kazin's thesis of a national teleology in American literature. It supports Partisan Review's 
defence of the dissident, nonconformist outlook as a primary cultural value. I have noted 
Schwartz's impatience with the tentatively nationalist sentiment in some of Kazin's early critical 
writing, and I would argue that both Rahv's plea against naturalism and Schwartz's cautionary 
"Our forests, Alfred?" revealed their conviction of the virtues of cultivating a perspective from 
the margin. Intellectually, both had matured in an atmosphere of critical symbiosis with the 
radical political movement before they became dissidents. Their distrust of the nationalist 
sentiment in literature, provoked by the opportunistic political strategy of the Communist 
Popular Front, was magnified by the neo-populist nationalist mythologies which became the 
vogue by the end of the depression decade. They sought to defend the integrity of art and 
culture against the political needs of the moment. 
On Native Grounds, too, acknowledges the relevance of the liberal tradition to the national 
cultural consciousness. Its political faith shows in its refusal to believe that the radically 
dissociated modern sensibility may have deprived American liberalism of its classical medium, 
namely social reality. Arguing that the American writer must come to terms with that reality, 
Kazin puts a premium on the collective attempt at reconciliation by elevating it into a national 
teleology. On Native Grounds is literary history conducted in the spirit of moral discovery: it 
concerns the gradual realization of "reality" in America. Through its reluctance to fix on any 
absolute standard as a cultural norm, it avoids the gross simplifications committed by radical 
populists in their interpretation of American history. Officially sponsored by the Communist 
Party, these radicals preferred Walt Whitman to Emily Dickinson, Thomas Jefferson to 
Alexander Hamilton, Theodore Dreiser to Henry James, or Mark Twain and Jack London to 
David Graham Phillips. They cultivated a narrowly doctrinaire view of the radical implications 
of social realism and naturalism, and were blind to the motives of the literary sensibility. 
Nevertheless, Kazin perceives a viable relationship between the populist radicalism of the 
Thirties and the revival of cultural nationalism: "The 1930's were marked by two expressions 
of the same need: to recover America as an idea and to create a new society in the shell of the 
old."35 
Christopher Lasch, among others, has argued that "the search for native traditions of politics 
and culture" characteristic of the Thirties was in fact a resurgence of prewar "Progressivism and 
the progressive interpretation of history." In its heyday, he claims, it was a "minor industry." On 
Native Grounds is a product of this large-scale movement of cultural stock-taking. Its unique 
position — perhaps together with Perry Miller's The New England Mind (1939) and F.O. 
Matthiessen's American Renaissance (1941) — is that it embraces the cause of liberalism 
without resorting to cultural ideology. Miller and Matthiessen, too, consider the cultural flower-
ing of American democracy in a liberal political environment. Whereas Kazin explores the idea 
of democracy against the background of the crisis of liberalism, Miller places it against the 
historical backdrop of the opportunities for liberalism offered by a decaying religious autocracy. 
Matthiessen finds the most fertile expression of American liberal democracy in the works of 
Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Hawthorne and Melville. Kazin himself, too, was to explain that 
"the instinct for democracy... was at the heart of my subject." In part, he enjoyed the blessings 
of historical innocence, for he had not yet linked the contemporary disillusionment with radical 
politics to the illiberal opinions of such artists and thinkers as Eliot, Yeats, Pound, Santayana 
and Céline.36 
Trilling's case against liberalism — or rather his adjurations to it — is outlined in his 
response to Vernon Louis Parrington. He argued that "reality" in the radical theory of American 
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literature, presided over by the august historical dialectics of Parrington's Main Currents of 
American Thought (1927-1930), was a "limited and essentially arrogant conception." Parrington 
had professed a consuming passion for certain germinal ideas which he considered crucial to the 
emergence of radical democracy in America. Those ideas, more properly a theory of environ-
mental genesis, took '"the broad path of our political, economic and social development, rather 
than the narrower belletristic.'" Ipso facto, Parrington betrayed the Progressive's obsession with 
the linear evolution of populist, egalitarian democracy — which he conceived as simple, 
progressive, social and economic determinism — and his inadequacy before the modulations of 
the literary mind. Trilling notes that Parrington was at a loss to account for the difficulties of 
personality and of aesthetic motivation to be found in "'belletristic'" writing. Apparently, 
Parrington found America's democratic destiny more adequately secured by the history of 
progressive political morality and of economic reform than by literary perceptions: 
There exists, he believes, a thing called reality; it is one and immutable, it is wholly external, it 
is irreducible. Men's minds may waver, but reality is always reliable, always the same, always 
easily to be known. And the artist's relation to reality he conceives as a simple one.... It does not 
occur to Parrington that there is any other relation possible between the artist and reality than this 
passage of reality through the transparent artist; he meets evidence of imagination and creativeness 
with a settled hostility... which suggests that he regards them as the natural enemies of democracy. 
This absolute faith in a progressive reality, Trilling argued, created a polarity in literary matters. 
Thus, Parrington claims that Hawthorne was too much of a realist to respond favourably to the 
revolutionary Utopian fervour of the Concord transcendentalists he revered. Also Parrington's 
notion of "romanticism" exposed the fuzziness of his nomenclature: it designated either the 
laudable moral impulse to attack the "reality" of established interests, or, pejoratively, involved 
escapism, a turning away from the ineluctable facts of social existence. Trilling concluded that 
Parrington's progressive intellectual historiography reinforced the tendency among radicals of 
the Thirties to allow their "virtuous political and social opinions [to] do duty for 
percipience."37 All too often they denounced the aesthetic self-consciousness of Hawthorne's 
work, or Henry James's for that matter, as obscurantism, as a philosophical failure, if not 
political reaction. At the same time, they indulged in a species of ideological bigotry on the 
subject of Dreiser's realism, using this in support of their own liberal-democratic liberalism. 
Trilling made much of the double standard which liberals applied in their assessment of 
James and Dreiser. This juxtaposition, he declared, "is inevitable and it has at the present 
moment far more significance than the juxtaposition which once used to be made between James 
and Whitman." Actually, Trilling saw James's "moral mind, with its awareness of tragedy, 
irony, and multitudinous distinctions" complementing Whitman's "transcendental mind, with its 
passionate sense of the oneness of multiplicity." He stressed that "the difference between James 
and Dreiser is not of kind, for both men addressed themselves to virtually the same social and 
moral fact. The difference here is one of quality, and perhaps nothing is more typical of 
American liberalism than the way it has responded to the respective qualities of the two men." 
I have sketched the sequel of Trilling's argument above. Suffice it to say that Trilling thought 
the liberal mind was suffering from a schizophrenic reflex to certain types of moral imagination. 
The current reaction against James was to be wholly accounted for by the distrust extended to 
ideas — or "perception and knowledge" — in literature by "American intellectuals... when they 
are consciously being American or political." In summary, Trilling's article legitimised the 
writer as an intellectual and a moral arbiter. It was a pregnant reminder of the significance of 
ideas about, of ideas as, reality. He takes Dreiser to task not only for his stylistic ineptitude but 
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also for his philosophical vulgarity, which Trilling thinks was responsible for the populist streak 
in fashionable criticism of his work. 
This is the liberal criticism, in the direct line of Parrington, which establishes the social responsi-
bility of the writer and then goes on to say that, apart from his duty to resemble reality as much 
as possible, he is not really responsible for anything, not even for his ideas. The scope of reality 
being what it is, ideas are held to be mere "details," and, what is more, to be details which, if 
attended to, have the effect of diminishing reality. But ideals are different from ideas; [yet] in the 
liberal criticism which descends from Parrington ideals consort happily with reality — a 
"cherished goal" forbids that we stop to consider how we reach it, or if we may not destroy it in 
trying to reach it the wrong way.3' 
To a biased mind, Trilling's strictures would prove lethal if applied to On Native Grounds. 
Indeed, Granville Hicks noted that without Parrington's pioneering work in the field of liberal 
intellectual historiography Kazin would have had no thesis to work out. The "ideal" which 
Trilling saw in a mutually supporting relation with reality in Main Currents Hicks identified as 
the unanalyzed emotion determining the affirmative historical outlook of On Native Grounds. 
Yet, Kazin's theory of a telic movement in American writing is less arbitrary and historically 
more responsible than Hicks cared to find out. Trilling's review of On Native Grounds, too, 
suggests as much. He roundly acknowledged that the tragic sense is the nearest equivalent of the 
American writer's forced involvement with the harsh realities of his environment.39 
It might be argued that On Native Grounds touched a soft spot in Trilling's political con-
science. The 1929 Crash called a halt to the increasing erosion of social values in art due to 
artistic insularity and political indifference, and the social aspects of literature became subject 
to revaluation. Around this time, Trilling was contributing to the Menorah Journal, notable for 
its concern with the Jewish cultural community but resented by Trilling for its provincialism. I 
have observed that a Jewish ethnic sense was not much of a cultural or intellectual commodity 
during the Thirties: cultural ambition among large sections of the American-Jewish population 
was channelled into political radicalism, social realism and activism. Jewish intellectuals more 
readily identified with Eugene Debs and Leon Trotsky than with Maimonides and Hasidism. The 
mixture of big city experience and the libertarian outlook of secular radicalism proved a potent 
amalgam to many Jewish intellectuals. Trilling, too, admitted to his attraction to socially 
committed forms of experience and literature. In 1930, he published "The Promise of Realism" 
in the Memorah Journal. The essay argued the universality of the themes being explored by 
social realists: 
There is no person in the United States, save he be a member of the plutocratic class, who is not 
in a direct line with [the characters of two social novels under discussion], not one who is not 
tainted, little or much, with the madness of the bottom dog.... America must, by the conditions of 
its life, be committed to realism for a long time yet, for painful contact with environment will not 
soon cease, and we cannot in literature avoid the bases of our life. 
Trilling proceeded to note that the function of the realistic writer ought to be that of "the 
imaginative understander, the wise investigator, the angry revolutionist." This view augured the 
political atmosphere in which much of the radical writing of the Thirties would be conducted. 
There was as yet no trace of his later conversion to liberal criticism. Actually, his assertion that 
"America must... be committed to realism for a long time yet" sounds the tragic note that is also 
at the basis of On Native Grounds. I would suggest that Trilling's argument in "Reality in 
America" derived from this earlier position, which showed considerable similarity with Kazin's 
criticism of the liberal interpretation of reality in On Native Grounds. In accordance with the 
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radicalizing sentiment of the early Thirties, however, Trilling took a more combative view of the 
social significance of realism than Kazin was to do later on. He sponsored avant-gardist notions 
of the realist as activist. "The salvation of American art," he declared, "lies not in a greater 
rapprochement with the environment, but in its becoming dangerous and subversive to the social 
order."40 
To be sure, On Native Grounds was written from a historical vantage-point. Kazin had 
witnessed the debacle of Marxist radicalism in the Thirties and had seen art's "subversive" role 
perverted to rigidly leftist political doctrine. If Kazin locates "a tradition of enmity to the 
established order" in American literature, he also hints that, historically speaking, and with the 
crisis of the liberal intelligence more in evidence than ever, the question of overthrowing that 
order was no longer a viable option. Moreover, the Communists' shibboleth of party centralism 
in political and cultural affairs had merely put a synthetic liberal framework in the place of the 
native tradition of radicalism. To Kazin, however, the relevance of the contemporary historical 
sensibility to On Native Grounds was the urge '4o recover America as an idea and to create a 
new society in the shell of the old."41 This was a species of liberalism which significantly 
refrained from preaching the social revolution and sought instead to establish the moral rel-
evance of the — bourgeois cultural — past rather than to furnish a rationale for abolishing it. 
In the cultural situation of the late Thirties, marked by a tum toward the celebration of the 
national past, it was a rare intellectual virtue indeed to realize that a meaningful interpretation 
of the heritage of the past must not use that past in disparagement of present dilemmas. Yet, 
such one-way traffic nearly monopolized current historical interest. 
Kazin's interest in recapturing America "as an idea" and creating a new society "in the shell 
of the old" is therefore fundamentally at variance with Trilling's assertion in "Reality in 
America" that the American writer, particularly if he be of the liberal persuasion, has tended to 
limit his creative possibilities to the progressive, redemptive outlook of radical democracy in 
America. In Trilling's analysis, the liberal presumably tended to value experience sec for its 
instrumental value in the cause of libertarian radicalism. He wryly observed that Parrington's 
"ideals consort happily with reality": liberals equated reality, in its historical aspect, with the 
linear evolution of society brought about by progressive forces. Under the liberal aegis, the 
densely packed, indiscriminate catalogues of reality provided by naturalism actually confirmed 
the historical immanence of the ideal. Naturalism became compatible with progressive historical 
logic. A mere zest for accumulated experience seemed all that was required to bring in the 
millennium; the notion that experience might conflict with the ideal was never seriously 
engaged. If a writer did not sufficiently dramatize the heroic battle of progressive forces in 
America, he would likely be branded as an obscurantist. The liberal looked for the ideal to 
assert itself through objective historical processes rather than in the imaginative processes of the 
mind. Accordingly, Trilling's final indictment of Parrington runs as follows: 
Parrington's characteristic weakness as a historian is suggested by his title [Main Currents], for the 
culture of a nation is not truly figured in the image of a current. A culture is not a flow, nor even 
a confluence; the form of its existence is struggle, or at least debate — it is nothing if not a 
dialectic. And in any culture there are likely to be certain artists who contain a large part of the 
dialectic within themselves, their meaning and power lying in their contradictions; they contain 
within themselves... the very essence of the culture, and the sign of this is that they do not submit 
to serve the ends of any one ideological group or tendency. It is a significant circumstance of 
American culture, and one which is susceptible of explanation, that an unusually large proportion 
of its notable writers of the nineteenth century were such repositories of the dialectic of their times 
— they continued both the yes and no of their culture, and by that token they were prophetic of 
the future.42 
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It is not hard to detect in Trilling's view both a reaction against the cultural chauvinism of 
the Communist Popular Front and a defence of the intellectual life. His initial affinity with the 
anti-Communist radicalism of Partisan Review may account for this. Trilling believed that ideas 
were crucial in cultural formation: their relative dearth and inferiority in the twentieth century 
had sponsored a weak-kneed liberal culture which was but poorly equipped to deal with the 
complexities of experience, both historical and otherwise. Kazin argues that reality in America, 
contrary to what Trilling would assert, has been responsible for a "moral transformation of 
American life, thought, and manners" (NG, viii). From the 1880s onward, the American literary 
ethos had registered the violent social transitions and the rampant materialist ethic which had 
made "the culture Emerson represented seem... only a biblical antiworld to the world [the early 
realists] had to live in and master" (NG, 32). Modem American culture was preeminently a 
construct reflecting changes in the external environment. It was characterized by the objective 
fact of moral estrangement, of an entire culture suddenly being cut off from its traditional 
moorings. It was not ideas which had caused this revolution: Kazin, in fact, is out to show that 
the late nineteenth-century Populist ethos had no such sense of a constructive involvement with 
reality. It considered reality an affliction. To the early agrarian realists, no specific ideas could 
bring about their reconciliation with a hostile environment. A distrust of ideas dominated their 
conscious experience, because they felt generally abandoned by the hollow rhetoric of democ-
racy under finance capitalism. They determined the tendency among liberals up to the First 
World War to regard current reality as a corrupt fix. On Native Grounds emphasizes the nature 
and origins of its protestant outlook. A literature conceived in the act of social protest does not 
readily embrace ideas about reality: it aims to supplant reality with visions of the ideal. We may 
conclude, then, that at the basis of On Native Grounds is a view of the role of mind, and by 
implication of the liberal sentiment, in modern American literature which is fundamentally 
different from Trilling's. 
When, during the Fifties, the critic Richard Chase was making an inventory of current 
tendencies in American literary theory, he compared the implications of Trilling's and Kazin's 
views. Drawing heavily on Trilling's conception of culture as an ongoing debate and a dialecti-
cal process, he argued the relative superiority of the "dialectical" view of American literary 
history to the "realistic" approach. His objection to the "old realists" was that they furnished 
rather schematic interpretations of certain writers and thinkers in order to make the interests of 
persons and groups rather than complex, individualized ideas the backbone of the historical 
dialectic of American culture. They had found out to their surprise that Melville, for instance, 
or even Whitman, defied such pigeon-holing. Overall, however, they were right about the 
tendency of literary history in the twentieth century, for Chase proceeded to note a significant 
liability of "dialectical" historiography, namely the danger of "sequestering cultural contradic-
tions within the mind of this or that great author." This view, he pointed out, gave the impres-
sion that such contradictions no longer existed objectively, which would in fact render contem-
porary culture unresponsive to the discriminations of great artist-minds. The "old realists," on 
the other hand, saw cultural history in America as an orderly and consecutive subsidence of 
advocates-of-one-idea, as if history had properly prepared for their disappearance. This overt 
allusion to historical force majeure as a cultural agent clearly implies that, to Chase's mind, 
Kazin the historian employed the idea of history as morally progressive teleology. In other 
words, Kazin postulated the irreducible reality of historical evolution whereas Trilling preferred 
to look into the cultural implications of a certain hierarchy of ideas rather than their historical 
continuities. Chase observed: "This older account of our culture, as expressed, for instance, in 
Alfred Kazin's On Native Grounds, pictured our literary history as a more or less monolithic 
drive away from puritan superstition, provincialism, gentility, and romanticism, and towards 
realism and naturalism in literature and a free, secular and radically democratic culture." He 
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proceeded to note, however, that Kazin took an altogether too cheery view of wiping out the 
sources of bigotry and reaction in American literature. The cultural disharmonies expressed in 
American writing do not just fade away, Chase argued: they form an integral part of the 
dramatic texture of the artistic imagination. Faulkner, Hemingway, Eliot, O'Neill and Frost 
could not be understood without them. On the other hand, Chase finds the "dialectical" version 
of cultural historiography "conservative and genteel by instinct." Prone to neutralize cultural 
contradictions within the expressive forms of the individual artistic mind, the dialectical 
historians have had no clear evolutionary and evaluative framework to apply to cultural develop-
ment. They move in a "stifling" atmosphere sharply contrasting with "the vigorous, if often 
vague and rhetorical, spirit of the old radical realism." 
The too easy corollary to the new dialectical view is that since our great writers have from the 
beginning contained within themselves the contradictions of their culture, no fundamental change 
of taste and ideas has happened or can or should happen. The new dialecticians have lost sight 
entirely of the great, blunt truth which was all the old realists could see — namely, that despite 
every setback American literature has progressed since 1885 toward freedom, reality, and the 
assertion of radical democratic values.43 
Chase's analysis does not altogether do justice to the tragic concept of On Native Grounds, 
nor is it in tune with its critical reception. For one thing, Kazin himself cautions against 
"historical complacency" in the study of the national literature. He also criticizes its early 
marriage to liberal ideology, which virtually made it a mouthpiece of social and intellectual 
rebellion. As a consequence, the emergence of genuine literary consciousness in America has 
been a laborious and often retrogressive process. It got snagged in considerations of social and 
political morality, of pragmatic philosophy and economic theory. The liberal impulse of early 
modem writing in America turned it into social polemics rather than a medium for aesthetic 
perception. He is therefore not so unconditionally convinced of the future prospects for 
"freedom, reality, and... democratic values" as Chase would have us believe. 
On Native Grounds is hardly monolithic in conception. Yet, it espouses the "old realists'" 
moral commitment to progressive literary history. It believes that it was not so much "puritan 
superstition, provincialism, gentility and romanticism" as the pragmatic cast of native social 
protest that has kept American literature from its long awaited emancipation. In point of fact, 
Chase actually makes Kazin a little too much like Parrington, whose naively liberal-progressive 
view of culture comes in for a good deal of censure in On Native Grounds.™ 
Realism and Naturalism: Discovery and Moral Design 
We should note the relevance of realism and naturalism to the realistic mode of cultural 
historiography and keep in mind that On Native Grounds was conceived at a time when 
naturalism was rapidly falling into disrepute.45 Surely, this was owing to its usefulness during 
the Thirties to the objectives of proletarian literature, which dictated the mobilization of 
revolutionary social forces. In On Native Grounds, Kazin sets himself the task of salvaging the 
redemptive view of history from the contemporary decline of radicalism. Starting out from the 
assumption generally bome out by the end of the Thirties that five decades of realism and 
naturalism had not brought the "secular and radically democratic culture" Chase refers to, he 
points out that current conceptions of realism-naturalism need to be adapted, and its origins as 
well as its historical role reconsidered. He is particularly concerned to disentangle it from the 
liberal tradition of American politics. Kazin's hypothesis is that the imperatives of the political 
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mind or the assumptions of social science have rarely promoted the historical sense in literature. 
In an essay of key importance, written in 1963 for the newly launched New York Review of 
Books, he once more argued that realism "systematize[s] our literary ideas of the external world. 
Realism and the novel had the same roots in the 'modern,' sceptical thing-concerned instrumen-
talist world." Arguing against the current deflation of realism, he pointed out that "realism-
naturalism" was actually "a springboard to the creative imagination" because, in spite of the 
"felt lack of purpose in the universe that such doctrines announce," it actually proves the 
writer's supreme freedom to note certain facts and dramatize them according to his own idea 
about reality. Creating his own perspective of the world, the writer unlocks the world as "a 
single order of truth." "How can we believe," Kazin asked himself, "that Zola is a mechanism, 
that Zola is anything but a free and creative human being proud of having found his key to the 
mystery of nature and society?" Evidently, Kazin did not think that realism occupied the same 
space as "reality," that it was in fact the writer's slant on things and his particular dramatization 
of a felt truth. However hard it may be to believe this today, so Kazin asserted, realism has 
never been a morally indifferent view of life. It is a creed, a faith, which contradicts the 
experience of determinism.''6 
Kazin continues to detect such moral strategies at the basis of the realist and the naturalist 
views. On Native Grounds' historiographical and critical method departs from Trilling's views 
on the modem naturalist's disparagement of "ideas" about reality. When Kazin reviewed Jacques 
Maritain's Reflections on America, he commented on the peculiar interpénétration of idea and 
moral sentiment in American cultural history. He noted that American exceptionalism, as a 
historical vision with a marked doctrinaire component, has survived against overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary: "Historically, the obstinacy of America's faith in 'principles' has been 
staggering." Apparently, Maritain, a philosopher in the European Thomist tradition, felt strongly 
attracted to the idea of America. Kazin did not find this hard to understand: 
From the European point of view, there is something impossibly romantic, visionary, and finally 
outrageous about an attachment to political formulas that arose even before a European revol-
utionary democracy was bom with the French Revolution, and that have survived all the socialist 
utopias and internationals. Americans honestly insist on the equality of men even when they deny 
this equality in practice, and hold fast to romantic doctrines of perfectibility even when this 
contradicts their actual or their formal faith — whether it be as scientists or as orthodox Chris-
tians. 
For a Thomist to respond so favourably to America, Kazin argued, is proof that America's basis 
in moral and political philosophy has not been revolutionary so much as "doctrinal." If ideas 
become operative at all in the native context, they constantly revert to their root meaning: the 
Puritan conception of human nature, the Declaration of Independence, a Constitution "for all 
contingencies and for all time," the classical American literature about Man rather than men and 
Nature rather than actual society. "It is because America is still so much more real as an ideal 
than as a civilization that M. Maritain... understands it so well — and likes it." Yet, even if 
Maritain recognized that America represents an idea, he did not know what the idea was, just 
as little as Emerson and Lincoln did before him. He implied that this was because Americans 
are reluctant to give intellectual formulation to their "significant ideas," and so "allow them-
selves to be misrepresented abroad." But Kazin added that Maritain's demand for 
a more concrete national faith... overlooks the fact that the very abstractness of our intellectual 
tradition conspires against "ideas" — philosophy — in the European tradition. Writers and sages 
who have tried to give a dominant character to American intellectual life have always failed. The 
ideality of America as a promise is more important to Americans than any particular idea. 
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This accounts, among other things, for the tremendous attraction of the New Deal for European 
intellectuals. They regarded it as the product of a magisterial and interrelated body of moral 
doctrine and social and economic theory but were astonished to find that a revolutionary social 
movement could apparently do without any theoretical grounding. Kazin is clear about the 
reasons for such scarcity of intellectual conceptualization: for the New Deal to work, the 
national leaders decided they could do without any operational philosophy. 
Roosevelt, on once being asked for his social credo, replied with some irritation that he was a 
Christian and a Democrat. 
And certainly Roosevelt's own philosophy was not the New Deal. It was a faith that one might 
call "America": so was Emerson's, Lincoln's, John Dewey's. ... the American sages [have been] 
able to equate many contradictory principles with America. America, though it rests on an "idea," 
does not lead to ideas; it assimilates them. As it assimilated Emerson's radical Protestantism and 
Lincoln's mystical nationalism, so it may assimilate M. Maritain's Thomism. 
The trouble with America "as an idea" is that America's own national existence has become the 
idea — which means not merely that it can lead to no ideas at all, but to a habit of venerating as 
an idea what is merely part of our experience.''7 
The opposition between the ideal and the real in the American intellectual tradition continues 
in the literary tradition, and Chase's observations on the 'realistic' method in literary 
historiography confirm this. It underlies the evolutionary philosophy of On Native Grounds, 
while Trilling's dialectical historiography, as Chase observed, tends to immobilize historical 
currents in literature. For one thing, if the cultural contradictions expressed by the great writers 
of the nineteenth century were indeed prophetic of the future, history would be confined within 
the limits of a few powerful minds. History would come down to a piecemeal and consecutive 
realization of their creative insights, and then grow static. This view minimizes the vital role of 
the extra-literary environment, and would involve denying the objective historical conditions of 
the most salient feature of modem American writing, namely "our alienation on native grounds," 
because the creative mind would absorb the experience of alienation and give it back as a 
literary idea. It would, moreover, perpetuate the notion that the cultural situation which nour-
ished Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Hawthorne and Melville reflected historical universals and 
that all further historical development would result in cultural homogenization. 
Literature and the National Purpose 
The writers of the mid-nineteenth-century flowering had confidently dramatized their minds as 
the ultimate gauge of reality. They believed that reality reflected the actualization of their own 
moral genius. To Kazin, it is a point of historical and critical interest that this quality of 
imagination was virtually absent from the literature after 1880. Moral and psychic secession 
from the industrial-commercial ethic made clear that the quality of modern life might be grasped 
only on the basis of a totally different metaphysics. The modern writer's alienation from his 
society had become an objective fact of his existence. In the literature after 1880, there is an 
overwhelming sense that modem reality no longer bears this "personal stamp." Yet, Chase 
declared that the "old realists" in literary historiography, and Kazin foremost among them, have 
caught on to "the great, blunt truth ... that despite every setback American literature has 
progressed since 1885 toward freedom, reality, and the assertion of radical democratic values." 
Unlike the dialectical historiographers, who speak of sequestering cultural contradictions within 
one and the same artistic mind, Kazin emphasizes the significance of the historical sense in 
literature. On Native Grounds dramatizes literary history as a series of individual failures, as 
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necessary failures which may be explained only when they are seen as partial approximations 
to a higher synthesis, a more durable integration transcending the historical afflictions of the 
modern literary sensibility in America. This synthesis operates within a nationalist framework. 
In its historical aspect, it generates a teleological motif, more particularly the image of the 
emergence of modem literary consciousness as an ordeal. It presupposes the existence of a 
unified, indigenous, organic experience. Hence the tragic context of recovering America, of 
restoring it to its heritage of radical democratic principles, which Kazin thinks has been the 
enduring motif of modem literature. 
Elucidating the telic development of modem literature, Kazin quotes Fitzgerald on the 
tragedy of writership in America: there are "no second acts" to American literary lives. The 
defeats which he spots in the great majority of modem artistic careers indicate that cultivating 
the historical sense is an essential requirement for literary survival. Kazin agrees with Fitzgerald 
that no one has as yet mustered "the necessary sensibility to what it has meant to be a modem 
writer in America at all" (NG, x). And still every literary generation in America, starting with 
the early realists, has tended to render its interpretations of reality with an absolutism which 
suggests that it would settle for no less than a definitive solution. Even so, initial impressions 
of reality in America have had a habit of paling rapidly. The hypothetical "second acts," which 
might have thrown light on the dilemmas typically facing the American writer, depend for their 
success on the ability of later generations to carry on the spiritual idiom of their forebears and 
so affirm a tradition. Kazin believes that the considerable record of individual artistic "failures" 
is proof of the historical tragedy of literary consciousness in America. A viable national 
literature involves a continuing process of evaluating and repossessing the achievements of the 
past. Kazin emphasizes that a notable lack of sympathy between literary generations has 
prevented this sense of continuity, of a tradition to pursue. American writers did not generally 
recognize their predecessors' achievements as the earlier stage in the fulfillment of a historical 
task, nor did they wish to acknowledge any indebtedness to them. They rather avoided starting 
from the same basis and became partisans of a cause all their own. They regarded the past itself 
as a conspiracy against the cause of free literary expression in the present. Thus, the usability 
of the past implied its partial and selective destruction in the present. 
Kazin's effort to define a comprehensive morale from American literary history struck 
several contemporary commentators as an arbitrary formulation of the relationship between 
history and morality. Cleanth Brooks, as we have seen, found Kazin "chary of first principles" 
and doubted the centrality of the radical tradition of liberalism which Kazin apparently associ-
ated with the democratic good faith of Van Wyck Brooks's The Life of Emerson and Carl 
Sandburg's massive biography of Lincoln. Similarly, Frederick Dupee suggested that On Native 
Grounds implied an "overdramatization of our literary history." A later commentator, Solomon 
Fishman, also complained that Kazin's thesis on the "homogeneity" of American writing since 
1870 required rectification.48 Delmore Schwartz's reservations have been dealt with above. 
Allegedly, Kazin too confidently identified the hypothetical telism of American writing with 
"freedom, reality, and the assertion of radical democratic values." It seems to me, though, that 
the book's final chapter rather doubts that these will be realized. On Native Grounds is narrative 
discourse identifying vital premises of an as yet unanalyzed continuity in modem American 
literature. There is another aspect that would argue its teleological purpose: mitigating the 
isolation of literary generations in America. Their "parricidal" impulse had been noted as early 
as Lewis Mumford's The Golden Day (1926). A decade earlier, however, The Seven Arts had 
sanctioned a rigorously discontinuous reading of the literary past and dismissed most of it as 
unrelated to the exigencies of the current situation. The assertion of a teleological principle in 
literature, however, aims to see the achievement of every literary generation and of every 
individual writer in the light of a continued effort and common purpose. The question Kazin 
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phrases is: given the crisis of the liberal mind and the violent fluctuations of the American 
literary experience, what features of our literary past ought we to consider vital to the future we 
aspire to? Could the contradictions of the modem literary experience in America be construed 
as the conflicting emphases of one and the same historical evolution towards a pluralist ethos in 
literary thought? Kazin suggests as much in Starting Out in the Thirties, when he declares that 
the revolutionary social consciousness of the new naturalist writers of the Thirties served to 
"retain what was vital in the great books of the Twenties and direct it towards a more hopeful 
outlook, a fraternal society.... What young writers of the Thirties wanted was to... show that our 
radical strength could carry on the experimental impulse of modern literature." The statement 
conveys an elegiac tone, however, which suggests that Kazin in 1965 did not doubt that such 
aspirations had never been fulfilled. Paul John Eakin claims that the predominantly elegiac note 
of Starting Out in the Thirties is a structural and stylistic feature intended to dramatize the 
erosion of the exalted historical faith that marks On Native Grounds: 
Starting is the story of a young man's entry into the world counterpointed against the disintegra-
tion of the world he was entering, for the future of On Native Grounds was an illusion. Even as 
he pursued the writing of the book in Provincetown in the summer of 1940... its spiritual premises 
were being sacked by history.... The revolutionary faith in "the great transformation" to be brought 
about by heroic writers working in tune with the spirit of the age was the greatest single casualty 
of the war. 
The conflict between the redemptive and the deterministic conceptions of history that provides 
the dramatic structure of Starting Out in the Thirties ends in a draw with the respective climaxes, 
the publication of On Native Grounds and the Holocaust, occurring off-stage. [Sitting in a 
newsreel theatre watching bulldozers prepare a mass grave for victims of the Destruction, Kazin 
realized that] his alienation from the audience and that of both together from history was overw-
helming. Literary radicalism was dead.49 
At any rate, On Native Grounds aims to lift the native experience to the level of collective 
consciousness. Its troubled affirmations of historical faith form the backbone of this attempt. 
Kazin would persuade us that only through self-knowledge do we secure the future, and that 
redemption will come once we have settled the dilemmas of our formative history. He believes 
that a "significant experience in national self-discovery" (NG, 485) stimulated contemporary 
revaluations of the cultural past. The past itself could boast renewed interest at a time of 
impending crisis and advanced social disintegration: "In the world after 1932, where everything 
seemed to be breaking up at once, the American had at first neither a sense of history nor the 
consolation of traditional values" (NG, 364). This renewed preoccupation with the past was a 
plausible reflex for a people in crisis who barely a decade before, at the time of Warren 
Harding's "normalcy," had still been totally neglectful of the past and trusted that a prosperous 
society can afford to dispense with the historical sense. What this movement in national 
rediscovery came up with was something altogether beyond the conventional rhetoric of 
America's uniqueness: starting in an inventory of losses sustained, it proclaimed the last 
remaining outposts of a native tradition of decisive historical significance. Kazin captures the 
evolution of that awareness: it "began by reporting the ravages of the depression and ended by 
reporting on the national inheritance" (NG, 487). 
By his own account, Kazin the historian did not feel so far removed in 1938 from the spirit 
of insurgent liberalism around 1912. The resurgent historiographical interest of the late Thirties, 
however, differs in some respects from the pre-War Progressive attitude to the past. A.H. 
Jones's "The Search for a Usable Past in the New Deal Era" signalizes some factors the deeper 
implications of which, however, are more adequately commented on by Henry F. May, Richard 
Hofstadter, Charles Crowe, and Paul F. Bourke. Also Christopher Lasch has examined the 
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liberal nationalism of the Thirties in the light of the revisionist historicism of the Progressive 
movement prior to the First World War. Jones argues that the progressive Young Intellectuals 
of 1910-17 compensated for the felt lack of a sustaining and central cultural tradition by 
creating a version of their own. According to Van Wyck Brooks, rewriting the past could 
produce a "usable" tradition. That "usableness" would typically establish the American 
environment's proverbial hostility to the independent life of the mind. Brooks was quick to sniff 
out the all-pervading tragedy in a series of aborted nineteenth-century literary careers and 
invariably pointed the same moral, namely that the past outlines the pathology of the literary life 
in modern America. The paradox was that the greater the failure of the past, the more convinc-
ingly the cultural promise of the present could be held up as the beginning of a historical 
emancipation. Jones emphasizes that the generation of Brooks, Bourne, Mumford, Waldo Frank, 
and Harold Steams 
wrote in a time of buoyant optimism and hope. They were missionaries preaching the gospel of 
art, prophets pointing the way to cultural salvation. In that crusade, the use of the past was largely 
negative: history represented something to transcend.... To discover and illuminate the historic 
barriers to innovation and accomplishment, in social life as well as art, became one of their 
tasks.... the Young Radicals sought to leam from the abortive experiences of their artistic fore-
fathers how to avoid compromise, frustration and defeat in literature.50 
And yet Brooks failed to connect his simplified version of the literary past to the present: his 
"reading of history, like that of the other Young Intellectuals, was cursory — designed primarily 
to justify a preconceived indictment of the present." Kazin stresses the urgent need for roots in 
the contemporary situation. He notes sympathetically that the new nationalism 
was a pervasive force, a new historic consciousness that gave new meaning to contemporary 
experience and thought... [In the revealing] effort of so many American writers to seek out the 
reality of America in a time of crisis, is an authentic and curiously unconscious characterization 
of a tragic period.... Here, in this body of writing, is evidence of how deeply felt was the urge 
bom of the crisis to recover America as an idea — and perhaps only thus to build a better society 
in the shell of the old; only thus to prepare a literature worthy of it. (NG, 488-9) 
Kazin is also vividly aware, however, that this historical interest often resulted in the creation 
of clearly synthetic traditions and ignored the complexity of the contemporary literary situation. 
On Native Grounds is a convincing argument against selective approaches to the past. 
Kazin links the guiding spirit of the national cultural inventory going on during the late 
Thirties to the dearth of philosophy, of political ideology, which marked the New Deal, itself 
a process of enormous social gestation. It was a historical inquiry "in which the sense of 
movement and of perpetual search was always more dynamic than any conception of the ends 
toward which it moved" (NG, 492). Even the figure of Roosevelt himself suggested the 
"malleability [which] was the focus of the great national experience under the New Deal" (NG, 
492-3) rather than active leadership. Although the public mind established a heroic historical 
background to relieve its sense of cultural disorientation in the present, Kazin does not think the 
New Deal was the source of the national faith. Looking back in 1959, he claims that whatever 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. thinks it symbolized, the New Deal was neither the expression of a 
political idea, nor did it provide a national, or even an intellectual, tradition. In a later article, 
Kazin reveals that to him and his fellow liberal intellectuals who grew up during the Thirties, 
particularly Richard Hofstadter, the New Deal was fascinating because its leading executive was: 
"Our only real criticism of the New Deal, indeed our only basic interpretation of it, rested on 
our fine-spun Jamesian analysis of, our love-hate relationship with, the man [Roosevelt]." In 
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other words, Kazin and his friends conceived of "the greatest movement of social advance in our 
history" in terms of the ambiguities and intricacies of personality. Ideas, historical theory, or 
political ideology, were distinctly ancillary. Thus, a vital stage in American social history turned 
out to have been determined by a "public personality" under construction.51 
Like his comments on Maritain, Kazin's assessment of the New Deal argues that American 
intellectual traditions have rarely determined the tendency of American history. The American 
ethos was presumably not susceptible to the motivations of intellectual analysis; it thrived on 
images of immanence, promise, and desire instead. To Kazin, Roosevelt's political "pragmatism" 
seems to be justified by modern society's betrayal of the classically hopeful American outlook. 
When, in On Native Grounds, he deals with the recurrent attempt in American historiography 
to recover "America" as a universal, libertarian principle, he marshals abundant evidence of 
proliferating cultural, social, and political pluralism challenging idealist historicism. Failure to 
acknowledge such pluralism and understand it is what he identifies as the cause of the 
American's shaky historical awareness. He believes that American historians have tended "to 
overvalue single traditions as such but to overlook the beauty of history itself..."52 
Progressivism versus the Inner History: Van Wyck Brooks, Beard, Parrington, Dewey 
I have argued that On Native Grounds belongs to the cultural movement which, towards the end 
of the Thirties, attempted a critical "rediscovery" of America. In New York Jew, Kazin admits 
that, while writing the book, he lived in "a state of scholarly innocence, of unexpected intellec-
tual assurance that floated my book home on the radical confidence of the 1930s." In "The 
Critic as Creator," he hints of having had "a great tradition to call on," but he adds that this 
sense of literature as the carrier of positive moral convictions is apparently becoming rare. In 
fact, the essay seeks to "restore consciousness" of such a tradition: "It seems clear to me that 
those of us who started in the twenties and thirties had a certain advantage. We came in at a 
time when it still seemed natural to relate literature and the arts to history, to the traditional past 
and the necessary future."53 
On Native Grounds's concept of tradition involves repossessing the past through a concerted 
effort at critical reintcrpretation. Kazin believes the critic is the trustee of transmitted values and 
builds an image of "the necessary future" from them. He insists on an organic relation between 
the literary past, writing in the present, and future literary effort. Particularly when Kazin comes 
to determine his position vis-à-vis the heritage of The Seven Arts, which cultivated a highly 
selective view of the relations between the past and the present, we can see that this conviction 
becomes the corner-stone of his criticism of them. There exist obvious similarities between On 
Native Grounds and The Seven Arts, but Kazin's effort is to assimilate and transcend the 
achievements of the prewar social critics rather than to identify with them. 
The Seven Arts critics held that certain environmental factors had exacerbated the extremes 
of the national psychology, and they had consequently set about removing these in order to give 
full reign to the creative spirit in America and so realize its cultural "Promise". The thesis of 
American cultural promise also informs On Native Grounds, though in a highly modulated form. 
Kazin conceives of that promise in terms of the continuous and progressive revelation of the 
American moral identity. He summons the American writer "to take up his destiny on native 
grounds." There is in On Native Grounds nothing of The Seven Arts' tendency to reconstruct 
current social experience in the image of the reputedly organic society of pre-Civil War days, 
which Van Wyck Brooks in particular considered an absolute condition for a healthy literary 
culture. Kazin carefully avoids using the health-and-sickness imagery which Brooks raised to a 
structural device in literary criticism and which induced him to regard present literary practice 
44 
as an adulteration of the superior standards of the past. This is precisely why, in the light of 
Brooks's swiftly deepening alienation from contemporary writing, the appearance of On Native 
Grounds was so timely. For Kazin sees modem literary tradition as a complex moral utterance 
reflecting a comprehensive response to native circumstances, and requiring an integration of "all 
the many different factors, the rhythms of growth, the subtle effects of our American landscape, 
the necessary sensibility to what it has meant to be a modem writer in America at all" (NG, x). 
But it remains for us to find out in which respects On Native Grounds retains, in Lasch's 
phrase, "the best of Van Wyck Brooks". 
Kazin's interest in the naturalist mode of historiography diverges from the kind of radical-
democratic hagiography popular in the late Thirties. In the wake of Beard's rigorously 
"economic interpretation" of history and Parrington's simplified account of the heroic survival 
of democratic ideas there had emerged a kind of cultural chauvinism which expediently located 
its heroes there where the anti-democratic forces were most in evidence. Such forces were 
commonly identified with centralized government and economic plutocracy. Richard 
Hofstadter's critical account of progressive historiography in The American Political Tradition 
argued that it had laid the foundations for the synthetic nationalism of the Thirties. Christopher 
Lasch has made cogent remarks about this transition: 
The most curious aspect of this degeneration of a once critical tradition of thought into a form of 
cultural nationalism is that it occurred under left-wing auspices. The emergence of the Popular 
Front in 1935 and the Communist Party's reassuring announcement that communism could be 
regarded as "twentieth-century Americanism" had given the signal for the repatriation of a 
generation of alienated intellectuals. Aestheticism, anti-Americanism, and the cultivation of the 
inner life went abruptly out of fashion along with the superrevolutionism of "third-period" 
communism, which had dismissed the reform tradition in the United States as petty bourgeois 
reaction and the New Deal as incipient fascism. Progressivism and the progressive interpretation 
of history underwent a revival, and the search for native traditions of politics and culture became 
a minor industry. 
Van Wyck Brooks, formerly an astringent critic of American culture, embarked on his 
nostalgic evocations of the nineteenth century in Makers and Finders. The debunking biographical 
essays of the Twenties and early Thirties gave way to filiopietistic commemorations of popular 
heroes — Sandburg's Lincoln, Van Doren's Franklin, Freeman's Lee — in which the sheer 
accumulation of empirical detail served to lull readers into an acquiescent, appreciative mood." 
On Native Grounds, too, is concerned with the formulation of a native tradition, but it displays 
none of the progressive characteristics of contemporary nationalistic sentiment, whether 
filiopietistic or politically oriented. As I have mentioned, it insists on the vital difference 
between tradition as the "usable past" and tradition as the past made to bear on the present. To 
Kazin, modem American literary history resists any claims for a monolithic progressive tradi-
tion. The use of tradition as he envisions it is not to promote any arbitrary sampling from the 
past in order to meet the exigencies of the present. It is rather to detect a principle of continuity, 
a progressive order of understanding, in the accumulated experience of the past and so to 
understand the present. 
In view of the cross-fertilization between the progressive historiography of the first decades 
of this century and the rigged-up neopopulist cultural tradition of the late Thirties, Kazin's 
account in On Native Grounds of the era that saw the rise of Progressivism, the cultural 
flowering during the Little Renaissance, and the impact of The Seven Arts, is central to his 
thesis. It involves a radical criticism of the intellectual and spiritual culture of Progressivism, 
and hence it quarrels with the entire heritage of the Little Renaissance. Kazin begins his account 
of Progressivism with an analysis of some central insights of radical scientific scholarship 
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around the tum of the century and how firmly these ideas and philosophies established them-
selves in the contemporary literary mind. He winds up portraying the shattering defeat of the 
Progressive ideal in the figure of Randolph Boume. 
Kazin specifically rejects the discontinuous historical perspective cultivated by Progressivism. 
Parrington, Beard, Carl Becker, and Frederick Jackson Turner had argued that a heroically 
embattled popular democracy formed the backbone of American history. To them, America's 
constitutional foundations and the pervasive sense of newness and possibility that comes with 
an ever expanding world gave maximum scope to the national faith in a linear and progressive 
history. The mechanical optimism about the national culture conveyed by Progressive 
historiography, however, was fair game for a later generation of cultural critics gathering around 
Partisan Review. Lasch typifies their remoteness from contemporary progressive ideology as 
follows: "Not only the superficiality of progressivism but the radical discontinuity of American 
culture, it seemed to these writers, derived from the ceaseless search for beginnings of which the 
frontier had provided the most durable set of images — the flight from complexity, the flight 
from the past, the belief that the past is an encumbrance that can painlessly be discarded in the 
restless search for a better future."55 
Lasch's description may clarify Kazin's strictures against the Progressive mind. In his chapter 
on "Some Insurgent Scholars," Kazin looks into the central assumptions of Progressivism. 
Arguably, the essay on Veblen serves as a prolegomenon as well as a resolution to his overall 
study of Progressive scholarship, for he calls him "an alien twice over" (NG, 133), meaning that 
in excoriating an aggressive money culture Veblen had found preciously little in the national life 
worth preserving and cultivating. Veblen used all his analytical powers to explain the current 
shambles of American capitalism but he could formulate no viable alternative. Criticizing the 
most conspicuous failures of American life, he lost sight of its potential. To Kazin, Veblen 
illustrates why so many naturalists eventually proved ineffectual. Veblen highlights Dreiser's 
ability to distil a transcendent ethic from a seemingly all-determined world, the contrast between 
them clarifying Kazin's drive for "acceptance" of the world of material conditions. 
[Veblen] was a naturalist, a more tragic-minded and finely conscious spirit than any American 
novelist of the naturalist generation; his final view of life was of an insane mechanism, of a 
perpetual and fruitless struggle between man and the forces that destroy him. Yet though he had 
what Dreiser and Crane and Norris seemed to lack, he was not their equal as an artist. He knew 
the rationale of everything where Dreiser, for example, has known only how to identify all life 
with the poignant gracelessness of his own mind; but he did not have the ultimate humility or 
enjoy the necessary peace. Veblen was an alien to the end... (NG, 141) 
The theme of alienation asserts itself here. What ailed Veblen was that he had not made 
America his home. Imaginatively, he had failed to repossess America. 
After this introduction, Kazin's argument about Progressivism quickly proceeds to a con-
clusion. He recalls the popularity of Dewey's philosophy of pragmatism during the heyday of 
the Progressive intellectual movement, from 1910 till 1917. Dewey "gave the Randolph Boume 
generation its symbolic values — constructive activity, a new conception of experience, intelli-
gence at work" (NG, 142). Kazin virtually echoes Brooks's earlier criticism of Dewey as a 
prophet without light or vision. His assessment of the socially constructive properties of "the 
poetic view of life," however, is different from Brooks's. Brooks resented pragmatism because 
it had attempted to "fill the place that only a national poetry can adequately fill."56 It had 
elevated the values of instrumental science over the poetic values that sustain great moral vision. 
Kazin, however, finds that Dewey missed the ironies central to American cultural history and 
even suggests that his reputation rested on a prodigious misinterpretation of the nature of 
experience itself. Dewey's advocacy of instrumental intelligence had raised false expectations 
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of a society smoothly operated by the experimental intelligence. Modelling social life after the 
interactions observable in classroom experiments, he gave the impression that the tremendous 
instrumental potential of ordinary experience could be activated at will. Under Dewey's aus-
pices, so Kazin argues, the road towards the social commonwealth and the highest forms of 
creative development appeared miraculously unobstructed. It was this aspect about the philos-
ophy of pragmatism which appealed to the contemporary literary imagination. The muckrake 
novel and the literature of social exposé were clearly formed in its spirit. They assumed that 
with the elimination of a few remaining, minor faults in the operational management of society 
the moral beauty of human nature in America would be fully released. 
Dewey's mind... could admit evil only as a problem, a hurdle to be overcome; never as a clue to 
man and his experience in nature. We begin to live, Yeats once wrote, when we have conceived 
life as tragedy.... 
Breaking with the past, the younger insurgents went to Dewey for fundamental values. But in 
a sense he had none; he had a principle of creative energy. (NG, 146) 
This need to break with the past illustrated Dewey's and his followers' reluctance to acknowl-
edge the tragic view of life. They considered the past a distinct element of complication in the 
process of constructing a progressive concept of reality. The past signified the closed universe 
of determinism; the present, by contrast, suggested possibility and promise of renewal. 
Again, we ought to realize that Kazin's assessment of Dewey's achievement, and of liberal 
Progressivism generally, reflects the cultural situation at the time of writing On Native Grounds. 
Since the Popular Front espoused native traditions in politics and culture, Kazin is interested to 
see if the heritage of Progressivism could function as a valuable resource in a cultural atmos-
phere characterized by the synthetic traditionalism of populist radicals. "Reality" in the Thirties, 
symbolised by the social crisis, had reduced Deweyan instrumentalism to a fair-weather philoso-
phy. On the brink of another world war, a philosophy which proclaimed every society "its own 
Messiah [and] every man... his own liberator" inevitably revealed its limitations. Kazin gravely 
notes that Dewey's views were "appropriate and moving doctrine for a society untouched by 
war, not to say Fascism" (NG, 145). In this respect, he builds on Bourne's vehement criticism 
of Dewey when the latter came out in support of war involvement in 1917. Yet, he does not 
specify Bourne as a redemptive figure on the contemporary intellectual scene. Bourne's militant 
defence of his generation's radical values, which he saw jeopardized by Dewey's exclusive 
concern with the experimental life, presumably did not protect him from compromising the 
integrity of experience either. Kazin believes Bourne's social philosophy was consistent with the 
liberal-progressive outlook: "It was only a faith equal to Dewey's own that could have made for 
so profound a disillusionment" (NG, 147). Bourne had no adequate conception of the tragedy of 
the literary life in America. 
The sources of Bourne's faith gradually become clear when Kazin evaluates the school of 
Progressive historiography headed by Charles Beard. Like Dewey's conception of the experi-
mental life, the Progressive view of history was based on the national aptitude for idealist 
historicism. Dewey's instrumentalism took a sceptical view of the fixed mould of past experi-
ence, while Beard saw it largely determined by the conservative ideological and economic 
interests which he claimed had been written into the American Constitution. Both perspectives 
encouraged a basic distrust of the past, much as if it were a counter-principle to America's 
cultural "promise." They created a radical image of American reality as inherently progressive. 
Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913) claimed that the national 
legislature had since its inception been dominated by powerful material interests. An Economic 
Interpretation became a key document in the liberal-progressive criticism of the American 
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governmental system and its resistance to democratic control. On Beard's authority, Progressives 
came to think of the Constitution as the symbol of the tenacious materialism which they held 
wholly responsible for the persistent flaws marring the American democratic experiment. 
An Economic Interpretation was presented as a "work of realism"; it was a compelling 
dramatic narrative, expressing Beard's conception of "reality." Beard's "realism," as Kazin 
affirms, satisfied a profound literary instinct, since his view of economic determinism as a 
decisive historical factor stimulated contemporary intellectuals and writers to think of the 
experience of the past as the product of easily identifiable ideological oppositions and conflict-
ing materialist interests. Assuming that the radical promise of America lay buried under the 
somewhat soiled aspect of current reality, they gravitated towards a monolithic interpretation of 
the past. Evidence of promise was to be found throughout the national history, they claimed, 
only in a more or less adulterated state. With the marked contemporary trend toward monopoly 
in the economic life, Progressives held that reform, more specifically anti-trust legislation, 
sufficed to restore the conditions for healthy economic competition and hence bring about 
America's august democratic future. They were generally more interested in the reconstruction 
of public morality and the social life than in studying the complex motivations and resources of 
the mind. 
Kazin believes that Vernon Louis Parrington fostered a similar, monocausal perspective on 
American intellectual history. Parrington traced the triumphant history of Jeffersonian liberalism 
through its various stages of decline and re-emergence. He sponsored radical intellectual and 
political libertarianism as the main tradition in American culture. Kazin points out that his 
historiographical method, like Beard's, was marked by a need for rigorous and dramatic 
symmetry. As in Beard's case, so with Parrington the interpretation of history satisfied a 
distinct, though crude, aesthetic need. This historical bias resulted in a tendentious reading of 
both the quality of historical experience and the sense of current "reality." Parrington's predi-
lection for revolutionary traditions in American history actually veiled a desire to see the cause 
of libertarianism and radical democracy triumph in the present. His historiographical method and 
his literary evaluations were tailored to that end. His crass literary judgements proved to what 
extent the Progressive conception of "reality" interfered with the growth of the tragic sense 
which Kazin thinks indispensable to modem literature, and suggested how it monopolized the 
contemporary imagination. As an intellectual and spiritual culture, Progressivism mistakenly 
believed it could furnish the 
year of 1913... with... a new conception of Manifest Destiny based upon the Declaration of 
Independence and the New Freedom to guide insurgents. There were new tools to work with, new 
forces everywhere... ; but above all there was the Progressive creed in whose light one could read 
all American history as a conflict between two sets of ideas.... In that spirit one could conceive a 
new history of American thought and even reinterpret the intellectual past in the light of the 
convenient Progressive dualism and the radiant Progressive future.... At bottom it was 
[presumably] only political and economic struggles that had divided American life between them, 
and they alone illuminated the drift and significance of the American experience.... Parrington was 
a significant force, but he proved again how slowly men have had to leam in America and how 
always on one plane; how they could gather a few insights generation by generation, live on the 
periphery of one moral and intellectual revolution after another, and finally build their creative 
understanding on fragments. (NG, 154, 160, 164) 
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Building Bridges: Richard Hofstadtcr and On Native Grounds 
The section on Progressive historiography in On Native Grounds was in fact an early statement 
of a new mode in American historiography which gained currency during the Forties and Fifties. 
This movement criticized the simplifications of the Progressive view of history, whose aftermath 
reached straight into the ideological wars of the Thirties, when, as could be expected, 
Parrington's work enjoyed its greatest popularity ever. There is, for instance, a significant 
resemblance between Kazin's book and Richard Hofstadter's The American Political Tradition 
(1948). Christopher Lasch has pointed out the similarity between Hofstadter's point of view and 
Kazin's critical sensibility. Lasch's observations are quite legitimate, since both men were 
intimately acquainted with each other's work. They had conducted their preparatory research for 
their books at the same table in the New York Public Library Reading Room in the late Thirties, 
and had frequently rushed over to some Fifth Avenue lunch-counter to thresh out an argument 
over a sober meal. "It is possible to see The American Political Tradition... as an attempt to do 
for the study of American politics something of what Kazin had done for literary history. Both 
books place the problem of American traditions at the center of attention... but instead of 
celebrating these traditions, in the manner of progressive and neopopulist historians, they 
remorselessly reveal their inadequacies." Lasch adds that both Kazin and Hofstadter were highly 
critical of their predecessors — some commentators have even spoken of Hofstadter's 
"parricidal" estrangement from the progressive historians — yet "absorbed whatever was 
valuable in their work." Arguably, On Native Grounds memorialized Van Wyck Brooks, just as 
Hofstadter continued to draw inspiration from Beard.57 
All of Hofstadter's historiographical work criticizes the simplified Progressive conception of 
American history as "a continuing conflict between antagonistic forms of property... between the 
people and 'the interests'." He was motivated by intellectual disgust over Parrington's Main 
Currents and Charles and Mary Beard's The Rise of American Civilization (1927). In the radical 
Thirties, these works had catered to the growing populist clamour for a heroic national tradition 
in democratic thought. Lasch notes that this populist rooting for a tradition had by that time lost 
every vestige of critical respectability and that it had become 
identified with a resurgence in American cultural chauvinism, a tiresome celebration of the 
American past— its indigenous traditions of popular radicalism, the crude vitality of its popular 
culture, and the national regeneration allegedly in progress under the New Deal. The progressive 
interpretation of American history... had helped to bring into being a "literature of hero-worship 
and national self-congratulation," which it was one of the stated purposes of The American 
Political Tradition to deflate.58 
In "But What Is an American?," an essay with a polemical cast similar to Hofstadter's 
political historiography, Kazin, too, dismissed the recent drift towards national orthodoxy. He 
condemns the intolerance arising from the search for a normative, native literary morality, for 
a "true north in our moral history." Like Hofstadter, he recognized that the Progressive concep-
tion of national traditions provided the groundwork for the political and cultural demagogy of 
the Thirties. They detected in the Progressive mentality a marked ambivalence toward the idea 
of cultural pluralism. They also sensed that the policy of constructing a "usable past" had 
produced clearly politicized accounts of American cultural history. The very concept of the 
"usable past," they pointed out, involved an image of the past designed primarily to support the 
claims of current political ideology. They distrusted the intellectual calibre of a tradition which 
would "use" rather than assimilate the past.59 
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Taking his stand against the Progressives' mythified image of the past, Hofstadter cultivated 
an interest in paradox, anomaly, opportunism, mental and political compromise, and self-
delusion as historical agents. He created a picture of historical "reality" that savoured none of 
the legendary quality imparted to it by the Progressives and neopopulists. Thus, he showed his 
affinity with Partisan Review's budding interest in the modemist literary sensibility. That, too, 
constituted an answer to the presumptions of an aggressive political and cultural monolith, 
namely Stalinism. Hofstadter carefully avoided using the past as the source of a national 
mythology. In the introduction to The American Political Tradition, he simply stated that he had 
no desire to add to an already abundant literature of self-glorification.60 
The Old View: Van Wyck Brooks 
Nor did Kazin. Like Hofstadter in the political field, he seeks to clarify the moral significance 
of ambivalence, complexity, and pluralism in American literary history. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that he should have taken issue with Van Wyck Brooks. And rather than support 
Lasch's view that Kazin retains the best of Van Wyck Brooks, I would suggest that his orienta-
tion on Brooks involves a complicated process of assimilation, not simply of "using," and 
transcendence. 
Kazin admires the early Brooks as a luminous and useful critical intelligence and an authentic 
moral voice. He particularly values Brooks's concern with the esthetic ideal "as a symbol of the 
creative mind" (NG, 179): 
Brooks gave his generation not only a more felicitous rendering of the first principles in which 
they already believed, but the suggestion of a faith to fight for... he summoned writers eloquently, 
as only a prewar critic could have done, to a new task based upon a national need.... A new 
possessiveness was needed, a new development of artistic personality in America; and it was to 
be a possessiveness not of things and wealth, but of the spirit. (NG, 181) 
Kazin admits that Brooks's programme of social reconstruction was a significant contribution 
to the revaluation of the literary life in America. In order to stress the urgency of his pro-
gramme, however, Brooks painted a melodramatic picture of the American artist's fate in a 
money-grabbing environment. Thus he aided the notion that the creative mind in America led 
a fugitive existence and asserted itself only intermittently and feebly, if at all. Consequently, 
Brooks's forays into American literary history yielded a sentimentalized picture of the artist 
irrevocably at odds with the boisterous and morally pragmatic native culture caught in the cash 
nexus. Brooks saw a deep chasm between the primary values of the fulfilled literary life and the 
current mediocrity of the native culture. The effect of this was to reintroduce into literature the 
issue of cultural determinism which contemporary Progressives like Walter Lippmann and 
Herbert Croly eagerly tried to dispose of. 
Initially, Brooks's criticism reflected the Progressive's familiar revisionist attitude to the past. 
He tried to identify those features of the American environment responsible for the dissociated 
extremes of high moral principle and a pragmatic interest in material arrangements wrecking the 
social life. This produced an overschematized typology of the national psychology. Prime 
symbols in it, he asserted, were the Puritan, the pioneer, and the businessman. The literary mind 
in America had become polarised, capable of identifying only those elements which militated 
against the poetic realization and socialization of American life. Brooks believed he could fuse 
these elements in a "middle" tradition. Yet, Kazin believes Brooks's synthesis excluded other 
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indigenous aspects of experience which had made American literature and culture what they 
were. He points out that even in America's Coming-of-Age, Brooks had evinced 
a certain want of toughness and humor that blinded him to the human imponderables that lay 
beyond theory. It was all very well for Brooks to break sharply with the past and to reveal how 
little the nineteenth-century writers had served their twentieth-century descendants, but what was 
that "certain richness" lacking in American literature? What did it mean to American literature in 
terms of a frontier humor which Europe had not known, or a coonskin democracy, or Western 
agrarianism, or sectional differences? (NG, 182) 
Kazin's point is that Brooks's interpretation of the native literary psychology coincided on major 
points with the Progressive theory of history. Taking current cultural deficiency for granted, he 
was quick to spot failure in the past. 
The result was a set of mutually reinforcing, intellectual assumptions about the protracted 
latency of America's cultural promise. The exact nature and scope of that promise was never 
clear to Brooks; he merely kept reiterating the need for "a certain density, a certain weight and 
richness, a certain poignancy, a 'something far more deeply interfused.'" He managed to find 
but scant evidence of that quality in the American literary past. With severe reservations, he 
could only think of Emerson, Whitman, Thoreau, and with even more difficulty of Melville, as 
suitable literary models. Actually, his fascination with the European scene celebrated an organic 
cultural environment which America presumably lacked, and Kazin exposes Brooks's defeating 
habit of comparing everything at home with "an absolute standard of European achievement" 
(NG, 181). Brooks had a distorted view of American cultural development; he misunderstood 
the quality of American culture. 
Kazin very much doubts whether Brooks's concern with a prophetic literary morality to 
leaven the culturally deprived native environment had the intended results. He argues that 
Brooks stigmatized life in America as a drag on the realization of the accomplished poetic 
personality. In fact, Brooks denied the possibility of mature imaginative experience in America; 
more particularly, he rejected the notion that post-Civil War writing proved the emergence of 
a different, modern culture. Kazin claims that literature in America, which he agrees with 
Brooks has as yet insufficiently cultivated its own poetic soil, will assert its centrality to the 
national life once it is taken for granted that the creative life must be rooted in acceptance of the 
environment — historical, moral, social, and literary — and cannot persist in the attitude of 
militancy, rejection and escape. It is for the imagination to transcend the terms of ordinary life 
and so realize its potentiality and seek a home within it. Kazin believes this reflects a process 
of moral initiation. He calls modern American writing a troubled literature of "realism and 
realization [my emphasis]" (NG, 518). 
Actually, the history of Brooks's critical views indicates that his theory of literature and 
society had from the beginning involved an unresolved antithesis between creative autonomy 
and "artistic subjugation to environment." Kazin emphasises Brooks's view that the artist is both 
the mouthpiece of America's unique cultural destiny and its catalyst, by using the obstetrical 
function of cultural criticism. Brooks's own performance in midwifery had been to identify, in 
America's Coming-of-Age, those writers whose work was a progressive and critical commentary 
on the state of society. Because he took a dualist view of the relations that persist between art 
and society, his choice was predictable. He extolled Whitman as the fount of the affirmative 
view of American life which Brooks himself promoted as the corner-stone of a national tradition 
in letters. Significantly, though, Whitman had managed to cultivate that affirmative stance only 
because he possessed "the rudiments of a middle tradition" and synthesized the cultural contra-
dictions of his time. Brooks detected in him the beginnings of a "national consciousness," an 
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indispensable ingredient of the literary and cultural nationalism he proposed in The Seven Arts. 
Like several of his colleagues at The Seven Arts, Brooks believed that Whitman was the most 
complete embodiment of the artist's dual role: he both absorbed and moulded his environment. 
Whitman's genius was to have avoided the "high-brow" and "low-brow" varieties of American 
experience which in numerous cases, apparently, had been responsible for the stunted and 
anaemic quality of the creative life in America, characterized by crude moral pragmatism 
alternating with preciousness of the intellectual experience. 
Brooks's intransigent pursuit of a "middle" region of experience between the extremes of 
acquisitiveness and abstract idealism, Kazin notes, sentimentalized the notion of a supportive 
cultural environment and stressed the fatefulness of the writing profession in America. This 
became evident when, after the War, the idea of America's cultural promise evaporated and 
Brooks increasingly expounded his environmental thesis in terms of "pessimistic 
determinism."61 His belief that the affirmative poetic personality could accomplish a trans-
formation of the existing social order foundered on the evidence of literature being increasingly 
divided between the mimetic and parodie modes of the new realists on the one hand and the 
socially atomised consciousness of the modernists on the other. To his mind, the writer had 
either taken a pragmatic attitude to prevailing social mores, and abandoned the task of moral 
leadership, like Dreiser, or, as in the case of the modernist, exiled himself from society. The 
writer's classical, dual capacity as both interpreter and moulder of a collective consciousness had 
disintegrated. Apparently, the War had eliminated the last vestiges of an organic culture in 
America. The promise of a creative social commonwealth had withered; to Brooks, the only 
usable tradition in the national culture now lay sealed off in the literature of the nineteenth-
century antebellum. 
Christopher Lasch has noted that On Native Grounds confronts "the problem of American 
traditions." This is obviously what Kazin does when dealing with Brooks's cultural analysis and 
the related conception of a "usable past." As Parrington had been concerned to recover the 
tradition of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian radical democracy and to dramatize its opposition to the 
conservative strains in the political life which became dominant after the Civil War, so the ideas 
which Brooks, and the critics of The Seven Arts generally, had about literature prompted them, 
too, to dismiss the literature of the immediate past almost wholesale as evidence of the prag-
matic acquiescence of the creative mind. In the Progressive mind, tradition itself became an 
extremely relativistic concept. Brooks, for one, emphasized the wasteland aspect about the 
cultural present in proportion to the perfect faith with which he anticipated the resurgence of the 
classical, transcendentalist literary personality as the cure for contemporary literature. Kazin 
sketches the effects of this attitude on the literary sensibility: 
when the First World War was over, Brooks's complaint against life in America became everyt-
hing; his summons to action was forgotten, as he himself had to forget it. What happened then 
was that all that was weakest and most humorless in Brooks's thought became the staple of the 
new disillusionment. Where he had decried the past, some of his followers now merely wept over 
it; where he had summoned them to "spiritual pioneering", they now all thought of themselves as 
a race of Amiels, Symondses, and Henry Jameses — victims and magnificent failures. (NG, 182-
3) 
To Kazin, Brooks's early work typifies the prewar liberal-progressive view of reality. He 
concedes that Brooks performed a notable service so long as he kept the creative potential of the 
life of the spirit firmly in mind; however, Brooks in the last instance was pessimistic about the 
possibilities for the spiritual education of America. He pounced on a limited set of symbols 
delineating the alleged causes of the polarities of American life. He also traced this dissociation 
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to the native literature, which either isolated itself from reality in America and its "ensnaring 
materialism" or patched up the most fulsome compromises with it. 
Compared to many prewar liberals, Brooks was working under a handicap: he could not find 
'greatness' to serve as a cultural ideal in his own day and age. He lost himself in oracular 
pronouncements on the cultural importance of a prophetic tradition in literature. Certain docu-
ments of the American literary past offered the highest promise of cultural integration and 
constituted veritable beacons to the deprived cultural atmosphere of the present. Yet, he believed 
even the examples of Emerson and Whitman had tended to exacerbate certain contradictions in 
the native culture. They offered but the tenuous beginnings of a heroic tradition in literature. 
Brooks clinched the implications of his views in America's Coming-of-Age, in "On Creating A 
Usable Past". He reasoned that America's protracted cultural latency 
result[s] largely, I think, from another condition that is, in part at least, remediable. The present 
is a void, and the American writer floats in that void because the past that survives in the common 
mind of the present is a past without living value. But is this the only possible past? If we need 
another past so badly, is it inconceivable that we might discover one, that we might even invent 
one? ... What... ought we to elect to remember? The more personally we answer this question... 
the more likely we are to get a vital order out of the anarchy of the present. For the impersonal 
way of answering it has been at least in part responsible for this anarchy, by severing the warm 
artery that ought to lead from the present back into the past.62 
It is clear that Brooks saw the past predominantly in the light of present exigencies and, 
conversely, that his hypothesis of an ideal enshrined in the past wrote off much of the culture 
of the present. His views epitomised the liberal-progressive, revisionist attitude to the past. 
Brooks sealed the discontinuity of past and present, Kazin concludes, offering a suitable model 
for later generations of writers wishing to shed the past for whatever reason. Studying the past 
only as compensation for present failure, Brooks never acknowledged that the present is the 
result of a necessary process of emancipation from the past. Similarly, he evaded the problems 
of historical consciousness because he wished to believe in an absolute literary morality. A 
mature culture, he vowed, was an environment which the great poet could respond to with 
unruffled affirmation. He failed to admit that the experience of the past is a vital resource to the 
contemporary artist, and rather opted for a selected image of the past to correct the "anarchy" 
of the present. In the last instance, so Kazin claims, this explains Brooks's reluctance to deal 
with literary experience as tragedy. Just what Brooks meant by "anarchy" revealed itself in his 
attitude to contemporary writing. He disapproved of Mencken, Dreiser, Wharton, Cabell, Lewis, 
and neglected upcoming writers like Stein, Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Dos Passos. 
On Native Grounds both rejects and transcends several of Brooks's key assumptions. Kazin's 
championship of Dreiser, by contrast, is a case in point. Moreover, he makes a significant 
attempt to salvage a sense of continuity, however fragile and tenuous, between the literary 
outlook of The Seven Arts and the modernist sensibility of the generation of the Twenties. Little 
inclined to minimize the effects on the literary mind of a society in violent transition, Kazin puts 
up an eloquent defence of what Solomon Fishman has called "the resources of conscious design 
available to the artist." On Native Grounds establishes beyond a doubt that "the literary imagin-
ation of America" is involved in a faltering but incontestably progressive process of emancipat-
ing itself from its original fascination with the social dimensions of creative freedom and that 
American artists came to recognize one another as artists, not simply as citizens facing similar 
hardships. Brooks's faith in the modem relevance of prophetic literature was patently a-historic-
al: it broke down when liberal visions of society broke down. Kazin believes that, with his 
relation to his world having become more complex, the modern writer should no longer aim to 
be a purveyor of apriori moral and intellectual values but work instead towards a viable sense 
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of selfhood based on his own experience. This would include the admission that our relations 
with the past are — and hence historical experience is — necessarily tragic. 
On Native Grounds traces the American writer's reluctant acceptance of the reality of a 
spiritual life. It offers a historical panorama of American literature as a precarious process of 
haphazard moral growth, virtually a tragic attempt to achieve collective self-consciousness and 
inward realization. Criticizing Brooks's environmental thesis — he is rather concerned with the 
writer's created environment — Kazin suggests that the creative potential of the national culture 
is proportional to its degree of complexity. He pictures the native literary sensibility gradually 
emancipating itself from the progressive-instrumental attitude to "the world" and sloughing off 
the dualist outlook ascribed to it by the prewar generation of liberal cultural critics. On Native 
Grounds registers the dilemmas of a literature uncertain about the uses of the imagination. For 
five decades, Kazin points out, the dominant aspect of American writing has been the unmistak-
able yearning for the blessings of a rich spiritual life together with the "self-assured refusal on 
the part of so many sensitive writers to admit the reality of a spiritual life" (NG, 34). The 
legendary dissociation of American literary generations, he adds, has been the result of a 
persistent refusal to face up to the complexity of experience, more specifically that which life 
in America has furnished. 
Kazin's theme of alienation on native grounds, which is the lion in the path of literary 
nationality, abounds with irony. To Kazin, a "literature of nationhood" must be able to offer an 
explanatory model for the radical conflicts within the native experience. A democratic literature 
should accommodate the contradictions which democracy, as an idea, seeks to harmonize. That 
Kazin would include Henry James in his discussion of alienation is hardly surprising. What is 
striking, however, is the assurance with which he posits James's creative personality as the 
answer to the social animus of American literary ideas. Of all modern writers it was James, he 
claims, who suggested the moral dimensions of the American's "complex fate." Though feeling 
himself alienated from an unperceptive audience, James was at home with the experience of 
being an American as few other Americans had been. And this was because he understood the 
relevance of the life of art in America better than any of his contemporaries. His imaginative 
powers protected him from the apriori moral and ideological condemnation of American life 
perpetrated by Progressives and radicals alike. He created the most generous vision of experi-
ence for the sake of illuminating the sheer moral space which Americans, whether at home or 
expatriated, might inhabit if they only cared to acknowledge its substance. To open up those 
vast stretches of aesthetic consciousness, Kazin affirms, was to be primarily the American 
artist's creative destiny and also his moral mission. James's relevance to the contemporary 
writer, as Kazin understands it, is that he proved how little the experience of an uncongenial 
environment need frustrate his aesthetic resources, the key element of his being. The sense of 
fundamental questions to be asked about life in America presumably turned up a prodigious 
supply of creative material. Moreover, the evidence of James's artistic career contradicted 
Brooks's allegation that, in leaving his native country, James had cheated himself as an artist. 
Kazin firmly denies Brooks's version of the 'problem' of James, and he adds that Brooks was 
virtually alone responsible for "the sentimental-pathetic conception of the artist in America" 
which dominated liberal criticism in the Twenties: Brooks "became... the historian of the 
negative and repressive aspects of American culture" (NG, 281). Kazin takes a much more 
positive view of the moral force of James's work. Actually, his argument in favour of the moral 
function of literature cuts across Brooks's view of the artist's leadership in moral values. For 
such leadership, if it did not command authority, merely confirmed many an American writer's 
fear that he was no more than a mere puppet of his culture. Kazin thinks it is irrelevant to try 
and prove that James was interested in a certain orthodoxy of values: 
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One could begin to criticize James only at the point where one left off criticizing his contempora-
ries. He had transcended them, given them an eidolon of greatness; but they could not use him, 
and he no longer belonged with them. If that isolation was a judgment upon his life and art, it was 
also a characterization of the generation which struggled to establish a primary sense of realism 
in American letters. For it was James's essential spirit — not necessarily his temperament or 
method or particular interests — that Howells and the others had missed: the consecration of a 
great career devoted with something more than sincerity to the life of art; the sense that one 
needed the discrimination, the aspirations, the invincible selfhood of art to live in freedom in a 
world hostile to the very elucidations of art. (NG, 49-50) 
Brooks's biography of Twain argued that culture interferes with the conscious realization of 
aesthetic design. He employed psychoanalytic tools to prove how the spiritual meanness of 
Twain's day, symbolized by his wife Olivia, had compelled him to make the most unworthy 
compromises with it. Brooks saw Twain wholly as an instance of "defeated greatness" and a 
reminder of the hardships which the artist in an acquisitive society endures. He did not under-
stand that Twain's psychic ambivalence was part and parcel of his artistic point of view. Kazin 
marks The Ordeal of Mark Twain for its "effort to draw an analogy between the Gilded Age and 
the postwar scene; an analogy between the ordeal of Mark Twain, which was dubious, and the 
self-consciousness of Brooks's literary generation, which was palpable enough." Brooks awarded 
such dramatic importance to environmental factors that he denied Twain the power of producing 
art as "conscious design." He did little to salvage Twain as an artist. He was obsessed not so 
much with artistic work as with the preconditions for the artistic life, or the shortcomings of life 
itself, in America. In Kazin's view, The Ordeal of Mark Twain served to excuse the ostensible 
literary mediocrity of Brooks's own day and age. The Ordeal and The Pilgrimage of Henry 
James "served a common purpose by giving literary opinion in the twenties a conveniently 
misanthropic image of the Gilded Age to take comfort in" (NG, 283). 
It was the very dualism of Brooks's environmental thesis itself that obscured his real 
contribution to "the awakening of sensibility in America." America's Coming-of-Age had been 
an inspiring call for a cultural criticism equipped for "a wholesale reconstruction of a social life 
all the elements of which are as if united in a sort of conspiracy against the growth and freedom 
of the spirit" (quoted in NG, 181). After the war, however, Brooks saw only evidence of this 
conspiracy, and turned out to be blind to the moral scope of independent creation. His interpre-
tation of James in The Pilgrimage was "grotesquely unrepresentative of James's style and mind" 
(NG, 286). Something else was involved, too. For where Twain, submitting to contemporary 
culture, had seen primary artistic resources in him deflected, so James, fleeing a world of 
business yahoos, presumably also cheated himself. To Brooks, the ideal writer "neither escaped 
from contemporary civilization nor was acquiescent to it" (NG, 179-80). He added the unfortu-
nate observation that this type of writer was absent from the modern literary scene in America. 
Insofar as an American writer was worth noting, he was likely to belong to the literary past and 
to bear the psychic marks of the spiritual abnegation his artistic aspirations required. Brooks 
increasingly came to think of creative expression as the antithesis of American life, and he 
expected significant literary achievement only from the alienated spirits in the margin of 
American society. Did it take a more authoritative figure than Brooks to prove that The Seven 
Arts' prewar faith in the compatibility of literary and social radicalism had been a self-defeating 
proposition all along? 
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Progressivism: An Instrumental View of Reality 
It may be that Kazin's account of The Seven Arts' liberal cultural criticism labours under his 
own assessment of the intellectual tradition of liberalism itself Paul F Bourke has suggested 
that On Native Grounds presents it rather reductively as a continuation of Progressivism 
Alfred Kazin's judgments on Brooks and Boume illustrate the appeal to a Zeitgeist He finds 
Brooks's America's Coming of Age an expression of 'the ardor and uplift so characteristic of the 
Progressive period' and writes of Brooks's criticism against the background of that brave new 
world of Progressivism, while Boume is held to be a personification of 'a certain literary idealism 
in the Progressive Period ' Kazin is not writing political history, but where he feels the need for 
a generalization about the period as a whole he sounds very much as if he is 
Bourke explains that Kazin's "literary" use of Progressive thought led him to bark up the wrong 
tree, for Brooks as well as Bourne were ultimately opposed to the reform politics of Progressiv-
ism and went much farther in their criticism of existing social arrangements I wish to stress, 
however, that Kazin's examination of the Progressive mind had one clear purpose, namely to 
show that its relativistic view of reality and experience in America yielded at best only a partial 
understanding of these Its leading assumptions, moreover, incited an entire generation of writers 
to take a fundamentally instrumentalist view of literature Social reportage, social analysis, and 
expose writing culminating in the muckrake novel were taken to be the appropriate road toward 
the commonwealth of democratic aspirations and unprecedented cultural flowering In addition, 
Progressivism was impatient with the conservative stress on continuity and consensus It 
propagated a "revisionist" attitude to the historical experience and proposed slashingly radical 
interpretations of American intellectual and political traditions In the process, as Kazin affirms, 
it frequently did not even bother to provide a closely reasoned argument for the reputed 
progressive and libertarian character of these traditions He points out that both Beard and 
Parnngton admitted as much Out of their deep intellectual commitment to the assumptions of 
radical, evolutionary science and their feelings of democratic partisanship, Progressives sought 
to bring the heritage of the past in line with current liberal expectations about culture and 
society They adopted what Charles Crowe has called the philosophical attitude of 
"epistemological relativism" vis-à-vis the past This allowed them to study history mainly for its 
"moral and social utility " George Bilhas has argued that Beard quite simply believed all history 
"was moving on a constantly ascending path toward a more ideal social order " Progressive 
historiography looked to shape a past that would expose some of the contradictions whose 
implications for contemporary democratic life the dominant ideology of the ruling interests 
expediently glossed over According to Richard Hofstadter, Beard's writing, for example, hinged 
upon a dualist conception of the historian Beard, he claimed, was "not simply a scholar but 
a publicist with an urgent interest m the intellectual and political milieu in which he lived " 
Hofstadter's insight into the ambiguities of Progressive thought offers a significant clue to 
Kazin's treatment of the literature of realism and naturalism in On Native Grounds 
The common preoccupation of the Progressive political critics, the muckrakers, and the early 
realistic and naturalistic novelists was the search for "reality " But what, to them, was reality9 At 
bottom, I think, it had three characteristics It was rough and sordid, it was hidden, neglected, and, 
so to speak, off-stage, and it was essentially a stream of external and material events, of which 
psychic events were a kind of pale reflex Reality was the bribe, the rebate, the bought franchise, 
the sale of adulterated food It was what one found in The Jungle, The Octopus, Wealth versus 
Commonwealth, or The Shame of the Cities The imagination of the era was more fundamentally 
conditioned by reporters and literary journalists than we usually recognize, and its characteristic 
56 
goal was "the inside story." That is why Beard's book [An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution], when it came out, was so quickly seen to fit into the political context of the 
twentieth century. 
Obviously, Progressivism distrusted the power of ideas and focused instead on theories of 
material evolution. Economic factors were considered decisive historical determinants. Intellec-
tual systems, ideologies, or even theories of psychological motivation counted for preciously 
little: they only served to conceal the reality of historical forces, which were exclusively 
material and geographical.63 
Christopher Lasch has noted that the politics of Progressivism "clung to a naive trust in 
science, progress, and the 'march' of history." Apparently, this had caused it to be identified, at 
the time of On Native Grounds' inception, "as itself part of the modem crisis [in culture] rather 
than its solution." Kazin reached the same conclusion as early as 1942: On Native Grounds 
traces how Progressivism coloured the resurgence of social and political radicalism in the 
Thirties. In effect, Kazin regards Progressivism as a political and intellectual liability, because 
the populist and nativist trappings of radical liberalism in the Thirties — Lasch dubbed it 
"literary Stalinism" — produced a suspiciously monolithic reading of the American cultural 
tradition.64 In order to expose the nationalist cultural mythology of the Communist Popular 
Front, Kazin traces its roots to the Progressive brand of liberalism which was dominant from 
1910 till 1917. According to Bourke, however, Kazin mistakenly identifies Brooks, Bourne, and 
The Seven Arts as representatives of the Progressive outlook. 
Bourke refers to Henry May's The End of American Innocence for a different interpretation 
of cultural history. He observes that May, unlike Kazin, distinguishes between the political 
rhetoric of Progressivism and the "intellectual innovation" that coincided with it but which did 
not necessarily mature under its auspices. What Bourke has in mind is that segment of the 
prewar resurgence of liberalism which May has designated the "Rebellion." In many respects, 
May found the liberal intellectuals of the Rebellion a far cry indeed from the Progressive 
cultural consensus of 1912, a consensus which stressed uplift, morality, and progress as the 
mainstays of culture. These liberals stimulated an atmosphere of intellectual dissent from the 
tinkering reform politics of Progressivism. To them, Progressivism savoured too much of 
Theodore Roosevelt's "practical idealism" and Howells's tepid assertions that realism and truth 
merge in the moral experience of goodness. Indeed, May points out that Progressivism was the 
result of the characteristically American tendency to find a compromise by adjusting a tradi-
tional civilization "to the new technological and scientific universe." Progressivism linked 
moralism and progress, and that was exactly "the vulnerable point in the American credo of the 
early twentieth century." For some time, it seemed as if cultural innovation in America would 
follow in Europe's footsteps, but native traditions persisted. The "Liberation," which was a 
development from European mysticism, at first "succeeded in breaking down the barriers [and 
then] it quickly disappeared, leaving the road open for older and deeper kinds of dissent." 
Representative names were Bergson, Wells, and Matisse; its principal event in the United States 
was the Armory Show of 1913. It showed an exemplary faith in creative intuition: "Traditional 
values, like traditional means of establishing them, were highly doubtful; it was permissible to 
prefer violence to peace, creative destruction to building, primitivism to civilization. The only 
thing that was not permissible was fear, especially fear of change or of the future."65 
The "Rebellion," however, challenged the freewheeling experimentalism of the "Liberation." 
It was a native rebellion conducted in a domestic cultural idiom. It stressed spontaneous, free 
individual expression and paradoxically raised a standard of art, of discipline, even of tradition. 
The "Rebellion," May observes, enabled the "believers in democratic self-expression and in 
aesthetic tradition [to] unite against the official credo of 1912." This supports Bourke's claim 
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that many accounts of Progressivism, Kazin's included, "make it difficult to understand why the 
politics of Progressivism were one of the principal targets for all these men, that is Brooks, 
Bourne and their fellow liberals." Bourke also charges that Kazin finds "in the work of late 
Victorians like Beard, Dewey, James and Veblen... only intimations of a full-scale assault on the 
nineteenth century led by a younger generation — men such as Lippmann, Boume and 
Brooks."66 Apparently, the radicalism of the writers Kazin deals with under the heading 
"Progressivism: Some Insurgent Scholars" — and how remarkable it is that he should have 
included writers as well as scholars — did not actually prevent them from supporting the late 
nineteenth-century, "Victorian," moral consensus on culture. 
Arguably, Kazin had his thesis too clearly in mind when he described The Seven Arts's 
liberalism as the hallmark of the Progressive cultural outlook. In the pages of The Seven Arts, 
the New Republic and elsewhere, the younger generation of liberal intellectuals expressed their 
dissatisfaction with Progressivism. It is obvious that May's view of the "Rebellion" does much 
more to suggest the cultural significance of the radical critics around The Seven Arts than 
Kazin's chapter "The Joyous Season" does. He stresses their intellectual discontent with the 
assumptions of "American Victorianism" which Progressivism continued to defend up till 1912. 
The Rebellion contributed to the "Little Renaissance" in art and culture, but it was not alone 
responsible for it. For one thing, it was the Liberation which had managed to break down the 
late nineteenth-century cultural consensus, and its proponents remained influential throughout 
1910-17. It included Lincoln Steffens, Hutchins Hapgood, and Mabel Dodge Luhan. These old-
style dissenters coupled a frank and individual aestheticism to an emotional brand of socialism. 
They did not develop any cultural programme from their aesthetic radicalism. The younger 
liberal intellectuals, Walter Lippmann foremost among them, did. Bourke concludes that the 
avant-garde of 1912, which often flocked together at Mabel Dodge's salon, was self-divided: 
Lippmann's generation — even such men as Simonson, Kuttner and Brooks whose interests were 
primarily artistic — found Hapgood and men like him old-fashioned, not so much in ideas as in 
the kind of private revolt they symbolized... 
If Mrs. Dodge's salon has any symbolic value for us, it might be that it suggests the absence 
of ideological density in what we have to explain about 1912 and, further, the presence of a 
preoccupation with defining an appropriate style or model for social criticism, a group preoccupa-
tion which figures as much as the desire to bury the nineteenth century.67 
Bourke is more positive than Kazin about Brooks's and Bourne's role in the history of social 
criticism in America. He supports May's assertion that Brooks and his generation were actually 
looking for suitable models of social criticism in the works of "late Victorians" such as John 
Dewey, Charles Beard, William James, James Harvey Robinson, Lester Frank Ward, and E.A. 
Ross: "May's strategy is to show how this older group of scholars in their attacks on nineteenth 
century formalism in philosophy, law, economics, and history anticipated the more devastating 
questions of the intellectual Liberation from Europe [as well as] the political and social ideas of 
the Rebellion." The younger radical intellectuals sought to apply the insights of radical scholar-
ship within the larger context of society. They envisaged a new social role and a new intellec-
tual style, namely that of independent social criticism. 
It is primarily for this reason that, of the older generation, [William] James and Dewey offered the 
nearest American model for the kind of generalizing language they required. Both James and 
Dewey had the same appeal in one sense as Freud, Bergson and other representatives of the 
European "Liberation" after 1910: that is, the capacity to offer formulations which transcended the 
scope of technical intellectual pursuits and which had relevance for all fields of social inquiry. It 
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is the pressure to find such a language in the second decade of this century which is especially 
interesting, a pressure... tied to the emergence of a new social role.68 
In style as well as content, then, the younger social critics abandoned the timid moralism which 
typified the reform policies of middle class Progressivism. Bourke leaves no doubt that the 
writings of Brooks and Bourne were not at all inspired by the Progressive Zeitgeist to the extent 
that Kazin suggests. 
Bourke's covert allegation that Kazin attempts to politicize a significant juncture of the 
national cultural history is a very serious one, but it is quite plausible. Kazin seeks to come to 
terms with an era of major realignments in the tradition of social liberalism. Obviously, his 
judgement reflects the moral indignation with the shambles of social radicalism in the Thirties. 
His portrayal of Brooks and Bourne against the "brave new world of Progressivism" both 
reduces their socio-cultural role and simplifies their politics. For it was precisely they who 
explored the literary implications of social liberalism and formulated them in a critical idiom all 
their own. And though Brooks's position was in certain respects highly unfortunate, both 
exposed and sought to transcend the limitations of Progressive liberalism. 
Kazin's bias is particularly clear in the case of Bourne. He has frequent recourse to rhetorical 
analysis. He echoes the contemporary encomiums which held that "in no one did 'the promise 
of American life' shine so radiantly as in Randolph Bourne," and proceeds cunningly with: 
"Above all Bourne was the perfect child of the prewar Enlightenment; when its light went out 
in 1918, he died with it." Presumably, after his death, so many battered liberal hopes were 
associated with Bourne's achievement "that the writer got lost in the victim" (NG, 183). This 
suggests that the historical reverberations of Brooks's environmental thesis are deftly played off 
against The Seven Arts's cultural theory. Bourne as victim of his society apparently bolstered the 
contemporary liberals' distrust of their native environment and confirmed their despair of its 
reconstruction. Kazin stresses that Bourne's achievement as a writer will always remain eclipsed 
by his public image as a tragic prophet, but he clearly exaggerates the sense of ephemerality 
about Bourne: 
Boume proved himself so inexpressibly confident of a future established on the evangelicisms of 
his period, so radiant in his championship of pragmatism, art, reason, European social democracy, 
and the experimental school, that he now seems a seismograph on which were recorded the 
greatest hopes and fiercest despairs of his time. No other critic in his period wrote so little about 
himself, or had... so little interest in himself. His books were always selfless.... He was not a great 
writer ... (NG, 184) 
Did Bourne's "selflessness" imply that he could not incorporate old-style dissent, notably those 
varieties of pragmatist philosophy propagated by James and Dewey, within a compelling image 
of life? It would appear so, for Kazin belabours Bourne's pregnant use of the metaphor of 
"youth." He suggests that Bourne's idealistic faith in the revelatory and creative powers of 
experimental radicalism was founded on paucity of experience. Boume, so Kazin concludes, 
wrote of and for a world which never existed. And it is precisely here that the requirements of 
Kazin's thesis overrule such evidence as exists. 
Kazin's assessment of Boume ultimately relies on rhetorical analysis. He turns Boume into 
the apotheosis of "a certain literary idealism in the Progressive period" (NG, 183), which is 
scant praise for Boume, who was an astringent critic of Dewey's pragmatism and who, at the 
height of liberal confusion over the war issue, insisted that "man cannot live by politics alone." 
Also Kazin's accusation that Bourne's writing was insistently "selfless" is questionable. It is too 
obvious an attempt to blame Boume with the frivolousness of the liberal-progressive outlook on 
history and the corresponding notion that you need only redesign and retool the traditions of the 
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past for a radically democratic culture to come alive in the present. Like Kazin, Bourne realized 
that the sense of tradition is about the assimilation of disparate sensibilities into a community 
of radical sentiment. He employed the metaphor of international youth as the correlative of a 
radical, pluralist culture, while Kazin rather refers to the task of capturing "all the many 
different factors, the rhythms of growth, the subtle effects of our American landscape, the 
necessary sensibility to what it has meant to be a modern writer in America at all" (NG, x). 
Finally, there is Kazin's own testimony in 1962 that "the great radical critic Randolph Bourne" 
had heralded "a very necessary historical spirit [which pictured] America as a place of enormous 
Whitmanesque hope." He admitted that this historical spirit had been more than a subliminal 
presence in On Native Grounds, but that the failure of liberal politics during the war, and the 
impact of the Holocaust in particular, had given short shrift to the "leftist idealism" of his book. 
But in what sense was his position in 1942 any different from Bourne's in 1917? Bourne's 
contagious idealism possessed greater historical relevance than Kazin was willing to admit.69 
To criticize Bourne's moral intelligence and focus on the contradictions in Brooks's cultural 
analysis is to question The Seven Arts's liberalism in matters of literature and society. Paul 
Bourke hints that Kazin's evaluation of the latter may have been determined by the need to 
criticize the cultural impact of contemporary liberalism, and in view of the social radicalism of 
the Thirties this is quite plausible. We must not exaggerate the importance of any political 
motives on Kazin's part, however. He has explained the origins of On Native Grounds stating 
that "it is clear to me that we have reached a definite climax in [our] literature, as in so much 
of our modem liberal culture, and that with a whole civilization in the balance, we may attempt 
some comprehensive judgment on the formation of our modem American literature" (NG, x). 
Kazin's literary historiography traces a moral tradition but does not intone a standard of proper 
political action. It takes the politics of liberalism into account precisely because it has often 
displayed a certain dualism vis-à-vis the world of historical fact and the texture of tradition. The 
significance of liberalism to a book like On Native Grounds becomes clear once we recognize 
how firmly Kazin roots it in the native traditions of populist radicalism and progressive reform. 
Bourke maintains that in running the liberalism of The Seven Arts together with Progressivism 
Kazin blurs that magazine's main concern, namely to formulate an artistic and intellectual 
radicalism capable of feeding a programme of social criticism. There is no doubt that The Seven 
Arts envisioned a reconstruction of the social order that went beyond the remedies the Progress-
ives proposed. Bourne, Brooks, Croly, and Lippmann sought to channel the impulse of cultural 
rebellion and dissent and incorporate it in a coherent programme for art and the new society. 
Kazin's assessment of The Seven Arts rather underestimates its role as a catalyst of cultural and 
artistic values; he identifies it too closely with the Progressive stance on native intellectual 
traditions. 
On the other hand, his focus on the intellectual limitations of modem American literary 
naturalism — and particularly its receptivity to social ideology, which culminated in the Thirties 
— shows the debilitating results of the absence of a sustaining tradition in writing. On Native 
Grounds describes how several generations of writers and radical intellectuals contributed to it, 
but it concludes that none of them individually managed to furnish "the necessary sensibility to 
what it has meant to be a modem writer in America..." (NG, x) Ideally, successive literary 
generations in America should have reinvested their predecessors' spiritual capital and so built 
out a tradition.70 The significance of the heritage of The Seven Arts to Kazin at the time of 
writing On Native Grounds is that it played havoc with the idea of tradition. Taking a highly 
selective interest in the literary past, the writers of The Seven Arts raised the principle of 
discontinuity to the status of historiographical method. What did not readily conform to their 
notion of a prophetic and affirmative tradition in writing threatened to be dismissed as evidence 
of the destructive force of the American environment. 
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In Starting Out in the Thirties, Kazin characterizes the literary radicalism of that decade as 
an attempt to look beyond "the wasteland of the Twenties to our real literary brethren in the 
Utopians and Socialist bohemians of 1912."71 What he seeks to establish in On Native Grounds 
as a possible historical liaison between the literary socialism of The Seven Arts generation and 
the radicalism of Kazin's own has by 1965 become a definitive judgment on the dissociation of 
literary generations in America. This historical judgement conveys the irony of his position with 
regard to The Seven Arts. For On Native Grounds is highly ambivalent about the pre-War liberal 
amalgam of aesthetic rebellion and social revolution. Kazin believes that the leftist orthodoxy 
of the Thirties perverted the liberal spirit of social aesthetics before the First World War. For 
that reason, he is interested in the liberal tradition in literature, which he thinks has shown a 
chronic optimism about the social utility of literature and the malleability of society. As a 
literary historian, he feels it to be his duty to prevent a lapse in historical faith similar to that 
brought about by pre-War liberal pragmatism. 
Modernism: A Dissociated Perspective 
The lack of historical resonance of The Seven Arts's programme for a national literature became 
apparent with the turn liberal criticism took in the Twenties and the rise of modernism. Brooks 
himself led the former. He no longer pictured the artist in an active relationship to, as a moulder 
of, his social environment. His biographies of Twain and James rather argued that great literary 
talent in America inevitably faces defeat. Brooks now conducted The Seven Arts's programme 
for culture as an inquiry into the reasons for artistic failure. By all accounts, the prewar syn-
thesis of aesthetic experiment and social reconstruction had disintegrated: "Nothing was so dead 
in 1920 as the crusading spirit of 1910" (NG, 195). The prewar hopes that a radical art might 
make society over were lost in the general condemnation of life in America. Liberal criticism 
in the Twenties virtually specialized in denunciation. Presumably, America represented every-
thing that kept independent creativity in check: the puritan mind, genteelism, vice squads, 
religious bigotry, social backwardness, and corporate greed. It became axiomatic with critics and 
literary thinkers that the artist could salvage his integrity only if he retreated from society. 
Postwar criticism featured the silent and heroic martyrdom of James, Melville, Ambrose Bierce, 
Emily Dickinson and Henry Adams. It also relished the image of the alienated artist-rebel, 
Melville no less than Rimbaud and Gauguin, whose work was testimony of intransigent social 
opposition. Its fetishism of the mystic aspects in Stein and Dostoevsky indicated a marked 
decline of interest in social literature. Maladjustment and exile, as Brooks noted, became a sign 
of grace. Every constructive concern with the native cultural heritage was satirized. Mencken 
was quite as guilty of this as were Joseph Wood Krutch, Ludwig Lewisohn, and Harold Steams. 
Kazin admits that they differed in means and motive, but stresses that the result was always a 
disparagement of the significance of creative effort in America. 
Nevertheless, Kazin observes that the profligate vitality of postwar writing proved that "the 
'modem' spirit had finally come into power." Apparently, "the new literature of criticism" (NG, 
193) had achieved its emancipation not only from the elementary issues which had determined 
the emergence of realism in the 1880s and 1890s but also from the defeating dualism of prewar 
liberal theories of literature and society. This is crucial: Kazin's historiographical thesis is about 
eliminating the experience of alienation in literature. Alienation persists because the social 
context of modem industrial civilization in America has tended to interfere with the original 
Jeffersonian vision of democracy. The appeal Jeffersonianism exerted on the trailblazers of 
"modem" literature, the early realists, however, crippled them as creative writers. Wiliam Dean 
Howells as much as Robert Herrick, for instance, are tragic protagonists in Kazin's narrative 
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because they pursued an ethical ideal that was radically at odds with the tendency of modem 
society. They virtually created in a void, because their spiritual and moral culture was not 
attuned to the new social reality. Kazin's study of such relative failures as Howells's and 
Herrick's explores the groundwork for a spiritual sensibility that will absorb the experience of 
alienation, transcend it, and turn it back as an act of appropriation and possession. To possess 
America as Whitman had done — to create in the language of the land — has been the primary 
task of the modem American writer. But Kazin claims that even in 1942 the native experience 
had not fully become the writer's creative idiom. The spirit of tragic acceptance required to root 
the imagination firmly in the American environment typically foundered on the ingrained view 
that social change rather than the illimitable resources of the spirit is the main creative factor in 
the human experience. The literary imagination in America has had to vie with dominant and 
traditional modes of perceiving reality, whether philosophically idealist, pragmatist, economic, 
or political. The literary sensibility of Progressivism combined these. It reconstructed reality 
rather than exploring it imaginatively. Kazin concludes that of the writers who were active 
during the Progressive period only Dreiser managed to suggest the possibilities of the imagin-
ation in America. 
Nor was "the new literature of criticism," which had its heyday after the War, an unequivocal 
advance over the pre-War literature of Progressivism. Though it affirmed the usefulness of 
literature despite the pathos of the artistic life in America, it only reluctantly came to terms with 
the mediocrity of "the native culture and manners" (NG, 199). Kazin makes much of the glaring 
contrast between the confident social outlook of pre-War liberalism and the indulgence in social 
satire during the Twenties. In a sense, he sees the modernist literary sensibility prefigured in the 
literature of liberal satire. 
The historical dissociation of literary generations in America, which is the major theme of 
On Native Grounds, features prominently in Kazin's view of the Twenties. During that decade, 
he argues, the literary sensibility in America became divided against itself and there emerged 
two loosely associated groups of writers whose work displayed a deep ignorance of each other's 
motives and their common roots in the native situation. What the modernist writer produced as 
a result of his exacerbated aesthetic self-consciousness, the "new realist" subscribed to because 
he found no suitable literary models among the pioneers of realism: in America, the literary past 
offered preciously few clues to the problems the artist encountered in the present. Kazin 
diagnoses a certain atrophy of the imagination in the tradition of realism in America. Sherwood 
Anderson and Sinclair Lewis, he declares, had 
only a formal relation to that first struggle for realism that had gone on in the eighties and 
nineties. It was the sudden current of liberation after the war that had set it in motion, and it... no 
longer had to fight for its life.... Where Norris and Dreiser had been philosophical naturalists of 
a sort, naturalists who had been interested in the struggle for power, men like Anderson and Lewis 
were essentially as remote from naturalism as they were from the old Pollyanna romances against 
which they rebelled. For if theirs was a realism of revolt, the revolt was entirely domestic... (NG, 
206) 
The redeeming feature of their work was that their parody of the native culture frankly showed 
a degree of elementary affection for it. Of course, Kazin's juxtaposition of "new realists" and 
modernists reintroduces the issue of literary nationalism: the hypothetical historical dénouement 
presented in On Native Grounds gives equal weight to the aesthetic and social dimensions of a 
prospective native literary tradition. 
Kazin's interpretation of postwar literature argues that Van Wyck Brooks's exclusive concern 
with nineteenth-century cultural models made it very unlikely for a similar tradition to take root 
in the present. For one thing, the interaction between the modem writer and society may be 
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fundamentally different from Brooks's faith in the artist as an instructor and moral prophet. 
Sinclair Lewis, for one, expressed the national sentiment to a degree, but the result of his 
mimetic talents was to confirm the conventional cultural attitudes of his readership rather than 
strengthen its sense of native fellowship through acts of constructive criticism. Lewis's work 
was characteristic of the Twenties' "revolt from the village," of the rebellion against the 
narrowness and sterility of commonplace life in America, which created "the sense of a personal 
quest in realism" (NG, 210). In Willa Cather, this quest resulted in a serene and articulate vision 
of moral integrity. But where Cather was willing to confront the risks of her personal 
"secession" from the historical in the defence of her artistic ideal, "Lewis has always led such 
a mimetic existence that his works have even come to seem an uncanny reproduction of surface 
reality." His caricatures "have really given back to Americans a perfect symbolic myth, the 
central image of what they have believed themselves to be" (NG, 220). Here is the writer 
undergoing the ultimate humiliation in America, namely to be accepted as simply one of the 
folk, the cultural average in a levelling democracy. Yet, for the idea of nationalism to be 
meaningful, it must go beyond the celebration of conventional mores. To Kazin, Norris and 
Dreiser are more valuable than Lewis to the cause of literary nationalism because their unortho-
dox versions of the American myth produced a far deeper inward realization of the contradic-
tions in the American experience. They figure prominently in Kazin's picture of literary history 
as a gradual process of spiritual redemption. 
In the postwar era Kazin detects only an ever widening discrepancy between aesthetic 
experiment in writing and radical social thought. His notion of a universal libertarian principle 
suggests that there may have existed an objective historical moment for a postwar resurgence of 
cultural renaissance coupled to social and political reconstruction. That he ends up tracing 
further evidence of their divorce must not necessarily imply that he was less fired than The 
Seven Arts with the conviction of America's radical cultural promise. He takes a chastened view, 
however, of the power of the literary personality to determine the course of social processes. In 
the modern industrial world, the value of an indigenous American literary culture rather depends 
on leavening social upheaval by imaginative means. This may explain his ambivalence about 
The Seven Arts's call for an intellectual avant-garde as the stewards of radical cultural innova-
tion. 
American Modernism and the Ahistorical Ideal 
In contrast to Brooks's mental secession in the 1920's, On Native Grounds can be said to bring 
"sustained contraries" to the exploration of the national cultural identity. Precisely in this 
respect, however, it falls short of a definitive, integrative vision. For Kazin is himself reluctant 
to decide, in the case of modernism, on the significance of "high" art to his thesis. It actually 
forms an element of complication in his design. Only after the publication of On Native 
Grounds, when it turned out that his book reflected "the confidence of a period that had ended," 
did Kazin drop some of his initial reservations about the avant-garde ethos. It was only after the 
Second World War that he began to assess the relevance of the creative radicalism on the part 
of writers such as Dostoevsky, Balzac, Flaubert, Zola, Nietzsche, Joyce and Rimbaud to the 
current situation in American writing, more in particular to the positions then being held by the 
deradicalizing intelligentsia. In accepting modernism, Kazin accepted the decay of the nationalist 
thesis. 
Yet, in 1942 Kazin still tries to isolate modernism within the national context. Sanford 
Pinsker believes that On Native Grounds tentatively offers an evaluative critical framework for 
both modernism and native traditions in realism and naturalism. It presumably "charted Ameri-
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can modernism as it struggled to be, as it sought continuities with Wharton and Dreiser, with 
Anderson and Lewis." it is Kazin who is seeking to trace those continuities for modernism. In 
Starting Out in the Thirties, he explains that On Native Grounds's search for such historical 
continuities was part and parcel of the non-revolutionary outlook of contemporary liberal 
radicalism: 
What young writers of the Thirties wanted was to prove the literary value of our experience, to 
recognize the possibility of art in our lives, to feel that we had moved the streets, the stockyards, 
the hiring halls into literature — to show that our radical strength could carry on the experimental 
impulse of modem literature. ... I was sure that we of the revolutionary Thirties would retain what 
was vital in the great books of the Twenties and direct it toward a more hopeful outlook, a 
fraternal society.72 
On Native Grounds is Kazin's bid to stop the gutting of the cultural past and tradition which 
began with nineteenth-century agrarian populism and became accepted wisdom with the Com-
munist Left in the Thirties. Kazin proposes to place the modernist movement within a larger 
pattern of literary development in America. The very rhetoric of his critical analysis, however, 
shows his bias against it, suggesting that Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Dos Passos mistakenly 
thought themselves to be free from the historical determinants of the national literature. Kazin 
agrees that they lifted American writing onto a different plane, yet the tenor of their careers and 
the lack of resonance in the literature that came after them testify that their work failed to 
provide a platform for continuity. What he is particularly critical of is their willed abdication 
from the social intelligence in literature. The revealing chapter heading: "Into the Thirties: All 
the Lost Generations," which echoes Fitzgerald's All the Sad Young Men, heralds his interpre-
tation of modernism. Kazin believes that the posture of social retreat, however brilliantly 
dramatized, turned out to be totally inadequate in the face of the Depression. Moreover, 
modernism further fragmented the already brittle cohesion of literary generations in America. It 
ignored the issues which had united American writers from the 1880s till the Twenties in their 
common pursuit of a liberal society. "With these writers," Kazin notes ominously, "a fateful 
new influence had entered American writing" (NG, 312). 
For if the modernists thought of themselves as a self-parented group emancipated from the 
moral and philosophical trifles of earlier writing, Kazin rather explains their literary posture with 
reference to their mythical and "epic self-consciousness" (NG, 315). Central to that myth, he 
adds, was their belief that their achievement represented the nee plus ultra in the American 
literary sensibility; vide Fitzgerald, who believed that his generation had grown up only to find 
"all wars fought, all Gods dead, all faiths in men shaken." Simply the act of locating themselves 
at the centre of modern destruction allowed them to think that they had forged modes of 
expression that would stand up amidst the onslaughts of a civilization which censored the minds 
of its citizens before it claimed their bodies in the cause of an imperialist war. Kazin would 
argue that this "epic" self-consciousness masked a serious failure of the historical sense in 
literature. It suggested the pathetic turn the world had taken, but the modernists mistakenly 
assumed that the war experience had dropped writers like Howclls, Henry Blake Fuller, 
Sherwood Anderson, Harold Frederick, Stephen Crane, and Sinclair Lewis over the horizon. The 
War suggested to the younger writers their emancipation from a defunct moral order. Evidently, 
the postwar literary situation marked a watershed in the history of modern American writing, but 
Kazin accuses the writers of the Lost Generation of having failed to continue the spirit of the 
prewar resurgence in life and letters. They had tailored the crisis mentality to their own prodi-
gious interest in craft and so minimized the literary significance of the dilemmas which writers 
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beyond their immediate scope had struggled with. Thus they decreed the lostness of all previous 
literary generations. 
Between Hemingway and Sherwood Anderson, between Fitzgerald and Sinclair Lewis, there was 
as wide and deep a gulf as there had been between Stephen Crane and Howells. And it was in that 
gulf, something more for these young writers than the familiar dissociation of the American 
generations, that they lived and wrote — proud and stricken in the consciousness of their differ-
ence from their predecessors, from all those who had not shared their intimacy with disaster, from 
all those who spoke out of an innocence the young writers no longer knew, or through a style that 
seemed to them conventional. (NG, 313) 
Kazin's judgement of them is harsh, for he believes that they virtually cannibalized literary 
precedent. Moreover, they held that their effort symbolized the only affirmation possible in a 
world of final renunciations, while in fact it was quite possible to argue the historical logic 
behind their aesthetic ethos. 
Kazin's view of literary modernism is clearly at odds with the idea of a teleological motif in 
American literary history. Prewar visions of utopia gave way to the literary experience of 
dystopia. The possibilities for a new language, which the war had opened up and which the 
modernists gratefully made use of, moved the modernists to think that their aesthetic radicalism 
corresponded with an equally authoritative spiritual gospel. Kazin, however, finds the spiritual 
message of modernism deadly sterile. There was too wide a gulf between a "Midwestern 
childhood" and the political and cultural desperation of war-torn Europe, and American expatri-
ates were caught on the horns of this dilemma. Bom in the 1890s, when modem literature in 
America was celebrating its first triumphs, the modernist writers too easily believed that they 
had vanquished the traditional dilemmas of that literature and, moreover, that these had been 
consigned to a past from which the war had effectively shut them off. They were deft players 
at ultimate sensations and emotions, but unable to look beyond the moment of their tragedy. 
Posing as the disillusioned and the dispossessed, they were apologists of their mental outlook. 
This was one explanation for their lack of interest in reclaiming the prewar literary heritage. 
Another was that they were highly impatient with previous modes of esthetic consciousness. As 
Kazin repeatedly notes, modernism gravitated toward clues about modem man's state which 
were abysmal. Its most glaring deficiency was its lack of moral force, and it was prey to a 
defeating solipsism: 
In its own mind the lost generation was not merely lost in the world; it was lost from all the other 
generations in America. It was a fateful loss and perhaps a willing loss, no tragedy for them there; 
but it was part of the general sense of loss, the conviction by which they wrote (and experienced 
the world, as if by different senses), which gave them so epic a self-consciousness. ... what was 
so significant about these writers from the first was that they were able to convince others that in 
writing the story of their generation, they were in some sense describing the situation of contem-
porary humanity. It was the positiveness of their disinheritance, the very glitter of their dis-
illusionment, the surface perfection of a disbelief that was like the texture of Hemingway's novels, 
that made them so magnetic an influence, in manners as well as in literature. ... they had seized 
the contemporary moment and made it their own; and as they stood among the ruins, calling the 
ruins the world, they seemed so authoritative in their dispossession, seemed to bring so much craft 
to its elucidation, that it was easy to believe that all the roads really had led up to them — that a 
Hemingway could record "the disappearance of the human soul in our time." (NG, 314-5) 
In much the same way that Kazin finds the naturalist tracts of the Thirties a mark-down from 
the aesthetic revolution of the Twenties, so he also introduces a hierarchy of literary values in 
a comparative study of three prominent modernists. He responds to Fitzgerald's soothing 
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nostalgia and to Hemingway's "psychological interest in fortitude," but finds that Dos Passos's 
mental economy reflected no less than the degradation of the socialist idea in the twentieth 
century. Dos Passos's U.S.A. marks the fundamental incompatibility of the modernist ethos with 
liberal social ideology. It pictures the moral vision of socialism falling apart under the pressure 
of modernist techniques, and Kazin concludes that "the defeatism of the lost generation has 
been... transferred by [Dos Passos] from persons to society itself' (NG, 341). 
In Hemingway, Kazin encounters the "most deliberate art of the day" (NG, 327) bound up 
with the ritual of purification. Hemingway assumed that in "preserving and refining [his] art" 
the artist might rid his identity of extra-literary ballast. In Our Time presented the young writer 
"in his early twenties, [for whom] the criticism of society had gone so deep that life seemed an 
abstraction; it was something one discounted by instinct and distrusted by habit" {NG, 328). Of 
course, social retreat was not an optimum condition for exploring a collective, imaginative 
destiny, viz. for a sense of nationality in letters. 
Hemingway was an early American instance of what Cushing Strout has called the 
'Voracious" imagination, which devours the moral design of '4he world" and replaces it with the 
rigorous but arbitrary ordering of a private aesthetic sensibility.73 Of course, Kazin rejects this 
as a denial of historical telos. He holds that Hemingway highlighted his native experience 
mainly through abrasive images of violence and degradation. Hemingway's war experience 
destroyed any interest in a moral consensus about the national life. He greeted nationalist 
sentiments with the sardonic image of Nick Adams potting German soldiers at Mons. The writer 
Hemingway evinced the psychology of a patrol in ambush: an extreme situation demanded 
extreme courage and extreme solutions. And whether the location was Caporetto or Michigan, 
that mentality was always the same. Hemingway responded to the public life as if he were 
parrying an enemy raid. There is a striking proliferation of death imagery in In Our Time, which 
title seemed to suggest Hemingway's lack of interest in the history of writing, as well as in A 
Farewell lo Arms. Survival in the present, Kazin concludes, seems to have little to do with 
creating a future. Hemingway gave short shrift to the liberals' interest in moral and evolutionary 
configurations of historical experience which had characterized prewar literature. His hero Krebs 
acquired a definite "nausea in regard to experience 'that is the result of untruth or 
exaggeration'" (quoted in NG, 329). Accordingly, Nick-Rinaldi-Adams resorted to a "separate 
peace" and social exile. 
That peace could be preserved only through utmost dedication to a Thoreauvian nature 
poetics. Hemingway's ambition for "a fourth and a fifth dimension" to be realized in prose 
symbolized his monumental artistic self-assurance, and to Kazin this is proof of the tremendous 
acceleration that has marked modern literary consciousness in America. He stresses that this has 
involved partial annihilation of literary precedents and gutted the tradition. Hemingway is seen 
to have modelled himself in varying degrees on Twain's Huckleberry Finn, Anderson's moody 
search for a psychological code, and Stein's interest in writing as experimental perception, and 
then to have moved beyond them, interested only in finding the style to match his own highly 
calibrated attitude of disillusionment. The tradition of modernism was marked by instability. It 
did not include the authority of the past. Even though Hemingway professed an admiration for 
Twain, 
he had no basic relation to any prewar culture.... Hemingway learned to write in a literary 
environment that could not remember 1913. Even the literary revolution that found its appointed 
heir in him, an avant-garde forever posing under its Picasso, and talking modernism with a 
Midwestern accent, could not long claim him. Once Hemingway had learned the principles and 
tricks of his art, made a literary personality out of the Midwestern athlete, soldier, and foreign 
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correspondent, created a new hero Гог the times in the romantically disillusioned posy dandy, he 
went his own way in his search for "the real thing." (NG, 333) 
The next phase in Hemingway's literary evolution was the attempt to establish the poetically 
felt nihilism of his earlier work as a suitable revolutionary social rationale to stem the ravages 
of the Depression. In that capacity, so Kazin argues, he was to become a false prophet to the 
naturalist writers of the Thirties. For one thing, Hemingway "brought a major art to a minor 
vision of life, and it is as important to measure the vision as it is to appreciate the art" (NG, 
332). He never made the connection with the receding prewar world of social ideas and moral 
vision. Kazin notes that the Hemingway who wrote the unsatisfactory novel To Have and Have 
Not (1937) "was an angry and confused writer who had been too profoundly disturbed by the 
social and economic crisis to be indifferent, but could find no clue in his education by which to 
understand it.... this new crisis had to be endured with something more than artistic fortitude..." 
(NG, 336-7) Significantly, Harry Morgan, the novel's hero, is both "passionately eager for 
human fellowship and contemptuous of it" (NG, 337). 
Kazin's indictment of Hemingway's latter-day social conscience becomes particularly vivid 
when he mimics Hemingway's style. In For Whom the Bell Tolls, Robert Jordan is 
the Hemingway guerrilla dying a separate death as once he had made a separate peace, the last of 
the Hemingway heroes enjoying the final abnegation, and now the least impressive. That separate 
death and abnegation were all there before, and they were very good before. Good when the 
hunter was alone in the hills, the matador before his bull, the quail skimming through the air. 
Good when Gertrude Stein could teach a young man fresh from the war to write perfect sentences, 
and the triumph of art was equal to the negation of life. Good when the world could seem like a 
Hemingway novel; and the "I" was the emblem of all the disillusionment and fierce pride in a 
world so brilliant in its sickness; and the sentences were so perfect, spanning the darkness. It did 
not matter then that the art could be so fresh and brilliant, the life below its superb texture so arid 
and dark.... But if it did not matter then, it matters now... (NG, 339-40) 
History, so Kazin believes, has eroded the modernist ethos. The Hemingway code was good for 
the blustering confidence of the Twenties, which could afford to be casual about the devaluation 
of life in art. In the Twenties, the satisfactions of art, of meticulous devotion to the structuring 
imagination, were counted on to compensate for its lack of a sustaining philosophy of life. 
Hemingway never achieved the affirmation of life which he was working toward in his socially 
conscious period. Robert Jordan remains the symbol of Hemingway's own "anarchical individu­
alism." Hemingway's protagonists do not crystallize that community of values which Kazin 
thinks indispensable in the face of the contemporary crisis: they remain apart and proclaim their 
individual emancipation from the pressing cares of the world. Yet, Kazin believes that, by the 
same token, they sealed their own inadequacy before the problems facing them. They had 
renounced their faith in a collective destiny — of social life as the setting of justice and spiritual 
fulfillment — too radically for Robert's belated conversion to work. Kazin concludes that 
Hemingway's 
is a triumph in and of a narrow, local, and violent world — and never superior to it.... 
Hemingway is the bronze god of the wholly contemporary literary experience in America. Yet in 
a sense he marks an end as clearly as he once marked a beginning. If we consider how the whole 
lost-generation conception of art and society reached its climax in him, and how much that 
conception was the brilliant and narrow concentration of the individualism and alienation from 
society felt by the artist in the twenties, it is clear that Hemingway's stubbornly atomic view of 
life is the highest expression of the postwar sequence, not a bridge to the future. (NG, 340, 341) 
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It was an unfortunate but irreversible development that the militant new naturalists of the 
Thirties were attracted to Hemingway's aesthetics of violence without finding a social philos-
ophy of corresponding vitality in it. John Dos Passos's work was even more of a liability to 
Kazin's thesis. In his dual capacity of modernist writer and radical social critic, Dos Passos, as 
Kazin is well aware, was the composite hero of two highly dissimilar literary generations. The 
social and aesthetic texture of U.S.A. raised expectations of reviving the literary socialism of 
before the First World War. Kazin believes Dos Passos's literary career illustrated the disad-
vantages of the polarized political atmosphere in which much of the writing of the Thirties took 
place. 
We do well not to minimize Kazin's attempt to separate Dos Passos's real creative stature 
from the implications of nihilism in his work. The most radically committed writer of his 
generation, Dos Passos exemplified for Kazin the dilemmas of the social intelligence seeking to 
establish some kind of continuity from modernism. His radicalism was powerless to find an 
appropriate medium for its social message. Quite unintentionally, he embodied the concentration 
of the destructive, anti-social forces at work in modernism. The writer with the most outspoken 
social ideas of his generation appeared unable to dramatize them in his fiction. Dos Passos's 
career — at the time of On Native Grounds's inception he turned sharp right — illustrated the 
progressive erosion of values, not merely communal, in the tradition of modernism from 
Fitzgerald, via Hemingway, to Dos Passos himself. 
Kazin believes the sources of Dos Passos's socialism are beyond reproach. Yet, he clearly 
believes that U.S.A. is lacking in poetic Dichtung. It denies the fraternity and solidarity basic to 
socialism. Kazin argues that Dos Passos 
has not Hemingway's grace, his need to make so dark and tonal a poetry of defeat; he centers 
everything around the inviolability of the individual, his sanctity. The separation of the individual 
from society in Hemingway may be irrevocable, but it is tragically felt; his cynicism can seem so 
flawless and dramatic only because it mocks itself. In Dos Passos that separation is organic and 
self-willed: the mind has made its refusal, and the fraternity that it seeks and denies in the same 
voice can never enter into it. 
Dos Passos's aesthetic version of the operations of modern capitalist society disqualified him 
from effective criticism of it. He offered the cultivation of the individual sensibility and 
conscience as the ulterior road to social salvation. His "need to save the individual from society 
rather than to establish him in or over it" showed that his aestheticism was incompatible with 
his social interest. In Kazin's historical thesis of American democratic literature, such 
"overscrupulous withdrawal" (NG, 344) from any kind of compromise with existing social 
reality is a distinct liability. 
Kazin locates Dos Passos in the tradition of native radicalism, which he thinks is a valuable 
alternative to the ideology of Marxist scientific historicism. Dos Passos's radicalism never 
developed into an operative social force, however, because the "human self in Dos Passos is the 
Emersonian individual, not Hemingway's agonist" (NG, 342). For Kazin to call this a throwback 
to Emersonianism means, in the light of the contemporary literary situation, to stress its anti-
social metaphysics. Hemingway achieved a poetically sanctioned and hence tragic separation 
from the social compact. Consequently, the development of Robert Jordan's personality took the 
form of an "education." The Dos Passos hero, by contrast, flinched from the experience of 
ordeal and purgation. He could muster no redemptive vision beyond the strategy of self-preser-
vation. The feeble morale of this serene Emersonian protectiveness contrasts with Hemingway's 
ability to reclaim a meaningful sense of selfhood from confrontations with the existing social 
world. What Kazin locates at the heart of Dos Passos's work is a mistaken faith in Emersonian 
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self-trust as a modem political virtue. Hemingway's agonism — a person's willingness to face 
radical conflict in order to compel the course of their individual fate — holds out a more 
humane prospect of the future than Dos Passos's radical aesthetics, which identified history with 
social and moral decline.74 
Kazin's account criticises the contemporary consensus that U.S.A. was the perfection of 
aesthetic vision in the tradition of social radicalism. He rather emphasises that for Dos Passos 
"the modern equation cancels out to zero" (NG, 344). The Hemingway agonist's experience of 
purification is wholly missing from U.S.A. The book does not support a heroic conception of 
life, nor does it project a redemptive conception of man's possible stake in history. Neither 
society nor democracy survive as vital moral propositions. In addition, the historical logic of 
U.S.A. rejects the idea of cultural nationality explored in On Native Grounds: the book ends on 
the bitter observation that "All right we are two nations." Dos Passos believed that America's 
historical exceptionalism — the faith that the national history expressed a constant evolution 
towards an inclusive democratic ideal — had become a vicious illusion. Kazin finds that U.S.A. 
epitomizes the Lost Generation's "measure of the national life [and] its conception of history" 
(NG, 358): "It transformed his growingly irritable but persistently romantic obsession with the 
poet's struggle against the world into a use of the class struggle as his base in art.... the old 
romantic polarity had become a social polarity, and America lay irrevocably split in his mind 
between the owners and the dispossessed..." (NG, 351) U.S.A. displays the tragic discrepancy in 
Dos Passos's mind between the national ethos as an anterior, poetic ideal and its historical 
actuality, and Kazin assumes that this moved Dos Passos to espouse the frankly nostalgic 
Jeffersonian libertarianism informing The Ground We Stand On (1941). An interpretation of 
political and intellectual history, this book furnished a retreat to America's "storybook 
democracy." It also showed Dos Passos's distrust of collectivism, sparked off, it is true, by his 
personal experience of murderous Communist chicanery in wartime Barcelona, but which 
equally extended to the cynical bureaucratic management of modern social development at 
home. All too often, Dos Passos's interpretation of society stressed the martial aspect it pres-
ented to the finely tuned conscience and sensibility of the protagonist-isolato. The latter pre-
sumably managed to preserve intact certain values whose significance only he, as a poet-rebel 
and a dissenting radical, understood. Kazin concludes that the moral tradition which Dos Passos 
pursued in his work proved no more inclusive than, and as ineffectual historically as, the mental 
currency of individual anarchism. The dissenting voice became a standard feature in Dos 
Passos's aesthetic sensibility. The body of his work, so Kazin concludes, has become not an 
effort at historical understanding but a flight into the American tradition of principled anti-
authoritarian ethics. While it may have suggested the vista of a usable past to him personally, 
Dos Passos's defence of the poet-anarchist as a politically virtuous person undermined the 
liberal-evolutionary conception of history as well as the possibility of a broad, progressive, 
social consensus. Therefore, Kazin turns Dos Passos's condemnation of Veblen — "he could not 
get his mouth round the essential yes" — back on the accuser: 
And no more can Dos Passos. U.S.A. is a study in the history of modem society, of its social 
struggles and great masses; but it is a history of defeat. There are no flags for the spirit in it, and 
no victory save the mind's silent victory that integrity can acknowledge to itself. It is one of the 
saddest books ever written by an American. (NG, 352) 
The autobiographical transfer which in Hemingway's work made for a violent assertion of 
integrity in the face of public degradation, and which to some extent determined Dos Passos's 
hostility to the undiscriminating apologists of power, both right and left, partially redeemed F. 
Scott Fitzgerald's literary career. Whereas other members of his literary generation enacted their 
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misgiving that artistic values will break down upon contact with social reality, Fitzgerald 
actually lived and wrote in the eye of the sumptuous, reckless world. The Actional drama of his 
work records this consciousness to a degree. By the logic of his generation, Fitzgerald should 
have expressed the post-Versailles disillusionment and joined its general disgust of the vocife-
rous, bragging assertions of postwar life in America. He managed, however, to avoid disparag-
ing the native civilization, which was becoming a popular pastime, and to turn it into the theatre 
of a grand, if irrevocably self-divided, vision. The vicissitudes of his own personal life enabled 
him to identify America with the poignant ambivalence of his own aspirations as an artist and 
citizen. 
In the last analysis, Jay Gatsby is the product of a romantic faith in history. Hemingway's 
protagonists, by contrast, usually disclaim historical antecedents or sentiments: they are com-
mitted to survival in the present. Kazin argues that Gatsby-Fitzgerald admittedly sprang from 
"his own Platonic conception of himself." Both Gatsby's and Fitzgerald's careers registered the 
tragic drama of self and history in contemporary America. Yet, Gatsby, although his antecedents 
are decidedly vague, retrieves the idea of providential history and matches it with the radiant 
optimism of his own faith in Daisy's continued loyalty. Gatsby is a missionary. He symbolizes 
the possibility of a redemptive note in our modern, jaded, ironic, historical consciousness. He 
has a vision, albeit a tenuous vision, for it crumbles upon contact with the proliferating evil that 
has infected the historical scene beyond Gatsby's naively restricted purview. He has carried his 
innocence straight into the historical world, which is a veritable booby-trap for the unknowing. 
And, strictly speaking, Gatsby has no knowledge of the historical world, for that would have 
forced him to recognise the foolishness of his romanticism. Unaware of the viciousness around 
him, he ends up getting himself killed, but this is not to say that his vision expires along with 
him. There has been a subtle but nonetheless significant transfer of spirit between Gatsby, the 
Proteus of history, and Nick Carraway, its chorus. The moral fable which Gatsby's fate is to 
Nick makes him decide to return home, to the West beyond the Ohio. Fitzgerald's resolution 
barely manages to escape the despair of resignation, but it does after all. Nick Carraway may 
find himself compelled to part mentally with the aggressive moral decline which is history in the 
East, but his retreat to his native area is not an abdication from Gatsby's faith. He continues to 
believe in it, albeit that his faith is a much chastened version of Gatsby's. Nick's insight will 
flower in a different situation, some other time. The moral certitudes of his own youth and his 
poignant remembrance of Gatsby's tragedy will mix in with the appeal of Gatsby's original 
vision. In fact, Nick's moral consciousness gives that anti-historical vision a basis in the rich 
ambiguity of historical experience. 
Kazin's reading of The Great Gatsby denies Fitzgerald such historical penetration. He claims 
that its vision in fact testifies to a hollowness of belief. Presumably, this inner divisiveness 
announced itself as early as in This Side of Paradise, where Fitzgerald's gift for dramatizing his 
literary genius reflected an irritable self-consciousness but did not manage to put its perceptions 
to the moral use of creating a compelling image of history. His work offers only a tentative 
solution to the dominant issues of modem American literary history, because "there was a 
persistent tension in Fitzgerald between what his mind knew and what his spirit adhered to; 
between his disillusionment and his irrevocable respect for the power and the glory of the world 
he described... he was preeminently a part of the world his mind was always disowning" (NG, 
319, 318). 
Kazin's emphasis on the absorptive power, the porousness, and the excitability of Fitzgerald's 
mind argues Fitzgerald's powerlessness to understand his world and his need to make it respond 
to the requirements of his own personal romanticism. Fitzgerald's undeniable talent expressed 
itself in sharply etched observations on the glamour, the effeteness, and the depravity of the 
postwar world. Its comparative failure was that it seemed to work only on images of poignance 
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and dissolution. Kazin finds that there is preciously little in Fitzgerald's work that suggests a 
consciously pursued commitment to life's moral design, to a faith that the imagination may 
secure one's spiritual destiny. As it was, Fitzgerald was too much a child of the insouciant 
ahistoricism of his time. His very life reflected and amplified the major flaw in his fictional 
work: "He became too much a legend in himself, too easily a fragment of history rather than a 
contributor to it" (NG, 316). 
Kazin bestows ambivalent praise on The Great Gatsby. The book was not "in any sense a 
major tragedy," yet it was the result of an attempt to work out "a conflict that would [have] 
paralyzefd] other [writers]" (NG, 321, 320). He believes that the book captured the self-
dividedness of American historical faith. It shows a kind of openness to the ambiguity of 
experience which the contemporary new naturalists and proletarian writers, with their 
programmatic insistence on social fact, looked on with suspicion. Fitzgerald's achievement was 
nevertheless wholly in the realm of consciousness, not of deliverance. Registering the downward 
pull of his world both in his books and in his life, he yet remained part of that world and he 
could not establish himself over it. Kazin's objection to The Great Gatsby is that Gatsby's final 
but momentary penetration into the depths of his illusion in fact reflected Fitzgerald's own 
indecision about a social setting whose ethics he knew to be objectionable. 
Kazin assumes there was a substantial amount of transfer between Fitzgerald the man and his 
fictional creation Gatsby. That is why he withholds the book itself tragic status. The poignance 
of Gatsby's collapse suggests a greater spiritual magnitude than he ever dramatized in his life-
time, and Kazin believes this testifies to Fitzgerald's personal need to stress the heroism of his 
writership. The "playboy's rare apotheosis" was "all the more moving precisely because all of 
Gatsby's life was summed up in it, precisely because his decline and death gave a meaning to 
his life that it had not in itself possessed.... Here was the chagrin, the waste of the American 
success story in the Twenties..." (NG, 321) Here the writer's fictional world prefigures his 
personal destiny. Gatsby's moth-like attraction to Daisy's "green light" is made to stand for 
Fitzgerald's own ambiguous relation to the irreversible process of history. Gatsby's dream of 
life's perennial promise, of the "orgiastic future," had made him blind to the fact that the future 
must necessarily derive its impact and sanction from the accumulated experience of the past. 
Significantly, Kazin cites the last sentence of the book as a reminder to all modernist writers 
that they cannot and ought not consider themselves exempt from the responsibility of taking up 
the integral burden of the past. 
Seen in this light, Fitzgerald's career enacted a process of erosion. Kazin summarily dis-
misses Tender Is the Night as a profusion of technical feats "lavished... upon a world of pure 
emptiness" (NG, 322). And it is not surprising that he sees Fitzgerald's odyssee of his boyhood 
world completed in The Crack-Up. Only in The Last Tycoon, he observes, can we "appreciate 
how much closer Fitzgerald could come than most modern American novelists to fulfillment, of 
a kind" (NG, 323). 
Applied to the immediate conditions of his creator's personal life, Gatsby's defeat illustrates 
the tragedy of modern writership in America. The success story of the Twenties generation of 
writers, who struck the public with a dazzling display of craft and a sense of style that appar-
ently assumed the substance of philosophy, in fact aborted a considerable tradition of social 
concern in American letters. They broke with the literary tradition of the native social intelli-
gence and so confirmed the historical dissociation of literary generations in America. Their 
example minimized the significance of the past, so that those who came after were tempted to 
commit the very same errors that in the 1880s and 1890s had established the pathology of 
modern American writing. As a result, the traditional function of literature in America — to 
find spiritual fulfillment in creating an intelligent and viable sense of environment — would be 
either trivialized or absolutized.75 
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Coda 
The new naturalists of the Thirties almost predictably took the wrong cue from the literary 
history of the Twenties. Looking for a consciously social perspective after a decade of individ-
ualism and social retreat in literature, they overcompensated and became champions of a literary 
ethics that would support radical social doctrine. They regarded social realism as an instrument 
toward social truth. The hardships of the Depression led them to believe that the truth was easy 
to see and they presumed to disseminate it in gross transcriptions of contemporary social 
degradation. To them, the "pure art" of their bourgeois predecessors mocked the seriousness of 
their social activism and was hence to be regarded with utmost suspicion. As militant social 
ideologists and naturalists, they were constitutionally averse to the complexity of literary 
observation characteristic of the Jamesian sensibility. Their truth was simple and they saw it leak 
out of the pores of social decay. Their delight in using the grossest possible effects for social 
exposé proved that, fifty years after its appearance on the American scene, naturalism still failed 
to meet elementary literary responsibilities. Artistic truth was still being subordinated to social 
imperatives to be achieved by political means. Kazin concludes that the evolution of the literary 
character in America has been a perpetual drama of vacillating between the poles of aesthetic 
craft and social concern. 
On Native Grounds was written in order to expose the tragic wastefulness of this process. 
Kazin expected to salvage a progressive historical sensibility from the American literary record, 
but on one historical occasion only did this synthesis promise to emerge, and that was during the 
pre-War resurgence of social liberalism and radical literary experiment. Kazin's account ofthat 
movement maintains an ambivalent note of vicarious involvement as well as elegy, but it ends 
rather abruptly in disapproval over its failure to sustain the liberal spirit of social and intellectual 
reform at a time when the political experience was shot through with the cynicism that followed 
upon the War and the rout of the social utopia. The debacle of literary socialism in 1917 proved 
to Kazin that liberalism had relied too explicitly on the evolutionary, progressive character of 
history. It had relied too explicitly on the findings of the scientific social intelligence and 
generally ignored the fact that the quality of the social experience depends on the responsible 
cultivation of the personal world. Kazin finds that it relates only tangentially to On Native 
Grounds' effort to explain the sheer diversity of the modem American literary experience as 
reflections of a unified, complex, native consciousness, a consciousness which had historically 
been preoccupied with Utopian visions of the social experience. That unified consciousness had 
yet to grow at the time of the book's inception. Mark van Doren, for one, agreed with Kazin 
that "some perennial blunder keeps being made" in American literature.76 Actually, Kazin 
claims that only a significant effort in critical revaluation can uncover the shared basis of all 
literary generations in the native experience. 
Towards the end of On Native Grounds there occurs an evocative poetic passage reminiscent 
of the closing paragraphs of Joyce's "The Dead," which enunciates in a ponderous rhythm that 
"the pressure of the times... beats upon all of us... and all our culture." The crisis of the 
democratic West affects Eliot, Hemingway, Joyce, and Proust alike: 
it beats upon the ardors and the accidents, the laborious struggles for realism and realization that 
make up our modem American literature; it beats equally upon the modernism that dazzled the 
world between the wars and the facile expiation that would wipe it all away. It beats upon us in 
America as it beats upon all the nations and all the living and the dead... The world seems to be 
waiting, waiting for its new order; everything we do, everything we believe in this moment of 
climacteric, can help to shape the future toward which men are moving in such agony today. (NG, 
518) 
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And confusion. For Kazin believes that the renewed historical interest in American culture 
toward the end of the Thirties represented an amorphous and uncritical search for roots, for the 
stable historical substance of American democracy. Much of this affirmative traditionalism, he 
claims, was merely a species of whistling in the dark and in fact a retreat from the current crisis 
quite as significant as Van Wyck Brooks's increasing intellectual and historical retrenchment. 
At the same time, however, this concern with the recovery of a national culture offered a unique 
opening to "a literature of collective self-consciousness" (NG, 486). At last, historical inquiry 
appeared to be conducted on a basis of native sentiment, "reaching a thunderous climax in an 
effort to seek out the American tradition [my emphasis]," and providing a "significant experi-
ence in national discovery.... Here the intelligence was native, as the subject was its very self' 
(NG, 485, 486). Its complacently affirmative and nostalgic attitude was quite plausible, Kazin 
admits, because "at its center lay a devotion to the heroic example, a need to question contem-
porary failure and demoralization" (NG, 487). The literary relevance of this historical 
stocktaking was obvious, for it provided "the raw stuff of that contemporary mass record which 
so many imaginative spirits tried to depict and failed to master" (NG, 489). In effect, the often 
mechanical literature of national inventory offered to compensate in native consciousness for 
what five decades of imaginative effort had not managed to transform into a living reality. It 
may have supported a frankly emotional and even jingoistic discovery of America, but its real 
significance testifies to an abiding historical need. "For what emerges so unmistakably from the 
enormous descriptive and historical literature of our day is how unready so many writers have 
been to seek its imaginative truth, how lacking they have been in the requisite confidence or 
detachment to dominate as artists what they suffer as citizens seeking to survive" (NG, 490). 
Van Wyck Brooks, in his later phase, employed his unabated public authority as a literary 
historian to claim the culture of Emerson's time as the American mainstream. He was both its 
apologist and advocate. There was not the slightest indication in New England: Indian Summer, 
or even in The Life of Emerson, that Brooks recognised the complicated pattern of transmission 
between the cultural situation of Emerson's day and the explosive contradictions of mass 
democracy in the present. The radiant Olympian assurance he found in Emerson and Allston, in 
John Quincy Adams and Thoreau, in Phillips and Whittier, convinced him that the nineteenth-
century antebellum furnished the tradition, the urgency of which in America he had himself put 
forward with so much creative despair at the time of America's Coming-of-Age. He found in it 
"an image of belief and security." But with it came an intolerance that demanded absolute 
loyalty to a certain past heritage of moral high-mindedness and idealism. Where formerly 
Brooks had argued the effects of alienation and estrangement in the work of Twain and James 
"in a spirit of tragic justification" and so made the American writer's relation to his environment 
the object of a suggestive and illuminating drama, he now excoriated every last vestige of 
estrangement as unpatriotic and indeed a distinct liability to the moral cause of democracy. His 
recovery of the central cultural tradition could hardly fail to result in an unhistorical criticism 
of culture and literature. Kazin detects in Brooks's traditionalism a "self-consciously contem-
porary... American mythology" (NG, 515), a supplication to the past in order to exorcise the 
moral irresponsibility of the present generation. Its desperate appeal to an affirmative literary 
morality shut Brooks off from understanding the internal evolution of modem literature. For 
Kazin believes that even modernism had, in some fashion, helped people to meet the current 
crisis: 
Brooks's intense personal attacks [on the modernists] confused the issue and served no purpose. 
There is sickness in contemporary literature, a very great sickness; but it is hardly self-willed, and 
it is bound up with the situation of contemporary humanity. Brooks, by calling some writers 
"rattlesnakes"... missed the laborious integrity of modem writers, their will to understand, to live, 
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to create insofar as the world will allow them to.... Brooks saw his own morality and belief in 
humanity; he forgot that one does not have to intone a standard to live and write by one, and that 
those who intone too self-righteously may have nothing left but a standard. 
There was nothing in Brooks's attack writers could leam from... (NG, 516, 517) 
Brooks's attempt to straitjacket literature and harness it to the cause of nationalism and democ-
racy both misjudged the present responsibility of a literature threatened by Fascism, which was 
primarily to exercise its moral and spiritual resources for the benefit of creative freedom, and 
reinforced the "call to action and conformism that had been depressingly familiar in literature 
after 1930" (NG, 517). That conformism extended to the somewhat frenzied recovery of a 
national cultural identity towards the end of the Thirties. It was reflected in the contemporary 
demand for a central and at the same time ideal native literary ethos. An identity like this would 
unlock the mysterious depths of the American destiny as well as raise its luminous spiritual 
idealism to the status of a cultural tradition. 
Kazin, now, declares that this search for the token experience in American literature caused 
serious defects in historical understanding, precisely because it did not recognize history as a 
necessary but piecemeal process of emancipation. On Native Grounds offers no remedy save the 
exhortation to refrain from using literature in defence of a particular set of extra-literary values, 
such as Brooks was doing. For the rest, Kazin could do little more than wait for the contempor-
ary world to return of its own accord to "some semblance of order," to restore primary virtues 
to literature and secure "the indivisible moral life of humanity" (NG, 517). A year and a half 
after the publication of On Native Grounds, he produced a lucid exposition of the type of 
historical intelligence which he thought the current situation required. In a review of Henry 
Seidel Canby's Walt Whitman: An American, he heckled the radically vacillating reception 
Whitman had enjoyed in the course of time from such different quarters as Charles Eliot Norton, 
Randolph Bourne, and Ezra Pound. So much of Whitman was still a mystery to the American 
public that Canby had apparently found it necessary to approach him as a problem. Canby 
evidently cared little about Whitman as "a prophetic force in the history of nineteenth-century 
materialism"; he rather saw in him a "moving [American] archetype." Canby was almost 
mechanically tempted to draw contrasts between Whitman and Henry James. Kazin found this 
a "dispiriting" affair, since it tended to 
prolong the stale, thoughtless quarrel between the friends of James and Whitman in our literary 
thought. It is as dispiriting as the recent efforts, by those who know how great an artist Henry 
James was, to make him out a greater "ethical" figure than William James; as dispiriting, 
unphilosophic, useless, as all revivals of that war between the "refiners" and the "commoners" 
which marks our schizoid history. 
When shall we leam that this historic quarrel — like the polar extremes of Jonathan Edwards 
and Franklin, Vachel Lindsay and T.S. Eliot, Henry Miller and Dr. Canby himself— is only one 
strand of the divided American self? The constant search for a true north in our moral history in 
the context of a life so carried on between populism and atomic self-realization, between Europe 
and the frontier, between the weight of our materialism and the vacant magnets of our classic 
idealism, that it is only in the resolution of all its discordant elements that we can even hope for 
resting-places in identity. The more it changes for us in America, the more it's the same hunger. 
All that these tiresome wars of vicarious loyalty do is to reproduce the anxiety for the cultural 
absolute (so that we shall not have to seek others?): to make the longing of our upholstered 
anarchy come true that Whitman is really the American, or Henry James; that Huck Finn will tell 
us no more than Sister Carrie; or that having understood or even shared the delicate tropisms of 
Lambert Strether, we shall not have to listen to the yearning dream of Gene Debs, or the facts of 
Lincoln's fierce friend Hemdon. This does not mean that because West and East are so often 
inversions of each other we do not have to sacrifice and to choose. But at least let us remember 
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that it is not we who are separate, but the different ways in which we always come back to the 
unity of the dream-myth (and Whitman had a hand in that); just as it is not we who ever shape the 
American process, but the disproportion between our techniques and our human means.77 
Kazin's stated purpose in writing On Native Grounds is therefore to furnish a historical and 
critical idiom that will resolve the "discordant elements" of America's moral history and so to 
create an indivisible relation between literature — as progressive moral elucidation — and 
historical responsibility. 
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Part 2 
A SELF DISCOVERED 

Walking the Open Road 
The Historical Background 
One almost anonymous occurrence in wartime London revealed to Kazin that the Western 
liberal democracies' political opposition to Fascism was at a low ebb. He was shocked by the 
newspaper report of the suicide in 1943 of Shmuel Ziegelboim, who had been the representative 
of the Jewish Workers Bund in the Polish Cabinet in exile. The report had included a letter from 
Ziegelboim's hand to the President of Poland and to Prime Minister Sikorsky, in which he 
mentioned the horrible truth of the Endlosung then running at the peak of its destructive power. 
The letter was both an accusation and an act of faith: 
I must... state that although the Polish government has in a high degree contributed to the 
enlistment of world opinion, it has yet done so insufficiently. It has not done anything that could 
correspond to the magnitude of the drama being enacted now in Poland.... 
I cannot be silent — I cannot live — while remnants of the Jewish people in Poland, of whom 
I am a representative, are perishing. My comrades in the Warsaw ghetto took weapons in their 
hands on that last heroic impulse. It was not my destiny to die there together with them, and in 
their mass graves. By my death I wish to express my strongest protest against the inactivity with 
which the world is looking on and permitting the extermination of my people. 
Aerial photography of the Oswiçem sites had already given some indication of what was going 
on, but Allied vacillation over bombing supply routes to the camps stood out in bold relief when 
Ziegelboim's declaration was released to the world. Kazin pressed the issue with an article in 
the New Republic, "In Every Voice, In Every Ban," explaining the terrifying burden 
Ziegelboim's letter placed on all people of avowed liberal views. The article became a searing 
denunciation of contemporary liberal culture. He pointed out that Ziegelboim's desperate sense 
of guilt had resulted from a "terrible... break in human solidarity." Kazin understood 
Ziegelboim's decision: 
I honestly believe that he was thinking not only of his own people at the end, but of the 
hollowness of a world in which such a massacre could have so little meaning. In any event I 
should like to think that I am more "fortunate" — that is, relatively untouched and able to think 
about what freedom is. And that is why I bring the matter up now, as a token of what Shmuel 
Ziegelboim died for, and in an effort to say some very elementary things which liberals especially 
have not always cared to face.... something has already been done — and not by the Nazis — 
which can never be undone, except as we seek to understand it and grow human again (or 
expectant, or merely wise) through it. For the tragedy is in our minds, in the basic quality of our 
personal culture; and that is why it will be the tragedy of the peace. The tragedy lies in the quality 
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of our belief — not in the lack of it, but in the unconsciousness or the dishonesty of it; and above 
all in the merely political thinking, the desperate and unreal optimism, with which we try to cover 
up the void in ourselves. 
Never in history had there been "so much self-deception about our essential goodness or our 
dream of 'social security', so little philosophic (or moral) searching of the lies our hopes build 
on our lack of community, as there is today." Materialism is the blight of any moral culture, 
Kazin explained, but in the present situation it was more nearly universal than ever: 
it is above all the materialism of all those... who want only to live and let live, to have the good 
life back — and who think that you can dump three million helpless Jews into your furnace, and 
sigh in the genuine impotence of your undeniable regret, and then build Europe back again.... 
where so great a murder has been allowed, no one is safe.' 
To Kazin, Allied indifference toward the Holocaust showed like nothing else the moral 
bankruptcy of contemporary liberalism. He was not the only one to see a connection between 
the state of the liberal mind and the fate of the Jews, though no one else framed the indictment 
with such conviction and outrage. When, after the war, the true scope of the Destruction filtered 
down in public consciousness, this caused widespread skepticism about political solutions, 
particularly of the liberal kind. Jews had been exterminated simply because of their identity as 
Jews, regardless of any ascertainable political objectives. Whether defined in religious, ethnic, 
cultural, social, or metaphysical terms, the issue of the Jewish identity was not so easily 
capturable in current political categories. Quite the contrary, it stirred up a public controversy 
in the United States which centred on the question why Jews should so frequently have been the 
object of the distempers of Western civilization. When democracy gave way in Germany and 
Italy, and when Stalin consolidated all political power within the Polit Bureau, the Jews became 
subject to vicious repression. The fact seemed unaccountable, and the effect of the Holocaust 
was an intellectual crisis. Many intellectuals had no views on the subject, while those who faced 
it began to digest the moral tragedy involved only much later. 
But the faster time carried us away from it, the closer the gas came. It stole up our skin without 
our always knowing it. It was total, the inescapable crime lying across the most documented 
century in history. People in the millions could be considered superfluous. Lenin had first 
propounded this. The Jews as a people were now the most concentrated and direct example. 
Certainly they were not the only ones. But the abyss was at our feet because we believed in 
nothing so much as what Trilling called "the life of the mind." The life of the mind was of no use 
unless it addressed itself to the gas. And what then?2 
Kazin's observation is made against the background of the rise to cultural authority in the 
Fifties of many liberals who turned revisionists of their own former radicalism. Foremost among 
them was Lionel Trilling. The immediate effect of Trilling's attempt to fuse liberal politics and 
the imagination in the Fifties was to brand much of the recent history of political radicalism in 
the United States as the product of misguided intellectual idealism and sheer disregard for 
cultural complexity. Trilling's "exquisite sense of accommodation," so Kazin believed, habitual-
ly dissolved the matter of morals and politics in the maze of his own fine-spun intellectual 
analysis. Imperatives of political action broke down under the insistent and unsparing examin-
ation of motives. The upshot of Trilling's critique of liberalism was to mcntalize whatever 
political situation happened to emerge, identifying liberal political activism with moral myopia. 
Kazin's objection was that in the long run Trilling's genius for accommodation only served the 
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conservative cause and failed to outline options for a politics of idealism and old-fashioned 
humanitarianism. 
Kazin's quarrel with Trilling was conducted on the fringes of a wider debate within the 
intellectual community. Intellectuals recognized that the political realities in Germany and Russia 
caused a moral and metaphysical crisis in the Marxist vision of history. For one thing, Marx's 
predictions appeared to have been misleading: the quality of postrevolutionary society in Russia 
was questionable, to say the least, and Hitler's rise in Germany had mocked Marx's faith in the 
historical function of a revolutionary vanguard of intellectuals. Both the Communist Party's 
consolidation of power in the Soviet Union and National Socialism in Germany were based on 
a violent contempt for intellectual and political independence. Whether to support Stalin or 
Fascism was a matter of Hobson's choice. Stalinist politics institutionalized the totalitarian 
aspects of Leninism; it was light-years removed from Marx's own profound personal and 
intellectual culture. And as for Hitlerism: it staggered contemporary political observers, regard-
less whether they were on the Left or not, to see moribund bourgeois liberalism in Germany 
recover and take on a new assertiveness. At least till evidence was given at Stalingrad that the 
new German system had its weak spots, too, there raged a serious polemic among intellectuals, 
particularly around Partisan Review, whether Hitler Germany was not actually a new historical 
phase of Western capitalist-industrial society, one that Marx had failed to account for. In other 
words, was not the Third Reich the beginning of post-Marxist civilization in the Western world? 
The debate proved less productive of answers than history itself. Kazin did not mix in it. He 
believed that such theories of the modern state were finally irrelevant to the singlemost import-
ant fact to be noted about the world scene from 1933 till 1945, namely that the rise of the 
totalitarian state called for a revised metaphysics of experience, of consciousness even. Marx's 
vision of reconstructed man was the most significant victim of the new historical formations of 
the modern political state. For Stalinist and Fascist totalitarianism derived their power from the 
most cutting denial of man's ability, apostrophised by William Blake, to put all his resources in 
a creative relation with the world. Indeed, immediately after the war Kazin was to become 
fascinated with Blake's poetic image of man and to see in him the prophet of a reclaimed, 
spiritual radicalism. "In Every Voice" took its title from Blake's "London," and although it is 
primarily a complaint against liberal inaction during the massacre of the Jews, it reaches beyond 
political moralism to an indictment of modern liberal culture itself. Kazin put forward that, if 
the European Jews were really no more than pawns in Allied military strategy, then the tradition 
of Western humanism was jeopardized. As early as 1941 he had told the literary Communist 
Granville Hicks that Stalinism was "a symbol of our contemporary mind and slow degenera-
tion." His diary records his conviction that it denied "the great moral content of the revolution-
ary drive [, that is to say,] the will to remake history..." Postwar political and sociological 
studies of Fascism established many parallels with the purposes of political terror in Stalinist 
Russia, and this confirmed Kazin's view in "In Every Voice" that both systems were nourished 
in the same moral nihilism. Totalitarianism thrived on the subjection of individual freedom, of 
individual consciousness even, to the exigencies of power.3 
Kazin was one of the first intellectuals in America to point to the inadequacies of a merely 
sociological interpretation of totalitarianism. He believed it reflected the ultimate stage of the 
modern mind's voracious and destructive will, which categorized the world across a spectrum 
of dynamic ideas. The appeal of Hitler and Stalin in their respective historical backgrounds was 
made possible by the moral paralysis on the part of those people who were desperate enough to 
lend their support to absolute solutions only, and who believed their leaders were cutting the 
cancer out of society. For a long time, also many American liberal intellectuals were prepared 
to believe this. They held that Stalin had struck a pre-emptive strike against political revisionism 
and that Hitler sought to boost political morale and national unity in the Weimar Republic. 
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Particularly they shared in the "self-deception about our essential goodness"; they rationalized 
the public indifference to a "philosophic (or moral) searching of the lies [which] our hopes build 
on our lack of community..." It had turned out that the imperatives of the Bolshevist revolution 
in Russia and the sociopolitical reconstruction of bourgeois liberalism in Germany had made the 
Jews a political anomaly. In the Soviet Union as in Germany, an ideology of social power 
quashed all opposition as forms of deviationism. In its support for totalitarian solutions, the 
modem mind showed its most obvious limitation: its fear of intellectual doubt. This infested the 
radicalism of both the Left and the Right. What followed was the liberal's abdication from the 
right to exercise his freedom of mind and to protect serious ideas from degenerating into 
intellectual myths. In short, Kazin claimed that the rise of totalitarianism was made possible by 
the liberals' loss of political conviction. The failure of social democracy was nowhere clearer 
than in Germany: 
Something has been set forth in Europe that is subtle, and suspended, and destructive... That 
something is all our silent complicity in the massacre of the Jews (and surely not of them alone...). 
For it means that we are not ashamed of what they have been this time, and are therefore not 
prepared for the further outbreaks of fascism which are so deep in all of us. It means that we still 
do not realize why 
In every Infant's cry of fear, 
In every cry of every Man, 
In every voice, in every ban. 
The mind-forg 'd manacles I hear. 
Blake knew it, as we can still know it: the manacles are always forged by the mind. Can the mind 
still break them free? Can it?4 
Stalin's bid for total power proved that the nineteenth-century liberal vision of utopia, 
conceived and managed by intellectuals, had turned bad from within. In addition, Hitler Ger-
many defied Marx's scientific assumptions about the inevitable social mutations to be expected 
in moribund capitalist systems. Von Ribbentrop's deal with Molotov in August 1939 meant that 
the Nazis and the Soviets acknowledged a certain community of interests. This destroyed 
Socialist hopes of progressive social reform in Western capitalist democracies. But the really 
revealing fact about the Jews' cruel fate in Europe, as well as the generally tepid response to it 
in the free world, was that they were "an 'anomaly,' a contradiction to the great 'unifying' 
tendencies of modem life and revolution." They were excluded from the Communist apocalyptic 
theory of history which aimed to transcend "all the divisions of humanity," and they were a 
stumbling block to the Nazist drive for a mythology of racial superiority. "Even in death" the 
Jews were anomalous, for Roosevelt was afraid to move in their behalf from fear he would 
break up the consensus about American war tactics. Kazin observes wrily that the Jews "were 
not a factor in Allied plans for the postwar scene." The Jewish people's only mission was to feel 
"condemned by the infamy that it had been guilty throughout history, and should, in its totality, 
be made a sacrifice."5 
Ziegelboim's letter broached issues of identity and self-definition, of a collective morality 
operating through solidarity, which would before long be central to Kazin's literary judgement. 
The Nazis' solution to the Judenfrage aimed to make Jewish existence irrelevant to culture. In 
1962, Kazin sketched how literature under the spell of the modem crisis had drifted away from 
its earlier alliance with progressive humanism, which had culminated in the United States in the 
insurgent social criticism of Randolph Bourne and The Seven Arts, and from the modernists' 
unshakable faith in the creative act itself: 
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...the twenties marked the apex, the culmination, of the trend of bourgeois freedom that began 
with the French Revolution and really died with the First World War. The giants of modem 
European literature — Joyce, Proust, Yeats... — could only have come out of that prewar 
freedom. American writers were still able to absorb that spirit to a certain extent through the 
twenties, but by the 1930's the Western world... was getting more and more flattened out, more 
organised into the mass society of our day. We saw writers like Hart Crane, D.H. Lawrence, and 
Mayakovsky — writers still possessed by what the romantics called "vision" — dying, often by 
their own hands. In Russia we saw gifted writers like Babel and Yessenin forcibly shut up. We 
saw Trotsky, one of the last true Russian intellectuals still in power, going off into exile and the 
state becoming cruelly harnessed to the brutal paranoia of Stalin. And then came the totalitarian 
state in Germany. The historical ideals and possibilities that survived into the twenties were 
evaporating. In the mid-thirties, in fact, we saw extremely gifted writers being sympathetic to 
totalitarianism.... The most dramatic one, perhaps, is Louis Ferdinand Céline...' 
Towards the end of the article quoted from above, Kazin gave a peremptory definition of 
the critic's function, and he claimed that, in order to be useful, the critic ought to be "a carrier 
of values" and to get people to "see the enormous moral universe implicit in a particular book 
or poem." 
But to operate this way, you must be a conscious carrier of tradition — of the values and strivings 
associated with it.... In the end, tradition is what makes the critic, the tradition he grows out of, 
and the tradition he tries to re-establish independently, for its inherent meaning. And when there 
is a break in tradition — too injurious a sense of "strangeness" — the critic wants to restore 
consciousness of it. The ancient gods are still there, waiting to be recognized.7 
The tradition Kazin espouses is a continuous process of self-renewal. For a person to be in a 
tradition and loyal to it means to apply his creative resources to it. To Kazin, therefore, the 
matter of tradition is related to our experience of history. 
The "break in tradition" Kazin refers to locates something far more significant than what 
contemporary observers of the writer's sell-out to Communism in the Thirties, whether or not 
of the fellow-travelling kind, thought of as another trahison des clercs. For if the classical 
definition of the intellectual's role in modern Western culture had hinged on the concept of 
alienation, of an inveterately complacent, bourgeois morality nipping the impact of his ideas in 
the bud, the contemporary writer faced the even graver prospect of seeing his traditional 
relations with society disintegrate. Society, or rather the State, became deeply hostile to evidence 
of a unique sensibility. In a totalitarian state, the writer definitely faced threats of a different 
kind than the old bourgeois scourge of indifference and moral outrage, and he no longer served 
as the "carrier of tradition." Yet another aspect of totalitarian cultural policies was to editorialize 
the past and bend it to current political exigencies. Either way, the writer had come unstuck 
from his traditional moorings, whether in religious transcendentalism or meliorist secular 
radicalism. No longer independent, he aided and abetted the State's monopoly on the interpreta-
tion of reality. The "traditional hopes" of Western liberalism expired and finally turned inward 
from despair of restoring democratic humanism worldwide. The "old gods" had apparently been 
vanquished, and they had left a universe emptied of moral causality. It was this conviction of 
a finally indifferent universe which tricked Céline into occasional bouts of hatred and anti-
Semitism. What Kazin finds equally instructive to note is that the post-liberal disillusionment 
may in its preliminary stages have passed through the cultural authoritarianism of Eliot, or at an 
even further remove, through the "inhumanism" of a writer like Frost. 
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A New Covenant 
Walker has its roots in the crisis described above. It was slow in coming.8 It was the first 
sustained piece of writing to appear from Kazin's hand since On Native Grounds, which had 
conferred a "crippling [literary] authority" on Kazin and compounded a sense of personal crisis. 
For Kazin's first marriage was breaking up, and in the fall of 1944 he found himself at Black 
Mountain College, an experimental "community" in North Carolina's Smoky Mountains, which 
harboured assorted "gifted refugees... waifs, psychic and intellectual orphans." Black Mountain 
College had just lost "that English gadfly of every academic establishment," Eric Bentley, and 
Kazin was a stand-in. He could never explain why he decided to join the college staff: 
Utopia pushed people into ecstasies of self-confrontation. We were all marked out — by the hill 
people, who distrusted us, and by ourselves by having selected ourselves for Utopia. Utopias 
always end as stories; anyone who was ever at Black Mountain would remember everything about 
it — and about himself there.... everyone's character and history were magnified. The real 
question on which everything turned was the personal sense of fate that had led each of us to this 
queer assemblage.9 
Martin Duberman recalls that Kazin "thought the community might be a pleasant place to 
work on a new book." Kazin mystifying his reasons for going to Black Mountain, however, 
shows that he had great trouble writing Walker. The atmosphere may have been madly 
experimental, but Kazin recalls finding little intellectual incentive there. The experience was no 
help. The overwhelming contrast between the reception of On Native Grounds on the one hand 
and the mounting dismay over the Holocaust and the crises of his private life on the other left 
him rudderless. The hopes recaptured in Starting Out that literature could be the midwife to an 
equitable social morality were dashed. Stalin's betrayal of the Revolution and the death-drive of 
Nazist racist mythology bred a pervasive disbelief in political solutions. In fact, the hysterical 
demand for total intellectual sympathy which Kazin encountered at Black Mountain symbolized 
his own despair of finding new sources of personal affirmation. He no longer believed in a 
historical teleology and now he expected to find some kind of compensation in creative sceptics 
such as Melville and Blake.10 
Kazin's interest in these writers is the starting point of a large-scale overhaul of a personal, 
literary metaphysics the end terms of which are set forth in Walker. I would therefore propose 
to look at them as one particular phase in Kazin's evolution towards what I would like to call 
a new covenant with the world. In the Thirties, when Kazin and so many others had seen this 
covenant largely in political terms, he had confidently identified with History as literature. He 
had thought of it as a creative tradition of constantly expanding moral consciousness. This had 
been the central intellectual persuasion of the liberal Left. After the war, however, those who 
had persisted in their liberal convictions could no longer hope to give a plausible political 
definition of their covenant. Now, the central symbol of the era was the Holocaust, which had 
made a hash of evolutionary and scientific historicism. The events of 1933-1945 provoked a 
spate of theories on the ineradicable evil in human nature. Many intellectuals, particularly those 
trying to live down their experience in the radical Left, undertook a metaphysical criticism of 
their original convictions and either turned to personalistic interpretations of the modem 
historical experience or embraced some form of anti-liberal politics. Some even sought refuge 
in religious orthodoxy in order to make up for their loss of faith in man's moral perfectibility. 
The exhaustion of liberal politics particularly affected former American-Jewish radicals 
whose intellectual universalism had made them a natural party in the radical movement before 
the war. They discovered that the political idiom of the Left offered no clue to the dramatic 
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change in status which the Holocaust had willed to them. For Jewish intellectuals in America 
and elsewhere to present themselves as the progeny of a long tradition of universalist, free-
thinking radicalism no longer seemed a defensible option. The Holocaust compelled Jewish 
intellectuals to review accepted notions about their cultural function and identity. The enormity 
of the crime itself seemed to suggest that, at least to the architects of totalitarianism, Jewish life 
was incompatible with the traditions of Western civilization, and under these conditions the Jews 
affirmed their Jewishness rather than their radicalism. 
Its reception proved that Walker was a book of paradoxes. Josephine Herbst reacted exten-
sively and favourably to the work in progress. Arguably, Kazin managed to tread a very thin 
hairline between Herbst's brand of radicalism — really an "old-fashioned American idealism" 
— and the precise historical moment when, on the one hand, radicalism had shed every last 
vestige of collectivist theory and tentatively turned into a culture of personal perceptions, and 
when, on the other, there was a growing emphasis on the centrality of the Jewish experience in 
the Diaspora as the new cosmopolitan ideal in intellectual matters. Van Wyck Brooks praised 
its combination of detachment and objectivity with the joy of wonder and discovery and intimate 
participation. Dudley Fitts and Lewis Mumford appreciated Kazin's ability to capture universals. 
Mumford was rapturous: "Nothing has given me so much pleasure as A Walker in the City since 
reading the so-different opening chapters of Proust's first volume. Your little book, I predict, 
will have a long life..." Mark van Doren insisted, while the work was in progress, that Kazin 
must find a personal form: "I see why you admire Thoreau so much. He found his form — i.e. 
he found a fiction." Edmund Wilson simply thought that the "autobiographical book did your 
writing a lot of good, I think." He was glad the book had been getting such good reviews. 
Norman Mailer, Irving Howe, Lionel Trilling and Oscar Handlin all faulted it for reasons of 
their own; their objections will be discussed below. It is certain, at any rate, that Kazin did not 
wish to see Walker labelled a "Jewish" book. Victor Gollancz, who had contracted for Walker's 
publication in Great Britain, was obviously amazed to hear this: "Nor, frankly, do I understand 
what you mean by the book not being 'Jewish.' You might as well say that Dostoievsky is not 
a 'Russian,' on the ground that his themes have universal application."" 
Gollancz's irritation seems warranted, but I think that the deeper reason for Kazin's reserva-
tions about such a convenient tag for Walker must be found in his own intellectual anxieties as 
a Jew. For some time after the war, the Jewish intellectual community both in the United States 
and in Europe had been engaged in an occasionally heated controversy over the issue of the 
Jewish identity. Commentary was founded in order to give a more mundane voice to the 
broadcast affirmations of "Jewish particularism." To be sure, consensus was even then hard 
enough to come by in the United States, and eventually the Jewish community split over the 
implications of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). It was Jean-Paul Sartre, 
however, who produced the most controversial interpretation of "authentic" Jewishness, drawing 
bitter public rejoinders from the Jewish conservative fringe in America as well as freethinking 
Jews.'2 
What is striking about the issue of "authentic" Jewishness after the war is that people 
attempted to thresh it out in philosophical polemics before a representative image of Jewish life 
had even been so much as localized. Jewishness became a yard-stick for rival approaches, 
whether sociological, metaphysical, or religious. The better a particular approach was able to 
accommodate the elusive moral qualities of modern Jewishness, the greater its allure to intell-
ectuals. Politically, Jewishness became the antidote to liberal disillusionment. Yet, up till the 
Second World War, the American Jews had quite as a matter of course dispensed with any such 
ideological emphasis on their ethnicity, while during the Thirties there had even been a tendency 
among large sections of the Jewish radical community in the United States to channel their 
social ambitions into the cause of speculative freedom. Maimonides and Hasidism receded 
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before the shining example of Trotsky. Nor did there seem to be much interest in conveying the 
tang of quotidian life in the Jewish communities. Much of the writing done by Jews in the 
Thirties carried a considerable load of social ideology. This was most evident in Michael Gold's 
Jews Without Money (1935). Other works, such as Daniel Fuchs's Williamsburg trilogy, Henry 
Roth's Call It Sleep (1934), and some of Clifford Odets's plays, captured Jewish life for its 
cultural vigour and pathos. Yet, an emancipatory objective cannot be denied them. 
Walker, and to some extent also Isaac Rosenfeld's Passage from Home (1946), brought an 
altogether different literary ambition to the interpretation of Jewish life and culture. Both are 
autobiographical works: Kazin's is autobiographical narrative while Rosenfeld's is fictionalized 
autobiography. Both were conceived when "authentic" Jewishness was displacing secular 
radicalism as the most urgent question facing the Jewish intellectual community. Both were 
attempts to find a basis for integration in an understanding of alienation. To some extent they 
are Bildungsromane, picturing the protagonist chafing under the constraints of the family 
household and venturing beyond orthodoxy towards the illicit satisfactions of the Gentile culture. 
We should realize, however, that to associate this process of shedding the limitations of youth 
and education with the classical concept of "the revolt against the fathers" is to perpetuate the 
often slickly dramatic jargon of modern psycho-social theory. It would distract from the central 
thesis of the Bildungsroman, that is to say that the protagonist's evolution is by way of intensely 
encountered personal crises as a result of which he is able to reconcile himself to some extent 
with the objects of his rebellion. It thrives on catharsis and spiritual purification. In his desire 
to leap the barriers of his early ties with his environment, the protagonist realizes that he can 
never sever his ties with it completely, and properly speaking never ought to. Eventually, he 
undertakes to reassess his past in order to equip himself for the future. Integration in this sense 
means to reintegrate the experience of the past in a mood of affirmative wonder. 
This is a dominant motif in Walker. Writing to Josephine Herbst, Kazin characterized the 
book as "a Thoreau's vision against a background that no one sees except sociologically." Of 
course, its very title suggests a link with the literary mystic of Walden Pond, but I believe that 
Kazin's transposition of Thoreau's myth to twentieth-century urban New York broaches 
existential questions to whose significance in modern times Thoreau was but a very imperfect 
guide. For Walker has all too often been credited with a so-called transcendental faith, which it 
presumably derives from a literary identification with Thoreau's self-mythicizing "woodland 
walks." Few commentators have stressed the difference in environment facing these two writers 
a century apart. Walker is an exercise of an altogether different moral and literary order from 
Thoreau's pursuit of perpetual self-renewal. Thoreau based his faith on the internal harmony and 
cyclical rhythm of natural history, while Kazin wrote Walker when the international community 
had barely begun to recover from the impact of the Destruction. When he complained to Herbst 
that people tended to see the background of the book exclusively in the sociological sense, he 
made it clear that it was not meant to be a celebration of Jewish ethnicity. Walker does not 
claim any status as sociology; its material is much too evocative and universal to be caught in 
sociological categories. It blends personal and artistic as well as cultural and historical issues in 
a deeply realized centre of imaginative consciousness. 
Allegedly, Kazin modelled Walker after Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 
and it has none of Thoreau's abrasive sense of self. I repeat that it faces an altogether different 
historical environment from Thoreau's and even Joyce's. Neither of these in any way doubted 
their irreducible freedom as moral and creative agents, and both resisted the idea that the 
popular ethos could in any way determine the pattern of their individual destinies as writers. 
Both were, properly speaking, self-declared exiles from their society. The "city" in Kazin's 
autobiographical narrative forms a glaring contrast to this literary stance of self-preservation. 
Despite the allusion to Thoreau in the title, Walker presents a sharp break with the naturalist's 
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solitary and guarded, contemplative existence. Thoreau's deft mystification of his social self in 
at Walden Pond becomes in Walker a symbol of the selfs identity through a profound literary 
assimilation of its environment. The city is the Brownsville ghetto and the world across 
Brooklyn Bridge. It is both denial and promise, centre and periphery, estrangement and identity 
rolled into one. The author-protagonist eagerly recording the proliferating urban mass of cultural 
diversity shows his intense need to test his own experience in the Brownsville ghetto for 
evidence of universality. Indeed, in the kind of perceptions it aspires to Walker establishes a 
significant modus of the Jewish experience. Kazin regarded this as a primary contribution to, if 
not a correction of, the postwar debate about the Jewish identity, which was largely conducted 
in philosophical terms. He puts his account in terms of lived life, of respectable human aspir-
ations and their subject's complex situation between the vanishing tradition of Judaism and the 
need for acceptance in the world beyond. He paints a suggestive picture of the particularity of 
Jewish life, but when intellectual circles around the recently founded Commentary began to 
promote Jewish particularism, Kazin objected vehemently: "A pox on all such 
incestuousness!"13 
Using politics as a descriptive metaphor would reduce the scope of Kazin's artistic intention 
in Walker. Not only does he steer clear of ideological matters, in the final analysis politics also 
turns out to be an inadequate frame of reference for the protagonist's dilemmas. Coming up for 
inspection in those sections that also feature Communist seditionists along with the largely 
ineffectual but comradely and nostalgic Socialism of his own father and the Jewish Tammany 
Hall on Pitkin Avenue, it remains too much of a reflex piety and symbol of abortive causes to 
help him get his bearings on the world of his personal experience. Kazin contextualizes politics 
in order to show its remoteness from the real hopes and aspirations of his fellow citizens in 
general. Politics, particularly of the radical kind, is part and parcel of the sense of breakup that 
is a ground-tone of Walker. Politics is a prominent and by no means always positive presence 
in the early parts of the book; later on they give way to the more complex registers of personal 
morality and religion. 
Arguably, Walker chronicles the defeat of the political intelligence: at the end of the book, 
politics is totally eclipsed by a personal search for God. Questions of destiny, justice, and 
deliverance have by then punctured the Marxist myth. The moral imagination has evidently both 
supplanted radical social theory and expanded the cramped mental horizon of a life devoted to 
the principles of orthodox Judaism. It could be argued that the protagonist's cautious but 
deliberate detachment from politics serves to build a line of defence around the self, or at least 
to indicate that contemporary politics were harmful to young sensitifs like himself. This involves 
more than just an indictment of politics as the form that pragmatism takes in the realm of power 
and material interests. In Walker, the contrast takes on some of the moral trenchancy of Blake's 
work when he dramatized the effects of the creative versus the analytical philosophies of human 
nature. Benjamin DeMott has captured Walker's drift very aptly: "In Kazin's memoir the ruling 
vision is one that in positive terms sets organic life, natural passion and physical sensation over 
against pallid feeling, middleness, neutrality, estrangement."14 The difference is that between 
denial and acceptance, isolation and accommodation, even of Jewish upstart pretensions versus 
teeming life in the kitchen of Kazin's parental home. It is between the life of the ideal and the 
spectres of the real. The very open-endedness of the protagonist's experience is the living denial 
of the Marxist intellectuals' conviction that history delivers itself in set quantities and so fills in 
the pattern of human deliverance. Radicals of various hue will find little leverage for their views 
in the kind of affirmation that Walker voices. 
Quite the contrary, the book is a searching examination of the living forms of the past. It 
hinges on the belief that only a redeemed past may secure the openness of the future. Kazin the 
memoirist repossesses the past and so renews it; in the act of recreation a new self emerges, no 
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longer hemmed in by the restraints that the boy was having to cope with and blessed with the 
redemptive power of memory. In the protagonist's expanding consciousness, we can see the ex-
radical's dialogue with history take shape. The quality ofthat consciousness, which is in fact no 
less than a leap of the imagination, enables him to break through the restricted mental idiom of 
his past life and so to establish the reality of his own creative mind. Walker's celebration of 
origins feeds the historical sense. DeMott finds this a significant technique of restoring the past 
to its central place in life and experience: 
The writer's sentence about Brownsville as a road that other roads cross ultimately takes a 
different tum from that which had been expected: the place itself, as it is created in the book, 
seems to be the sum of all the crossings, rather than a separate entity — a scale brought into being 
by the writer's post-Brownsville movement, instead of a pre-existent set of coordinates. Something 
is being weighed on this scale, of course." 
What is being weighed are the chances of Walker's vision incorporating the coordinates of 
Brownsville existence in one transcendent scheme and so create the space that the transcendent 
self can inhabit. Indeed, DeMott claims that the Brownsville we see in Walker's pages is "a kind 
of activity — a process of self-emergence to be reconstructed." I would stress, however, that 
this reconstructed self is blessed with the wisdom of retrospect, because Walker's protagonist 
finds his ultimate destiny among the different factors of the Brownsville environment as they are 
being defined by the literary man coming from yonder side of the Bridge. Kazin himself seems 
to endorse this assumption, since he spoke so admiringly of Thoreau's power of vision in 
relation to his book. On reading a first sketch of Walker, Mark van Doren saw this, too: 
I can only urge you not to worry about being personal — you obviously must be. The only 
problem, as you know, is to find the form. I see why you admire Thoreau so much. He found his 
form i.e., he found a fiction. He created himself as a character. Thus he could be witty. A 
necessary condition.16 
Van Doren made this remark at a time when, as Kazin realized, the literary situation was hostile 
to naturalism, which is why Walker does not deal in the crude concepts of social causality 
characteristic of early naturalists like Norris, London, and Dreiser. Nor does it account for the 
one-time popularity of Marxist social theory among Jewish radical intellectuals. The memoirist 
shuns any commitment to evolutionary social theories; it is the reminiscent self that is the agent 
of change, which takes the form of levels of consciousness developing around a polarity of good 
and evil. The ritual passage across Brooklyn Bridge into Manhattan sensitizes the boy-protagon-
ist to certain moral and existential insights, so Walker's resolution clinches the issue of self in 
terms of love and religion, in short, of transcendence. It is a plea for acceptance, for assimila-
tion, for identification with those great creative spirits who had attempted to make their country 
equal to their own image of it. It proclaims that life's fulfilment lies in making connections. 
Walking home with his girlfriend, Kazin realized that "the smell of the earth and the lights from 
the distant city made a single background to my desire.... with the lights of Jamaica Avenue 
spread out before us, it was hard to think of them as something apart, they were searching out 
so many new things in me" {W, 175-6). 
Walker's protagonist-memoirist shapes his destiny on the strength of his Jamesian sensibility. 
James's injunction that the writer must take "what groups together" — and so create the very 
substance of life — evidently influenced the author of Walker. Indeed, its narrative selfs 
perceptions unify opposites in an environment which is downright hostile to such forms of self-
realization. In this respect, Paul John Eakin has interpreted Walker in terms of the shift in 
perspective which occurred in Kazin's work after On Native Grounds. His analysis ofthat shift 
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is correct, though he omits to mention exactly when and why it occurred. Eakin may have 
thought that Walker's lyrical cast reflected a decisive turn away from the historical argument of 
On Native Grounds, but he fails to see that its lyrical self-creation was in large part meant to 
compensate for the loss of historical faith among postwar intellectuals.17 
Walker's motto would seem to confirm this. It is taken from Whitman's "Crossing Brooklyn 
Ferry": "The glories strung like beads on my smallest sights and hearings — on the walk in the 
street, and the passage over the river." Of course, Whitman's line carries us beyond the basic 
implications of the naturalist's self-mythologizing first explored by Thoreau. It speaks of 
passage into a different region, possibly a different experience, and of the poet's loving identi-
fication with it. It acknowledges the crisis involved, of a bridge to be crossed, not necessarily 
in the geographical but certainly in the spiritual sense. Now, for Kazin to cross that bridge 
meant much more than to escape from his humble origins and to rise to social and intellectual 
status. In all respects, On Native Grounds had conferred that status on him, and yet this could 
not solve the problems he was trying to solve, both personally and as a literary historiographer. 
In my view, the motto states the writer-poet's role as a self-constituted, redemptive historical 
agent. The question Walker broaches is not one of simply abandoning the historical realm — 
however discredited History as a moral concept may have been immediately after the war — for 
a species of ecstatic experience in a void, but of the self constantly having to generate creative 
evidence of history's redemptive design. The theoretical underpinnings of man's historical 
emancipation having become dubious, the self remains the sole agent capable of projecting 
viable images of moral design onto the world. 
Thus, Walker's reminiscent, lyrical self does not proclaim its apartness from history but re-
enters it. The occasionally eschatological invocations to a transcendent realm of being derive 
from a strong desire to be submerged in Otherness and so to approximate the tragic knowledge 
of circumstance which modem man has come to associate with the anarchy of history. As it 
happens, Eakin does shed light on the kind of transition involved in Kazin's shift from a 
historical chronicler and moral witness in On Native Grounds to the private and consciously 
mythicizing lyricist of Walker. He takes his cue from Kazin's "Midtown and the Village": 
Against a background of wartime alienation Kazin projects a visionary moment of promise in 
which he anticipates the liberation and self-discovery that autobiographical writing was to bring 
him in the time to come. As he walked out into the streets of the Village after playing the violin 
with Isaac Rosenfeld, he found himself crossing familiar limitations into a new future as an artist: 
"suddenly my buried longings to write something not in the name of history, but to gratify myself 
alone, surprised me. I had written a book but did not yet feel like a writer..." 
The violinist registers the antithesis between the creative mind and the historical experience, 
which in its failure to meet the ideal may cause the conviction of determinism. He stresses his 
basic freedom to create, to act in conscious defiance of history. Eakin remarks that the act of 
walking "frees Kazin from the debris of history to discover the transcendent power of the self." 
Walking becomes a disinterested exploration of the forms of existence in America, disinterested 
but for the opportunities of growth offered to the self. The walker presents America as the very 
ambience of transcendence. As Eakin has it, he recovers America "as an idea."18 
Legitimation is another structural metaphor in Walker. Kazin uses the experience of classical 
music, as the prime expression of creative desire, to approximate the orchestration of con-
sciousness which he, as a writer, brings to his material. Walker sounds the higher registers of 
consciousness tracing a second-generation American Jew's preoccupation with the enigmatic 
relationship of self and culture. Music also appears in its more quotidian forms, as the family's 
pious devotion to High Culture, or as an index to the Soloveys' exoticism. But in the meta-
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physical sense it captures the moral tenacity of the Jewish historical mind: music restores the 
past in all its pulsing phases of slavery and redemption, of dispersal and unification. This is 
offset, however, by the popular belief that the Jews embody estrangement and dissonance, since 
the unified culture of orthodox Judaism has historically been "responsible" for violent cultural 
backlash in the form of pogroms. The historical given of alienation and apartness has clearly 
determined the memoirist's sensibility. His book expresses a desire for home, which is a 
condition he ultimately attains by breaking through the fixed forms of the past. Going back 
home means growth of vision and the acquisition of knowledge. The long period of restraint in 
Brownsville was a necessary precondition for heading out for Manhattan. Home is the mark of 
the creative spirit rising to the occasion, and because the reminiscent self ultimately proves itself 
superior to the menace, the limiting past portrayed at the beginning of Walker is never a 
tyranny. Home means to have successfully humanized a hostile environment. The walker 
retrieves the coordinates of his formative life on the grid on big-city existence, eagerly antici-
pating his arrival at his final destination: the walk across the Bridge into the mainstream, 
Manhattan. He negotiates the central dilemma of his alienated existence and authenticates the 
experience captured in Whitman's "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry." The act of crossing completes the 
musical metaphor. 
Writing to Josephine Herbst in 1951, Kazin explained that Walker "is a poem in four 
movements." Herbst had not quite been able to suppress her natural reservations about a book 
that promised to have the power of novelistic vision but which had really turned out not to be 
a novel. Her measured praise of the parts proved she had missed the quality of the whole, Kazin 
answered, and he added: "I've no interest in doing fiction... I can do it easily; but it's not my 
dish." Presumably, Kazin had little desire to allow the fictional component to upstage the 
autobiographer's interest in his own éducation sentimentale. A subsequent letter reiterated that 
Walker was meant to describe "consciousness as our freedom, the streets as the workshop of the 
senses. 
First Movement 
Walker's first poetic movement is entitled "From the Subway to the Synagogue" and has for its 
epigraph Blake's "mind-forg'd manacles" as the emblems of modern man's neglect of his 
natural capacity for wonder. Blake's horror before life in the modern metropolis suggested that 
man in the aggregate had lost his belief in the liberating power of individual vision, and had 
resorted to the vicarious certitudes of ideology. He had vitiated his native capacity as a free 
agent of the moral imagination, the will to rethink his relation to the world on the strength of 
his own, particularized experience. In 1949, Kazin admitted to Glenway Wescott that his work 
for Viking's Portable Blake represented him far more exactly now than On Native Grounds. In 
the introduction to that compilation he insisted that, above all, Blake hated scepticism, doubt, 
experimentalism, believing that these flowed naturally from a depleted sense of man's 
transformative, creative powers. Kazin's analysis of "London" suggests to what extent Blake's 
poetic exhortations inspired the author of Walker, enabled him to move backward it time and to 
trace his origins in the spirit of rediscovery: 
In the first draft of his poem, Blake wrote "dirty Thames," but characteristically saw that he could 
realize more of the city's human slavery in describing the river as bound between its London 
shores. His own place in the poem is that of the walker in the modem inhuman city, one isolated 
man in the net which men have created.... For him man is always the wanderer in the oppressive 
and sterile world of materialism which only his imagination and love can render human. 
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Like Blake's "Songs of Innocence" and "Songs of Experience," Walker links innocence and 
imagination. Its structure argues that acquiring experience does not necessarily mean to abandon 
innocence: the experienced, literary self of Walker recovers its earlier life in Brownsville and so 
creates it anew. Later on, Kazin would maintain that Walker was "romantic doctrine" and 
represented "a fable of youth, sweetness & search." Its journey backwards to recover youth in 
Brownsville, however, is not made for innocence's sake, for that would deny the authority and 
knowledgeability of the reminiscent self. Kazin himself has repeatedly noted the sheer arduous-
ness and frustration involved in writing Walker. He felt crippled for being "a critic with a 
critic's weakness for ideas," but on another occasion he conceded that work on Walker had had 
a tremendous impact on his personal experience as a working critic. Apparently, the book 
changed its writer. Its narrative structure reflects this sea change in personal and critical 
consciousness, which, as Allen Guttmann points out, takes the form of a paradox: "How fiercely 
the young man sought to escape the world [i.e. youth in Brownsville] that the autobiographer 
lovingly reconstructs." Fact, or rather history, enters into a procreative relationship with style. 
Walker traces the emergence of a critical self as much as it glorifies a new sense of origins. It 
illustrates the movement of redemptive historical consciousness, which is no less tragic for its 
being redemptive. The tragedy is of the loss that the aspiring boy must sustain before he 
becomes the writer to construct a replenishing vision from his boyhood experience. Working on 
the manuscript, Kazin decided that Walker would be about "the possibility of historical 
sight."20 
A key aspect of that vision is that it may accomplish the journey from the boy's original 
conviction of marginality and alienation, which Kazin believes is "the moral estate of man in the 
city," towards reconciliation and integration. I would argue that the historical imagination in 
Walker ultimately hinges on the protagonist's necessary dualism. Its continuity of vision does 
not distil a hierarchy of moral ideas, or consecutive phases of man's "moral estate," in terms of 
causality and evolution in time.21 Quite the contrary, the boy at the centre of the remembered 
world is anxious to break through the moral, cultural and religious curbs on his aspirations and 
to attain the status of the man whose literary self rises above them, whereas the man is aware 
that historical Brownsville has drawn indelible tracks in his experience, both personal and 
literary. The condition of isolation and self-communion in the ghetto, initially strongly resented, 
turns out to be a blessing in disguise for the growth of historical consciousness and the sense of 
tradition. For the literary man who has settled in Manhattan finds that he must thread his way 
back to the Brownsville of his youth. The shuttle movement from the margin across the Bridge 
towards the centre and back has its parallel in historical awareness. History is never simply the 
present extending our consciousness in time but it certainly also presses the recognition that the 
present may revive certain aspects of the muted past and, vice versa, that a living past may 
counter the seeping paralysis of the present. No conception of a self bound in time and place 
can negotiate this distance and yet retain a continuity of consciousness. That is why the narrator 
fuses boy and man in a Janus-like tension between aspiration, responsibility, desire, and loyalty. 
Only so may experience partake of innocence. And even though it is experience that makes the 
writer, experience does not diminish the power of the imagination to construct a vision of 
innocence. That is to say, it insists that the world be regarded as a storehouse of possibility. 
Sherman Paul has argued that Walker's narrative self is an ingenious literary ploy meant "to 
countervail a fact of history that even as he makes his way back he [that is to say, the young 
man cum writer] is painfully aware of in the eroded environment: that you can't go home 
again." Isaac Rosenfeld's companion-piece Passage From Home seems to belie this. Both books 
argue that the designation "home" in Jewish cultural consciousness retains some ambiguity of 
protection warring with suffocating orthodoxy, of expert catering to individual needs alternating 
with demands for strict adherence to communal ethics. Neither Kazin nor Rosenfeld considers 
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home the womb of unworldly innocence. As sons of immigrants, both were aware that the 
parental culture could lead to mental astygmatism in the world beyond the ethnic community. 
They were concerned with some policy of adjustment to that world, and it is by now an 
established fact of history that the sons and daughters of immigrant Jews have accommodated 
quite successfully. But we ought not to forget that they obtained the tools for their success, the 
specific cultural and intellectual aptitudes, from their struggle to alleviate their parents' self-
consciousness vis-à-vis the host culture. Not seldom did generational conflicts in the Jewish 
home erupt over the issue whether the Old World culture ought to resist seeking connections 
with the American goyim. All the same, the children were to interact with the American 
environment for reasons not always acceptable to their parents, and with results not always clear 
to them.22 
In this process of assimilation, which the one party looked on with anxiety mixed with 
disapprobation and which the other considered the only pathway to cultural legitimation, the 
father and the mother played significantly different roles. Kazin's picture of his family in 
Walker is no exception to the rule. He, too, singles out his mother as the dominant influence of 
his youth.23 She was obviously the most conspicuous object for the son to identify with. For 
although Kazin paints an endearing portrait of his father, who was a "free thinker" fond of 
sporting his son — his Kaddish — among "working-class skeptics" daily parading on Pitkin 
Avenue, his was essentially a lifetime of barely skirting the edge of grace, of a pathetic loyalty 
to Socialist ideals, and of an initially successful job hunt in the Middle West ending in his 
return to New York City and the degradation of living in the Brownsville ghetto (W, 43). In this 
sense, the mother is not open to the charge of failure: she never left the city. 
Kazin gradually substitutes a picture of his mother as a work-ridden recluse for the sense of 
the vast geographical expanse and opportunity cluttering the references to his father painting 
boxcars for the Union Pacific Railroad all the way into Omaha. The kitchen is where she carried 
out her daily chores and where the son got his education, emotionally through his ties with the 
ever-present mother, and spiritually through his unflagging absorption in the literary classics. 
The kitchen is central in Kazin's account of his education: it takes up one entire chapter of 
Walker. But towering above it is the figure of the mother, who remains in her nearly manic self-
abnegation painfully loyal to the burden of the Jewish experience. She represents the extremes 
of his historical situation which the boy must learn to negotiate and which task the memoirist 
has performed with success. On the anniversaries of her parents' deaths, she would light a 
candle in a kitchen glass and sit watching the flame brooding about der heym. Loneliness would 
overtake her, the memory of all the deaths that had left nothing but oblivion: 
With us, life started up again only on the last shore. There seemed to be no middle ground 
between despair and the fury of our ambition. Whenever my mother spoke of her hopes for us, it 
was with such unbelievingness that the likes of us would ever come to anything, such abashed 
hope and readiness for pain, that I finally came to see in the flame burning on top of the ice-box 
death itself burning away the bones of poor Jews, burning out in us everything but courage, the 
blind resolution to live. In the light of that mourning-candle, there were ranged around me how 
many dead and dying — how many eras of pain, of exile, of dispersion, of cringing before the 
powers of this world! (W, 70-1) 
As a literary description of the nature of historical experience, this formulates a position which 
Kazin was to develop further in Starting Out in the Thirties. There he would deal with his 
mother and his cousin Sophie in starkly dramatic contrasts and conclude that the mother's 
traditional posture of a suffering, care-worn disciplinarian in orthodox pieties offered better 
chances of entering into a fruitful relationship with history than Sophie's eagerness to find 
compensation for her broken dreams. The mother suggests the moral genius of Jewish history. 
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She breathes the virtues deriving from a commitment to the old and tried, however scant and 
threadbare the solace, and this makes her character stand out vividly from that of her husband 
and the cousin. There is a sense of waste about the lives of the latter; they spent it in a hollow 
pursuit of eroded ideals. The mother never risked being caught off her guard. The "single line 
of sentience" she drew for her son repudiated any emotionally slick interpretation of history as 
a cyclical pattern of decay and restoration (W, 71). Accordingly, her vision of time and experi-
ence makes no provision for readily available grace or redemption through faith in a purposive 
history. She resists such spiritual placebos. For the Kazins, as for so many Jews, life would start 
up again only on the Virgilian "last shore." In order to force access to the spiritual rewards of 
the new country, it would be necessary to drink the cup of abnegation and disenchantment to the 
lees. As immigrants, the Kazins considered themselves the typical outsiders, the alienated and 
the dispossessed. So the memoirist relives his walks as a boy furiously pressing ahead toward 
the throbbing, alluring, and yet forbidding heart of the big city. Doing this, he recreates the 
hopes and the fears, the essential dualism, of the Jewish historical mind. And as he revolves a 
grid of associations in his mind, he becomes aware of the forms his destiny in America may 
take. 
Walker is a narrative legitimizing an emergent self. It relates historical considerations to 
questions of the Jewish identity. Kazin has himself explained this connection as follows: "My 
involvement with so much personal history has this excuse: it is about someone taken up in 
history, who was in history — like all his people — before he was bom." As has been noted, 
Walker explored ideas that would become central to Kazin's subsequent career as practising 
critic. Foremost among these was the demand for an affirmative historical stance. A related issue 
was the significance of Jewish traditions to the acculturating second generation, which incited 
an occasionally bitter intellectual polemic among the Jewish population of both the United States 
and Europe after the horrors of the Holocaust had begun to sink in. Kazin watched this develop-
ment with anxiety. He was neither a partisan of the kind of religio-ethnic orthodoxy advocated 
by Ludwig Lewisohn immediately after the war, nor did he expect much clarification from the 
positions leading European intellectuals, and Sartre foremost among them, took on the question 
of the Jewish identity.24 Even though several renowned American-Jewish intellectuals 
countered Sartre, Kazin suspected that the issue might bog down in high-flown metaphysical 
speculation. Walker counters such intellectualized polemic with a narrative memoir of a youth 
whose upbringing may have been ethnocentric, but who ultimately pays the dues of love to the 
aspects of universality revealed in the particularities of his own experience. Conversely, and 
quite as if to reinforce the point, it is the memoirist who feels that the arc of his emancipation 
and growth cannot be completed as long as he does not know what it springs from. The 
imaginative writer, who has become an expert in the universal manifestations of humanity, 
discovers the man in the child. The journey back to Brownsville symbolizes the theatre of the 
imagination breaking down the metaphysical walls of the ghetto while entering it. 
This act is a preliminary to the larger cultural message of Walker. The memoir itself plots 
Kazin's own spiritual growth to the point where he could write a book like On Native Grounds. 
Indeed, for Kazin the return to Brownsville is fraught with cultural implications, for it brings 
him back to America's "Brown Decades." The crude expansionist materialism of that time 
forged America's national and world power, the inner dynamics of which Kazin and his friend 
Richard Hofstadter understood so well, which they looked on with awe and, as Jews, also 
feared. But just how the world of the American 1880s and 1890s relates to the intellectually 
eager and culturally hyphenated boy in Brownsville is perhaps expressed most clearly in the 
blurb on the book's jacket: "This world [which the aspiring boy walks into] expands in time and 
space — and inwardly into the boy's soul — to become the whole city of New York..., to 
become America, of the present and the past, to become the world of music and literature, 
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metaphysics and religion." "Home," then, as also the inception of On Native Grounds illumi-
nates, is the faculty of creative consciousness rather than any geographical location. In 
Rosenfeld's phrase, it is that frame of mind which secures passage from home into the world. 
"Home" also has to do with the temporal aspect of consciousness. I have argued that Walker 
is about the possibility of historically affirmative vision. Sherman Paul links the meaning of 
Walker's narrative structure to Kazin's observation in "The Jew as Modern Writer" that the "real 
drama" in Jewish writing "is the contrast between the hysterical tenderness of the Oedipal 
relation and the 'world'; in the beginning there was the Jewish mother and her son, but the son 
grew up, he went out into the world, he became a writer." Now, as the writer returns to the 
world of his parents he conceives of another home, the cultural past. This time, home is the 
product of deliberately chosen attachments: the confined Brownsville setting finds its counterpart 
in a world of inner freedom and spiritual joy. His personal rediscovery of Brownsville is the 
mould into which "old America" is made to fit. To have located so much transcendent power 
at the hearts of the equally deterministic settings of the rampant commercialism of the Brown 
Decades and the twentieth-century Jewish ghetto of New York shows that Kazin managed to let 
the imagination do the work of gTace. For the comparative similarity of these highly dissimilar 
environments occurred almost naturally to him: 
The present was mean, the eighteenth century too Anglo-Saxon, too far away. Between them, in 
the light from the steerage ships waiting to discharge my parents onto the final shore, was the 
world of dusk, of rust, of iron, of gaslight, where, I thought, I would find my way to that fork in 
the road where all American lives cross. The past was deep, deep... (W, 171) 
The impressionable youth at odds with life in Brownsville but also irrevocably bound up with 
it is in tune with the cultural drama of the Brown Decades. He readily identifies with those 
"lonely Americans whose careers, though closed in death, had woven an arc around them which 
I could see in space and time — 'lonely Americans' — it was even the title of a book" (W, 
172).25 
Likewise it was a book, Lewis Mumford's The Brown Decades, that fired his enthusiasm for 
those artists of the past whose work had managed to survive public neglect. Kazin mentions 
Albert Pinkham Ryder, Charles Peirce, Emily Dickinson, Thomas Eakins, John Augustus 
Roebling, and Walt Whitman. Concerned to delve up every sign from the New York cityscape 
that might stir up fresh memories of them, he liked to believe "that I had stood outside all that, 
that I would be alien forever, but that I could at least keep the trunk open by reading" (W, 172). 
The thrust of this imaginative identification through reading, together with the incessant walking 
excursions into the centre of the city and back, suggest the mental rhythm that Kazin believes 
guides the modern self in its interaction with the historical situation. The boy learns to particu-
larize the internalized world of the father-authority as his own experience widens, and to use his 
psychic drives as agents in the external world. In fact, he seeks to acquire a legitimate identity 
in that world, much as all those "lonely Americans" had tried to legitimize their creative visions, 
as even his own father and mother had in their shambling effort to establish some sort of 
balance between a tenacious loyalty to the crushing weight of Jewish history and an unwavering 
faith in the possibility of resurrection. The walker-memoirist, who is the boy matured to a 
literary awareness of things, records the past feeding into his origins and so creates a tradition. 
That tradition begins in a recognition of the particularities of the Jewish experience but finds its 
most powerful stimulus in the need to go beyond the compacted world of Jewishness. The 
tradition tolerates the fact of alienation and marginality only because its declared purpose is to 
break these down. Ultimately, Walker's protagonist will define the spiritual motive of his quest: 
"Why had I always to think of insider and outsider, of their belonging and our not belonging, 
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when books had carried me this far, and when, as I could already see, it was myself that would 
carry me farther — beyond these petty distinctions I had so long made in loneliness? [emphasis 
added]" (W, 173). 
The literary self that emerges from this struggle establishes a connection with that compre-
hensive body of mythical, literary projections of the creative self in America, and further defines 
and fixes it. The self-education of the boy in Brownsville parallels the struggles of Roebling, 
Whitman, Dickinson, Ryder, and so many other creative spirits of the Brown Decades, to make 
their voices and visions contribute to the idea of America. Their tradition lives: in Kazin they 
have found an offspring. It is this sense of America as a living idea explored by these nine-
teenth-century visionaries that is the secret of the "fork in the road" which Kazin is so anxious 
to locate. It is very much an idiosyncratic version of the theory of the "usable past" once 
espoused by the social critics of The Seven Arts, though it is wholly free of Brooks's censorious-
ness towards the immediate past. Indeed, as Sherman Paul has observed, Kazin rather expresses 
his affinity with the other faction within The Seven Arts, more specifically with the cultural 
ideas of Paul Rosenfeld and Alfred Stieglitz.26 Kazin regarded Rosenfeld as a fellow spirit, 
who had written criticism as an act of love and gratitude for the artistic experience conveyed in 
the work at hand, and had expressed the deepest personal associations with it. At the time of 
Rosenfeld's death, in 1946, his defence of "the humanistic moral passion that is still the great 
heritage of our romantic and democratic past" was urgent and virtually formed the sole remain-
ing outpost against the "split in our present literary consciousness... permanently symbolized, I 
often think, in the influence of a writer like T.S. Eliot..." For it is owing to Eliot, Kazin 
claimed, that we now like to think that we "live in a time when an overwhelming sense of 
having come to the end of a period in man's total history has put a premium on intellectual 
revaluation rather than on the literature of 'real' experience."27 Rosenfeld's attractiveness to 
Kazin was in his eloquent defence of the selfs classical stature in American literary thought. 
His critical appreciation of the artists frequenting Stieglitz's salon at "291" Fifth Avenue, who 
were generally acclaimed in the pages of The Seven Arts, resembled Kazin's own interest in 
Whitman and Stieglitz, who presented their artistic selves as paradigmatic myths of creative 
America. 
The epigraph from Whitman's "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" suggests that Walker's reminiscent 
self records the radical democratic openness of American society. Though such openness is in 
scant supply from the boy's perspective, the writer-self leaps back in time past the world of 
boyhood towards the cultural ambience which catalysed Whitman's genius and replenishes 
himself with it. I agree with Sherman Paul that both Whitman's account of a New York ferry 
crossing and Stieglitz's famous photograph of people in the steerage preparing for a transatlantic 
crossing, or photographed after it, point back to the time when America's great romantic and 
democratic heritage was still intact, when it still promised self-fulfilment and opportunity as a 
universal civil right. I also agree that Kazin's use of Whitman's poetic ideas relates in different 
ways to the question of self and history. But I deny that the epigraph ignores the poem's tenor, 
which Paul alleges is contained in the phrase immediately preceding it: "The similitudes of the 
past and those of the future." Paul argues that the poem celebrates the continuity of experience, 
"but faith in this continuity is not easily held at 'the end of a period in man's total history' — 
or even in the presence of the gratuitous change we accept in the name of progress. Yet, this is 
the faith that the autobiographical passage from present to past awakens." Kazin's account of 
that passage echoes some of the dread which Charon must have felt in ferrying the dead across 
the Lethe, but the dominant chord rings with the promise of resurrection and renewal. 
Whitman's poem actually abounds with images proclaiming the transcendence of time and place, 
the defeat of isolation, of alienation. The ferry hovering in the middle of the river signifies 
man's pensive brooding over the reason behind life's fleeting phenomena. The poet, who speaks 
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to posterity with the voice of the past, promises a future of progressive reconciliation with 
reality. This redeems our experience in time.28 
But Walker starts out with identifying the different guises of modern alienation and apartness. 
The protagonist pays tribute to Blake's insight that modern man's bondage results from his own 
insensibility and cynicism. The "walker in the modern inhuman city," who is the protagonist of 
Blake's "London," realizes that it is the "mind-forg'd manacles" which impede man's creative 
self-realization. By extension, Kazin's walker in the American twentieth-century cityscape 
humanizes his environment, and by breaking down "petty distinctions" (W, 173) he redeems 
himself. He implements Blake's idea of man's original spiritual mission to "recover our lost 
sight." Yet, Walker's protagonist is not just Blake's epigone. The true disciple reveals himself 
in the measure of dissent. For obvious reasons, Blake's poetic understanding of the secret 
richness of childhood means much to him: it criticizes the blunted ways of adulthood. Blake 
teaches us to recover a child's perspective on experience: "In experience there is always the 
longing for 'unorganized innocence: an impossibility'; in innocence there is the poignant 
foretelling of experience, which is death without the return to confidence and vision. Blake is 
utterly without cynicism." Kazin warmed to Blake's idea that experience is "the 'contrary' of 
innocence, not its negation." Walker's narrative self, however, records how the complexity of 
history has pierced this poetic myth of a wholly anthropomorphic and organic destiny. Too 
intent on loosening the "mind-forg'd manacles," Blake may have stressed the autonomy of 
vision to the point where it denied the reality of everything external to it. His voracious lyricism 
was impatient with what Henry James called "life at its stupid work," and etched away every 
sign of inassimilable detail in order to stress the all-sufficient brio of his own gift. Apparently, 
he was not concerned in the slightest about possible mental sloppiness in his own account of the 
world. Indeed, "the world," which, as we have seen, represents for Walker's protagonist both the 
medium of his rite of passage and a coveted prize, never becomes much of a reality in Blake's 
work at all.29 
Much of the material in "Part 1 : From the Subway to the Synagogue" illustrates, or strains 
against, the message of the epigraph. I have sketched the relation of Blake's poetics to A Walker 
in the City, and I submit that Part 1 of Walker records the world primarily in terms of the 
difficulty of self-approbation, of negation, marginality, and threat. The child's innocent vision 
is exposed to evidence of division, contrast, frustration, and separation. He is as yet not 
equipped to relate these to the ambiguity of his own position as an aspiring naif reared in 
cultural orthodoxy. The boy occasionally voices bitterness at being held back, unable to match 
the accomplishments of "the others" forever dangled before him. The "city" is the everlasting 
symbol of this. But as a literary persona he gears himself to dispel that constant fear of lostness 
and marginality. "Every time I go back to Brownsville," he claims, "it is as if I had never been 
away" (W, 5). The "as if' seals the difference. Time has made him the man he is now, and 
although this man traces his way back to the boy out of a felt inadequacy within his present 
situation, his literary account of his own progress in the world, which is inseparable from having 
"been away," causes the boy a certain embarrassment and impatience regarding the early 
handicap of his environment. The man's return to Brownsville is a call to transcend the fatalist 
view of history through a leap of the imagination: 
It is always the old women in their shapeless flowered housedresses and ritual wigs I see first; 
they give Brownsville back to me. In their soft dumpy bodies and the unbudging way they occupy 
the tenement stoops, their hands blankly folded in each other as if they had been sitting on these 
stoops from the beginning of time, I sense again the old foreboding that all my life would be like 
this. Urime Yidrt. Alfred, what do you want of us poor Jews? {W, 6) 
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Of course, for himself as for them, he wants everything he has accomplished since, and more. 
The boy, like the man, dreads stasis. The man returning to Brownsville stirs up a precocious 
rebelliousness in the boy. Initially, he confesses that Jewish fatalism and passiveness in the face 
of history could be numbing. At the same time, he is convinced that life in the ghetto was 
paradoxically an indispensable preamble to catching up with the mainstream afterward: 
"Brownsville is that road which every other road in my life has had to cross" (W, 8). Thus, 
Whitman's "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" becomes the emblem of the literary mind reconstructing 
a boyhood experience both as an entranceway to the national cultural past and as a source of 
faith in an as yet uncertain but wholly open future. The boy-walker, who recreates by means of 
narrative vision, detects in ghetto conditions a spiritual challenge; the urge to move toward the 
centre of the city is above all a feat of the mind. And in the man's return to Brownsville the 
writer acknowledges an equally vital aspect of commitment to life, namely the desire to incor-
porate the past into the present, to make it come alive again in the present. It is from this 
created continuity, indeed a leap of the imagination, that our expectations about the tendency of 
the future derive. The protagonist creates in the spirit of Whitman's "Crossing": in its 
connectedness with past and future a searching present will find its legitimation and a creative 
identity. The boy is preparing to be a man. 
The boy's need for growth and transcendence are dramatized against the background of 
Jewish cultural orthodoxy. Particularly its prohibitiveness toward adolescent sex illustrates how 
essentially remote from the stuff of life orthodox Jewishness could be. The young Kazin, soggy 
with literary emotions gleaned from The World's Greatest Selected Short Stories is at one time 
infatuated with a girl named Deborah, "not least because she had been named after a prophetess 
in Israel" (W, 13). He actually takes the book along as a gift in order to gain access to her 
house, only to find that her family is quite laconic about such cultural piety: "Look boychik, 
you don't have to buy your way in here every time with those damned books just to see 
Deborah! Come on your own!" {W, 14) 
A contrastive study of two institutions, viz. the synagogue and the "movie house," accelerates 
the narrator's development. They are each in their way emblematic of the state of cultural 
cohesion among the Jews and the goyim respectively. The boy automatically associates his 
emotional appetite for the life depicted on the movie screen with the disapprobation and the 
censure which he knows will be the natural response of his environment. He identifies quite as 
a matter of course with one particular celluloid hero, whose ultimate ordeal takes the form of 
an Iron Maiden. It is as if the boy punishes himself for the hubris of his illicit, imaginative 
excursions: "I instantly saw in that ominous patch of light the torture-box of life-in-death, some 
reproach calling for the punishment of my sin" (W, 15). But the man in the boy explains and 
partly justifies the boy's budding aesthetic delight. He defends his right to look to the imagin-
ation for spiritual sustenance: "A sin, perhaps, but only of my own devising; the sin I recorded 
against all idle enjoyment, looking on for its own sake alone; but a sin. The daylight was for 
grimness and labor" (W, 15). 
Kazin sketches the rivalry between the "Stadium" movie house and the little wooden 
synagogue in symbolic contrasts. The cinema is "the great dark place of all my dream life" (W, 
39) where the repressive laws of orthodoxy no longer hold. The synagogue, on the other hand, 
suggests duty and the responsibility belonging to the moral estate of a young Jew "confirmed 
in the faith of my fathers" (W, 40). The boy situates both locations allegorically on his right and 
left hand respectively: 
Right hand and left hand: two doorways to the East. But the first led to music I heard in the dark, 
to inwardness; the other to ambiguity. That poor worn synagogue could never in my affections 
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compete with that movie house, whose very lounge looked and smelted to me like an Oriental 
temple. (fV, 40) 
There is a sense of displacement here. The boy yearns to do his religious duty not in the 
synagogue but in the "temple" of the imagination, the seat of "inwardness". A better world 
seems to be available, albeit at the cost of a crude reawakening, because after sessions "the 
gritty light on Bristol Street would break up the images on the screen with a meanness that 
made me shudder" (W, 40). That light seemed to "mock the imagination (W, 40);" it "was for 
grimness and labor" (W, 15). This may explain to what extent the boy considered the dutifulness 
of the orthodox merely a hollow observance, a spiritually crippling piety. Their ashen insistence 
on the hardships of life lived in the Diaspora missed something of obvious value to the boy, for 
deep inside the darkness of the movies everything that was good in life, everything that spoke 
straight to the imagination, began in some instant dark fusion between the organ music from the 
pit and the cycles of terror that started up again each Saturday afternoon in the "episodes". 
Walking home afterward, everything I felt came to me as the first ominously repeated notes of 
Schubert's Unfinished... music that was as uncontainable as water or light or air, that shifted its 
course with each new breath it took and showed me the rapids, the storms, the plunging mountain 
falls of consciousness itself.... 
Not so in the synagogue. (W, 41) 
There, the observing Jews would reaffirm their communal identity. To the young Kazin, it 
seemed as if they asserted and defended their separateness with the ritualistic fervour they 
habitually lavished on the interpretation of religious dogma. He assumed that to swerve from the 
communal ethic was to renege on the Jewish God. The impression one gets from Kazin's 
account of life in the Brownsville community, whose members were generally, like his parents, 
immigrants from Eastern Europe, is that they cherished their apartness, and made this a vital 
moral issue. Obviously, the fact of the marginality of life in the ghetto did not result from 
geographical and cultural demarcations only: it was certainly also a self-perpetuating form of 
mental pride, if not downright illiberalism. The need to segregate was very strong even within 
the community, among lantsleit or people from the same area in Poland and Russia. In fact, the 
Dugschitz synagogue received some stiff opposition from another one "halfway down the 
block," where, according to the scornful Dugschitzers, the "outsiders" from Warsaw or Galicia 
persisted in making a mockery of the sacred institutions of Jewry. Tolerance was in short 
supply, and the merest evidence of dissent could be interpreted as permissiveness and disloyalty. 
The main concern of the community was to resist all experience outside the tradition. 
This tradition had little in common with the historical confidence in radical democracy which 
Whitman had expressed in "Crossing." In fact, it illustrated the burden of Blake's "mind-forg'd 
manacles": 
Secretly, I thought the synagogue a mean place, and went only because I was expected to.... I felt 
I was being pulled into some ancient and mysterious clan that claimed me as its own simply 
because I had been bom a block away. 
Whether I agreed with its beliefs or not, I belonged; whatever I thought of them, no matter 
how far I might drift from that place, I belonged. This was understood in the very nature of 
things; I was a Jew. It did not matter how little I knew or understood of the faith, or that I was 
always reading alien books; I belonged, I had been expected, I was now to take my place in the 
great tradition. (W, 45) 
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The note of oppressiveness is emphatic. Central to the boy's experience of communal claims to 
loyalty is that they offered no scope for an individual, distinctive identity within the community. 
In the passage above, Jewish religious devotion comes out as a form of historical hermeticism 
granting little leeway to alternative configurations of self. It strangles free thought and monopo-
lizes experience. But primarily the boy finds emotional and spiritual sustenance in reading 
"alien" books, and he retrospectively adopts the defiant but conscientious morality of the 
dissenter. The boy foresees that the returning writer will have been a pilgrim to strange coun-
tries; he anticipates being an eater of forbidden fruit. 
Kazin has claimed that in writing Walker he realized that "there was no intellectual solution 
to my search for the meaning of Jewishness."30 He believed that no single idea might capture 
the sheer scope and inherent divisiveness of the material that went into Walker. And yet his 
overwhelming complaint against the stultifying religious climate of his youth is that orthodox 
Judaic observance interfered with the creative potential that ideas have in people's conscious-
ness. God, he points out, was "our oldest habit" (W, 46). He was a censorious God, an all-
powerful and inaccessible judge: "He was simply a mad tyrant, someone I needed constantly to 
propitiate." He was so self-contained, so entirely fixed in a unique relationship with each of His 
believers individually, that these believers were incapable of communicating His true spirit 
among themselves. Kazin notes with distress that "I could not even speak of Him to others," 
neither to old Talmudists, young Zionists, Protestants, nor to the Italian Catholics on the 
outskirts of Brownsville. This God planted division and estrangement. And yet Kazin did not 
give Him up; there was no reason why he should unconditionally have parted company with 
Him: "I had feared him so long — He fascinated me, He seemed to hold the solitary place I 
most often went back to. There was a particular sensation connected with this — not of peace, 
not of certainty, not of goodness — but of depth; as if it were there I felt right to myself at last" 
(W, 47). 
Kazin believed that "to rebel against the tradition was somehow to hold fast to it." This 
paradox is also the backbone of the memoirist's literary vision of his boyhood experience. For 
that, too, maintains in suspension, or rather perpetuates, the mind's shuttle movement between 
margin and centre, which negotiates the Blakean polarities of innocence and experience. Just as, 
in Sherman Paul's words, the synagogue and the movie house reflect "coeval aspects of the 
self," so it is only through an exercise of the imagination that the man can identify the linchpin 
of the boy's world-view, the necessary condition of his consciousness. And that may be found 
in a reconciliation of the discordant strains of his being, in a balance between the selfs need to 
"press outward toward release and liberation as well as inward to the deep centrality and 
security of the self." Indeed, what Kazin detects in his ambivalence vis-à-vis religious dogma is 
"the moral necessity of his being."31 What distinguishes Walker's narrative self is its capacity 
to outgrow the divisions originally proliferating within itself and its immediate environment. 
The boy's formal education did everything to bring the fact of his differentness home to him. 
He remembers his career in school as a never-ending struggle to appease the teachers, the 
superintendent, and the board with displays of mental agility and unswerving national loyalty. 
Kazin's account is a trenchant coda to Randolph Bourne's reflections in "Trans-National 
America." Bourne had pleaded against rubberstamping American immigrants and their offspring 
on the grounds that such would only create bastard cultures with no dynamic orientation of their 
own, and Kazin's recollection is streaked with instances of just this attitude on the part of the 
teachers; the "glacially remote Anglo-Saxon principal" (W, 18) even went by the name of King. 
Non-WASP subjects stood in the same relation to the dominant culture as tenant-farmers to a 
feudal landlord: 
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I worked on a hairline between triumph and catastrophe. Why the odds should always have felt 
so narrow I understood only when I realized how little my parents thought of their own lives. It 
was not for myself alone that I was expected to shine, but for them to redeem the constant anxiety 
of their existence. I was the first American child, their offering to the strange new God; I was to 
be the monument of their liberation from the shame of being —• what they were. And that there 
was shame in this was a fact that everyone seemed to believe as a matter of course. It was in the 
gleeful discounting of themselves — what do we know? — with which our parents greeted every 
fresh victory in our savage competition for "high averages,"... for a few condescending words of 
official praise.... It was in the sickening invocation of "Americanism" the word itself accusing us 
of everything we were not. Our families and teachers seemed tacitly agreed that we were somehow 
to be a little ashamed of what we were. Yet it was always hard to say why this should be so. (W, 
21-2) 
The parents' desperate yearning to see their children legitimized before the ways of the New 
World and yet holding on to their own Old World customs is reflected in the boy's ambiguous 
groping towards a new cultural and spiritual identity. But it is also clear how much the writer 
knows himself to have been an ambassador and an emissary, a mediator of cultures constantly 
bringing impressions from the larger realities around him into accord. Even so, the theme of 
"From the Subway to the Synagogue," which is that the man's return to Brownsville makes 
"past and present each other's faces" (W, 6), promises a continuity of experience whose former 
absence stirs vitriolic memories in the writer's mind. For this compulsory training in 
acculturation fostered in Kazin an artless historical hopefulness and patriotism symbolized in his 
reminiscence of the slick idealism surrounding the figure of Theodore Roosevelt. Walking 
through a deserted assembly hall the boy looks with veneration at Roosevelt's picture on the 
wall, the American flag draped around it and the eagle prancing over it. Roosevelt at Oyster Bay 
represented "the other land [and] that thorough varnished cleanness that was of the new land..." 
(W, 26) The irony that Kazin lavishes on his youthful admiration for Roosevelt's political 
moralism and messianic militarism, in fact an enlightened imperialism, illustrates that here, too, 
the past may have been the playground of a misguided innocence, because later on he was to 
endorse with devastating seriousness William James's verdict on the state of the national ethics 
under Roosevelt. 
Second Movement 
We learn from the beginning of "Part 2: The Kitchen," that the past has no proper relevance 
outside the present. Under the shaping impact of an expanding consciousness they do become 
"each other's faces" indeed. The very particularity of the historical setting on which "Part 2" 
opens argues that such a transfusion process is indispensable. For the place is London at the end 
of the Second World War, this time a highly un-Blakean metaphor of freedom, and the occasion 
is "a broadcast of the first Sabbath service from Beben Concentration Camp" (W, 51). The 
urgency of the situation ties in perfectly with the dualism of historical consciousness which the 
walker-writer employs. For with the liberation of the survivors of Bergen-Belsen and the other 
death camps it turned out that the pattern of violent repression which had marked the history of 
the Jews since the Dispersal had escalated beyond the power of understanding. The Holocaust 
shattered historical faith; the methodical persecution and destruction of European Jewry had 
absolutized their inassimilability as an embarrassing cultural anomaly. Kazin himself has 
immortalized its impact in the image at the end of Starting Out in the Thirties, where a nervous 
cinema audience responds with utter disbelief to the newsreel shots of liberated Bergen Belsen. 
A British Army bulldozer is shovelling emaciated corpses into a mass grave, while a few 
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survivors stand apart, looking apathetically through the barbed wire. They are altogether 
symbolical for the moral death which has struck at the heart of Western liberal civilization. 
With the legitimacy of the Jews' very existence called into question, Jewish history had 
contracted to zero point, and therefore the most pressing task was for them to recover a vital 
sense of origins, to project configurations of Jewish life and history that did not lead to the trap 
of nihilism which the Nazis had so carefully laid out for them. That is why the writer of Walker 
draws on the openness of the boy's world, which centres in the kitchen during preparations for 
Sabbath. This is also a metaphysical and a spiritual exercise, leading back to the indestructible 
core of the Jewish historical experience. That, too, like the protagonist's dual identity, maintains 
an equilibrium of loss and subsequent restoration. In the greater historical context, as in the 
writer's own experience, there is a pulsing desire for transcendence at work. For the "healing 
quietness" descending on Brownsville on Sabbath eve illustrates that "Jewry had found its way 
past its tormented heart to some ancient still center of itself." The remembered scene is one of 
preparation in devotion, of grateful expectation of God's abundance. The Jewish household 
begins to yield evidence of God's plenty. The atmosphere is one of deep sympathy and inclusi-
veness. The boy's fascination with Henry Hudson's discoveries furnishes the mental accompani-
ment to this. He discovers in that experience "the theme of my own new-found freedom on 
Sabbath." Now his associations with the outside world are no longer troubled by exclusion, fear, 
and shame. He can mesh with it in a sensible way. So can the father, for each day he would 
purposefully leave a copy of the New York World at home for the boy's perusal, testimony of 
"that other hemisphere of my brain beyond the East River" (W, 52). The barriers are coming 
down, and it seems as if the family's isolation in the Brownsville ghetto is cancelled by the very 
necessity of their intercourse with the world outside. That necessity legitimizes the memoirist's 
literary effort. The boy had anticipated this when he recognized that he himself must act as a 
free, creative agent in order to close the gap between his parents' expectations of the alien, 
American culture and his own impending acceptance of it: 
My father and mother worked in a rage to put us above their level; they had married to make us 
possible. We were the only conceivable end to all their striving; we were their America.... They 
did not consider themselves free... and looked on themselves as instruments towards the ideal 
"American" future that would be lived by their children. (W, 56) 
It is very much the children's duty to break through the lock-step of the Jewish communal 
experience, for this had confirmed the impression that to be a Jew necessarily involved the 
obligation to pitch one's life against the most rigorously deterministic setting. 
The mother is the most faithful representative of this aspect of Jewish sensibility, and as such 
she furnishes a dramatic contrast to the cultural and spiritual allure surrounding the figure of 
cousin Sophie and her set. I have pointed out in the previous chapter that Kazin associated the 
two women with distinct if not countervailing historical sensibilities. What needs to be stressed 
here is that Sophie had "strong progressive interests," and felt a certain kinship with "the 
enlightened tradition of the old Russian intelligentsia" (W, 54). That Sophie's self-conscious 
cultural grooming would eventually seal her fate at the hands of a cynical goy and con man may 
illustrate that it was not possible to escape the confines of the ghetto so quickly without 
incurring grave risks. True, the young Kazin is infatuated with Sophie and her acquaintance, 
who expressed strongly socialist sympathies with emancipatory ideas in art and society. He 
recalls that they were familiar with Sholem Aleichem, Peretz, Gorky, Tolstoy, Nijinsky, 
Nazimova in Chekov's The Cherry Orchard, and Pavlova in "The Swan." Radicals in politics, 
art, and social thought, Sophie's colleagues suggest the irreverent rebelliousness of the great 
pioneers in the women's liberation movement, Emma Goldman and Alexandra Kollontai. 
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Indeed, Kazin was well aware that they supported the cause of liberation in a much more 
comprehensive sense than their immediate situation as dressmakers warranted: "Those Friday 
evenings, I suddenly found myself enveloped in some old, primary Socialist idea that men could 
go beyond every barrier of race and nation and language, even of class!, into some potential 
loving union of the whole human race. I was suddenly glad to be a Jew, as these women were 
Jews..." (W, 58). And this is precisely because, as a Jew, he is himself so sensitive to the 
barriers hemming him in. Socialism and cultural cosmopolitanism exerted a natural appeal to 
those barred from participation in the mainstream. 
For Sophie, the ultimate form emancipation took was marriage. But her cultural desires and 
emotional needs made her a person easy to exploit. Almost over-eager in solving the conflict 
between her liberal intellectual interests and her participation in the ritualized cycle of Jewish 
life, she lost her place in the one without obtaining sufficient foothold in the other. By contrast, 
the mother wrestles with the most agonizing memories of "Der Heym." To her, "home" was the 
Poland she has left. She has incessant visions of her family there being wiped out one by one 
in pogroms or starved by economic misery. Whereas Sophie apparently lost her moorings, the 
mother, who had come to America to escape the hardships of Jewish life in Europe, embodies 
the continuity of the past in the present. Her son registers the sway her emotions have over his 
life and resents this: 
In many ways der heym was entirely dim and abstract, nothing to do with me at all, alien as the 
skullcap and beard and frock coat of my mother's father, whom I never saw, but whose calm 
orthodox dignity stared up at me from an old photograph at the bottom of the bureau drawer. Yet 
I lived each of my mother's fears from Dugschitz to Hamburg to London to Hester Street to 
Brownsville through and through with such fidelity that there were times when I wished I had 
made that journey too, wished I could have seen Czarist Russia, since I had in any event to suffer 
it all over again. (W, 59) 
"Home," then, is the ineluctable cycle of Jewish history. It is "the ancient still center" at the 
heart of Jewishness which is the Jews' main resource against the unremitting violence of their 
historical lot. It consists of the complex strands of unbreakable continuity between the Jewish 
past and the present. It is a kindred continuity to that which the writer returning to Brownsville 
constructs in his memories of his boyhood, and which, as the narrator-protagonist proves time 
and again, has a similarly transcendent purpose. Even the family's congenital Socialism vanishes 
before it. The father once rejected the offer of a homestead in Colorado on the grounds that he 
would have been terribly lonely there. He waived aside the son's bitter reproaches with the 
remark that ghetto conditions had unified the Jews in spirit and experience, and that this matter 
was not for any individual Jew to make light of. The historical fact of the Dispersal had inspired 
one overriding fear: 
"Alfred, what do you want of us poor Jews?" 
So it was: we had always to be together: believers and nonbelievers, we were a people; I was 
of that people. Unthinkable to go one's own way, to doubt or to escape the fact that I was a 
Jew.... We had all of us lived together so long that we would not known how to separate even if 
we had wanted to. The most terrible word was aieyn, alone.... My father had never been able to 
find his father's grave. Aleyn! Aleyn! Did immigrant Jews, then, marry out of loneliness? Was 
even Socialism just a happier way of keeping us together? 
I trusted it to do that. (W, 60-1) 
"Home" suggests the internal coherence of the Brownsville community and the Jewish 
family. It offers care and security, albeit at the cost of an enforced participation in the burden 
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of Jewish history. The father's desperate search for his father's grave intones a recurrently 
threatening loss of origins and identity, but in the mother's vicarious suffering and unflagging 
identification with her Polish kin, as well as in the son's response, we sense how each success-
ive generation was compelled to re-enact within the scope of its own, unique experience the 
universal tragedy of Jewish history. The mother had but few options: a person either chose to 
act on "the fury of our ambition... the blind resolution to live," or submitted to catastrophe. Her 
mind was so deeply stamped with remembered "eras of pain, of exile, of dispersion" (W, 70), 
that she allowed the Mosaic dispensation to dominate her historical sense. But it is precisely in 
the mother's spent face after a day of hard work — the equivalent of historical travail? — 
poring through the kitchen window at the sunset coloring the neighbourhood scenes that "she 
has drawn for me [viz. the boy-writer] one single line of sentience" (W, 71). There is a promise 
of release here, of reward and redemption, after obligations fulfilled and duties performed. The 
son believes that sooner or later experience itself may arrange itself metaphysically in the 
harmonious colours of the sunset which pierce his mother's soul. Even from the occasionally 
stifling togetherness of family life in the kitchen there may finally emerge that liberating tone, 
that chord, that will give meaning to a history of bondage, proof of the self-determination of the 
spirit. This is the nucleus of the walker's argument. The narrative traces the process that 
converts the knowledge of external constrictions into the available resources of inwardness. That 
one moment of introspection which the mother allows herself each day measures how the boy's 
consciousness has expanded. Imaginatively, he has matured, and his parents' complex situation 
now concerns him much more vividly, and directly, than the synagogue. For him, Sophie's 
culture and his mother's graven insistence on bearing the brunt of every possible psychological 
hardship come together in their shared fascination with Russian culture. Unconsciously, the 
family identifies, emotionally as well as intellectually, with the creative power of another people 
long subject to the scourge of history: the Russians, too, have distilled music out of the cruel 
mechanisms of life. The Kazin family would sit down to hear the boy Alfred play the violin, 
and it is the writer who comprises by dint of his literary effort the power of the music to unify 
the family and comfort it in its task of endurance: 
Any slow movement... seemed to come to them as a reminiscence of a reminiscence. It seemed to 
have something to do with our being Jews. The depths of Jewish memory the violin could throw 
open apparently had no limit — for every slow movement was based on something "Russian," 
every plaintive melody even in Beethoven or Mozart was "Jewish." I could skip from composer 
to composer, from theme to theme, without any fear, ever, of being detected, for all slow move-
ments fell into a single chant of der heym and of the great Kol Nidre sung in the first evening 
hours of the Day of Atonement, in whose long rending cry — of contrition? of grief? of hopeless 
love for the Creator? — I relived all of the Jews' bitter intimacy with death. (W, 62-3) 
Only then would they go on to great singers like McCormack, Galli-Curci, Gluck and Caruso, 
all of them testifying to the creative power of goy culture. Particularly the father was enamoured 
of Caruso, "that Italyéner": the artistic lushness of the Italian character could become attractive 
to the Jew. It expressed creative desire and assertion. 
Yet, the most memorable image of Part 2, and really also its resolution, is the spectacle of 
boys from the neighbourhood springing their pigeons from their traps. They plot the growth of 
the boy's consciousness, "widening and widening their flight each time they came over our roof 
again..." (W, 72) The protagonist has vanquished his initial reservations against revisiting the 
scenes of his youth. He acknowledges the usefulness, and indeed the necessity, of the attempt 
in much the same way that the pigeons explore the world in their natural, biologically deter-
mined rhythm of departure and return. The Jewish notion of "home" now corresponds with the 
idea of the centrality and the universality of the experience of Jewishness, dramatizing the 
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Jewish sense of self and its vicissitudes in history. By virtue of his alienated state, the Jew is 
free to explore the culture he aspires to from the outside and to reconstruct it from his own 
understanding of it. 
Third Movement 
Part 3 of Walker, "The Block and Beyond," continues on the up-beat the dramatic argument 
presented in Parts 1 and 2. Kazin recalls the quarrels one "dark-faced girl" used to have with 
her widow mother over her love relationship with an Italian boy, a goy. In order to placate the 
mother, the boy offered "to become a Jew" and actually had himself circumcised before the 
marriage. The drama enacted here is that love may vanquish even the violently exclusive codes 
of Jewish religious ethics. The point is significant, because the Jewish sense of the alien, the 
inassimilable and the illicit, dominates this chapter. At the same time, access to the "beyond" 
illustrates that the block is not the reflection of a block universe. Indeed, the notes of discord 
and misalliance constantly being heard around the block test the protagonist's capacity to bring 
down the defensive barriers of Jewish propriety. The writer-memoirist aims to make the 
"beyond" a natural extension of life in his own neighbourhood. He is all for a more inclusive 
and less puritanical morality. Thirty-six years later, Kazin would explain that what drove him 
to write Walker was 
the aliveness of the scene, the inextinguishable contrasts, the absurdity.... so much packed-up 
humanity... 
I... found my rhythm, the push toward home and the pull away again, the longing for the secret 
treasure of family and Jewish togetherness, and the contrary motion of seeking the open treasure 
that is the great city, infinite New York that belonged not to "us" but to "them." A key to my 
book is of course this constant sense of division, even of flagrant contradiction between wanting 
the enclosure of home and the open city, both moral certainty and intellectual independence. This 
conflict has never ended for me... To rebel against the tradition was somehow to hold fast to it.32 
The Gentile boy's conversion-by-circumcision is offset by the raunchy tastes of the barber 
on the block. Himself a snappy dresser, the barber would habitually sit poring over the soft 
pornography of the Police Gazette, his business embellished by "the unbelievable breasts of the 
calendar nudes." There is no doubt that he is a moral leper. He is a careless driver of motor­
cycles, and his squalid character is suggested on "the front page of the Graphic one morning 
showing Mrs. Ruth Snyder strapped and burning in the electric chair. The smell of hair tonic 
could never disguise the steaming exhalation of raw female flesh" (W, 79). The barber is moral 
evil personified. He represents another stage in the protagonist's initiation in the world of love, 
which had begun with suspicions of lasciviousness on the part of "Mrs. В.," a school teacher. 
He also recalls the boys gloating over dirty pictures: "They had never said anything about this 
at home, and I thought I knew why. Sex was the opposite of books, of pictures, of music, of the 
open air, even of kindness. They would not let you have both" {W, 30). Later on, when faced 
with the barber's salaciousness, however, he is no longer dependent on his parents' morality for 
guidance. He has learned to cope with deviant conduct himself. 
Fear of the forbidden, geographical and otherwise, is the steady accompaniment of the boys's 
explorations of Brownsville. These match the thematic structure of Whitman's "Crossing 
Brooklyn Ferry," glorifying the poetic riches of perception. "Beyond" parallels the desire to 
understand, and so possess, the world outside of Brownsville. It is "the city" as well as the ferry 
and the El station, both of them symbolizing passage. It is the present city as well as "the old 
New York of gaslight" which the writers of The Seven Arts had immortalized, and the city 
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painted by John Sloan and Thomas Eakins. It is "anything old and American." It is New Haven 
as well as Washington D.C., Coney Island as well as Indian Point. It may even be found inside 
Brownsville, in the mother's evocations of der heym, in the blacks of Litvonia Avenue, in the 
tea parlours of "burly Jewish truckers."33 It couples the sympathy of curiosity to a sense of 
heading out, of wanting to know. It is evidence, as in Whitman's poem, of moral direction. It 
signifies care and responsibility for the future. 
The transcendent urge released in explorations of the "beyond" occasionally generates the 
spiritual intensity and symbolism of an epiphany. "It would have to be dusk" (W, 96), Kazin 
recalls, suggesting that the recovery of the past, which is itself one aspect of the dual "beyond," 
is an expression of religious need. For earlier on he had indicated the necessity of reflection on 
experience, that thought itself completes experience, and he had associated this insight with his 
mother's habitual moment of introspection after a day of care and toil. Kazin employs the 
symbol of the arc to suggest how the openness of the present affects the burden of the past. The 
moment we yield our completed experience to the past, we revise its pattern. In this reflexive 
dedication of the new, of the very gift of creation, to the past we acknowledge that the transition 
from present to past is a redemptive one. Thus, we commit ourselves to recognize the presence 
of the past, and the present is redeemed by the past, whose substance is not so much one of fact 
and perceived sequence but of a superstructured world of the spirit, the stuff of the imagination: 
Now the light begins to die. Twilight is also the mind's grazing time. Twilight is the bottom of 
that arc down which we had fallen the whole long day, but where I now sit at our cousin's 
window in some strange silence of attention, watching the pigeons go round and round to the leafy 
smell of soup greens from the stove. In the cool of that first evening hour, as I sit at the table 
waiting for supper and my father and the New York World, everything is so rich to overflowing, 
I hardly know where to begin. (W, 73) 
Recollection in tranquillity offers guidance and faith. It supports vision, and so lays the comer-
stone of the future. At dusk, images of old New York would overwhelm the boy: "The past was 
that forest of telegraph wires hung over lower New York" (W, 97) which he had seen in old 
photographs. The symbolism is obvious: the wires guide us through the maze of the past. They 
establish our medium of communication with it. "Dusk in America any time after the Civil War 
would be the corridor back and back into that old New York under my feet that always left me 
half-stunned with its audible cries for recognition" (W, 96). The walker would make an attempt 
to redeem that old America, wrecked by the impact of modem industrial ethics, in On Native 
Grounds. There, Kazin drew the lessons of the past in order to anticipate the possible configu-
rations of the future. Walker, by contrast, argues that the future must be lived in the spirit of 
creative recovery of the past. But the future is not an open proposition: it must adapt to the 
material which the past releases. Kazin's position includes a redemptive dualism, for the creation 
of Walker's protagonist proves that life need not be lived among the rigid determinism of 
established facts, but rather takes its shape and meaning from the way these compel the mind 
to devise a complementary, redemptive metaphysics. In this sense, as Kazin has argued, natural-
ism "defines the possible." It may also explain why Malcolm Cowley urged Kazin to nurse his 
"early humiliations" in Brownsville in the spirit of gratitude. Equally, to trace the emergence of 
nineteenth-century postbellum literature in America was to interpret history in the light of moral 
evolution. It is from an imaginative identification with the rebel artists and thinkers of the 
postbellum era — Dickinson, Roebling, Ryder, Eakins, Peirce — that Walter's protagonist 
distils the historical faith that motivates him. They had been isolated, too, and had suffered from 
a marginal relation to their cultural environment, but they had wrested artistry from their 
predicament. Their moral views, never naively evolutionary or downright pessimistic, proved 
105 
that their relation to their world expressed the variousness and scope of art The boy-protagonist 
is buoyed up by the conviction that, if art was possible then, it must surely be possible now 
Yet, the distance between past and present, which in Walker is metaphysical rather than 
temporal, seems hard to negotiate The boy's reluctant submission to the enticements of the 
"beyond," which equal the promise of the future, inevitably leads to an aggravated sense of 
difference upon return 
But why that long ride home at all9 Why did they live there and we always in "Brunzvil"9 Why 
were they there, and we always here7 Why was it always them and us, Gentiles and us, 
alrightniks and us9 Beyond Brownsville was — "all the city" Beyond was the strange world of 
Gentiles, all of them with flaxen hair, who hated Jews, especially poor Jews To be a Jew meant 
that one's very right to existence was always being brought into question Everyone knew this — 
even the Communists summer nights on Pitkin Avenue said so, could make the most listless crowd 
weep with reminders of what they were doing to us in Fascist Poland, Rumania, Hungary It was 
what I had always heard in the great Kol Nidre sung in the first evening hours of the Day of 
Atonement What had my private walks into the city to do with anything' (W, 98-9) 
The Jewish past is not a dead weight to be shed at will The protagonist acknowledges that m 
the course of his development he must continue to obey its gravitational pull And even though 
the early phase of his life contrasts so violently with the mobility of society beyond 
Brownsville, he knows that he must hold on to the laws of the community His own education 
still incomplete, he could defy them only at his own peril 
In the depths of his frustration, he even sets up a conspiracy theory of history from his own 
chafing resignation to the burden of the past Remembering the synagogue, the shabbes, the 
phylacteries and the prayer book, he cries out m confusion "How many fathers I had1" (W, 
101) Jewish orthodoxy exerts a stranglehold, yet he realizes that loyalty to the innermost 
sanctuary of its moral theorems, the continuity of life in the family, forbids that he become a 
parricide As yet, he finds that the past only offers confusion and constraint, but he will learn 
that that is no reason to dismiss it as an obstacle to his education Actually, life in the Jewish 
home, which was ritualized and seemingly static, gave him "a purchase of risk and growth "M 
Like the arc, the protagonist straddles distinct spheres of life and experience His walks enact 
a proliferating dualism of past and present, history and self, locale and metaphysics, tradition 
and experience They secure a steadily expanding consciousness and set the stage for a recon-
ciliation of these The outcome is fixed in the literary sensibility of the narrative self It is an 
ecstatic faith that "the glories of perception" will increase the capaciousness of his soul 
In finally questioning the orthodox conception of God the protagonist celebrates his own 
new-found identity He finds Him a God of resignation, of weariness, of ponderous inertia On 
the Day of Atonement, it occurs to the protagonist that the traditional devotion in prayer actually 
sums up "the whole earthly life of Brownsville" (W, 102) He realizes that the fact of his 
Jewishness may be ineluctable, but is also aware that the cycles of Jewish history may not have 
brought the Jews closer to redemption Significantly, he dramatizes his own growth against the 
theme of historical stasis or even regression He finds the fatalism and resignation of orthodox 
religious observance insufferable, and asks himself desperately if the Chassidim still have a 
historical role to play These religious enthusiasts, "walkers" like himself, had brooked no 
restrictions to their joy in the Lord and the beauty of a world elsewhere, even amidst the direst 
poverty and isolation of the Eastern European shtetls The sheer act of walking prepared the 
protagonist "to meet beautiful unmet Chassidim" {W, 104), who are virtually historical avatars 
of his own absorbed self He looks to his God to reveal Himself in some conception of destiny, 
not as One to be reconciled in the bitter repentance over the vanity of all human effort Walking 
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the Brooklyn Bridge, the walker ventures to stand face to face with the possibility and the desire 
for transcendence. The pulsing arteries of the city incited 
the riot in my heart as I saw the cables leap up to the tower, saw those great meshed triangles leap 
up and up to the tower, higher and still higher — Lord my Lord, when will they cease to drive 
me up with them in their flight? ... Papa, where are they taking me? Where in this beyond are 
they taking me? (W, 107-8) 
Brownsville continues to suggest crampedness and denial. Evidence of furtive sex recurs, though 
it no longer disturbs the boy. And in the littered back-yard "you could only look straight up, the 
clotheslines seemed about to strangle you..." (W, 111) They do not inspire the metaphysical 
connotations of the cables supporting the Brooklyn Bridge. 
His growth enables the protagonist to present the history of Mr. and Mrs. Solovey in the 
form of a cautionary tale. They were an "enlightened" couple who had come to live in 
Brownsville after having travelled all over the world. It seemed perverse, "a moral sickness" (W, 
116), to do so, for it suggested that Brownsville was the natural destiny of people at the end of 
their tether: "I felt they had floated into Brownsville like wreckage off the ship of foreignness 
and 'culture' and the great world outside" (W, 118). Having had all the advantages, they had yet 
lost their love for each other, as well as their hope. They kept themselves aloof from the 
community, and were kept out in return. The man's voracious reading and tantalizing indiffer-
ence to his business made the familiar Jewish ambition for success seem banal. Nevertheless, the 
protagonist "loved them," because they seemed to suffer the loneliness which attaches to those 
whose mental span reaches beyond the loyalty and solidarity dictated by communal interests. He 
experiences a shock of recognition: 
I felt I was alone, that there were things I had to endure out of loyalty but could never accept, and 
that whenever I liked, I could swim out from the Brownsville shore to that calm and sunlit sea 
beyond where great friends came up from the deep. Every book 1 read re-stocked my mind with 
those great friends who lived out of Brownsville.... 
The Soloveys came into my life as the nearest of all great friends.... Passionately attached as 
I was to my parents, it had never occurred to me to ask myself what I thought of them as 
individuals. They were the head of the great body to which I had been joined at birth. There was 
nothing I could give them. I wanted some voluntary and delighted gift of emotion to rise up in 
me; something that would surprise me in the giving, that would flame directly out of me; that was 
not, like the obedience of our family love, a routine affair of every day. I wanted to bestow love 
that came from an idea. {W, 120-1) 
Mr. Solovey's wilful sloppiness is a standing reproach to Jewish mores. He upsets familiar 
social aspirations and complacent notions of success, discarding them as irrelevant to the world 
which his reading symbolizes. Despite his sympathy for them, the boy understands that such 
haughty independence of spirit may court catastrophe. And in the depths of her desolation — 
the husband having gone bankrupt and still more indifferent to her — Mrs. Solovey commits 
suicide. The protagonist concludes that the husband's fierce inassimilability dragged them down 
in the world. The disparity between their minds' radicalism and the massive inert body of 
Jewish observance and social duty inspired the terror that killed Mrs. Solovey. She enacted the 
tragedy of self. The protagonist recognizes the drama involved, and so takes his education one 
step further. For her death represents a criticism of the boy's unlimited faith in the transcendent 
self and the glories of the imagination. Sherman Paul has aptly called this episode the boy's 
"first impasse of being, the subsidence... of so much that here and elsewhere in the book is 
rendered epiphanically."35 
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Fourth Movement 
In Part 4, "Summer: The Way to Highland Park," the boy is finally launched beyond the 
periphery of Brownsville. Even as the memoirist's return has been the agent of the boy's release 
into the "beyond," it is in the boy-protagonist that the writer restores the indispensable bond 
with his origins. For in the protagonist's ambiguous groping toward the centre he specifies the 
relation between writer and world, and his own in particular. The writer achieves self-under-
standing in the boy's excited spirit of discovery. He becomes reintegrated with his earlier self, 
which illuminates the crisis of approaching that decisive "fork in the road where all American 
lives cross" (W, 171). That moment is reached when the protagonist begins to project outward 
the spiritual pliancy generated in the awareness of being moulded. It is reached when the self 
undertakes to be the maker of its own mould. 
The protagonist's narrative voice in Part 4 records the exhilaration of controlling the contra-
dictions of moulding and being moulded. He has become knowledgeable. Attending a meeting 
in the Labor Lyceum, ignoring the speakers and reading Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man instead, he will conclude that "Socialists are not deep" {W, 142). But compared with 
the sneering militancy which was the trademark of the Communist cadres, the Socialists turned 
out to be thoroughly Yiddish, homely, nostalgic for the political atmosphere of Brownsville 
before the Irish Tammany had taken over. Kazin realizes that "I had been one of them all my 
life" (W, 143), even if they distrusted his bookishness. By contrast, the Communists were all too 
contemptuous of the human factor. They blamed the Socialists with every set-back to the radical 
cause. Accusations of betrayal were rife: "Sometimes the pressure of those arguments would 
reach around the speaker's stand, push it over, fill up the evening with unquenchable bitterness 
between worker and worker" (W, 144). Communist political tactics certainly grated on a 
budding literary sensibility eager to find salvation in subverting "petty distinctions." 
Nevertheless, the protagonist proves the sheer human range of his own interests by devoting 
himself to the exception. David is a Communist activist who visits Kazin at home and is 
sincerely interested in his juvenile writing. David's own living conditions are typical for 
someone of avowed Communist sympathies, but Kazin is struck by the extreme poverty of the 
neighbourhood, which he finds altogether of a piece with "Brownsville's frankness" (W, 150). 
So, presumably, is the world of David's consciousness, for his "dining room" is cluttered with 
his chemistry text-books, photographs of American social squalor from Soviet Russia Today, 
pictures of Lenin, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Frederick W. Douglass, Henri Barbusse, and Ernst 
Thälmann. Certainly here, too, as in the protagonist's tentative identification with the Soloveys, 
we see enacted the history of an idea. David's radicalism harks back to an old American 
tradition of pacifist, libertarian humanitarianism. It spells a richness of imagination, and a 
willingness to pursue the cause of emancipation beyond the contingencies of ideology that 
dominated the Communist rank and file. David's chemistry studies symbolize his purity of 
motive: he was looking to make society over. 
Finding the way to Highland Park, at sixteen, coincides with the dawn of the protagonist's 
literary sensibility. The very discovery of his literary gift would lend him the tools for conceiv-
ing his own destiny. The teacher who becomes his mentor would humour him on walks around 
the Highland Park Reservoir. After one such session, the boy for the first time realizes with 
dismay that he can barely hope to avoid having to cope with questions of an existential nature. 
A newly completed self, he, too, must face the anxieties of the egocentric predicament. 
Summer is the time of fruition and delivery. He gets his first paid job as an errand runner. 
During his work, he reads David Copperfield and begins to expect some form of metaphysical 
reconciliation about to occur. He is not disappointed: "And then it came. All the way down the 
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Street, there seemed to be nothing but myself... and silence through which I pressed my way. 
But the large shadow on the pavement was me, the music in my head was me, the indescribable 
joy I felt was me" (W, 158). The protagonist's identity, his narrative self, has been completed. 
Reading a Biblical text, he feels layer upon layer of self unfold within him, asserting the 
promise that man will forever renew himself. Other texts provide a similarly heightened 
consciousness of self in its creative interaction with the world: a quotation from Sir Thomas 
Browne, Lawrence's The Rainbow, Henry Vaughan's "The World," Blake's "Tyger! Tyger!," 
the opening lines of A Farewell to Arms, and Whitman's "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard 
Bloom'd." These establish the Soloveys' heritage on a firmer basis. They are writers he can 
"instinctively trust" (IV, 161), advocates of a particular conception of self. Even so, they are but 
the preliminaries to an even intenser union. For the fellow mind par excellence whose ideas he 
wishes to share is Yeshua. Yeshua resolves the boy's dialogue with the world in every respect. 
He spells sympathy and justice, in history as well as in the spirit. In Him, the Word takes on 
flesh and becomes fused with the world. He is Idea. His spiritual language will break through 
the walls of alienation and dissolve artificial divisions: 
I had been waiting for him all my life — our own Yeshua, misunderstood by his own, like me, 
but the very embodiment of everything I had waited so long to hear from a Jew — a great 
contempt for the minute daily business of the world; a deep and joyful turning back into our own 
spirit. It was he, 1 thought, who would resolve for me at last the ambiguity and the long ache of 
being a Jew — Yeshua, our long-lost Jesus, speaking straight to the mind and heart at once. For 
that voice, that exultantly fiery and tender voice, there were no gaps between images and things, 
for constantly walking before the Lord, he remained all energy and mind, thrust his soul into 
every comer of the world, and passing gaily under every yoke, remained free to seek our God in 
His expected place. 
How long I had been waiting for him, how long... (W, 161-2) 
Yeshua is the purest expression of Walker's narrative self. He is a literary creation, proof of a 
personal religion nourished on literary ideas. He resolves the narrator's necessary dualism in the 
unity of His being. He is a great soul, a stem moralist and a judge. He is the scourge of all the 
tyrannies perpetrated in the name of religion, morality, or scientific historicism. The walker-
protagonist has created God in his own image, and is replenished by Him. 
Having frankly professed his loyalty to the idea of Yeshua, he is prepared to solve the 
dilemmas of his own historical and cultural self. Straying into those sections of Manhattan 
where nineteenth-century brownstones still dominate, he finds he has achieved his purpose: "I 
had made a discovery: walking could take me back into the America of the nineteenth century" 
(W, 170). That past remains "deep," but distinctly visible in it are those "solitary Americans 
whose careers, though closed in death, had woven an arc around them which I could see in 
space and time" (W, 171, 172). The arc reminds us of the son's solemn interpretation of his 
mother's emotional trepidation at nightfall, but it also symbolizes the geographical and spiritual 
pattern of his explorations. It signifies the sheer spiritual will to keep on scaling the walls of 
alienation till they disintegrate. And, like those "solitary Americans," he will thus make himself 
heard across the generations. He will create his own future audience and so, indeed, help to 
create the future. But thinking of the artists in nineteenth-century New York, 
I felt then that I stood outside all that, that I would be alien forever, but that I could at least keep 
the trunk open by reading. And though I knew somewhere in myself that a Ryder, an Emily 
Dickinson, an Eakins, a Whitman, even that fierce-browed old German immigrant Roebling, with 
his flute and his passionate love of suspension bridges, were alien, too, alien in the deepest way, 
like my beloved Blake, my Yeshua, my Beethoven, my Newman — nevertheless I still thought of 
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myself then as standing outside America. I read as if books would fill my every gap, legitimize 
my strange quest for the American past, remedy my every flaw, let me in at last into the great 
world that was anything just out of Brownsville. (W, 172) 
Leaving the library for "the best of walks" to Highland Park, he can barely control his indign-
ation: 
Why were these people here, and we there? Why had I always to think of insider and outsider, of 
their belonging and our not belonging, when books had carried me this far, and when, as I could 
see, it was myself that would carry me farther — beyond these petty distinctions I had so long 
made in loneliness? (W, 173) 
Highland Park stirs up the contrary emotion, which is the heart of the walker's trip: it was "pure 
idea." It gives full play to creative desire. It inspires a Whitmanesque acceptance of everything 
which is not the self, and so strengthens it: 
From one side of the reservoir hill we could look across the cemetery to the skyscrapers of 
Manhattan; from the other, to miles of lampposts along Jamaica Avenue. Below us was wood, 
then a military cemetery, slope on slope laid out in endless white crosses. We never tired of 
walking round the reservoir arm in arm, watching the light playing on the water, and going, as it 
seemed, from one flank of New York to the other. The city was no longer real; only a view from 
a distance, interrupted by cemeteries on every side. But on a summer night, when we lay in the 
grass below, the smell of the earth and the lights from the distant city made a single background 
to my desire. The lampposts winked steadily from Jamaica Avenue, and the YMCA's enormous 
sign glowed and died and glowed again. Somewhere in the deadness of the park the water gurgled 
in the fountains. In the warmth and stillness a yearning dry and sharp as salt rose in me. Far away 
a whistle hooted; far away girls went round and round the path, laughing. When we went home, 
taking the road past the cemetery, with the lights of Jamaica Avenue spread before us, it was hard 
to think of them as something apart, they were searching out so many new things in me. (W. 175-
6) 
This passage bristles with the vigorous counterpoint of Whitman's poetic catalogues. Creative 
desire vies with ubiquitous intimations of death, the promise of the far-away city is reflected in 
the lights of Jamaica Avenue and the YMCA. Turning back towards Brooklyn, the protagonist 
yet knows he is advancing ever more steadily upon the centre of the city. He has achieved a 
modern instance of Whitman's "Song of Myself," and therefore the tradition of Whitman lives. 
He has found his proper destiny in a vision of love, symbolized by the girl at his side. Both in 
her and in his vision, he celebrates his power to create cohesion and moral order amidst 
evidence of division, slavery, bigotry, and disbelief. Only through love do self and the world 
enter into a meaningful relationship. 
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Starting Out in the Hungry Decade 
Bridging Opposites: The Search for a Native and Radical Aesthetics 
For all of its virtues as intellectual memoir, Starting Out in the Thirties is primarily a statement 
on the continuity of American literary history. On Native Grounds intoned the tradition of 
realism-naturalism as the classic expression of the modern imagination in America, reflecting the 
writer's forced engagement with the volatile nature of modem social reality. Kazin addresses the 
American writer's tendency to wallow in either moral repugnance or Utopian desires, to fret in 
self-chosen isolation rather than to try and gauge the anarchic social realities of the American 
market-place. As if by some obstinate and inexplicable tragedy, he fell short of completing his 
individual, creative vision of the world. Kazin claimed that those writers who battled against the 
genteel tradition were not lacking in courage and aspiration, but in intelligence, poise, and 
wisdom. This contradicted the notion then current among radicals that the proper domain of 
literary issues is largely determined by the Zeitgeschichte. To literary Marxists, the coming of 
the new social order implied a new literature, but Kazin believed that the older generation of 
modern writers carried the destiny of American literature in their hands, and that a more 
sustained, inward exploration of the development of their creative talent could have made many 
of the literary controversies of the Thirties irrelevant. As it was, the old guard stopped short of 
certain acute and significant literary insights and retreated into the protectiveness of a purely 
personal or traditional morality, like Cather, or simply became repetitive. That was the tragedy 
which Mark van Doren thought Kazin had portrayed so vividly in On Native Grounds. The book 
certainly flouted the prescriptions of radical cultural doctrine in the Thirties and offered an 
eloquent critique of Popular Front liberalism. 
I propose to look at Starting Out in the Thirties as dramatizing the public issues of the era 
against the background of the divorce of naturalism as a meliorative social ethics from its 
counterpart in the scientific claims the Communists made for social realism. The divorce was 
historically imperative because of the overtly political objectives of the Communist cultural 
critique. The Comintern's policy during the Third Period had decreed the formation of a 
"proletarian aesthetics" spearheading revolutionary social doctrine. As intellectual drama, 
Starting Out features the drift toward cultural regimentation, both at home and abroad. It traces 
the declining historical optimism that had been at the heart of On Native Grounds. There, Kazin 
had assumed that, after five decades of mulling over the same moral and intellectual issues and 
at a time of severe crisis of the liberal mind, the American literary ethos would outgrow its 
stagnancy, relinquish its habitual posture of estrangement from the world it faced, and prepare 
for living in it. In addition, On Native Grounds expressed the, particularly Jewish, intellectual's 
rapprochement with the native culture he had hitherto distrusted if not condemned. The dishar-
monies of the national civilization had in fact for a long time been his motive for remaining 
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culturally disaffiliated. But Richard Pells, among others, has described On Motive Grounds as 
primarily an effort toward adjustment: 
... for a number of Partisan Review alumni, the occupation became not so much a way of keeping 
faith with one's radical origins as a means of finding a "path to the outside world." It was hardly 
accidental that the one full-length book to emerge from Partisan's stable — an extensive and 
basically sympathetic treatment of twentieth-century American literature — was entitled On Native 
Grounds. When Alfred Kazin started the work in the late 1930s, it seemed an illustration of 
Partisan's favorite themes — the inability of the American artist to deal with social experience at 
the level of conscious ideas, the innate conformism of the Popular Front, the emphasis on a moral 
and cultural critique of national institutions. But by the time it was published in 1942, Kazin had 
infused the book with a lyrical sensitivity to the American past and an eloquent appreciation of the 
writer's inviolable (if sometimes ambiguous) ties to the larger society worthy of a Van Wyck 
Brooks or Lewis Mumford. In effect, On Native Grounds represented an act of assimilation, a 
symbolic rite of passage over the Brooklyn Bridge into the "great world" beyond, a spiritual 
transformation from "outsider" to "insider" — from alienation to adjustment. And in the process 
of accommodating himself to his native land, Kazin revealed how much the anti-Stalinist writer 
shared in common with the rest of the intellectual community, how eagerly he wished to make 
himself a part of America's values and traditions, how rapidly the ideological and aesthetic battles 
of the 1930s were giving way to a mood of consensus with the approach of World War II.' 
Starting Out in the Thirties is a historical primer, modest but vivid, of the cultural and 
political events that sparked off the decisive crisis of socialism in the United States. It portrays 
how radicalism in the postwar era survived only in the form of personal culture. Kazin considers 
himself a literary radical, and it irks him to see literature invaded by the liberal-experimental 
assumptions of scientific socialism, which classically attributes social evil to the malfunctions 
of the capitalist system. One objective of socialist realism, for example, is to expose a culture's 
rotten institutional base and so bring about social amelioration, and Kazin's memoir features the 
false expectations raised at the time about literary Stalinism and Popular Front liberalism. It 
registers the failure of the collectivist ideologies propagated by the official Left, and deals with 
its historical subject in the idiom of personal consciousness and moral tragedy. Central to that 
tragedy is the revolutionary Marxist intellectual, who expected dialectical materialism to furnish 
the comprehensive analysis needed to understand the structure of society and improve it. The 
Marxist writer was in a similar bind. Convinced that it was his task to promote revolutionary 
consciousness, he limited his professional interest to the proletarian aesthetics that the Commu-
nist Party called for. 
Politics and the Self 
Starting Out teems with biographical vignettes of radicals either still in or already out of grace, 
whose lives took shape from their allegiance or opposition to the doctrine of social 
revolutionism. Persons in the latter category furnish the book's moral standard. They display 
none of the revolutionary exclusiveness and intellectual cynicism of the Communists during the 
Third International, and hold themselves personally accountable for their intellectual beliefs. The 
magnitude of their personal convictions reveals that Kazin's faith in the radical cause is now in 
terms of self-realization within history and no longer, as in On Native Grounds, with a presum-
ably redemptive historical logic, or rather a fermentation of moral consciousness. 
For all of its concern with political and intellectual morality, Starting Out is primarily an 
aesthetic document. It explores certain kinds of intellectual experience and conviction in terms 
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of personalities and personal identities. It reveals the inadequacy of historical dialectics as a 
social tool. In this respect, it resumes the evaluation begun toward the end of On Native 
Grounds, which exposed the bluntness and callousness of much naturalist realism in the Thirties 
and urged a rediscovery of the nation's spiritual ethos. In the case of Farrell, Kazin observed 
that 
[Farrell's work] was art, powerful and vital art; but it was also a perfect example of that uncon-
scious and benevolent philistinism which believes that one escapes from materialism by surren-
dering to it... In the left-wing theory of literature, which was so riddled with determinism that it 
employed only half one's mind and soul, spiritual insight was to be won only by proving how 
little there was of it in life.2 
Kazin's criticism of the positivist bias of much radical writing in the Thirties portrays the 
démythification of Marxist dialectical materialism then already underway. Starting Out is 
committed to "the spiritual imponderables that lie beyond theory."3 Even so, Kazin did not wish 
to see his personal, ethical brand of socialism associated with the incipient religious revival 
among contemporary, post-Marxist intellectuals. The independent anti-Stalinist Left, which 
features prominently in his analysis of Thirties historical determinism, maintained a strong belief 
in the Marxist scientific historicism and refused to seek refuge in religion. Such stray evidence 
of religious conviction among the deradicalizing intelligentsia as appears in Starting Out merely 
illustrates how difficult it was for some people to break away from Stalinism, even when it was 
objectively in decay. Indeed, Kazin convincingly shows that many who turned their backs on 
Communism developed a moral dogmatism remarkably like that of the Communists in their 
prime.4 Nevertheless, Kazin discerned a significant connection between religion and socialism, 
which I shall comment on below. 
Kazin has indicated that Starting Out covers both the literary and the political drama of the 
period. He wanted it to tap the literary tradition of independent spiritual radicalism, of 
"humanistic moral passion." Addressing the contemporary crisis required no less. If successful, 
this would give substance to the literary radical's social role. Kazin describes himself at the 
beginning of Starting Out as "a literary radical, indifferent to economics, suspicious of organi-
zation, planning, Marxist solemnity and intellectual system-building; it was the rebels of 
literature, the great wrestlers-with-God, Thor with his mighty hammer, the poets of unlimited 
spiritual freedom, whom I loved — Blake, Emerson, Whitman, Nietzsche, Lawrence."5 Only 
the literary radical had the keen sense of human variety and complexity that was missing from 
contemporary radical utopias to such a disastrous extent. Starting Out recreates the moral 
heroism of the individual conscience in an ambience of increasing ideological regimentation. 
Kazin's biographical cameos present modes of radical humanism surviving in a totally 
politicized arena. They express his conviction that the tradition of intellectual dissent will secure 
values increasingly under fire from radical politics. The writers he mentions embody that 
tradition. He was to find additional cases in classic American literature, in the European 
literature of the anti-Communist Left, and in the Western, poetic tradition of Romantic rebellion 
and self-assertion. As a memoir, however, Starting Out shows a recurrent flaw of Thirties 
historiography. Jules Chametzky, among other people, charges Kazin with a "nagging dilemma 
of self."6 This may reflect Kazin's reluctance to take a stand, not simply as an interpreter but 
primarily as a participant, vis-à-vis history and its supposed identity with the radical will. 
Arguably, this question belongs in the context of the search for a moral and historical teleology 
carried out in On Native Grounds. Suffice it to say that Starting Out is a condemnation of the 
intellectual chicanery and the moral callousness that blighted the history of Marxism in the 
United States. 
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Starting Out is part of a substantial body of historical literature about Thirties politics and 
culture. Its pre-publication in May 1962, "The Bitter '30s: From a Personal History," may have 
been a trailblazer.7 Also Daniel Aaron's Writers on the Left (1961) showed the need for a 
revaluation of the native heritage of radical liberalism. Aaron's book focussed on a slightly older 
generation of radical writers and intellectuals, and it identified strongly with the literary 
bohemianism of the anarcho-syndicalists and the Old Left generally. Arguably, this was a 
natural response to the vogue of anti-Communism in the United States during the late Forties 
and Fifties. What concerns us right here is how the history of McCarthyite anti-Communism, 
and its impact on the culture of the deradicalizing intelligentsia, paved the way for reassessments 
of the radical heritage in the United States such as Starting Out. Kazin broaches the related and 
vexing question of the relationships between the political intelligence and the literary mind. The 
critique of liberal politics, he observes elsewhere, also caught on among adepts of a profoundly 
literary interpretation of radicalism, vide Lionel Trilling. 
Trilling's plea on behalf of the "liberal imagination" involved a carefully modulated exposi-
tion in literature of the relations between liberalism, viz. a set of assumptions about progress and 
rationality, and politics. He cautioned his contemporaries to insist that politics is imagination and 
mind, or else they would find that imagination and mind are politics, and of a kind that they 
would not like. Of course, as a response to nearly two decades of stultifying radical polemic and 
StaJinoid thinking, Trilling's effort to restore the free play of mind in cultural and political 
matters was certainly warranted. One limitation, however, was that the strenuous exercise of the 
imagination of "variousness, possibility, complexity, and difficulty" tended to paint a bleak 
picture of the possibilities for meaningful political action. To Kazin, this displacement of liberal 
politics by "a culture of radically disjunctive intellectual propositions" minimized the natural 
development of power alignments which he thinks have, more than any intellectual or political 
programme, shaped the modem American experience. Trilling allegedly domesticated the drama 
of social power to his own tremulous concern with "manners." His intellectualized cultural 
consciousness compromised his capacity for liberal political action. At best, Kazin concluded, 
his views showed a self-saving morality.8 
I would argue that the "dilemma of self' which Chametzky spotted in Starting Out, when 
seen against the background of Trilling's evolution from an early interest in Marxist social 
theory to the modulations of cultural consciousness, is there by design. For one thing, where the 
awareness of self is not the book's central theme, this is amply compensated for by a vividly 
critical interest in the environment as a power controlling individual fates. Kazin's memoir does 
not so much have himself for its central protagonist as the occasionally exalted, frequently 
spellbound, and almost always precarious and tragic human sense of our situation in history. The 
narrative enacts the conviction that what went missing from the brave new world of Marxism 
was a personal definition of the democratic conscience, if not identity, and of the role of the 
free mind in the radical conception of history. It is itself an instance of the structuring moral 
imagination exposing the limitations of contemporary politics and the sheer human waste 
involved. Privately, Kazin stressed that "it is very important to see the book as a book of life, 
not an intellectual autobiography.... [Starting Out is] narrative in the form of autobiography... 
my interest in the book is not in my growth... but in the hardness of a time entirely political.... 
[The book] must be seen in terms of the issues, with my place in it a testimony to the facts and 
significances, not the self-sufficient subject."9 I would add that Kazin envisages a supremely 
creative role for the self in a totally politicized world. 
Kazin is out to create certain values from his personal experience to be used against the 
spokesmen for a Marxist future. He makes exemplary literary use of his experience in the ghetto 
of Brownsville. A Walker in the City poeticized his youth in Brownsville. It dealt with his 
initially timorous dissociation from an amorphous yet orthodox Judaism, and testified to his 
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troubled identification with affirmative Jewishness next. It delineated the second-generation 
Jew's attempt to move beyond the pale and stated the mythical importance of that experience. 
The real tragedy of the Holocaust gradually occupying the centre of the contemporary intellec-
tual debate, Walker drew admiration for its revaluation of the Jewish identity. Brownsville, and 
the journey beyond it toward Manhattan, are Kazin's equivalent of the move from the margins 
of history into its mainstream, from prewar Jewish radicalism and intellectual universalism to 
the exacerbated postwar concern with the Jewish identity. It was a journey accomplished by 
many radical Jewish intellectuals of his generation. To Kazin, it illustrates the radical belief that 
history documents the emancipatory struggle of the masses. Starting Out uses this yearning for 
liberation as a defence of intellectual freedom, freedom from the self-generating dynamism, the 
intellectual intolerance and hermeticism, of radical historical theory. It enacts the gift of 
responsible self-determination. 
Kazin's narrative expresses a passionate exhilaration at the anticipated confrontation of 
certain sets of radicals and intellectuals. Its account of the "class struggle" — waged by revol-
utionary intellectuals on behalf of the inert and ignorant masses — dismisses the doctrinaire, 
prophetic and apocalyptic tendencies of the kind of historical metaphysics fashionable at the 
time. "Part One: 1934" attacks the Communist faith in the impending revolutionary transform-
ation of capitalist society: 
just then I was sick of Communists. I had the deepest contempt for those middle-class and 
doctrinaire radicals who, after graduating from Harvard or Yale in the Twenties, had made it a 
matter of personal honor to become Marxists, and who now worried in the New Masses whether 
Proust should be read after the Revolution and why there seemed to be no simple proletarians in 
the novels of André Malraux. 
I felt myself to be a radical, not an ideologue; I was proud of the revolutionary yet wholly 
literary tradition in American writing to which I knew that I belonged, and would say over to 
myself, from Axel's Castle, the last, woven sentence of Edmund Wilson's chapter on Proust.... I 
lived in the Heartbreak House of capitalist culture, waiting for it to stand accused by all writers 
worthy of the name. (SOT, 4-5) 
This is an unambiguous defence of bourgeois cultural achievement. Wilson had pointed out the 
need for a radical literature with a creative vision similar to Proust's. Kazin, however, doubted 
that a union such as this could be achieved. He suspected that the coming social revolution 
would destroy a literary culture rather than establish one, though he was certainly hoping for 
some kind of reconciliation between Marxist social purpose and the modernist literary sensibili-
ty. The doctrinaire outlook and coarsenss of much writing being done in the Thirties convinced 
Kazin that developing a more appropriate idiom for radical sentiments through a devotion to 
serious literature, past or present, was a more promising route toward a humane social order 
than proletarian agit-prop. He makes a claim for the responsible work of the imagination, rather 
than the scientific assumptions of Marxist historicism, to revolutionize our understanding of the 
world and so secure our future. 
Starting Out's drama highlights Togliatti's observation that in all likelihood the major 
intellectual battle of the twentieth century would be waged between Communists and anti-
Communists. Kazin sides with the "Party of Hope," that is to say with those writers and 
intellectuals whose visions of the future were based on acts of creative consciousness. He 
moralizes about Blake, Emerson, Nietzsche, Lawrence, and Whitman to that effect. These 
writers epitomized what he felt was preeminently Blake's redemptive, libertarian outlook, his 
"dialectic of reason and energy," which included a defence of the imaginative life and a 
celebration of its power to cast off any "mind-forg'd manacles."10 And where Kazin himself 
had been profoundly hostile to radical doctrine and scientific planning even before the war, 
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these artists offered prophetic commentary on postwar liberalism's troubled relation to the 
human condition. All of them spoke of a personal libertarianism that Kazin found highly 
relevant to the contemporary situation. Similarly, Kazin believed his own affinity with literary 
radicalism in the Thirties was different from Malcolm Cowley's, for instance, in that he was 
convinced it represented an "explosion of personal liberation" {SOT, 13). Like so many literary 
Communists, Cowley had failed to see that the Revolution had been accomplished in literature 
even before it became widely recognized as a political option for social renewal. 
Careers in Radicalism: James T. Farrell, John Chamberlain, V.F. Carverton, Sidney 
Hook 
On Native Grounds sharply criticized the new naturalism. Many of the young novelists of the 
Thirties had presumably evinced an "abject surrender to naturalism," ignoring literary respon-
sibilities. And despite Kazin's acid admission at the time that the typical working class writer 
"brought to his work the pride of that first victory against middle-class society which had given 
him the freedom to become a writer at all," and despite the fact that the new naturalist's 
fondness for autobiography "made for a powerful and often deeply moving literature of confes-
sion," Kazin held that proletarian writing betrayed a "significant personal need of catharsis by 
terror..."" Even a powerful writer like James T. Farrell had apparently slipped into the belief 
that the most effective way of defeating an outworn social morality was to outrage it. At best, 
Kazin detected in Farrell ' s work only faint signs of promise. 
Yet, Farrell reappears in Starting Out, a monument amid the rapid overturn of literary values 
in the postwar era. He is now the minority writer working with supreme historical faith to locate 
his ethnic identity at the centre of American cultural and historical destiny. Literary democracy 
in America was strengthening, and the tradition was passing from the vested interests — 
Stephen Vincent Bénet, the Van Dorens, Henry Seidel Canby — to the coming men and 
women. They introduced a new ethos and a new direction. Farrell never developed a literary 
self, however. In 1949, Kazin argued that Farrell habitually invokes "Dreiser's example in 
support of [his] own work... because [he is] working in a time hostile to naturalism." FarrelPs 
revaluation of naturalism in his novels had evidently taken the form of "autobiographical saga." 
A revisionist of the naturalist tradition, tracing its development through Tolstoy, Chekhov, 
Dewey, and Proust, he had yet tended to "read into 'naturalism' his own fierce ardors and 
defects as a writer," vitiating his own power of imagination.12 
Farrell's work has a special bearing on Kazin's own autobiographical writing. In a com-
memorative article about Farrell, Kazin suggested that Farrell had felt wholly liberated by 
"social science." Farrell had been a "Thomist Socialist" and had coupled his personal destiny to 
his faith in "social rationale."13 It was always the framework of Marxist social analysis, and not 
his individual imaginative resources, that had bolstered his sense of impending historical 
deliverance. He had relied on theory, not the individual imagination, to point the way into the 
future. In fact, Farrell's methodicalness served the Marxists better than any moral conception of 
the literary imagination. Studs Lonigan, Kazin concluded, painted in the starkest terms the 
complete absence of democratic loyalties from the American scene. Farrell's work rather 
symbolized the serious defects of the Marxist conception of history, which has failed to produce 
the 'noble' human economy it assumed would ripen with the decay of the capitalist order. 
Farrell never expected literature to illustrate anything beyond the scientific imperatives of 
Marxist historicism. 
The section in Starting Out on William Saroyan stresses that some individuals continued to 
formulate extrapolitical responses to the contemporary crisis. It also indicates Kazin's view of 
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the way history and the radical sentiment interact. As an artist, Saroyan defied assorted inflic-
tions visited upon the creative mind in the name of social engineering, historical reason, and by 
a world-wide economic slump. He represented the secret cynicism that was the reverse side of 
the era's fascination with historical uplift. He is given short shrift by Kazin: Saroyan's thrills 
could hardly serve as a clue to the post-radical experience. Neither Farrell nor Saroyan believed 
that their historical destiny was in any way bound up with an imaginative personal ethics. 
Such contrastive cameos illustrate the radical extremes of Thirties historical consciousness. 
As I have noted above, the historical confidence that impelled the author of On Native Grounds 
turned one generation later into a plea for the cultivation of a radical individual sensibility. 
Indeed, some years after Daniel Bell announced the end of ideology, also Kazin officially 
documented the failure of the Left's moral claim to history. Kazin remained committed to a 
hopeful vision of history, however, and to historical vision as a moral asset. 
Starting Out documents the ongoing vitality of the radical sentiment in American intellectual 
culture even after the international Communist movement had become discredited. Indeed, Kazin 
believes that the effervescence and polemical vigour of contemporary intellectual life offset the 
mediocrity of literary achievement in the Thirties. Louis Kronenberger has objected that Kazin's 
picture of the Thirties focussed too much on the ideological warfare and that the major current 
was genial cultural debate rather than radical politics. Kronenberger's assessment will be dealt 
with below, but I wish to stress that it is precisely this view of the Thirties as a time of simply 
tightening one's budget and leisurely discussing alternatives to the gradualistic reforms of the 
New Deal that Kazin objects to. For the crisis was real: Communist revolutionary cadres 
actually threatened to by-pass democratic procedures to bring in the new social millennium. 
Kronenberger's idiom reminds us of On Native Grounds's account of the bohemian literary 
socialism in Greenwich Village prior to the First World War. Starting Out, by contrast, docu-
ments the erosion of the entire tradition of social literature in America, which was Emersonian 
in origin and had been a valuable source of historical optimism, tapping a universal morality of 
personal radicalism. 
Despite the substantial body of independent radical opinion in the Thirties, Kazin does not 
automatically grant heroic status to dissenters. The real hero in Starting Out is History itself. 
The dissenters are rather seen as agonists, attuned to their historical moment and performing 
their task of humanizing a deteriorating social order. Starting Out is thus a moral essay on the 
sources of historical faith. It traces the various forces associated with the tendency of history. 
Kazin's Jewishness is paramount among them, and its role will be discussed below. For the 
moment, we shall limit ourselves to the secular radicalism of the Thirties. 
There have been several attempts to account for the attraction to Communism felt by 
intellectuals generally in the Thirties. Kazin finds it remarkable that Marxism should have 
become popular at a time when "'the increasing narrowness and totalitarianism of Stalinist theory 
and practice revealed a characteristic contempt for the individual mind." Despite his disgust with 
intellectual Stalinism, however, he felt quite sympathetic in On Native Grounds to the Marxists' 
concern with social reform. He actually came close to excusing the foibles of Marxist criticism 
and of proletarian literary theory when he observed that there had been "no tradition of histori-
cal criticism for the native Marxists to apply..."1'' Marxist theory filtered down in the public 
consciousness mainly because it offered a coherent and dramatic image of the origins and effects 
of the imminent capitalist breakdown: it had no conception whatever of the type of society that 
would be created by the "withering away" of the State. Its intellectual contagion was largely the 
result of self-fascination, its impetus owing to the cultural history of one particular class rather 
than the reality of social antagonisms. At all times, as Kazin concludes in Starting Out, Marxism 
in the United States was less a social than an intellectual and cultural phenomenon. 
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In On Native Grounds, Kazin was still torn between a deep sympathy for the Marxist social 
conscience on the one hand and a troubled awareness of its indifference to the uses of the 
individual moral imagination on the other. He speculated in extenso about its possibilities and 
liabilities in the contemporary literary situation, and concluded tentatively yet passionately that 
the Marxist intellectual was in charge of a noble mission, using scientific tools to establish the 
"requisite foundations under Socialism for a literature of unparalleled human fellowship and 
dignity..." But he was keenly aware that the results had been "notorious."15 Starting Out is a 
witness' account of the decline of the ethical imperative in radical historical theory. It is itself 
an exercise of the structural imagination in historiography, aimed to off-set the individualized, 
post-Marxist psychology and the defeat of collective ideals in the Fifties. It offers an explanation 
of the depressed status of politics at the time and the increasing cultural encystment of radical 
ideas. Kazin addresses himself primarily across the moral collapse of Marxism, however, both 
in its socio-revolutionary and literary aspect, to the libertarian visions it originally inspired. 
Those visions, he argues, occasionally survived, though all too often fugitively, as "revisionism" 
and "heresy," or, even more rarely, as literature. 
Heresy is a dominant metaphor in Starting Out. Kazin vents a genuine disgust and a deep-
seated rancour about that fashionable contemporary phenomenon embodying the Janus-like 
psychology of the radical postradical intelligentsia in the United States: the revolutionary 
theoretician cum cultural expert. He features, among several other converted radicals in disguise, 
John Chamberlain, who was in his eyes the incarnation of the moral decay that blighted the era. 
In 1932, Chamberlain had published an intellectual and historical survey of American social 
literature with the pregnant title Farewell to Reform: The Rise, Life and Decay of the Progres-
sive Mind in America. The book had savaged the Progressive sentiment in American literature 
and had ignored aesthetic criteria for the benefit of tracing a political tradition of democratic 
radicalism. It was virtually a primer for the Revolution. Kazin's personal remembrance of 
Chamberlain exposes the ideologue behind the Marxist intellectual. With a touch of shame, he 
recounts his attempt to confront Chamberlain with the "programmatic" quality of his thinking. 
But Chamberlain possessed the Marxist's arrogance, which never failed to impress the rank and 
file. He lived in untroubled anticipation of the revolutionary future. He was a typical Thirties 
"intellectual journalist," who thought that the actual problems of society were unworthy of the 
high sense of purpose proper to the radical intellectual's calling. 
[Chamberlain] made radicalism seem as American as baseball. It was not until I got to know him 
better that I realized how abstract his mind was — before the decade's flames were out, 
Chamberlain's reaction against Communism was to make him an apologist for the American 
businessman; with him one cause led to another. He lived on ideas, "notions" of things, so 
completely missing the color and the emotion of the human crisis behind them that it was possible 
to talk to him about anything, to talk to him all the time, without him entertaining the slightest 
curiosity about the things we discussed. (SOT, 7) 
Kazin's portrait of Chamberlain makes him a representative of the American middle class, 
which believed that it was the theoretical and practical vanguard of the Revolution. The middle-
class intelligentsia plays a dubious role in Kazin's study of Marxist cultural influence: 
[Chamberlain] personified to himself the crisis of the American middle class, of the old bourgeois 
certainties. The chilling deliberatcness with which John Chamberlain was able to consider the 
formation of a radical party interested in more than reform, the possibilities of taking power, the 
confiscation of inherited wealth, all demonstrated the bankruptcy of normal middle-class standards, 
the crisis of the middle-class Americans from small towns, of Yale graduates. The new style was 
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Chamberlain's rambling flirtation with radical ideas, a willingness to consider anything, so long 
as it kept alive the possibility of creating a new society. (SOT, 9) 
The history of Communism in the United States was riddled with cases of sectarianism. 
Party-line Communists branded dissent as obstructionism and bourgeois revisionism. As a case 
in point, Kazin balances his portrait of John Chamberlain, the defender of ideological virtue par 
excellence, with his experience of the radical salon organized by V.F. Calverton, a native 
American rebel in the tradition from Mark Twain to Dwight Macdonald. At the time, Calverton 
was the long-time sole editor of the Modern Monthly (1923-1940). The magazine espoused a 
many-hued, undogmatic Marxism. Starting Out features Calverton for his attempt to infuse 
Marxist doctrine with some measure of heterodoxy and so save it from the Communist pundits. 
Calverton was a regular proselytizer of Marxism, but the real moral drive behind his concern 
with it was its promise of man's rise toward liberty. He had tried to synthesize the "modem" 
sciences — sociology, psychology, anthropology — with the originally humanistic objectives of 
Marxism, and so to relieve scientific naturalism of the odium of being a doctrinaire spin-off of 
Stalinism. His anti-partisan convictions had enabled him to promote a generally heterodox 
socialism. 
Kazin finds him interesting mainly because his political evolution and his Kaltstellung by the 
Communist Party symbolized the totally cynical changes of official policy in the Communist 
movement: 
Calverton had been a boy revolutionary in Baltimore in 1918, an intellectual sympathizer with the 
Communists in the early Twenties, when it was still possible to think of them as rebels rather than 
"shock brigadiers of culture." The early days of Communism were in fact Calverton's Bohemian 
Period, his Left Bank and his Nineteen-twenties. He was a premature Marxist. By the middle 
Thirties [when Kazin became acquainted with him and] when so many respectable and important 
figures were being welcomed into the United Front and Stalin was being acclaimed as the only 
responsible leader of the time by reformed cynics on Collier's and in many a New York publish-
ing house, Calverton was out of fashion again, this time as a premature anti-Stalinist, and was 
feeling increasingly isolated. (SOT, 65-6) 
Calverton was perhaps the most conspicuous dissenter among the disaffected radicals who 
frequented his salon at one time or other. They were all of them anti-Stalinists and devoted 
revisionists of Marxism. Kazin's assessment features Calverton's spiritual integrity — then in 
short supply — and it intones the moral fibre of native radicalism. What Calverton attempted 
to achieve was what Edmund Wilson had urged the American radical movement to put into 
practice if it wished to survive, namely to adapt Marx to American conditions.16 
Starting Out is not the revisionist interpretation of the Thirties in the sense it has been 
charged with.17 It offers an incisive analysis of the post-radical psychology, which came in 
with the emergence of the deradicalized cultural intelligentsia after the war. It is not, in the way 
that On Native Grounds was, committed to the teleological motif, or rather the evolutionary 
naturalism of the national experience. In 1942, Kazin had bargained on the moral progress of 
history, whereas Starting Out examines the morality of a set of radical attitudes to history, 
including that of the anticommunist Left. More particularly, it is concerned with such attitudes 
as the expression of a certain state of mind. With the containment and failure of Communism 
in the United States, the precocious dissenters from Stalinism briefly enjoyed their enhanced 
status as political experts, which came under fire again when the Cold War erupted. The gradual 
evolution of the radical intelligentsia from anti-Stalinism in the Thirties to anti-Communism in 
the Fifties involved a major shift away from scientific historicism towards a penitential aware-
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ness of "the ironic mode of history."18 This entailed a retreat from historical theory to a new 
emphasis on exploring viable modes of selfhood. 
The elegiac mood of Starting Out argues that radicalism at the present time leads a precari-
ous existence. Yet, Kazin explores the roots it has in common with the early American 
revisionists of Marxism. He believes that native radicalism is the moral focus of a heterodox and 
"Americanized" Marxism. Except for its revolutionary stance, Marxism seemed thoroughly 
compatible with the native, nineteenth-century tradition of anti-capitalist and radical democratic 
dissent. What Kazin aims to do in Starting Out is to show that native revisionism of Marxism 
was reclaimed radicalism. This is why the book imparts a resonance to certain contemporary 
issues and controversies which they do not normally have in the political history of the period. 
So, too, the famous debate between Sidney Hook and Max Eastman. It is recalled more for the 
intellectual stimulus it gave to the generally orthodox critique of Marxism than for any palpable 
success in rooting such redesigned Marxism in modem American social conditions. In this 
respect, Starting Out, like On Native Grounds, infuses the radicals' revolutionary hopes for the 
future with a certain elegiac and tragic mood. In fact, the heroic cast of contemporary dissent 
from Communism contrasted with the vanity of its unspoken pretensions to historical influence. 
Dissidents generally did not manage to contain the spread of Stalinism, though they certainly 
formulated some prophetic insights into its expansionist drives. In itself, the Hook-Eastman 
debate may even suggest that dissident positions were blighted by internecine struggle. The 
troubled history of their relations with Trotsky, which Kazin mentions only incidentally, 
suggests that one could legitimately speak of the dissidence of dissent. 
We get a poignant image of the radical's predicament in Kazin's picture ofthat "one horribly 
experienced Polish veteran of the revolutionary wars, a kindly but despairing expert on all 
Socialists and socialisms, Utopian, scientific, social democratic, libertarian and dogmatic, a man 
with a heavy bold front and a face shaped like a stone by every obstacle in his path" (SOT, 
67)." This man's poignant disillusionment reflects the shattering contrast between the mystique 
originally surrounding the Bolshevik takeover of power and the actual experience of revolution-
ary life afterwards. He furnishes the keynote of Kazin's radicalism, namely the defence of the 
integral historical experience against scientific prescriptions of historic inevitability, or of the 
literary view of history against the claims of scientific historicism. It involves a contrast between 
creative philosophies of life and scientific determinism. In the last instance, Kazin provides a 
dramatic contrast with the buoyant hopes of many a fledgeling Marxist. 
In the case of Eastman versus Hook this generates ironic overtones. For one thing, Eastman 
was a poet nursed in personal rebellion, who considered the violence of the Russian Revolution 
the result of the unfortunate tendency of Marxism toward mysticism and "teleological cant." 
Kazin suggests that Eastman's was a rare instance of a poet with obviously non-conformist 
leanings posturing as an advocate of scientific social experiment. This is a shrewd value 
judgement on Eastman's aesthetics. Eastman may have been intellectually independent, but he 
shared fully in the spiritual malaise of contemporary radical dissent. Along with John Reed, he 
had been a stalwart of the Bohemian radicalism of Greenwich Village in its heyday. They had 
both been sympathetic to the literary socialism of The Seven Arts. The following, however, 
suggests that the moral tradition of radicalism was in decline: 
Eastman's argument that Marxism had a split personality, tom between its practical scientific 
realism and its blind Hegelian faith in the final purpose of History, made him sound psychological 
and therapeutic to it. I had always known of Max Eastman as a romantic poet and a rebel, vaguely 
a male counterpart of Edna St. Vincent Millay, and was not prepared, when I saw him in action 
at Calverton's parties, for such a steady drumfire in behalf of science, scientific method, experi-
mental naturalism and scientific engineering. When it came to poetry and art he sounded, in the 
phrase of the time, like a technocrat. (SOT, 69)2° 
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Kazin crisply adds that, between them, Hook and Eastman confirmed the obsolescence of 
Deweyan philosophy.21 That this debate between two prominent exegetes of Marxism appeared 
in the pages of Calverton's Modern Monthly proved that, much like the practice of Marxism, its 
theory, too, was fissionable material, also among dissenting ranks. Even the boldest and most 
comprehensive modem experiment in social engineering apparently failed to address the human 
crisis behind the crisis of the socioeconomic order. Kazin clearly condemns the excessively 
positivist orientation of radicalism in the Thirties. What he thinks was ultimately at stake in the 
Hook-Eastman controversy was a philosophy of human nature and a view of the experimental 
intelligence that was appropriate to the current socio-political situation in America. 
Hook took exception to Eastman's arguments against historical "metaphysics." He considered 
the theory of Marxism, including dialectical materialism, an eminently logical system "and a 
startling anticipation of American pragmatism at its best." Like Eastman, Hook was interested 
in a version of Marxism tailored to the American situation. There was a significant difference 
in focus, however, which betrayed a shift in the intellectual's view of the social practice of 
Marxist theory. Although Kazin does not inquire into the reasons for Eastman's rejection of 
Marxist "'metaphysical' idealism" (SOT, 71), the thrust of a letter of his to Edmund Wilson 
rebutting Wilson's interpretation of Waclaw Machajki's views of the workers' distrust of 
intellectuals may suggest that he thought Eastman was making a vital point: 
But there is surely one very serious omission to M[achajki']s theory — or to your own essay. 
Intellectuals are not just of different class interests from those of the masses: the masses are, in the 
visionary sense, the interest of intellectuals. Intellectuals, in the proper sense of the word, and 
certainly in the Russian, are not just selfish in their own class interests; they are visionaries, 
fanatics turning the suffering of the masses into the stuff of their own dreams.22 
Kazin's sensitivity to such manifestations of caste-mindedness among Marxist intellectuals dates 
back to his encounter with the dissenting intelligentsia at Calverton's. To picture Hook as the 
rigorous systematizer promotes the suspicion that he, too, may have shared in some of the more 
vital human weaknesses common to visionary intellectuals. Foremost among these was his 
unshakable faith that the dialectic governed historical action and that it furnished an infallible 
analysis of progressive History. Hook displayed the characteristic intolerance of experimental 
logic; he stated every social issue in terms of the explanatory power of logical hcrmeneutics. It 
would turn out he regarded himself as the steward of the right, revolutionary frame of mind. 
Kazin's response to Hook at the time was one of deeply mixed admiration: 
When he contrasted the superstitions represented by the old philosophy and the oppressions 
inherent in capitalism with the instrumentalism that could be the new knowledge and the co-
operativeness (through the application of intelligence alone) that could be the new society, he 
made the choice stark and the issue dramatic. He put clearly before you the logical choice of 
scientific intelligence over religious superstition, of planning over confusion, of pragmatism over 
Thomism, of Dewey over Freud. Here was logic, here was science, here was experimentalism. 
Here were instruments of social analysis that exposed all the contradictions in capitalist society 
and could give men all they needed for creating a society practical, sensible, harmonious and just. 
His method, wholly and entirely rational, would become the lever of the revolution. How could 
one not grasp it? Hook saw every situation so clearly that he concentrated his whole personality 
into the force of his logic — then wondered why his opponents were so dumb, and no doubt 
honestly regretted that they were. (SOT, 73 f1 
Kazin suggests that views such as Hook's, with their preening insistence on the intellectual 
felicities of radical social analysis, betrayed a lack of faith in political democracy. Hook, like 
121 
Eastman, was willing to look beyond the political abortions of the Revolution to the progressive 
principles that had driven it, but unlike Eastman he did not see any necessary connection 
between the Soviet Union's revolutionary woes and the intellectuals' reification of dialectical 
materialism. To Kazin, this symbolized the hold that Marxism had on modern intellectual 
consciousness. 
Kazin makes much of the contrast between the revolutionary character of Marxism on the 
one hand and the anti-revolutionary, even nostalgic bias of the American historical mind on the 
other. In the Communist cosmogony, both the past and its experience had become notoriously 
expendable. The past was identified with the embourgeoisement of the economy, and hence of 
culture itself. The dialectic stipulated that the bourgeois phase of economic life, including any 
values arising from the bourgeois experience, would be transcended as a matter of historical 
logic. The past was made largely irrelevant to the imperative of a proletarian future. Kazin 
believes that the Communists' intransigence to non-revolutionary aspects of life and forms of the 
creative intelligence not clearly contributing to instrumental social logic betrayed a deep-seated 
fear of the motives and responsibilities of the individual intellectual conscience. That he recalls 
his own admiration for Proust's work so vividly, despite the fact that it was largely irrelevant 
to radical social engineering, is a case in point. Proust's spiritual culture was a touchstone of a 
tradition of differently honed literary radicalism which Kazin believed was being destroyed by 
the Communists. He refuses to believe that in the post-revolutionary situation the creative 
achievements of the bourgeois mind could be relegated to the dustbin of history. Moreover, he 
believes the majority of radicals hold a flawed philosophical view of their relation to society: 
Nature... never means the specific facets of animal reality, but concepts of Reality and (in the 
Romantic period) of God. [Criticizing Hook's philosophy of naturalism:] An "enlightened natu-
ralism," no matter how "sane," how true to "nature," actually conveys less of the actual and 
continuous impenetration of nature by mind that actually prevails [than the mystic]. 
Partisan Review and the Intellectuals 
Marxist historicism has even deeper implications for Kazin, and he believes it inspired some 
modem uses of radicalism: 
The lit. radical, the pure Protestant spirit — the individual as consciousness: from the beginning 
it feared science as its enemy. [Kazin reasons that consciousness was kept from ideal freedom; 
science kept "essence" from transcending "existence," and forced it to "submit" to it.] But it is 
exactly this submission that ever gives us freedom from that insistence on our essence which cuts 
off the world in its rough and disorderly state, that separates the soul from history. Just as we 
must show that the development of society is not the paradigm of the individual soul, is not 
"rational" as a model of the human being's own rationality, so we must insist that the individual 
soul must not reject history because it is uncapturable by the free religious consciousness... 
...if the great Communist heresy is to identify society with history, the romantic-religious 
heresy is to reject society and history together as the record of the individual soul.24 
Perceptions such as these quarrel with the deceptive appeal of Marxism in contemporary 
intellectual life. Kazin rather envisages a literary radicalism shaped after the irreducibly complex 
human image. When he reviewed Mark Schorer's William Blake: The Politics of Vision (1946), 
he accordingly praised Schorer's ability to set Blake apart from the many false prophets and 
intellectual mystics of Blake's own time: 
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[Schorer] has shown him as a poet and a thinker who accepted and corrected the revolutionary 
thought of his time.... This is the Blake of the real world — the world dominated by the human 
image and filled with the human mystery. Blake thought that there was finally nothing else, and 
that was his undoing. But it was man that obsessed him, not God. This is the Blake who came 
with an intellectual sword — Blake the libertarian, who replaced the broken images of man's 
servitude to God with heroic myths of man rejoicing for once in all his human faculties... and the 
drama of the myth is always man's vital discovery of his own gifts, crowned by the power of 
love... Blake's greatness is in his horror of abstract systems. He showed at every point how deeply 
the mind of man impenetrates and shapes the objects he studies.... Blake... came to insist so much 
on the human image as the central fact in the world that he rearranged the world around it.... We 
do not believe enough in the power of man to change the world; Blake came finally to believe in 
nothing else. His real heresy is not against God... [but] against the humility, bred in us by 
naturalism, that though man shapes life, he is not the only thing in it." 
Blake's work has a special bearing on our age, Kazin concluded, since "revolutionaries are 
always more akin than contemporaries." He disqualified the Communists as mere contempora-
ries, not revolutionaries. 
On the point of cultural anti-Communism, Kazin found himself thrown together with the 
literary radicals of Partisan Review. Their precocious anti-Stalinism appealed to him, as did the 
fact of their axiomatic individualism. Partisan Review cultivated an atmosphere of radicalism as 
personal culture; it sponsored a Catholicism of mind not encountered elsewhere in radical circles 
in America. What Kazin objected to, however, was their extreme self-consciousness about their 
role as the one independent, native intelligentsia in political and cultural affairs: 
But for the many brilliant Jews around what Edmund Wilson called "Partisansky Review"... the 
"movement" had become another theology to be sloughed off like Judaism. Their creativity was 
to arise out of a historic tension between whole traditions and systems of ideas. The aim was 
unlimited freedom of speculation, the union of a free radicalism with modernism. Somehow 
America in wartime supplied the assurance that this was possible. Fugitives from orthodoxy in 
religion and radicalism alike, they had been formed by the national culture without always 
knowing it. Their faith was to be "intellectuals"; around Partisan Review it was safer to be an 
intellectual than a mere writer.26 
Partisan Review stressed the political relevance of the radical element in literature mainly to 
suggest that its cultural analysis matched the radical tendency of history. The content of its 
literary radicalism was a veritable index of arguments against a Communist-proletarian poetics. 
A self-elected vanguard, Partisan Review made a conscious effort to come up with a cultural 
definition for its radicalism. As refugees from the doctrinaire Left, the Partisan Review intel-
lectuals identified the principle of integrity in literature with the stance of dissent. They believed 
that the soundest analysis of the modern situation was available only from the periphery of 
political and cultural power. By the time of the Communists' politically expedient alliance with 
native liberalism in the Popular Front against Fascism, however, a large-scale "rediscovery" of 
America took place. The resulting glorification of native traditions was an open invitation to 
national celebration in culture and politics, which Partisan Review abhorred. It rather promoted 
a cosmopolitan radicalism, firmly rooted in the intellectual culture of the international avant-
garde. Its scorn for nativist orthodoxy was given a classic formulation by Dwight Macdonald, 
when he excoriated the incipient cultural nationalism of Van Wyck Brooks and Archibald 
MacLeish.27 
Kazin's frank, incisive, and unsparing portrayal of the Partisan Review ambience voices 
grave doubts about their vanguard notions of cultural formation. These implied a certain 
contempt for the native culture, though Kazin argues that the latter had to some extent been a 
123 
formative influence. Kazin's introduction into Partisan Review circles prompted substantial 
reserve, distrust, and even intellectual malice in some of its leading figures, presumably because 
On Native Grounds had used their alienation thesis, which they had adopted from Marxist class 
theory, within an identifiable native cultural pattern. Kazin had moved the exclusively intellec-
tual ethos of Partisan Review significantly closer toward the centre of the national experience. 
In addition, he had linked it to the tradition of social aesthetics in the United States since 
Whitman. On Native Grounds had tried to see the native experience in literature in terms of a 
common democratic destiny. It had quarrelled with the notion and function of the avant-garde 
élite. Partisan Review's carefully cultivated role on the political fringe, so Kazin argues in 
Starting Out, magnified the virtues of marginality beyond proportion, giving rise to a "saving 
remnant" theory of history and culture. Kazin clearly took his distance from the theory of the 
avant-garde, which he considered to be mainly a spin-off from the intellectuals' predictable 
rationalization of their plight in a democracy with populist, anti-intellectualist tendencies. 
Starting Out confirms Kazin's distrust of elitist intellectual blueprints for history or society.28 
It builds on the insight established in On Native Grounds that a truly democratic culture in 
America requires a primary effort at self-understanding for it to be persuaded that it carries its 
own destiny within its bosom and that it may work towards its own deliverance. 
The history of Kazin's radicalism is therefore significantly different from Partisan Review's. 
His views were not affected by its historically imperative switch from political to aesthetic 
radicalism. Labelling On Native Grounds precocious, Norman Podhoretz actually referred to its 
belief that modem American literature was the authentic expression of a homogenous cultural 
and moral identity, and as such a viable object of study. Kazin had made a claim on behalf of 
a native literature which the majority of the intelligentsia would not recognize until after the 
war. His increasing fascination in the years after the war with the radical sentiment in literature, 
therefore, must not be rashly identified with Partisan Review's championship of the great 
modernists. His concern with a historical and democratic teleology in the national literature 
diminished with the dimming prospects for creative social engineering in the course of the war, 
more particularly on account of the shattering impact of the Holocaust and the liberals' tepid 
response to it. At the end of Starting Out, Kazin recalls the trenchant newsreel image of the 
liberation of Bergen-Belsen, in which the pathos of secular radicalism and scientific historicism 
stand fully revealed. This is the closing remark to a decade of ideological controversy and 
political violence over a rational and just management of the public realm. One cannot avoid the 
impression that all modern history leads to death. Current political and historical theories were 
evidently powerless to explain such a devastating travesty of human dignity and creativity, 
which was proof of the metaphysical and moral callousness of modern social engineering and 
of the liberal politicians' and intellectuals' failure to understand the nature of the totalitarian 
state. 
Starting Out in the Thirties is also a sampling of post-radical attitudes to history. Kazin 
provides a skeleton interpretation of an as yet unfocussed, undoctrinaire, humane radicalism 
which to some extent also explains the debacle of scientific historicism. His vehement attack in 
On Native Grounds on the respective socio-cultural blueprints proposed by literary Marxism and 
by the formalist critics then in the ascendancy suggests that he had given up the hope that either 
could develop the much desired redemptive social intelligence operative in literature.29 Starting 
Out, however, deals with the disintegration of radical expectations about History. At the same 
time, it defends the position that, though history may prove "uncapturable," we ought not reject 
it. Kazin's concern with the creative individual life and personal integrity contrasts sharply with 
the Utopian, starkly dramatic and apocalyptic nature of the Marxist world view. This is particu-
larly visible where Kazin links the personal and the collective aspects of the contemporary 
historical faith. He registers the shift away from the intellectual interpretation of History as the 
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theatre of secular emancipation and moral deliverance towards an increasingly personalistic 
interpretation, or internalization, of the historical experience.30 Kazin's continued concern to 
formulate a defensible radical option — a "pure" protestantism aiming to root "essence" in 
"existence" — reflects an early and acute insight into the "failure of nerve" psychology which 
afflicted numerous radical intellectuals in their moments of deepest crisis during the war — and 
some of them again during the McCarthy era. He does not carry the retreat from history as far 
as they did, nor does he follow them in their occasionally abject reverence for the ironic 
sensibility of the sceptical modemist hero.31 He also rejects their personalistic definitions of 
religion as the sole source of a viable metaphysics in modem times, and rather holds out the 
hope that a personal, literary radicalism may restore the possibility of historical deliverance. He 
believes this should involve the recognition that the modem radical and sceptical literary 
protagonist is in fact a dissenter from the crippling materialist culture of rational positivism. In 
many cases, he argues, the modem hero is thrown back on himself by his experience of his 
marginal, "adversarial" role in the history of the national culture. 
Kazin kept his distance from Partisan Review for another reason. His insistence that the great 
modems had been passionate and imaginative defenders of the integral human consciousness 
reflected a faith in the moral function of their writing not generally seen among devotees of 
modernism around Partisan Review. The disaffected, all too intellectual hero of modernist 
literature whose mental economy Partisan Review considered of the highest political and cultural 
value was to Kazin often as not the creation of a writer unable to distil any clue to deliverance 
from his own experience on the fringes of the national life. Kazin scorned this cultivated 
indifference, which the Partisan Review critics, too, used in order to stress their politically 
independent radicalism. He believed it pandered to neglect of or even contempt for anything that 
marred the precious design of the intellectual's basically self-protective attitude, an aestheticized 
assertion of integrity. The modems whom he, as a young literary radical, had embraced during 
the radicalization of the liberal intelligentsia during the Thirties — he mentions Blake, Law-
rence, Emerson, Whitman, and Nietzsche (SOT, 4) — had been invariably those whose criticism 
of society, hostility to ideology, restiveness under orthodoxy, and suspicion of the revolutionary, 
scientific intelligence had gone hand in hand with a vision of historical deliverance. 
The intellectuals at Partisan Review saw the Revolution fail, but as outsiders and "alienatoes" 
with no access to political power they had had a highly plausible alibi. Yet, Kazin stresses that 
they continued to regard themselves as the revolutionary vanguard in political and intellectual 
affairs. They were thinkers rather than actors, and their habitual aversion to orthodoxy in 
political and cultural matters was little more than expedient self-protection. They occupied a 
marginal position in the revolutionary movement: "The élan of their lives, revolutionary faith 
in the future, was missing" (SOT, 157). They were intellectuals and critics, not moralists. They 
resigned themselves to the defeat of revolutionary socialism: "[To them,] History was now a 
tangle of meanings without a clear-cut issue" (SOT, 158). They were no great sticklers for the 
moral imagination in the perception of history and believed that the moral contagion which 
Kazin had considered part of the historical mission of Socialism had never been much of a 
reality anyway.32 
Versions of the Radical Intellect: Bertram Wolfe and Malcolm Cowley 
In taking issue with the modem cultural hero's metaphysics then being expounded in Partisan 
Review, his example is again Blake. He suggests that Blake the radical is not a sceptic in retreat 
from history but is driven by the conviction that the inexhaustible complexity of the "human 
image" urges a constant revision of our relations with the world. Like Lawrence, Emerson, 
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Whitman, and Nietzsche, Blake was dependent upon no God for his personal salvation: he 
virtually wrested his spiritual destiny away from the force of circumstance. The others, too, were 
rebels against incrusted morality and conformity. They were poet-libertarians, giving the modern 
intellectual afflicted by the experience of marginality a compelling image of his creative task. 
Blake heralded an "immense revolution in personal consciousness," and "gives support to 
modern man in his most critical phase..."33 
The conscientious objectors and radical dissenters of the Left, whether Old or new, featuring 
in Starting Out in the Thirties intone a moral standard. The "revolutionary yet wholly literary 
tradition in American writing" to which Kazin had pledged himself early on in his youth 
coupled a concern with the integrity of the self to personal rebellion and a metaphysical 
criticism of society. The anarcho-libertarian, antisocial strain of classic American literature has 
been widely noted, and Kazin argues its relevance to contemporary politics and culture. What-
ever the limitations of their intellectual views, both Eastman and Hook, so Kazin maintains, 
"still preserved revolutionary ideas in the form of honest personal judgments" (SOT, 73). 
He carefully distinguishes between Partisan Review's radical cultural doctrine and the merits 
of the unaffiliated contemporary intellectual personality. Bernard Wolfe's intellectual career, for 
instance, marks a crucial phase in the history of Marxism in the United States. Wolfe was 
outraged over the course the Revolution had taken in Russia, yet he retained a strong faith in the 
ongoing validity of Marxism. After breaking Communist ranks, he spent his life expounding the 
principles of revolutionary integrity, protecting them against those who were interested in power 
rather than the values of social democracy. 
Bert Wolfe was almost the last of his breed, and sitting with him at the end of Provincetown pier, 
I listened gratefully to his stories of the original Communist International, of John Reed and 
Angela Balabanov, Bukharin and Lunacharsky and Trotsky, in those legendary days of the 1920s 
when the new Communist movement had been led by revolutionary intellectuals. Doctrinaire and 
fanatical as they had been, they had lived and ruled, they had killed and died, by what they had 
honestly considered imperatives of the intellect. Stalin did not like intellectuals with that much 
conviction. Stalin could do something about his jealousies and dislikes. (SOT, 153) 
Kazin's vignette suggests Wolfe as Jay Gatsby recasting history at West Egg. Wolfe's historical 
intelligence did not go beyond "social forces, impersonal as the stars in their courses..." (SOT, 
154). In the process of establishing a new society, personal integrity was subordinate to histori-
cal logic: Wolfe was passionately defending the virtues of scientific historicism even when its 
revolutionary politics was morally discredited. He epitomized both the historical faith of 
intellectual integrity in the revolutionary movement and the callousness and ruthlessness of old-
style radicals in applying classical Marxist analysis to contemporary society. His career in the 
anti-Stalinist opposition led him to believe that it was up to him to write the official, revised 
history of the Revolution. This certainly affected his assessment of contemporary historical 
issues. Kazin noticed that "his mind was more on Trotsky in 1917 than on Hitler in Paris" 
(SOT, 153). 
A major ordeal for radical morale were the Moscow Trials in the late Thirties. Taking a 
responsible position on them, as many a radical confessed, was a matter of much soul-searching. 
Still, many continued their commitment to Communism: 
in 1936 the issue was not quite so simple even for those who knew that the trials were wrong. The 
danger was Hitler, Mussolini, Franco. And because the Fascist assault on Spain and the 
evergrowing strength of Hitler had made the United Front necessary, I found myself more 
sympathetic to the Communists. They had, they had just had, they still seemed to have, Silone, 
Malraux, Hemingway, Gide, Rolland, Gorky, Aragon, Picasso, Eluard, Auden, Spender, Barbusse, 
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Dreiser, Farteli, while the Socialists seemed to have only their virtue. I was tired of virtue, and 
now wanted to see some action.... everything at home and abroad seemed to call for the same 
revolutionary energy. (SOT, 85) 
Yet, continued personal commitment to radicalism required the most strenuous exercise of the 
moral imagination, and this, so Kazin observes, was precisely what the apologists of Stalin's 
Popular Front tactics in particular so often lacked. Though the intellectuals mentioned above 
may at one time have been Communists by association or political sympathy, Kazin is interested 
in them because, as artists and individuals, they defended the integrity of personal morality 
against ideas of historical necessity and political coercion. Their natural dissidence not only 
exposed the social rationale of Fascism, he argues, but also promised to keep alive a certain 
respect for free inquiry among the apparatchiks and cadres of the Party. 
Kazin's list includes names that would soon be notable for explicit revolt against the Party 
— think of Silone, Malraux, Gide and Farrell — and is strongly internationalist in orientation. 
It features the American writers Hemingway, Dreiser and Farrell because of their deeply 
personal and independent commitment as artists to a new, radical social order. Such indepen-
dence and courage was apparently missing among the doctrinaire literary intellectuals dominat-
ing the American literary scene at the time. I am referring to Malcolm Cowley in particular. He 
continued to be a spokesman of the official Communist literary press even after the Russo-
German pact had decimated the ranks of the Communist Party and continued to bet on the 
"waves of the future". Cowley's career showed how strongly the Communist promise of 
historical justice actually worked on the imagination of many a radical in the Thirties. 
Kazin is highly critical of Cowley. In "The Bitter '30s," a pre-publication of Starting Out 
published in May 1962, Kazin barely managed to disguise his personal resentment against 
Cowley. He implicated Cowley in the cultural politics of Stalinism, hinting that the increasing 
appeal of Marxism among the artistic and intellectual élite had moved Cowley to write his 
autobiography Exile's Return (1934). Intellectually, that book had sealed Cowley's retreat from 
what the Communists excoriated as Twenties nihilism, irresponsibility and expatriate literary 
exoticism. It was his salute to the "lost generation". To Kazin, Exile's Return showed that the 
expatriate had become converted and come home. It was a celebration of ideological rectitude. 
Cowley's subsequent position as literary editor at New Republic saw him "superintending... 
Communist hacks, writing genial editorials condemning the prisoners in the Moscow Trials." 
Nor was he "likely to have new writers forget" the nature and range of his literary acquaintance. 
Kazin pointed out that Cowley possessed an 
incredible feeling for literary calendars and literary chronology that made [him] redirect the 
literary side of the New Republic so firmly in the direction of a sophisticated literary Stalinism, 
since for Cowley revolution was now the new stage of literary development.... To Cowley, 
everything came down to the literary trend, to the forces that seemed to be in the know and to 
himself in the lead. 
Rebutting Cowley's allegations that the article came perilously close to perpetrating the kind of 
character assassination fashionable in the Thirties, Kazin observed: 
But what you couldn't understand was that, at a time when I was trying to make my way out of 
the tenements, to rise above the misery of my life, you were not only directly unfriendly, but 
presented the interesting spectacle of a literary socialist who was certainly betting on the wave of 
the future, while I was losing my faith in the only religion I had. The drama ofthat contrast, as 
well as the drama of our relations, fascinates me. How can I leave you out of a book about my 
life when you have played such a memorable and even painful part in it? But I am not writing to 
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get back at you — my subject is my rise from early humiliations. Anyone who has had as much 
death and self-denial in his early life as I've had finds the recovery a romantic subject to talk 
about. 
Any subsequent disclaimers of political self-righteousness on Kazin's part, or of former party-
linership and lack of "intellectual honour" on Cowley's, were powerless to conciliate Cowley. 
He seriously advised Kazin to jog his mind: 
No, I wasn't conscious at the time that you felt animosity towards me. I did feel that you were 
strenuously on the make, which amused me, and I suspected you of expressing safe opinions, at 
a time when "reckless" was my word of praise for a virtue I didn't always cultivate... 
I've been searching my own memory and conscience to see whether I was betting on what I 
thought was the wave of the future. I wasn't, to the best of my recollection. I was sincerely 
Marxian at the time, but without the optimism of the faithful. After 1933 I was much more 
exercised by the spectre of fascism than by the hope for a proletarian revolution. I had chosen a 
side, but feared it was going to lose.... But I'd like to offer one warning, which is that you should 
be careful not to fall into self-pity. I'm thinking about your rise from Brownsville and "from many 
early humiliations." What you fail to recognize is that there is a Brownsville in every literary life. 
A writer should be grateful to his Brownsville, or regretful that it wasn't Brownsville enough; the 
early humiliations is what winds him up and keeps him going. In my life the Brownsville was 
East Liberty... 
But that's just my own story. There are worse ones in the lives of others you met or heard 
about at the time. Burke, Dos Passos, Anderson, Farrell, Crane, Caldwell, Wolfe, and Max Lemer, 
to choose names at random, all had their Brownsvilles, physically and emotionally squalid, and 
that helps to explain their rage for putting justificatory words together. Edmund Wilson was an 
apparent exception. Although it was he who wrote The Wound and the Bow.... I suspected that he 
had a Brownsville, too, if one looked harder for it.... part of the story is that Brownsville was your 
salvation as well as your sorrow, and that you rose from those early humiliations by force of 
ability, but also because they served you as a springboard; give thanks for them. Another part of 
the story is that you weren't a sharp or sympathetic observer of the sorrows of others.3,1 
Cowley listed the cultural and psycho-social handicaps he had typically encountered during his 
youth and as a radical of non-proletarian descent at Harvard. He apparently attached quite as 
much importance to his experience of "death and self-denial" as Kazin, showing an equally high 
respect for the spiritual integrity of the Marxist Old Left, and may have wished to show the 
social and human pathos underlying his sympathy for the Stalinists. Even during the period of 
revisionist historiography of the Thirties, in the early Sixties, Cowley apparently thought it 
convenient to redirect current estimations of his former alliance with the orthodox Left at the 
Stalinist New Republic. He presented it as the product of sterling liberal aspirations. 
Though Kazin and Cowley presented widely different views of the contemporary literary 
situation, this exchange may show how naturally a consideration of individual origins slipped 
into value judgements about interpretations of literary radicalism. In Cowley's case, such 
radicalism quite confidently joined Marxist social analysis to the desire for personal liberation. 
He cautioned against associating the literary Thirties too explicitly with naturalism. In 1964, he 
tried to minimize the cultural impact of the Communist cadres with the assertion that they had 
been incorporated in a general movement toward a didactic and messianic moralism, visible in 
the messianic and apocalyptic nature of revolutionary faith in the Thirties. Cowley's retrospec-
tive view may have been inspired by the wish to relieve the radical movement of the odium of 
having been in the game purely for considerations of power. This, however, is precisely one of 
the achieved insights of Kazin's memoir. Kazin puts the respectfulness and moral virtuousness 
of dissenting radicalism over and against Cowley's assertions of the era's ingenuous 
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millenarianism, which supposedly matched revolution with revelation. In terms of intellectual 
history, the difference cannot be overlooked. Suffice it to say that both Cowley's rejoinder and 
the content of Kazin's memoir indicate that literary radicals in the Thirties had as much the 
emancipation from social and cultural deprivations in mind as they considered themselves 
pledged to a revolutionary overthrow of the existing order.35 
Cowley argued that the Thirties had actually been a political tightrope ride between the 
demands of the proletarian revolution and maximum resistance to Fascism. At the time of 
Kazin's first acquaintance with Cowley, revolutionary proletarian literature was already being 
traded in for a politically more expedient, native and progressive liberalism. Yet, in Starting 
Out, Kazin vividly remembers Cowley at the New Republic doling out reviews to needy 
reviewers as a "conscious symbol" (SOT, 16) of the proletarian solidarity of the day. At the 
same time, "the sight of Cowley in the vivid stripes of his seersucker suit seemed to unite, 
through his love of good writing and his faith in revolution, the brilliant Twenties and the 
militant Thirties" (SOT, 15). Clearly, Kazin thought Cowley's natural interest was with the 
literary Harvardians who, in 1917, joined the Norton-Harjes Ambulance Corps and capitalized 
on their experience in postwar Paris or were carried along by the artistic radicalism of the 
Village in the Twenties. That cosmopolitan generation of experimenters in life and letters 
appealed strongly to Cowley's progressive expectations about literature and society. He swam 
confidently with the historical tide: 
He seemed always to have moved in the company of writers, literary movements, cénacles, to see 
history in terms of what writers had thought and how they had lived.... Wherever Cowley moved 
or ate, he heard the bell of literary history sounding the moment and his own voice calling 
possibly another change in the literary weather.... unlike the "working-class" writers to whom he 
passed out review copies with a half-smiling air of acknowledging their turn in the literary tide, 
Cowley radiated ease and sophistication. (SOT, 16) 
The point being made is that Cowley's position as an enlightened literary Communist hardly 
resulted from an authentic experience in class sentiment. Quite the contrary, he was patently 
with the "haves" in literature, with the Van Dorens, with Henry Seidel Canby, and John 
Chamberlain: 
For me... all these critics in power... were outsiders. Although many of them were also politically 
left, it would never have occurred to me then to feel common cause with someone like Cowley, 
or to feel particularly close to Chamberlain, for writers from the business and professional class 
could only interpret in an abstract and literary way the daily struggle that was so real to me in 
Brownsville. (SOT, SO)36 
Nor did Cowley understand what that struggle sparked off. The "experience of connectedness 
in the literary world" (SOT, 51), the personal sense of shared issues, of discovering a collective 
aspiration in the act of writing, was constantly breaking through the literary surface. Kazin 
identifies an explicitly personal design such as this in James T. Farrell's as well as William 
Saroyan's work. He thought he could read, as Cowley presumably could not, the life behind the 
book. Farrell's unsparing exposé served a social logic which he assumed clarified his own 
destiny as a writer and a radical. Diametrically opposed to Farrell's belief was Saroyan's 
excitable, witty aestheticism, staged in a social limbo. Kazin suggests that no current socio-
analytical theory could explain the significance of both Farrell's and Saroyan's work to them-
selves as writers. He argues that, between them, they defined a revolution in literary rather than 
social consciousness. They created parameters of self-realization that current radical ideology did 
everything to deny. 
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In short, Cowley failed to see just where the revolution was coming from. Even if he himself 
showed "no abdication from the standards of the aesthetic generation" (SOT, 17), he missed the 
"real excitement of the new period [the Thirties]," an excitement brought about by "the 
explosion of personal liberation which... writers brought in from the slums, farms and factories" 
(SOT, 13). And that was precisely the quality of Kazin's own aspiration as a young Jew 
impatient with the limited horizon of the Brownsville ghetto. Kazin's radical temper was 
common to cultural and ethnic minorities of his day, but he was primarily concerned with the 
shock of recognition which the life and work of such writers as Farrell, Saroyan, Anderson, or 
Albert Maltz inspired in a culturally ambitious, young literary talent. Their work assured him 
that the experience of the bottom dog was a legitimate subject for literary reflection, and that to 
write about the squalor of your personal situation expressed your desire to rise above it." 
Kazin's account cuts across the theoretical grounding of much "proletarian" writing of the 
day, and as such it adds little to the objections he formulated in On Native Grounds. There he 
claimed that as early as the Twenties the cultural ukases from the Comintern had made 
"proletarian writing" a clone of Marxist social analysis. He stressed that there had been a 
vigorous tradition of working-class literature in the United States for some time, vide "the 
Wobbly songs of Joe Hill and the poems of Arturo Giovannitti, the novels of Jack London and 
Upton Sinclair." This tradition had been sapped, however, by the politicization of literature after 
Lenin's death. Under the tutelage of Michael Gold and Joseph Freeman in particular, and even 
V.F. Calverton, working-class literature in the United States became "a method of indoctr-
ination".38 
Kazin considered such compliance with political orthodoxy a downright degradation of the 
originally eclectic and libertarian literary Socialism of Greenwich Village before the war. Then, 
the Masses had been a forum for social and artistic progressives of various, but generally Leftist, 
political hue. And even though its successor, the New Masses, could at its start in 1926 still 
boast the active support of John Dos Passos and Edmund Wilson, it soon printed little else but 
intransigently revolutionist Bolshevik journalism. Eventually, it became the house organ of the 
Communist Party. 
When, in 1937, Kazin reviewed After the Genteel Tradition, a collection of critical essays 
about modem American literature edited by Malcolm Cowley, he argued that "the tendency to 
associate the quality of a work of art with the correctness of its ideas" was the besetting 
weakness of "the radical mind": 
... the effort is not always sustained. Prejudice finally breaks into a temper: Mr. Cantwell looks at 
Sinclair Lewis with murder in his eye; Miss Flanner berates Jeffers for not being somebody else. 
From emphasis on the whole, with all the care and sensibility implied in that emphasis, they steal 
down to a barren indignation; a looseness of approach is discerned in some fallacy of thought; and 
what is lost sight of is the identity of the artist, the fact that he is one man enmeshed in a compli-
cated environment, and not a seer with a taste for polemic.39 
Even the more moderate critics on the Left did not always manage to avoid slurring over the 
vital problems of self and sensibility. Failure to develop that self by literary means explained the 
high incidence of aborted careers among the radical ranks. Of all the writers originally trumped 
up by the Communist literary establishment, merely Richard Wright and Albert Maltz proved 
not ephemeral. The rest — including Isidore Schneider, Edwin Seaver, Jack Conroy, Fielding 
Burke, and Grace Lumpkin — soon exhausted their slender store of social ideas and kept 
reiterating set responses to stock situations. 
Kazin spoke in a didactic voice to the young critics contributing to After the Genteel 
Tradition. He admired them for so conscientiously continuing the work of literature when it 
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seemed that, after 1929, all the "old favorites" of the Twenties generation of expatriates, 
aesthetes, and devotees of liberal cultural self-disgust had become exhausted. They had "helped 
indoctrinate a new patriotism," had "reintroduced a more precise criticism" after at least one 
decade of liberal impressionism, and had given the new literary Left a distinctive voice. He 
noted that these critics "are not content to claim that, in retrospect, the writers who revolted 
against the genteel tradition do not seem to have revolted hard enough or wisely enough; what 
they mind most is the palpable fact that many of these writers are old beyond their time; that 
they have continued, rather drearily in some cases, to be coy about their virginal 
unorthodoxy."40 
As Kazin reminded Cowley, the spate of new writers coming up in the Thirties represented 
"an explosion of personal liberation," a welcome sequel to the increasingly tongue-tied and self-
communicating literary generation of the Twenties. A major shift in literary orientation took 
place between On Native Grounds and Starting Out. The earlier work had traced, in Richard 
Chase's terms, the native development towards "realism and naturalism in literature and a free, 
secular, and radically democratic culture." It had appealed to a certain "leftist idealism" in its 
belief that the corresponding social consciousness would lay the foundations for "buildfing] out" 
and securing the spiritual future. On Native Grounds had assumed that a nourishing relationship 
existed between literature and society, but in 1962 Kazin admitted that 
I wrongly assumed that the Thirties — my own period, so to speak — was a natural continuation 
of the high American creative period in the twenties, and that a great historical future lay before 
us in which the radical and artistic temperament would flourish.... What has happened is that the 
age is now working against the writer in a peculiarly destructive way — the way that destroyed 
Mayakovsky and not with the writer as I had imagined and hoped when I was writing On Native 
Grounds.... The independent tradition of American radicalism and protestant thought running from 
Emerson to Whitman to the Faulkner who wrote A Fable means more to me than ever. But I take 
a much chastened view of making those hopes real, and of the writer acting as their creative 
agent.41 
Starting Out: Aspects of the Revolution 
In his review oí Starting Out, Jules Chametzky claimed that Kazin had failed "to come to grips 
with a nagging dilemma of self which Kazin's telling of his personal history continually 
suggests but never fully resolves." He noted that the structure of the later chapters echoed "the 
dissolution of the literary and revolutionary imaginations whose former unity had given meaning 
to Kazin's coming of age." I would argue that this dissolution was intended, and I have pointed 
out that Kazin's "interest in the book was not in my growth... but in the hardness of a time 
entirely political." Louis Kronenberger, however, has pointed to the problem of adequate timing 
and argued that the hardness became dogmatic only during the second half of the Thirties. 
During the first half, politics was amiable, explorative, tolerant; it reflected the genial pragma-
tism of the New Deal. He observed that the Thirties were 
larger than Kazin's celebration of their later half. And conceivably it was their earlier half that, if 
it now seems more wavering in outline, was more vibrant in actuality. The earlier half was still 
formative, transitional, when dispute was not yet frozen into dogma, and the soapbox speech and 
the speakeasy footrail were often conjoined.... There were already, to be sure, a good many 
politically seasoned intellectuals; but most people who in the early thirties raised their voices and 
lost their tempers arguing about Marx did so much as they had argued about Schönberg or Joyce, 
and in much the same atmosphere. Mr. Kazin comes in just as Prohibition is going out. 
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Kronenberger suggests that Marxism represented one strand in the native tradition of rebellion: 
it became obvious to Kazin, in the second half of the decade, that Communism itself posed a 
formidable threat to that culture. Cultural discourse generally became riddled with Stalinoid 
thinking, with the "proletarian" totalitarianism of demagogic intellectuals. In this respect, Joseph 
Epstein has argued that the last chapters of Starting Out "assess the effects of emotional 
commitment to a single idea."42 
The "dissolution" in the later chapters Chametzky comments on shows how literary radicals 
gradually abandoned progressive interpretations of history and furnishes a record of radicalism 
degenerating into private metaphysics. These chapters effectively establish Communist politics 
and the moral imagination as sworn antagonists and raise sharp doubts about Partisan Review's 
hopes of amalgamating political and literary radicalism. Kazin's sense of increasing dogmatism 
and party orthodoxy destroys the picture of a liberal cultural consensus presented by 
Kronenberger's account of the era. Necessarily so, because to Kazin the intellectual history of 
the Thirties signifies the final dereliction of the independent tradition of native rebellion and 
creative social vision in America from Emerson via Van Wyck Brooks to the defenders of 
Marxist heterodoxy in his own day. 
Structurally, the intellectual drama of Starting Out illustrates that the notions of cultural 
centrality and marginality developed by Stalinist intellectuals, and by inference also the relation 
of the vanguard to the masses, had shed little light on the moral genius and continuity of 
American writing. Kazin's memoir features the origins of dissent in the Thirties and suggests a 
transfer between "humanistic moral passion" as the life-blood of history and the autonomous 
literary intelligence.43 It maintains a steady note of dispossession about the history of Marxism 
in the United States, of revolutionary promise slipped beyond control and gone to seed. Starting 
Out "show[s] the radical as the prophet of a revolution that made him its first victim."44 At the 
same time, Kazin is convinced that the literary record of the Thirties reflected a revolutionary 
change of social consciousness. The fact that the act of writing virtually acquired pofessional 
status among the lower echelons of society proved to him that the proletariat was laying claim 
to its share in history in quite a different way from what orthodox Marxism had led a generation 
of intellectuals eager for leadership to expect. Significantly, the literary revolution eluded 
political imperatives: "More than the age of the ideologue, of the literary revolutionary and the 
'proletarian' novelist, roles usually created within the Communist movement, the Thirties in 
literature were the age of the plebes — of writers from the working class, the lower class, the 
immigrant class, the non-literate class, from Western farms and mills — those whose struggle 
was to survive" (SOT, 12). These writers clamoured for their own personal experience to be 
admitted into the mainstream of American life. They did not so much become revolutionists in 
order to claim their historical share in the native culture — revolutionism clearly served the 
political agenda of the Communist Party best — but rather secured a sense of the significance 
of their personal experience by bearing witness to it in literature. 
The Thirties saw a phenomenal spread of literary democracy.45 The crisis had boosted a 
collective morality of making do, and the nearest thing available to a philosophy of social 
recoupment and stability at a time of widespread collapse was the note of moral uplift, individ-
ual integrity, and reassurance these writers got from writing about their own lives. On Native 
Grounds's embattled yet affirmative vision of American life and experience was available after 
all. It was realized not so much in the searing testimonials of the "new" writers per se, but in 
the imaginative understanding that allowed an acculturating, second-generation Jew like Kazin 
to see how James T. Farrell and William Saroyan, of Irish and Armenian immigrant stock 
respectively, were encouraged by their personal experience as writers. Henry Roth, whose Call 
It Sleep (1934) was not to receive anything approaching full recognition until it was reissued in 
paperback in 1964, is a case in point. Though he receives passing notice in Starting Out, Kazin 
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published a retrospective revaluation in "The Art of Call It Sleep" arguing how in Roth's 
magnum opus the affirmation of immigrant ethnic experience was joined to a whole gamut of 
technical resources commonly associated with the High Modernism of the Twenties. The essay 
revises generally ideological interpretations of the literary era: 
Call It Sleep is the most profound novel of Jewish life that I have read by an American.... A 
fashionable critic writing in the opulent years after 1945 scorned the 1930s as an "imbecile 
decade," and explained with the usual assurance of people who are comfortably off — that the 
issues in literature are "not political moral." Anyone who thinks "political" issues and "moral" 
ones are unrelated is living in a world very different from the 1930s or the 1990s. 
... Henry Roth... was as open to the many strategies of modernism as he was to political 
insurgency.... 
... We can now see that the book belongs to the side of the 1930s that still believed that 
literature was sacred, whether or not it presumed to change the world. Those who identify the 
1930s with works of political protest forget that it was the decade of the best of Faulkner's novels, 
from The Sound and the Fury to The Wild Palms, Eliot's Ash Wednesday, Hart Crane's The 
Bridge, Dos Passos's U.S.A., Katherine Anne Porter's Flowering Judas, Edmund Wilson's Axel's 
Castle, Fitzgerald's Tender Is the Night, Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer, Steinbeck's The Grapes 
of Wrath, Thornton Wilder's Our Town, Nathanael West's The Day of the Locust, Richard 
Wright's Native Son, Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls. 
What Call It Sleep has in common with these works is its sense of art sustaining itself in a 
fallen world, in a time of endless troubles and social fright.... And no one was likely to feel the 
burden of the times more keenly than a young Jew starting life in a Yiddish-speaking immigrant 
family and surrounded by the physical and human squalor of the Lower East Side.'16 
Louis Kronenberger showed that he understood the dual track of socio-intellectual emancipation 
in the Thirties, and he compared Starting Out to Granville Hicks's memoir of that era, Part of 
the Truth (1965). Explaining the difference in approach in terms of cultural motivation and 
cultural tradition, he asserted that both Kazin and Hicks were "protesting types" in the classic 
American vein. To him, Kazin's New York, working-class Jewishness and Hicks's small-town 
New England, "Thoreauvian and Puritan" protestantism engaged in a fruitful pas-de-deux: 
For any such Jew, political and social protest was a matter of conditioning; for any such Gentile, 
it became a matter of conscience. What for the Jew, given his disabilities and his historic 
"homelessness," constituted an ingrained point of view and a sense of home, a kind of adjustment 
to maladjustment, constituted for the New Englander a tocsined point of departure and a cause for 
outrage. Where the Jew tends to grow hoarse and disputatious over tenets and texts, the New 
Englander more often acts out a stem and simple Ich kann nicht anders. Together, the Jew's 
enlightened sense of persecution and the New Englander's awakened sense of obligation have been 
now the watchdogs of American injustice, and now the bloodhounds. During the 1930s they could 
many times seem both.47 
We remember Kazin reminding Cowley that he cherished the Thirties mainly on account of his 
strong personal desire to rise from "early humiliations." This did not just refer to leaving the 
Brownsville ghetto in search of a living but also to finding oneself increasingly outside Jewish 
orthodoxy and yet being barred from participation in the mainstream of American life. 
Kazin's Jewish origins are the hidden force in his radicalism. "Brownsville is that road which 
every other road in my life has had to cross," he reflects in A Walker in the City, and yet, as a 
child, he thought "we lived at the end of the world."48 Here, too, the view from the periphery 
sheds light on the centre. As early as 1951, then, Kazin acknowledged that his picture of the 
Thirties was based on his own experience in the withering tradition of Judaism. Walker owed 
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much to the rebounding concern with an authentic Jewish identity after the Holocaust, and its 
Jewish protagonist is an emblem of personal consciousness reconstituting a historically disil-
lusioned world."9 Its serene vision of the self includes a faint promise of a universal historical 
morality, but Kazin's emphasis is actually on the past, on the centrality of tradition and the 
weight of accumulated experience rather than the Marxist's Faustian pact with history. Transcen-
dence has become a personal gift and an individual responsibility. Starting Out, by contrast, 
prepares for the future. Starting out with little else but the moral soundness of their own hearts 
and minds, Kazin and a good many of his fellow radicals had a world to win. They worked 
confidently at their emancipation from "early humiliations." Still, the poignant account of his 
mother's cousin Sophie puts a gloss on any doctrinaire faith in historical deliverance. Kazin's 
mother very much had Sophie's fate as an old spinster at heart. Since Sophie boarded with 
them, the mother would not suffer any member of the family to be lacking in the necessary 
respect and concern for her difficult situation. It was borne in on them that a great tragedy, 
namely "love" being abandoned by a heartless world, was unfolding before their own eyes. Of 
what use was the Marxist vision of Armageddon to Sophie? She found deliverance in the guise 
of a near-anonymous Gentile. After many disillusionments in her personal relationships, she 
quite abruptly decided that this man was eligible. Together they left for the Middle West, where 
he abandoned her on an impossible pretext. Sophie sustained a shock from which she never 
recovered, dying years later after prolonged hospitalization. 
To Kazin the memoirist, she has sacramental value: "Loneliness had become her profession. 
It glowered in her like a passion... She was a great sufferer; life had let her down" (SOT, 39). 
But her sexual self-consciousness, never relaxing into mere vanity, enabled her to take her own 
destiny through a grand affirmative act of "love." This distinguished her from Kazin's own 
mother. The contrast between the two women is dramatic, suggesting Kazin's own growing 
awareness that to strike out for individual fulfilment — a personal counterpart to the Marxist 
redemptive historical teleology — entails definite risks. His allegiance is divided between 
Sophie, who was so intent on cutting out her own niche in a better future, and his mother, who 
professed her unwavering faithfulness to the unchanging pattern of her own experience, to the 
actual shape of life and her conviction that life was an incessant continuation from the past: 
It was from this brooding inner life of my mother's, which in its suffering stubbornness seemed 
to incorporate the history of the Jews, and was so pledged to permanence that it became her idea 
of the Eternal..., that I, already stamped with so many of my mother's apprehensions, blindly 
sought relief through Sophie. She was not only a woman, but a woman who openly and passion-
ately demanded things for herself— who even seemed to be nothing but a demanding self. (SOT, 
41) 
Kazin's ambivalent aspirations ultimately reflect a stand-off between a "blind" faith in historical 
transcendence and his increasing sensitivity to the value of "permanence". Earlier on in Starting 
Out, he had argued that in the interest of the Socialist commonwealth the achievements of pre-
revolutionary, bourgeois culture could not and must not be rejected. Between the self-effacement 
of the mother and the appealing, eager yet flighty transcendentalism of Sophie's self-appraisal, 
the choice seemed stark to the adolescent: 
I saw that abandonment... with which she would give herself, some day, to the ideal loved one. 
Surely it was for this look, this possibility, even, that I loved Sophie — for something that said 
the world is made to be risked, for some sense that our fate is not always to be deliberated. With 
all the emptiness in our cousin's life, she stood up for herself, she launched herself again and 
again on those terrible seas — while my mother crept about, silently suffering her bruised and 
wounded shoulder, eating in her corner after mealtimes like a dog, working every minute of the 
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day as if her life were nothing.... Sophie knew that the world owed her something... (SOT, 42-
3 ) 5 0 
Ironically, however, Sophie did not "save" herself. 
Starting Out thus reconsiders the basis of the whole radical movement. For Sophie's history 
features at distinct and decisive moments in Kazin's account of the personalities and the ideas, 
the sentiments and the sophistry, that determined its course. The first part comes after a series 
of incisive cameo studies none of which results in a serious condemnation of Marxism as an 
influence on the contemporary mind. At this stage, Marxism still boasts the interest and loyalty 
of a host of intellectuals, literary and otherwise. With obvious exceptions — John Chamberlain, 
an occasional soapbox orator, and the Communist harassment of Socialists at Madison Square 
Garden commemorating the victims of Dolfuss — contemporary advocates of Marxism retained 
a good deal of the ingenuous Bohemian radicalism and the speculative, heterodox abandon of 
the Village prior to 1917. Kazin also recalls Malcolm Cowley in 1934 writing glowing reviews 
of "brilliant new revolutionary novels" (SOT, 18) like Silone's Fontamara and Malraux's Man's 
Fate. There is the Village bum and literary intellectual Joe Gould, who occurs immediately 
preceding Kazin's discussion of Malraux's novel, and who gives the impression that he could 
by all means have made his appearance in it. There is also Cowley's assistant Otis Ferguson, 
whose jazzy, irreverent style gave a bracing relief from the ponderous note of "High Culture" 
kept up at the New Republic. Jazz music was Ferguson's natural passion, symbolizing his erratic 
but principled individualism. Kazin believes he was "a more revolutionary force on the maga-
zine than any of the good English professors at Smith or the staff critics at Collier's and Time," 
whose militancy was merely perfunctory and politically expedient. But Ferguson's was an 
excessive romanticism, and it carried him out of his depth: he "believed in sensations, not in 
ideas; in ecstasy, not communication" (SOT, 31).51 Like Sophie, and with a similar blind 
wilfulness, he threw his life away. He was the only man to die on his ship when the Allies 
landed at Salerno. Ferguson was in several respects a libertarian force in a decade infected with 
salvationism, but he did not have the key to personal salvation. 
The dénouement of Sophie's personal history functions as a coda to the sectarian power 
struggles within the Communist movement which erupted in full force at the time of the 
Moscow Trials. These struggles paradoxically made the backsliders from Communism a source 
of authority. Also ex-fellow travellers such as Calverton, Norman Thomas, Max Eastman, 
Sidney Hook, and Eugene Lyons became respectable. Their home-baked radicalism offset the 
ideological exhaustion and the increasing intolerance of Communism, and seemed to suggest that 
they had successfully followed Edmund Wilson's advice to "Americanize" Marx. 
Meanwhile, such myopic and dogmatic radicals as Kazin's college friend Francis Corcoran 
had adopted the cause of Stalinism, too.52 Like so many others, Francis expected Marxism-
Leninism to bolster the disintegrating system of belief — he was a pious Catholic — in which 
he had been reared. He was very soon a "methodical" Stalinist, "quick to enlist on the side of 
his new faith the intellectual assurance that he had learned in the old" (SOT, 95). He represented 
the Marxist's worst flaw, namely the fear of intellectual doubt. He thought it a matter of bad 
faith to suppose that the Revolution might be swerving from its appointed path, that it could 
generate destructive energies which Marx had failed to foresee. In the last instance, Francis 
believed with all his heart that Stalin was a historical intelligence who promised to draw the full 
revolutionary potential from Marxism-Leninism. To him, Stalinism was august Marxist 
revisionism. After Stalin struck up an alliance with Von Ribbentrop, however, the stays in 
Francis' defence gave way. But with the disillusionment came the contrition for having believed 
in anything liberal at all, and his guilt over his former gullibility inspired a deep distrust of 
human motives in general. Nor did he wish to blame himself for his moral blindness: 
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Everyone was guilty... Evil was the prime fact. Man was steeped in it. There is, said Francis to me 
earnestly, "a Hitler in each of us." With so much guilt at large, there was no need for Francis to 
worry about anything; he floated in guilt as in a clear mountain spring.... Francis was a saintly 
informer in the threatening style that was to be the making of Whittaker Chambers... (SOT, 142-3) 
To people like Francis, history as an intellectual and moral experience had ceased to exist. 
By the time Sophie's vision of the future got ruined through a venturesome alliance with a 
Gentile "romantic heavy," Communism had revealed its damaging potential in intellectuals. 
What Kronenberger called the Jew's "historic 'homelessness'" becomes symbolically lucid in 
Sophie's mad fling at destiny brooded on by a young sensitif— Kazin — constantly striking the 
balance between her life and his mother's. Kronenberger spoke of an "adjustment to malad-
justment" as the nearest equivalent of the Jewish quest for "home". In Starting Out, this does 
not result in a glorification of ethnic Jewish culture; Jewishness was not always to be defined 
from within. Kazin recounts the story of inviting Ferguson — "I superstitiously thought of him 
as a visitor from the great literary world" (SOT, 34) — to his parents' home on the assumption 
that a Jewish meal might get the literary big shot Ferguson interested in him. Later that night, 
Ferguson shattered Kazin's expectations: "What the hell was so exotic about that?" Kazin was 
"unnerved" to learn that Ferguson found them "as a group" so "commonplace" and dull (SOT, 
47). In his own mind, he had come to associate Jewishness with its symbolical function in 
history: 
it seemed to me that we were especially interesting because we were among the dispossessed of 
history; I saw us as the downtrodden, the lonely, the needy, in a way that fitted my faith in a total 
redemption. 
There are times in history when a group feels that it is at the center of events. Poor as we 
were, anxious, lonely, it seemed to me obvious that everywhere, even in Hitler Germany, to be 
outside of society and to be Jewish was to be at the heart of things. History was preparing, in its 
Jewish victims and through them, some tremendous deliverance and revolution. I hugged my 
aloneness, our apartness, my parents' poverty, as a sign of our call to create the future. (SOT, 47-
8) 
To Kazin in the Thirties, it was the Jews rather than the proletariat who were the most 
revolutionary force for progress in history. The Jewish mind was closer to the authentic and 
problematic experience of historical deliverance than Marxist claims of historical inevitability. 
American conditions had bred a certain social humility in it, wedding it to a clearly liberal 
outlook.53 Kazin's own experience in the Brownsville ghetto provided a similar springboard for 
deliverance. In addition, he deals with his personal sensibility in collective terms, reflecting the 
Jews' shared experience of marginality. The implication is that the Jew is the archetypal 
underdog, forever anticipating historical break-through. His situation resembles that of the 
"new," working-class writers in the Thirties, whose literary effort was genuine testimony of their 
desire to rise from social and cultural misery and destitution. They, too, understood that with the 
crisis of capitalism a new literary ethos would arise and that unexpected personal opportunities 
were opening up. Ostensibly unified, the experience of the era seemed to point to the imma-
nence of a new and equitable social order. Every issue, so Kazin claims, could be seen in 
collective terms and construed as evidence of this. It corroborated his "sense of the inclusiveness 
and destiny of history" (SOT, 85). 
So my parents' poverty had a mystique for me, and our loneliness a definite heroism.... I felt, with 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the outrage of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler working 
together was a challenge, not a defeat; I trusted to the righteousness of history. Just as I was trying 
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to break through, so history was seeking its appointed consummation. My interest and the genius 
of history simply had to coincide. (SOT, 85-6)" 
This is historical faith recreated in the warp and woof of personal consciousness. As a personal 
metaphysis, it defeats the Communist faith in historical necessity. All of Starting Out is actually 
a searing indictment of the pundits of Bolshevism. Many people, intellectuals or not, believed 
that the exigencies of the current crisis put them in a privileged relation to history. They 
believed in their capacity as mentors of an emancipatory historical evolution. Starting Out 
records how this assurance often slipped into crippling ideological partisanship. 
Kazin offers one outstanding exception, however, for it was through Francis that he met John 
and Harriet: " John, a law student, was the most charming man I had ever met. A natural 
conservative in a radical period, with a melancholy knowledge of the shoals and traps of human 
nature, he expressed himself through mimicry, and he could do to a perfection that drove us 
howling off the couch Franklin D. Roosevelt..." (SOT, 100) John is a pseudonym for Richard 
Hofstadter, whose revisionist historiography of American politics was to become prominent in 
the Fifties. Harriet is his wife Felice Swados, a gifted writer and formidable personality who 
was to die at the age of twenty-nine. Kazin's friendship with Hofstadter inspired an exchange 
of ideas which may have been a decisive influence on the historical outlook of On Native 
Grounds. Both men shared an intellectual fascination with the "brown decades" of the nineteenth 
century — "the years of crude expansion and technological innovation in which our America 
had settled into shape." Hofstadter, the "half-Jew," habitually teased Kazin about his fascination 
with Henry Adams. With misanthropic delight, Adams had drawn up a prophetic theory of 
history on the basis of the supposed decay of the best social and political traditions of his time. 
Both Kazin and Hofstadter understood Adams's motives, admitting that "we were both in the 
spell of what had caught and frightened Adams. America... would soon be the greatest power 
instrument in history — we all went to make up that instrument. America was the perfect 
subject for history."55 As intellectual spectators and commentators, both felt that Jewish eman-
cipation and America's manifest destiny were related, one setting the stage for the other. They 
also understood why Adams had been so hostile to Jews, particularly immigrant Jews: these 
were cultural parasites and put the best eighteenth-century, patrician traditions in American 
political democracy in jeopardy. In actual fact, however, the Jews' affirmation of their identity 
within the context of America's accumulating social and political power in the Thirties made 
their breakthrough possible. The Jewish intellectual claimed his place, as a witness and as a 
critical intelligence, in the national experience. Accordingly, both Kazin and Hofstadter were 
concerned with indisputably American traditions in literature and politics respectively. As Jews, 
they felt they could bear testimony to America's mission. 
Most of all Kazin was impressed with Hofstadter's lack of partisanship: "He was a derisive 
critic and satirist of every American Utopia and its wild prophets, a natural oppositionist to 
fashion and its satirist.... We had been formed by the Great Depression, but Hofstadter was a 
secret conservative in a radical period," adding wryly that Hofstadter was soon to find himself 
in a different ideological camp altogether: "The times caught up with him." In all of his work, 
Hofstadter evinced a certain "irony about power". Actually, "unlike other historians of our 
generation, [Hofstadter] was afraid of power," and Kazin adds that this was "natural to 'our 
group' — people who kept up some habit of alienation long after they had ceased to be radicals 
and become happily institutionalized."56 Nevertheless, Hofstadter's initially rabid distrust of 
Franklin Roosevelt did not concern Roosevelt's function as a historical agent. For one thing, 
Kazin, too, distrusted him, but admitted that "I could almost believe in him now, there was so 
much need of him to do the right thing. FDR's historical function was destined; everybody's 
was" (SOT, 85). Kazin's personal situation and background, the social aspirations of second-
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generation Jewish intellectuals, America's growing world status, its internal political dilemmas, 
and the repressive totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia unlocked one, unified pattern of 
revelation: "Wherever I went now, I felt the moral contagion of a single idea" (SOT, 83). 
Apparently, this moral contagion involved the belief that history was working toward an 
equitable solution for all men, and that it would honour the moral struggle of the Jews in 
Germany and New York, of the Chinese Communists hounded by Chiang Kai-shek, of the 
Spanish Republicans, of the Marxist conscientious objectors in Stalinist Russia, and of the 
down-and-out peasantry of Silone's novels alike. They were all of them working toward their 
salvation on the strength of their personal hopes for a place in the mainstream of history, a 
willingness to make it come out right by the imperatives of their hearts and minds, to force the 
world to recognize the value of their experience. Their historical redemption lay in a vital sense 
of continuity and universality of their moral concerns, whether these expressed the rise from a 
Jewish ghetto in New York City or the libertarian aspirations of the Spanish Republicans. 
In order to understand how little this moral conviction had to do with liberal politics, we 
need to remember that both Kazin and Hofstadter felt extremely ambivalent about the New Deal 
and its leading executive, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Neither of them detected in it any operative 
philosophy, and they believed it mainly revealed the influence of pragmatism on the American 
sociopolitical scene. Hofstadter claimed that Roosevelt had sensed "the failure of tradition," but 
that he had posed no alternative. Instead, Roosevelt had appealed to a makeshift morality of 
making do. Also Kazin, in his review of Arthur J. Schlesinger Jr.'s The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 
II; The Coming of the New Deal (1959), pointed out that the history of the New Deal proved the 
progressive collapse of national traditions. Schlesinger, he claimed, had come up with a decep-
tive picture of consensus and unity about the Thirties. He objected to this: the "unexpressed 
admission" at the time was rather "that the crisis was permanent and uncontrollable; in America, 
virtually the last symbol of pure capitalism, one could see the old order of ideas actually 
disintegrating..." Schlesinger had recast Roosevelt's pragmatism as "exciting democratic vitalism 
and pluralism," but in fact it was so slick a departure from conventional politics that it caused 
both critics and supporters to misjudge its real operative strength: 
The New Deal did not destroy the old order. Like all modem revolutions, it came after the old 
order had collapsed. It operated... in a world of improvised solutions. But Roosevelt could not 
know how much he had gone beyond the traditional morality, the clear sense of good and evil, 
that at least left Woodrow Wilson historically lucid. 
It is this failure to show the growing uncontrol within and behind the New Deal, the hidden 
dimension of moral extremism, that I object to in Schlesingers book. He writes as if...he were 
reporting from some irrefutable center of established truth. Actually, it has become increasingly 
clear that the New Deal represented, against the will and sometimes without the knowledge of 
many people who participated in it, a series of adventures in a void that was created by the decay 
of tradition.... Schlesingers book... hints of the permanent crisis that is the truth of our times." 
Starting Out in the Thirties creates parameters of personal consciousness that overrule this 
sense of moral crisis and decay. Schlesinger gave an altogether synthetic interpretation of recent 
social and political history in the United States; Kazin, now, identifies the irreducible personal 
resources from which the diffused public intelligence in the Thirties might be rebuilt. In 
literature, writers as "dizzy and grandiloquent" (SOT, 14) as William Saroyan emerged because 
"there was no tradition to hold them down." At the New York Times Book Review, J. Donald 
Adams, a staunch defender of genteel literary culture, was still trying to uphold certain 
"standards": he "was necessary... to our radicalism; he defined the opposition" (SOT, 14-5). 
Literary traditionalists like Adams and Canby disliked new bearings in literature and virtually 
read writers like Farrell, Saroyan, Algren, Dahlberg and O'Hara out of the canon. The break-
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through of these "naturalists" in the Thirties challenged the character of the genteel literary 
culture and introduced a new morality of personal testimony in letters. The status quo was 
breaking down. Sectors of the native experience were streaming into literature which had up till 
then been neglected. Though many of them were uncouth stylists and literalists, these writers' 
difference from the generation of the Twenties was mainly that they wished to affirm the value 
of a distinctly native, social experience: "What young writers of the Thirties wanted was to 
prove the literary value of our experience, to recognize the possibility of art in our lives, to feel 
that we had moved the streets, the stockyards, the hiring halls into literature — to show that our 
radical strength could carry on the experimental impulse of modem literature" (SOT, 15). 
Starting Out: Its Achievement 
Reviewing Starting Out, Leo Marx acknowledged that Kazin had been able to objectify this 
continuity of creative ambition with the modernist generation of the Twenties. Yet, he main-
tained that Kazin did "not salvage from the story of the 30's a redeeming idea or, indeed, any 
idea not rooted in his own immediate experience." I agree with Marx and several other com-
mentators that Starting Out is but a poor guide to the actual content of the ideological contro-
versies of the Thirties.58 What Marx fails to see, however, is that Kazin is also looking to 
establish a point of departure enabling him to trace the era's continuity with the intellectual life 
after the war. He aims to show that the intellectuals' fascination with Communism in the 
Thirties created a certain state of mind which persisted even when Communism was no longer 
a defensible option. The controversies died down, but they left an indelible imprint on the minds 
of former radical intellectuals who, after having sloughed off their revolutionary opinions, set 
themselves up as America's deradicalized postwar cultural intelligentsia. 
When Kazin's friend Francis finally broke with Stalinism, he claimed with unabated assur-
ance that his experience in Communism had revealed to him Man's infinite capacity for folly 
and evil. Presumably, he was now a "realist" beyond illusions. Similarly, the Partisan Review 
critics felt that the growing consensus about the deceitfulness of Stalinism was not likely to 
promote their theoretical support for an anti-Stalinist avant-garde of disaffiliated intellectuals. 
In contrast to Bertram Wolfe's brand of Socialism, the Partisan Review group soon gave the 
impression that it was no longer interested in the historical liberation of the proletariat. Among 
anti-Stalinist intellectuals, the preservation of the intellectual conscience became in itself a 
matter of tradition, often at a noticeable price to the moral heritage of humanitarian socialism 
itself. Kazin believes that Mary McCarthy in particular put her combative, contemptuous 
intellect over traditional socialist commitment. She exulted in taking apart personalities who did 
not come up to her own intellectual standards: "Mary McCarthy was the first writer of my 
generation who made me realize that it would now be possible to be a radical without any 
idealism whatsoever" (SOT, 155). 
Kazin's editor at Atlantic Monthly, Peter Davison, lauded Starting Out as "a remarkable piece 
of cultural speculation about the intellectual and politics." He believed its theme was "the 
interaction between private feeling and radical commitment, later so completely unravelled by 
history." Also Josephine Herbst, a veteran of the Left in both Europe and the United States in 
the Twenties and Thirties, welcomed Kazin's departure from fashionable accounts of the Thirties 
and found that he had successfully rooted the experience of the decade beyond the history of 
radical ideas: 
When you write you don't care for the thirties per se — neither do I... You do make a 
humanscape.... It wasn't the period of primal discoveries for me, but the revelation of true forms 
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as the wrappings dropped away.... I want everything for life that I ever wanted, but all that didn't 
begin with a secular creed, nor died with it. To root it beyond its accredited boundaries is to me 
the whole point about writing about it at all, for nothing changes like that for the human heart 
[emphasis added]. 
Herbst captured the moral drive behind Starting Out in a nutshell. If Paul John Eakin detects in 
the book's chronology a "radical shift in Kazin's sense of his relation to history," he might have 
extended his observation to Kazin's elegiac note about the fate of the radical movement. Kazin 
agrees with Herbst that the decade was formative in much more than the political sense alone. 
Both of them associated a personal and transcendental motif, a personal catharsis, with their 
experience in radicalism, while Kazin believed that 
so much of mine seems to be connected with the descent into hell, with the indemnification of old 
sins... they were not the bitter thirties, not in my mss. anyway. Josie's example is, whatever the 
reason, the right one. My reason for being positive and golden about it all is that one takes up the 
struggle for values in one's own way — no political myth can be my carrier of value all the way. 
Here Kazin parries the charges frequently levelled at veterans of the Thirties in the post-
McCarthy era that they are ex-radicals gone sour. He objects to the primacy of politics in the 
experience of his generation, the depression generation. He denies emphatically that the years 
from 1935 till 1960 were "a devolution from some state of originally radical grace." What 
matters is '4o avoid thinking of any period as the norm, from which all other periods are a 
decline. The thing is to avoid historical sentimentality, to avoid being nostalgic for Revolt! The 
thing is to be oneself, unimpeachably always..." The urge to portray the Thirties as a decisive 
historical crisis may well be deceptive, since it suggests accents that do not feature in the actual 
experience of the decade: "Down with the myth of the 30's, the myth of the revolutionary 
period, when it was actually one of depression and social engineering."59 
Starting Out is an obituary to the Marxist revolution, but its title argues that Kazin rebels 
against the sense of defeat and historical decay. The narrative concentrates on a moral examin-
ation of the future, and Kazin makes a case for historical redemption through imaginative 
consciousness rather than through revolutionary social science. I disagree with Leo Marx that 
Starting Out presents "an oppressively self-enclosed view of reality"; it rather argues the 
increasing significance of individual moral vision after the defeat of radical politics. In 1962, 
Kazin expressed the strong need for an idealist reveille at a time of proliferating, tough 
"realism". Such "realism" was the ideological watermark of current anti-liberalism. It may well 
be that Kazin had the State Department's Cold War policy in mind when he lashed out: 
We Americans realize that we are caught up, like everybody else, in the lockstep of necessity. But 
later on, if the disaster of another world war is unloosed upon humanity, we shall no longer be 
able to exculpate ourselves on the ground of necessity.... For it should be obvious that we cannot 
trust what is called necessity, that we cannot limit our intellectual faith only to what are called the 
"realistic" decisions.... For the first time since the modem era began, we can see that the missing 
element in all our political calculations has been man — his hopefulness, his good regard for 
himself, his free hope of the future. We have pushed disgust with ourselves up to the limit of 
political safety; the worse we think of ourselves as a whole, the worse we behave. Realism now 
has as many dangers as the innocence we used to have...60 
Starting Out in the Thirties is a personal vision of history transcending "innocence" and 
unaffected by "realism." Kazin's original assumption that a historical continuity of moral vision 
was central to literature did not stand. With On Native Grounds' "grand historical design" 
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invalidated, he was forced to find an alternative definition of literary continuity. He intended 
Starting Out in the Thirties both as a sequel to and a revaluation of On Native Grounds: "[Now] 
the positive side of the man begins.... Now the conflict can begin — no longer outside... but 
inside... the individual's sense of his own positive freedom to say yes and no.... The power 
above all to stand up for himself." Starting Out accordingly studies the metaphysics of personal 
deliverance. It states that literature itself — vide Barbusse, Pound, and Céline — could no 
longer be claimed by intellectually libertarian and democratic-progressive forces exclusively. In 
these writers' work, literary ideas actually consorted with totalitarian sentiments. Starting Out 
dramatizes the creative consciousness as the central theatre of enduring human values. It enacts 
Kazin's belief that historical faith inheres in the quality of individual moral vision: 
The religious value of "socialism" is the sacramental value of the poor, is indeed the background 
for individual authenticity described in the book.... The struggle is — not to give an absolute value 
to "history" itself, nor to confuse the transcendent value that properly belongs only to transcendent 
factors, or to any particular item in history. The real background of the struggle is the urge that 
made all those Cowleys and Hickses and Obed Brooks Davises interesting in the Thirties. The 
period was dramatic and clear cut [sic] in a way that only religious ages are, when life really 
seems about to take a new direction. Today history no longer makes sense. My fight is to show 
that it does, that the continuities of history are real. The fight in the book is to show that certain 
values (of which Socialism was the expression) are real. I no longer believe in Socialism, but I 
certainly believe in those values. History should never be identified with any one creed.6' 
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Intellectuals: From the Ashes of Politics 
Defining the Jewish Sensibility 
Several commentators have noted the self-mythicizing quality of Walker, while praising its grasp 
of time and location. Temporal and spatial relations in Walker are the warp and woof of the 
narrative protagonist's budding consciousness, and his return to a "limiting pastness" traces the 
origins of his individual identity. Exploring the tradition, he redeems it through his narrative 
strategy of breaking back into the past and restates it in terms of present consciousness. Both a 
writer and a historian of the self— his self— he has found that his personal fate lies in the full 
play of his consciousness. In the postradical world, the self asserts the moral presence in history 
of reason, justice, possibility and desire.' Not many postradical intellectuals were willing to side 
with Kazin on this issue: as an explorative form, Walker was well-nigh unique. Of course, the 
pervasive disillusionment among Marxist radicals towards the Fifties signified that revolutionary 
blueprints of society had failed and that history was not makable in the way they had supposed, 
but this did not mean that they were prepared to measure historical progress in the subtle 
refractions of individual consciousness. Their commitment to radicalism was essentially different 
from Kazin's, who found Socialism attractive mainly as a "moral idea." 
"Under Forty: A Symposium on American Literature and the Younger Generation of American 
Jews" is a key document of the American-Jewish mind in the Forties. Virtually all contributors 
professed having no special ties with, or interest in, the cultural world of Jewishness. Yet, seven 
years afterwards, Walker was to paint an evocative picture of Jewishness becoming an issue of 
existential proportions in the postwar world. In Walker, Kazin created his "natal country," a 
moral landscape of the Jewish soul.2 
By Kazin's own account, Walker's creative achievement was to preserve the complexity of 
Jewishness and prevent it from developing into a doctrinaire position: 
As the past broke out in my book, it came to me more and more that there was no intellectual 
solution to my long search for the meaning of Jewishness. I would never fully fathom the hatred 
behind the Holocaust. I would never become pious in the orthodox Jewish fashion. I would never 
settle in a country that desired to be all Jewish. I would never believe in Socialism's "final 
conflict." I would certainly never ally myself with the financially and politically powerful or the 
bom-again patriots who were picking up their ideologies from the ex-left. 
These questions had concerned members of the Jewish liberal intelligentsia since the emergence 
of totalitarianism in Europe till the onset of the Cold War. Interestingly, Kazin detected a 
similar requirement for some sort of orthodoxy in Walker's critical reception among Jewish 
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literary intellectuals and historians. Leslie Fiedler, Irving Howe, Norman Mailer, Lionel Trilling 
and Oscar Handlin, he observed, all thought the book a flawed achievement, suggesting with 
more than a touch of sarcasm that they presumably did know what its proper message ought to 
have been: "All these Jewish sages were correct; the book astonished me, too, by going Us own 
way [my emphasis]." All of them less than adequately appreciated the carefully designed dual 
perspective of the protagonist's consciousness. "To rebel against the tradition was somehow to 
hold fast to it," Kazin claims, but the Jewish response to Walker suggested that "the tradition," 
even if far from single and unified, brooked no rebellion. Walker's critics clearly showed 
intellectual timidity before the radical paradoxes of consciousness it conveyed. Kazin presents 
his case for the centrality of Jewishness with much conviction, deftly playing off the Jews' 
expert grasp of the dislocations underlying modern culture against the ironic prominence and 
continuity of the Jews in modem history. As a statement on history, Walker lays the axe at the 
root of Eliot's view, expressed in his review of Joyce's Ulysses, that modem history is a 
spectacle of futility and anarchy, and had best be avoided by those having the problems of 
tradition and individual expression at heart: 
To want it both ways was also to span a good deal of the vehemence of Jewish history in a way 
perhaps unimaginable just now to those children of suburbia for whom Jewishness is psychology 
and troubled self-defense. See them now, wearing a chique inch of yarmulke, relish the ballet and 
the nudes at the museum of art. For me, as for so many Jewish writers and intellectual 
troublemakers of a certain age and condition, life in the 20th century has been essentially political. 
With Jews usually at every crux of our turbulent century. 
That for Kazin and his fellow Jews life in the twentieth century has been "essentially political" 
argues nothing less than that "the vehemence of Jewish history" was enacted outside and beyond 
the scope of the modernists' wholly literary concern with the tradition. Accordingly, Kazin does 
not think it was up to Eliot, Joyce or Pound to reject the political nature of the modem world 
as irrelevant to the cause of literary expression. The Jewish identity, its collective aspirations 
and visions, did operate as historical agents in modem times, albeit that the totalitarian state 
reacted to them with peculiarly destructive force. For Jews in particular, the self bears every 
possible relation to history, even to history in its modern exclusionist temper: 
When Dr. Sigmund Freud in Vienna found himself virtually ostracized for his professional 
insights, he proudly said, "Being a Jew, I knew I would be in the opposition." Leon Trotsky, Rosa 
Luxemburg, Grigori Zinoviev, Osip Mandelstam were confident that their being Jewish was 
historically insignificant; those who destroyed them did not think it insignificant. Replacing 19th-
century illusions that the "Jewish question" would disappear under socialism, the 20th century 
everywhere has seen the persecution and even extermination of Jews wherever the state has total 
control. The crowd that cheered Dreyfus's disgrace was replaced by the crowd in occupied 
Warsaw cheering as Jews locked into the ghetto flung themselves out of windows to escape 
deportation.3 
This states the case. Under modem conditions, Jewishness has been essentially inassimilable. 
The modernists' literary scepticism about history could only be corrected by capturing and 
expressing the rich ambiguities and the persistent creativeness of the Jewish experience. 
Despite "Jewishness" moving to the centre of contemporary intellectual discourse, many 
Jewish intellectuals were anxious not to align themselves with overtly particularistic positions 
on the question of ethnic affirmation. As I have noted, this reluctance was so pronounced that 
Kazin felt moved to charge liberal intellectuals, and Jews not least among them, as well as 
radicals and reactionaries with silent complicity in the guilt over the Holocaust. Alexander 
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Bloom reports Kazin's dismay at the New Republic's tepid response to "In Every Voice, In 
Every Ban": apparently they had just been "faintly embarrassed because it [viz. the Destruction] 
didn't seem to them to be particularly urgent." Bloom's findings illustrate that as late as 1945 
they were highly ambivalent about articulating their Jewishness. Kazin was not. In Walker, he 
sketched the unique position of Jewishness as a force in politics, art, and society, but transcend-
ing each. In a biographical sketch of a much more recent date, entitled "New York Jew," he 
recalls that the became "self-consciously Jewish" in the Thirties, when he began to write and 
publish. Few Jewish radicals who started out with Kazin then developed a self-consciously 
Jewish outlook in their work. The sacred cause of History and culture demanded that they side 
with Trotsky in order to give the lie to Stalin, and study Franz Kafka in order to expose 
affirmative Jewishness. Such views were common fare at Partisan Review during the war and 
immediately after. Kazin took his bearings differently: 
even in the literary world of New York [during the late Thirties and the early Forties], anti-
Semitism was obvious. As it happened, I fell in love with American literature and the native 
Protestant tradition. I began to work in that field when it was still relatively unsystematic. I seem 
to have written the only historical book [viz. On Native Grounds] on the whole modern period of 
American literature. I say that not as a matter of pride but as a source of wonder. To be sure, I 
had an historical sense...4 
The significance of On Native Grounds and the question of Jewishness came together for 
Kazin in the figure of Lewis Gannett. As a writer and a colleague, he had acclaimed Kazin's 
first book-length performance. As a representative of the dominant Anglo-Saxon faction in 
American culture, however, he had also found occasion to make some snide references to 
Kazin's Jewish background. The episode had stung Kazin into a vivid remembrance of Henry 
James's dismay, after years of absence from the American scene, at New York's vulgar 
"lowness." Particularly the city's bustling Jewish population had fanned James's cultural spleen. 
James's image of "low" culture, which stigmatized the Jews and the immigrant urban proletariat 
alike, sensitized Kazin to the fact that America's most imaginative spirits could find Jewish life 
distinctly anomalous and even redundant. If James had viewed it with abhorrence, some 
prominent Jewish writers and intellectuals did not particularly care to see their careers associated 
with the plebeian, demotic assertions of Jewish life which James had encountered in lower 
Manhattan around the turn of the century. Indeed, they believed that the question of Jewishness 
largely depended on the aspects of their personal experience and culture they chose to affirm. 
Walker did not explicitly reject this, but the burden of its inquiry into the character of 
Jewishness was that "Orthodoxy remained the heart and soul of it all."5 To many Jewish 
intellectuals, including Lionel Trilling, such an admission would have been tantamount to 
surrendering their culture. They habitually shied away from any orthodoxy — political or 
cultural, Jewish or American — in order to stress the scope and the complexity of their own 
perceptions. 
Kazin's diary entry for 1 July 1974 records his belief that the great book he had begun by 
writing On Native Grounds ended with the writing of Walker. As I have said before, they are 
companion parts, yet essentially different, for Kazin adds that the transition reflected his "change 
from humble scholar to a writer in my own fashion & my love of those strange minds who 
helped to form my sense of the self as a possible unit and master of style." He reiterates that the 
self "and its journey" are Walker's subject. On 26 July 1948, he explained that Walker would 
furnish "a picture of moral solitude within the social disorder." It was a "call to integration, i.e. 
the involvement of his [viz. modem man's] total self in his living activity [as expressed in] the 
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mode of walking, or meditation." Walker's mode of meditation actually establishes that inclusive 
rapport with the world which On Native Grounds'1 humble scholar had confidently expected to 
emerge in the course of American literary history. 
In this sense, Walker was a wholly original contribution to the intellectual polemic about 
"authentic Jewishness," which was to concentrate in the pages of the fledgling Jewish magazine 
Commentary. A rapid exchange of views about the issue occurred in the intellectual press, some 
of which were an obvious travesty of antiliberal political ideology, while others were significant 
attempts to arrive at a radical cultural definition of Jewishness. The radical movement of the 
Thirties had offered obvious compensations for Jews, whose cultural isolation was not likely to 
subside even when they had succeeded in breaking away from the ghetto, and the radical cause 
promised a more equitable social order through reform or revolution. It also held out a Utopian 
future of international brotherhood, and so in fact represented that larger community operating 
on principles of humanitarian justice which many Jewish radicals wished to see realized on 
American soil. Commitment to the cause promised cultural emancipation. Later, with scientific 
historicism in decline, a new test of radical intellectual integrity was needed. A person's stand 
on the Jewish issue during and after the war became the litmus test in this respect.6 
Compared to the history of radical ideas in the United States from the Thirties till the mid-
Fifties, Kazin's radicalism showed remarkable stability. The sentiments and ideas it affirmed 
retained a high degree of consistency amid the rapid turn-over of ideological states. Kazin 
associated his Thirties Socialism as readily with "one long Friday evening around the samovar 
and the cut-glass bowl laden with nuts and fruits, all of us singing Tsuzamen, tsuzamen, ale 
tsuzamen!" as with his father's selfless interest in the Socialist rituals of solidarity, affectionate 
participation in unionist small talk, and the cultivation of personal friendships. For the father, 
as for the son absorbed in reading Joyce during a meeting of Socialists in the Labor Lyceum, 
Socialism operated as much in the cultural realm as in the political.7 It nourished a sense of 
community that spoke more directly to people than the Communist utopia of the workers' state. 
There was also an unspoken admission on the part of the Kazins that their being Jews solidified 
their stake in Socialism. In the protection of the family circle, Socialism survives as a cultural 
ideal rather than a tool for scientific social reform. 
Walker presents certain key elements of the protagonist's experience in Jewishness contrib-
uting to the formation of a transcendent consciousness. Several of these, and I am thinking 
mainly of the sense of isolation and the literary community of solidarity, also feature in Starting 
Out in the Thirties. The continuity of these themes in his personal narratives — the view from 
the margin and the need to break through to some assertion of centrality — illustrates that in 
Kazin's case the change from many a Jewish intellectual's universalism before the war towards 
the assertion of Jewish ethnic identity after was less dramatic than the history of the Jewish 
liberal community as a whole would suggest. And this is because he did not wish to emphasize 
the respective claims of universality and ethnicity to the extent that fellow radicals with roughly 
the same background did. Walker was concerned with "integration." For Kazin, the worlds of 
Jewishness and universal ideas connect. Consciousness was suckled in Brownsville and it might 
also culminate there. The process of growth redeems the situation from which the protagonist 
started out. 
The remarkable differences of cultural and ethnic sensibility among the second generation of 
American Jews stood out in relief in a symposium organized in February 1944 by the Contem-
porary Jewish Record, which aimed to gauge the potential of the Jewish cultural heritage against 
the background of the increasing pressure of political events on the Jewish community. The 
editors sent a questionnaire to young radical intellectuals who had all of them participated in the 
social movement of the Thirties and who were now presumably casting about for another 
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unifying focus to their cultural criticism. The participants, including Trilling, Kazin, Delmore 
Schwartz, Isaac Rosenfeld, Louis Kronenberger, and Clement Greenberg, proceeded to demolish 
any pretensions to a Jewish cultural identity in America. That "more elusive question" which 
exploded the issue was '"to what extent, and in what manner, has [the Jewish writer's] aware-
ness of his position as artist and citizen been modified or changed by the revival of anti-
Semitism as a powerful force in the political history of our time?'" Norman Podhoretz has 
pointed out that the editors were evidently convinced that the contributors "were assimilationists 
and that their assimilationism was grounded in the belief that the 'Jewish problem' — as it used 
to be called — was on its way to being solved in the modern world." But they showed irritation 
over the underlying view that, now that assimilationism as an emancipatory programme for Jews 
had gone bankrupt, their role as intellectuals was to enhance Jewish consciousness among their 
own set. Almost without exception, they rejected the editors' artfully constructed dilemma and 
refused to be caught in any Zionist position or even a posture of ethnic affirmation. Instead, 
they excoriated the mediocrity and imitativeness of Jewish "middle class" mores, believing these 
to be evidence that even the pure Judaic communal culture which the editors envisioned was a 
historical absurdity. The Nazi regime, they stressed, had made it clear that nationalism in all its 
phenomena, even the Jewish variety, was ultimately repellent. They were remarkably detached 
from the so-called Jewish heritage which the editors had hoped they would acknowledge.8 
Podhoretz's comments on the 1944 symposium suggest that the emancipation of American 
Jewry coincided with the decisive integration of American cultural consciousness after the war 
and that this conceivably even helped it along. America's postwar social cures thus come out as 
the Jews' cultural enfranchisement, a point which, of course, many Jewish intellectuals did not 
care to endorse. Kazin certainly did not. I propose to compare his contribution to the 1944 
symposium with Trilling's, and to trace the development of their ideas about Jewishness, 
tradition, alienation, and accommodation. 
Trilling was deeply aware of his Jewishness but intellectually non-committal about it. The 
opening sentence of his contribution to "Under Forty" — "It is never possible for a Jew of my 
generation to 'escape' his Jewish origin" — confirmed his ambivalence. The statement reflects 
a mental straining away from Jewishness. Although he conceded that his youth in "an active 
[Jewish] community large enough to be both interesting and protective" had been "one of the 
shaping conditions of my temperament [and] intellect," Trilling disclaimed any active concern 
for Jewishness in his work. He declared that even if the fact of his Jewishness were inescapable, 
it could stir up very little in him beyond "a resistance... to the stupidity and centrality which 
make the Jewish situation so bad as it is." He called his a "minimal" position. Even the first 
tremors of the Holocaust could not move him to give support to those who were suffering on 
account of their Jewishness, whose relevance to himself he was minimizing. He would not be 
caught in "the failure of merely symbolic action, of merely guilty gesture." Trilling went on to 
observe that the Jewish community had been overtaken by an "impasse of sterility," a result of 
the dominance of "negative, or neuter, elements" in it. It did not "want" enough, not, at least, 
enough to suit Trilling's taste, and instead tended to shut itself off from "certain parts of the 
general life" in retaliation for being kept out. Contemporary Jewish religion restricted itself to 
giving a "social and rational defense" of this retreat. Its rational purpose rested on no sure 
foundation, however, for the traditional Judaic experience continued to show a "deep inner 
uncertainty" and a scatological fixation on death ritual. Trilling concluded that out of modern 
Jewish religion "there has not come a single voice with the note of authority — of philosophi-
cal, or poetic, or even rhetorical, let alone of religious authority." He was equally outspoken on 
the subject of "the literature of Jewish self-affirmation," which proselytized on behalf of 
"adjustment" to the Jewish heritage and branded failure to do so as heresy. Trilling declined the 
pleasure of being accepted into the Jewish fold "on a wholly neurotic basis." To him, it sug-
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gested the smothering exclusiveness of a provincial and parochial life as he witnessed it among 
the Jewish upper middle class, which was "one of the most self-indulgent and self-admiring 
groups it is possible to imagine."9 He mentioned Ludwig Lewisohn as a case in point. He also 
criticized the Menorah Journal, to which he had himself contributed for some time, for taking 
this approach, and he ended on a note of general revulsion from Jewish culture. 
Although several commentators have wished to lump together Kazin's outlook on Jewishness 
with Trilling's, these two men's evaluations have differed in several respects. Whereas Trilling 
had a low opinion of its cultural vitality, and of the heritage itself, Kazin acknowledged that it 
was a significant force both in his personal experience and in his experience as a writer. He 
discovered that the heritage could still inspire "the texture of a genuine and received Hebrew 
culture" among some of his contemporaries and so nourish a belief in the "spiritual foundations" 
of human life. He held dear "the kind of universal curiosity which springs out of so profound 
a sense of nationality (not nationalism) that it lives on the illumination its sources provides," as 
was the case in "Marc Chagall's bitter fantasy of the Jewish Jesus on the cross..." This is 
certainly no "minimal" position on Jewishness. Yet, Kazin, too, had "never seen much of what 
I admire in American Jewish culture, or among Jewish writers in America generally." He agreed 
with Trilling that the Jew's eager "adjustment" to his own heritage copied the self-conscious 
smugness of American middle-class life generally: "It is about time we stopped confusing the 
experience of being an immigrant, or an immigrant's son, with the experience of being Jewish. 
When I read a novel by an American Jew that is at least as grounded in the life it rejects as 
Farrell's Studs Lonigan or Dreiser's Sister Carrie, I shall believe in the empirical fact of our 
participation." Kazin's contribution expressed the dual view of his Jewishness whose creative 
potential he was to explore in Walker. Kazin wished to preserve his duality of outlook, for he 
believed this polarity of sensibility provided the very basis of his experience. In this respect, he 
differed from Trilling, who believed a secular programme could bring about the emancipation 
of the Jewish intellectual class: 
I learned long ago to accept the fact that I was Jewish without being part of any meaningful 
Jewish life or culture. I have tried to be dignified in my knowledge of it and even to hope that I 
could be appreciative. But I learned what was more important for me in my apprenticeship as a 
writer — to follow what I really believed in, not that which would merely move through associ-
ations of naive community feelings. The writing I have been most deeply influenced by — Blake, 
Melville, Emerson, the seventeenth-century English religious poets, and the Russian novelists — 
has no direct associations in my mind with Jewish culture; it has every association, of course, with 
the fact that, like many another American, I have had to make my own culture.10 
Trilling's secularism put a different emphasis. To Kazin, Trilling's response to Walker was 
revealing as it was summary: "Trilling said you shouldn't write about such things." Trilling's 
detachment, however, was to cause him some intellectual anxiety when Ezra Pound was 
awarded the Bollingen Prize for poetry in 1949. Pound's virulent anti-Semitism seemed proof 
that Trilling had been altogether too Olympian about the irrelevance of Jewishness to literary 
perceptions. To be sure, Pound had shown literary greatness, which he had used to attack Jews. 
When the issue of the literary value of Jewishness came to be discussed in the Commentary 
symposium on "The Jewish Writer and the English Literary Tradition" in 1949, it was his wife 
Diana, and not Trilling himself, who responded. Her contribution skirted the issue, but could not 
conceal the dilemma on which the Trillings were stranded. Alexander Bloom has put it with 
painful clarity: "Confronted with the odious choice of either chastising writers once held in great 
esteem or accepting anti-Semitic elements in their works, [Diana] Trilling attempts to draw 
distinctions which do not exist."11 
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With the claims of modernism and the Jewish historical sensibility violently conflicting, the 
choice seemed stark and dramatic. It was also schismatic, for partisans of either cause no longer 
even found their shared Jewish origins a proper forum for an investigation of values. The 
modernist sensibility was inimical to the Jewish cultural identity. Many Jewish intellectuals who 
had found their vocation in the defence of a radical culture and politics during the Thirties now 
found it excruciatingly hard to give up their radicalism and henceforth to base their perceptions 
on acts of ethnic affirmation which their universalism had proscribed. While they cast about for 
a formulation that would leave them their attachment to their cosmopolitan radicalism, they 
could not but acknowledge that a critical symbiosis between Jewish culture and modernism was 
hard to achieve. Forced to choose sides, not a few of them suppressed the first stirrings of an 
ethnocentric revaluation on their part for the benefit of keeping open the avenues to modernist 
High Culture. Those who disagreed dismissed this as a psychological liability and spoke of 
"Jewish self-hatred." Yet others spoke more emphatically in favour of Jewish ethnic affirmation 
and so became embroiled with fellow Jews for whom the political translation of their intellectual 
universalism in the Thirties had been decidedly left-of-centre. In the course of the Fifties, it 
would turn out that the former had discarded their leftist ideology together with their cultural 
radicalism, increasingly manifesting themselves as assimilationists operating on the political right 
wing. This was a profitable stance to take for young, ambitious intellectuals motivated by 
memories of penury and deprivation. At a time when Senator McCarthy was promoting 
"America" as ideology, they were among the first to jump on the political bandwagon.12 
It is clear that the working hypothesis of the 1949 symposium on "The Jewish Writer and the 
English Literary Tradition" was much less compromising for Kazin than it was for someone like 
Trilling. He had no stake in modernism, or at least was not planning to make it the corner-stone 
of his cultural outlook or critical pedagogy. When his response was solicited, he had some three 
to four years of arduous work on Walker behind him, finally bringing him to his central insight 
that alienation — "the moral estate of man in the [modem] city" — must yield to "the call to 
integration..." Unlike most Jewish intellectuals, Kazin did not feel compelled to read an either/or 
proposition in the leading question. He rather set out to grapple with the kind of fascination 
which the modernists had held for many Jewish intellectuals, often despite their evident anti-
Semitism. His opening remark is a magnificent gambit, if perhaps not altogether original: 
"When God made the Jews, he ordained them to be bearers of witness to the human condition." 
A wholly literary idea, it is rich in its perceptions about the Jews' role as a spiritual vanguard 
in modern culture as well as about the tragic history of modern consciousness. The majority 
culture itself was under attack from all quarters. Kazin, then, perceives only a paradoxical 
opposition between the most strident mind among modernist writers and the Jew. The difference 
is that the latter, by virtue of history and experience, has internalized, vicariously as it were, the 
moral loathing at the terrible truth about the integral human condition which the former, on 
account of his isolated position in the artistic vanguard, vents in neurotic outbursts of revulsion 
and moral aggression. The Jewish intellectual in particular feels a certain kinship between 
himself and the anti-Semitic modernist writer because he, too, faces a daunting problem, which 
is the world in its fiercely inassimilable detail. In the modern world, intimacy with the burden 
of Jewish history thus acquires a prophetic quality. This enhances the moral stature of the Jews, 
because they possess by birth and tradition what non-Jews could not possibly hope to acquire: 
This makes it very difficult for us, for their art is our morality. And except for this small matter, 
that they are always stupid about us, and insult us, and that some, like Pound and Céline, have 
even called for our deaths, we cannot let them go, nor can they let us go, for they imitate us, they 
are obviously fascinated by us... And think how, in our tum, we are fascinated with their resem-
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blance to us. How else explain the great community our intellectuals feel with the most divided 
among them? After all, it is not to the "naive," the "simple" believers and humanists that we go, 
not to the truly Christian, like Bernanos and Mauriac. But precisely to the nasty ones, the clever 
modem ones — a Dostoevsky, a Henry Adams, an André Gide, a Santayana, a Cummings, a 
Céline, an Eliot, a Pound. How we love them, though they love us not! How we squirm and strain 
to get into Eliot's City of God — that state religion of forced faith, less hope, and no charity — 
though he has barred us from it in advance! Yet the community is there; they feel it and we feel 
it. 
For Jews to recognize their plight in the works of these modernists was paradoxically to find a 
semblance of authenticity, because the recognition identified them both as exiles from a world 
which they aspired to enter. Kazin admits, however, that it "grows dull to live only with Jews," 
and that Jews, for reasons of their "intellectual diet," had best not ignore the modernists. Much 
in the vein of Walker, Kazin concludes that there must be some form of communication between 
'them' and 'us.'13 
The Jew and the modernist writer were thrown together through a coincidence of political 
history and cultural psychology. For one thing, the Jew's experience of life in the Diaspora and 
his long record as a political and cultural pariah had given him an insight into the ambiguous 
motivations of the modem personality. Both as victim and moral witness, he had learned to 
accept the ironies of the modern condition as the central luminous fact of his own existence.'4 
Moreover, his intellectual sensibility fed on a sense of isolation from and lack of participation 
in a sustaining community which the modernist writer, too, suffered from. The war proved a 
watershed in the Jew's cultural role. For upon the collapse of radical ideology, modern society 
required a different framework of analysis. Faith in radical reform siphoned off into an existen-
tialist concern with the ironic manifestations of the modem personality. This might take the 
form of a religious inquiry, a quest for some inclusive description of the human estate. Central 
to that inquiry was the attempt to establish the causes of the destructive exclusionist temper of 
modem society. A correlative issue was guilt over former support for the moral optimism at the 
heart of the liberal world view. In expiation of this, many flocked to philosophies proclaiming 
the ineradicable evil of the human heart. Else why had entire ethnic and intellectual groups been 
marginalized, both under Fascism and totalitarian Communism, and eventually pushed over the 
brink? Were the margins of political tolerance really so narrow that all evidence of a distinctly 
ethnic culture had to be destroyed? On the very strength of his own experience and identity, the 
Jew was in the best position to suggest answers to these questions. Where his ethnic awareness 
had formerly been an object of opprobrium and a social handicap, Jewishness now became 
culturally prominent, if not, among certain groups, a faintly honorific tag. Many Jewish intellec-
tuals undertook the sad task of explaining their newly gained cultural status. Few gloried in this, 
because it implied making sense of the inexplicable horror of the Destruction. The controversy 
ensuing over this issue would cause the first signs of break-up within the Jewish intellectual 
community, which, after all, felt itself to be a community largely because the Holocaust had 
apparently conferred a collective political fate upon them. 
For Partisan Review intellectuals, too, "Jewishness" became prominent as the latest tag in the 
analysis of modem cultural developments. This is not to say that they were defectors from their 
former stance on cultural radicalism, for the tragic complexity of modem Jewish consciousness 
equalled that of the modem writer. Both, as Alexander Bloom puts it, were specialists in 
alienation. So it was hardly a coincidence that the anti-Semitic strain in the English literary 
tradition provoked ambivalence in certain Jewish intellectuals, for they found themselves thrown 
together with a certain type of mind whose raison d'être it was to deny and hate everything that 
was distinct about their cultural identity. Others transformed the dilemma of their Jewishness 
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with great assurance into an intellectual asset. Particularly Delmore Schwartz was quick to claim 
a special role on account of his Jewishness, basing this on the inflections of its moral 
percipience: "I understood my own personal squint at experience; and the fact of being a Jew 
became available to me as a central symbol of alienation, bias, point of view, and certain other 
characteristics which are the peculiar masks of modem life, and as I think now, the essential 
ones." Schwartz's case was tragic. To Kazin, he personified the plight of rationalism and 
classical reasoning in a world being wrecked by political catastrophes: 
Delmore was... a prophecy of the last literary generation to believe in the power of culture, the 
logic of tradition. There was this belief, which not even Hitler would destroy in some of us, that 
there was a reason behind the frightfulness. Of course, every political season the reason changed. 
Once it was "imperialism." When the killing began, it was "human nature," or the devil in us. 
Delmore was already the poet on the cross of culture." 
Schwartz had burst upon the literary scene with his story "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities," 
a skilful and ingenuous reconstruction of the writer's own unhappy destiny unfolding. In 
picturing his parents' emotional shiftlessness within the historical framework of a flashback, he 
had emphasized his own powerlessness to resist the degradations inherited by birth, the ines-
capable squalor of Jewish history. By inference, all of the Jews' cultural pathos was contained 
in that situation. "It was the greatest fable I was ever to read of 'our' experience," Kazin admits, 
hinting at some emotional slickness involved. Schwartz would repeat the drama of a rare 
intellectual sensibility betrayed by the stultifying formalism of tradition and environment in 
subsequent "personal epics," giving his heroes grotesque names such as Shenandoah Fish in 
order to press home the pathos of being called Delmore. But Kazin thinks Schwartz was wrong 
to assume that his anguished belief in the power of reason and tradition could lend coherence 
to his own tattered perspective on the world. With the Holocaust getting under way, Schwartz 
was getting out on a limb. For with the advent of the totalitarian state, reason and intelligence 
had become more deeply alienated from their traditional roots in culture than Schwartz believed 
possible: "He practised 'irony' as if this famous literary strategy of the time was a Jew's only 
defence. Of course he could not see the joke. He was the drama." This drama, which was 
initially confined to Schwartz's literary outlook, would eventually cause him to become mentally 
unhinged, prey to ravaging bouts of manic depression and paranoia. He had, in Kazin's view, 
taken his faith in rationality to the point where every departure from it must rouse the suspicion 
of conspiracy and betrayal. Thus, Schwartz's faith in a wholly intellectual interpretation of 
existence caused him to become an exile from the world.16 More indirectly, it led to his 
ignoble death, deeply estranged from even his best friends. 
These included the philosopher and Partisan Review editor William Barrett. He found 
interesting similarities between Schwartz's vibrantly neurotic personality and the cultural 
psychology of the upcoming Jewish intellectual who, towards the end of the Thirties, found in 
Partisan Review a representative forum. "Of the Jews who have been my friend," he writes, " 
I think Delmore had the least grasp of his own Jewishness — he knew neither how far out nor 
how deep in he was committed. And yet, perhaps for this reason, he was the most haunted by 
it..." Alexander Bloom has stressed the idea of schizophrenic Jewishness, claiming that the 
'"idea of Delmore Schwartz'" had greater currency in the New York intellectual community 
than Schwartz did in person. As the most exuberantly self-conscious, and wryly ironic, alienist 
of the group, Schwartz certainly exerted a spell, but Kazin's interest in him focuses on the 
fatefulness of his intellectual posture. For eventually "Delmore Schwartz, like all other people 
in an age of unbelief, had nothing to trust but literature." He looked exclusively to literature to 
secure the kind of moral and intellectual authority which was rapidly becoming extinct during 
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the postwar retreat from secular optimism. Kazin makes much of Schwartz's failure to find an 
answer to the political and cultural pressures of postwar society, which ended in his self-
destructive paranoia. Still, he extracts a moral lesson from Schwartz's tragic fate at the cross-
roads of life and literature: 
Our great men. Jewish heroes — always, for Delmore, heroes of thought. Joyce... [a king]. Every 
gifted "king" is an indefinable new event. The "kings" to Delmore's mythology, + Delmore the 
agonist as my mythology. The Jewish masses. The dust of the earth, + their kings.17 
What the idea of the agonist means to Kazin was perhaps best illustrated in his review of 
Max Brod's biography of Kafka. There he agreed with Brod that what is "central to Kafka is... 
his ability to accept his torment as a guide to the human condition." He intended to counter "the 
general disposition to make Kafka the last word in the cabala of advanced art and theology" at 
a time when Kafka's fame as a cultural hero was beginning to spread fast beyond the Partisan 
Review circle, who had been the first in the United States to claim him as such. They found in 
the abrasive ironies of Schwartz's personal background and career many parallels with the 
isolation of Kafka's artistic and intellectual life. But the main connection between them was of 
course that both were Jews and archetypal modern artists. Kazin's analysis — and dismissal — 
of "the Kafka problem," then, exposed the tendency among contemporary Jewish intellectuals 
to wallow in "metaphysical anguish" and existential fear. He admonished his contemporaries not 
to base their understanding of Kafka on a selective exegesis of his symbols, but instead to 
develop an "ability to accept and to share his sensibility; to take him for what he is, a writer 
who saw the world from below, and meant what he wrote to be the bottommost vision of 
reality." In their modern spiritual perplexity, they had tended to absolutize the significance of 
Kafka's art and render it into an inclusive symbol of their own moral shiftlessness. Pascal, so 
Kazin reminded them, had also experienced this stage of existential doubt, but he had found no 
solution beyond it except in the to him ineluctable moral fact that only by acknowledging the 
existence of God does man have access to grace and redemption. To Kazin, however, Kafka is 
the greater secular hero, the quintessential agonist: 
Kafka bears it; he insists on it; there is a goal but no way; there is a problem but no resolution... 
[He captures] the haunted quality of existence — haunted by man's own mystery unto himself. To 
face him openly is to see that he is talking directly about that inner portion of consciousness 
which is unbreakingly the judge of life. That portion is not simply the stream of consciousness, 
where we silently quarrel with the things we must outwardly accept, and it is not simply the realm 
of anxiety or sickness. It is that sense of ourselves on earth whose captive wing we occasionally 
get in poetry. It is in another realm that equidistance between nature and immensity... leads us not 
only to create gods but to believe in them. What is intolerable in Kafka is that he throws no 
comforting bridges of doctrine across for us. What is beautiful in him is that he takes us gravely, 
and with the most meticulous seriousness, into a world which is exactly, in all its proportions, true 
to our inner experience.... he presents as a fact, as a simple adventure, man's search for his own 
meaning. 
His willingness to undertake that search is of the utmost moral importance. By no means does 
Kafka offer confirmation of the ritual value of alienation, displacement, and neurosis. Kazin 
believes his diagnosis of the modern condition was simpler, and need not lead to the modish 
anxiety and neuroticism cultivated by devotees of the "idea of Delmore Schwartz." He regards 
Kafka as a prophet of the universal modem condition. The atrocious world of his fiction is no 
less than a luminous metaphor of all the wily tyrannies and the wilful alienations we inflict on 
ourselves daily. Kaflca involves us in the world, he reads our character in it. His greatness lies 
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exactly in his "ability to dissolve the world in his symbols without losing it." Kafka bears the 
mark of a primary imagination, that is to say "the gift of surrender; the creator yields to his 
inference about the world and recasts it in the light of his own symbol."18 
Schwartz's reliance on the virtue and reason of poetry did not stand him in good stead when 
it came to sharpening a dependable morality on the grit of experience. In his commemorative 
article about Schwartz, Kazin stresses his intellectual control, the "classical good sense and 
traditional logic." To be sure, these were distinct assets for someone of his generation, which 
gloried in its newly gained prominence in the great secular debates of the Thirties and Forties. 
Marx and Freud were Schwartz's luminaries, as were "the great creative figures of modem 
literature and art." But with the post-Marxian and post-Freudian world losing its clear intellec-
tual design, Schwartz found himself stranded in it: "Lost he was, but he was not enough 'lost' 
in the demonic poet's tradition of losing himself to this world and finding himself in a richer 
world of private vision. He was an example of the anxiety that can afflict the individual who 
respects too much the rationality of the world." Schwartz was not a visionary in the sense that 
Yeats was, or Blake, or Hölderlin. Reading him, Kazin could not avoid the impression that "his 
unhappiness and his rational culture were all of a piece." And in his grudging admiration for 
Schwartz's "The World Is a Wedding," he applied one of his favourite critical yardsticks: 
This is the naturalism of the poet who wanted, as he said, to show the miraculous character of 
daily existence. Living as he did between the abyss of self and the mountain heights on which 
dwelt Joyce and Eliot, Delmore had to believe in the miraculous nature of daily existence — 
nothing but a miracle could save him. The world is a wedding says the Jewish proverb. It is not 
a wedding just now? It is one more than you know, it goes on in secret places." 
The "abyss of self' was a heritage which Schwartz, on account of his high-minded taste for 
advanced literature, found it difficult to cope with. The self-mocking and self-mythologizing 
personae in the work of Eliot and Joyce wish to achieve immunity from compromising 
entanglements with the historical world it was not given Schwartz to enjoy. Consecutive shifts 
in the political life put his faith in the reason of things to the test, and his invocation at the end 
of "Socrates' Ghost Must Haunt Me Now" — "Old Noumenon, come true, come true!" — fully 
reveals his despair. The terror unleashed by the totalitarian state and the horrific evidence of the 
Jews' central role in it gave the death-blow to the traditional faith in rational enquiry. Kazin 
clearly believes that Schwartz illustrated the divorce of the Jew's inherited rational culture from 
the most conspicuous developments in Western societies such as mass subjection through 
totalitarian control and the political implementation of racist ideologies on a scientific basis. 
Kazin himself would admit that he could grasp the significance of the Holocaust only as a 
political fact, and that the most substantial conclusion to be drawn was that "there was some 
unconscious drive in politics which, in my more naive [socialist] youth I hadn't grasped."20 
Schwartz, however, persisted in his effort to systematize the world by poetic means. He did not 
conform to his generation's rites of passage, as Kazin had after the publication of On Native 
Grounds. The "unconscious drive" in modern society really stumped him. 
Artistically, Schwartz laid himself open to another charge: "The great limitation of 
Schwartz's poetry [in 'Genesis'] as of so much contemporary poetry founded on the ordeal of 
the individual, is the actual poverty of experience, the lack of an actual heaven or hell for the 
poet to visit." The world turned incomprehensible to Schwartz "because the effort of his 
intellectual will, of his superb intellectual culture, was not always enough to sustain him." For 
Kazin, now, it is precisely the indissolubility of self, history and society which generates the 
friction it takes to dramatize in forms of art our consciousness about our existence. The modem 
self must account for its difficult relation to history and the world; only so can it achieve a truer 
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because more tempered sense of itself. The world is the "heaven or hell" we must visit in order 
to convince ourselves that we have not constructed the universe in our own image, but that its 
nature is revealed to us through struggle. Becoming wedded to the world may be fraught with 
anxiety and pain, but it rescues the self from a wholly literary, stylized existence in the pining 
egotism and the plaintive despair which afflict so many of its models in modernist writing. For 
them, as Eliot argued in his plea for an impersonal art, the pursuit of self was distinctly a 
liability in a madly shifting world threatening it with instant destruction. Only the tradition 
could give the modem writer shelter and provide him with a sense of security and an image of 
centrality. Kazin, however, holds that the writer must assume responsibility for articulating new 
values from his own experience. Eventually, the sense of self will supplant the sanction of 
tradition as a moral tool. The willingness to accept the necessity of moral struggle, of capturing 
the refractory reality of the world in the pathos of experience, may reconciliate him with the 
"abyss of self' and shun purely poetic projections of existence which disintegrate under the 
impact of experience. Kazin believes it was the agonistic quality of Schwartz's work, the 
unflagging straggle to keep open the sources of moral regeneration, which constitutes his 
relevance today. That is why he claims "Delmore the agonist as my mythology."21 
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The Inmost Leaf 
Focus on the Central Self 
The vision of the embattled, private self pitted against the world and struggling to extract moral 
enlightenment is a major concern in Kazin's critical work after On Native Grounds. His 
contributions to "Under Forty" and "The Jewish Writer and the English Literary Tradition" 
made clear that he rather associated Jewishness with the self-driven, culturally hyphenated but 
ambitious outsider than with "naive community feelings." He felt attracted to Blake, Melville, 
Emerson, the seventeenth-century English poets, and the Russian novelists, because like "many 
another American, I have had to make my own culture." In "The Jewish Writer and the English 
Literary Tradition," he made an even stronger claim for the Jews' difficult relation to modem 
society, suggesting that the tragedy of Jewish history had ordained them to be prophets of the 
modem condition and that therefore they formed an object of envthe y for the "most divided" 
and gifted among the non-Jews. The Gentile intellectual believed that the Jew posed a threat to 
modem culture. He even blamed his own neurotic discontent with mass culture on the Jew. 
Even so, Kazin believed "our intellectuals" did not go for religious solutions to their problems 
but paradoxically relished sharing their exile on the fringes of the cultural mainstream with the 
snarling goy exiles from modernity. There was a sense of "community" and of sharing their 
alienation and understanding it. The Jew at the centre of the historical drama, "whether as 
apostle or as victim," and the anti-Semitic modem writer were thrown into each other's comp-
any.22 That position had already been claimed by the modernist writer who, for altogether 
different reasons, had suffered the trauma of expulsion: he was an outcast from a society 
devastated by moral paroxysms and uncertain about its public aims. In some cases, he was an 
exile by choice — witness Eliot and Pound — or had abdicated by choice, like Henry Adams. 
And in this he differed from the Jew, whose composite cultural identity focused the destructive 
intolerance of the modem political temper. That intolerance was bred of intellectual despair and, 
as Kazin would stress again and again, it was as conspicuous in the ideology of the totalitarian 
state as it was in Eliot's conception of tradition. 
In 1962, Kazin pointed out how crucial an influence Walker's narrative persona had proved 
to be on his mind and style as a working critic. Working on Starting Out, he would convince 
himself that it had to be "rooted in time," much as the success of Contemporaries, too, derived 
from "the time sense it is based on and the time sense it is about. Only the Leaf was a melange 
without historic point." These observations position The Inmost Leaf vis-à-vis the history of 
Kazin's critical values on the one hand and the major currents in the intellectual life in the 
Fifties on the other. That relationship comes out best in Kazin's charge that the contemporary 
intellectual life lacked the gift of conviction. Historical faith in particular was at a discount: 
"History stinks. Only the Communist now believes in history. As only the Catholics believe in 
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'religion.' The independent-minded are left with the ashes. The 'liberals' are left only with their 
liberalism." 23 
In Contemporaries and Starting Out, Kazin undertakes to regauge the contemporary historical 
sensibility. Both books aim to redress the damage which "History" had sustained as a moral-
intellectual proposition. Leaf is a collection of essays, some of which reflect the developments 
sketched above, while others comment on them. Its title celebrates Herman Melville's genius 
when he used these words to explain to Nathaniel Hawthorne the exhilarating yet frightening 
flow of inspiration which carried Moby-Dick to its conclusion. Melville had for some time been 
prey to a harrowing sense of man's inadequacy in the universe, to religious if not intellectual 
despair. Hawthorne's praise of Moby-Dick, however, reassured Melville and filled him with 
gratitude: "I feel that the Godhead is broken up like the bread at the Supper, and that we are the 
pieces. Hence this infinite fraternity of feeling." Melville felt that Hawthorne might be able to 
guide him in coping with the terrible necessity of facing a frightful imaginative truth. But 
Hawthorne could not, or at any rate did not. Melville received no further stimulation or illumi-
nation from him, and he was left to handle the shock of his imaginative discoveries all by 
himself. In an earlier, still hopeful letter to Hawthorne, Melville had already hinted at the 
overwhelming dilemma he expected to encounter: 
My development has all been within a few years past... Until I was twenty-five, I had no devel-
opment at all. From my twenty-fifth year I date my life. Three weeks have scarcely passed, at any 
time between then and now, that 1 have not unfolded within myself. But I feel that I have now 
come to the inmost leaf of the bulb, and that shortly the flower must fall to the mold. 
Hawthorne's failure to cultivate the "infinite fraternity of feeling" on Melville's part during his 
moments of crisis suggests the increasing isolation of the creative genius in nineteenth-century 
America. The growth towards consciousness of Walker's protagonist, and his ensuing identifi-
cation with the great aliens in nineteenth-century American literature, had expressed Kazin's 
belief that their isolated genius furnished the material for an affirmative and transcendent vision. 
The Inmost Leaf continues that affirmative stance. Kazin aims to be that empathizing critic that 
Hawthorne failed to be.24 He elucidates and salvages the innermost creative vision of writers, 
both foreign and native, whose work he believes in some way provided useful commentary on 
the postwar literary situation characterized by intellectual despair and spiritual anxiety. For 
Kazin, the 'inmost leaf 
represents the creative element, the continuous revision and recreation of reality... But the horizon 
toward which that creativity yeams, that is the nameless, the to-be-created, and it is precisely this 
that causes anxiety... We identify this genius with a place even in ourselves, and think once we 
have come to that place (perhaps once we can even name it) we have come to the barrier, and that 
is no more. But that is the continuing, perhaps the purely inward story of talent; what we are 
concerned with is that inner gift itself.... As I look over these essays, written over the last twenty 
years, I can see that I have always been driven by the same need to define the individual work of 
talent, "the gift," and it is this individual creative element, this continual discovery of alternatives 
and revisions of "reality," this joyful surprise constantly presented to the world by each newborn 
talent." 
The Jamesian Mind and the Literary Uses of Experience 
A milestone in Leaf is the essay about Henry and William James entitled "Our Passion is Our 
Task." It is a masterful study of two totally different minds operating from a similar, passionate, 
156 
moral concern to create an inhabitable reality. William was the first in America to concern 
himself with human psychology on a scientific basis; his younger brother Henry was an extra-
ordinarily ambitious novelist whose deepest wish was to portray the individual creative mind as 
the prime instrument of man's inward moral freedom. Kazin's essay was published in 1943, and 
though it coincided with other major contributions to the James revival which occurred in the 
Forties, it is essentially different in theme and focus from such seminal interpretations as Philip 
Rahv's "The Cult of Experience in American Writing," which exempted Henry James from 
complicity in "that prolonged crisis of the human spirit" which is modernity and looked to his 
heritage to speed up the international reception of American literature, and the New Critics', 
who regarded the achievement of James's later career as the acme of the structural intelligence 
in literature and as such a superior form of knowledge.26 In a review of The Question of Henry 
James (1945), which was edited by F.W. Dupee and came out during the widespread revaluation 
of native American traditions, Kazin gently dismissed the attempts to determine James's 
Americanness vis-à-vis Whitman's, viz. to assign a relative value to the tropisms of James's 
mind in comparison to what was considered Whitman's full-blooded experience. He also hinted 
at the tremendous creative possibilities at the heart of "the problem of [James and] the American 
writer," namely that no such problem need exist, "except, that is, for him to be himself, and 
thus find a more human and perceptive self to be."27 
The emphasis on the self also marks Kazin's study of the James brothers. Both William and 
Henry constructed a "perceptive self' in order to express their sublime faith in a morally 
structured universe. That was an elusive concept, for Kazin makes much of their mutual inability 
to understand the motives behind their respective investigations into the nature of consciousness: 
"Similar as they were in their studies of human consciousness, in raising to an ideal end the 
operative supremacy of moral serenity of an individual 'center of revelation,' they could only 
smile to each other across the grooves in which each had his temperament" (Z,, 10). Kazin rests 
his case on the radically divided world in which each had to work and find fulfilment. By 
implication, he deals with the elusive hold of literature on the world when compared to the 
psychologist's reverence for the ethical obligation to abide by the data of experience.28 
William's own psychically troubled life did not limit his work to the kind of determinist 
inferences which, as a dedicated positivist, he was likely to make. That is the source of Kazin's 
fascination with him: here was a naturalist, a student of human nature, who refused to believe 
that mechanistic theories of the human mind comprise the whole scope of man's moral experi-
ence. William dismissed the reductive view of man's inward creativity implicit in contemporary 
philosophical scepticism, and celebrated man's power to purge himself of evil and to locate 
within himself the supreme redemptive purpose of Creation. In this respect, he very much shared 
Henry's aim, who also sought to make the complex world of experience cohere in a sacred 
image of the human personality. And though they started out from opposite poles, the fictional 
and the empiric, they were both motivated by their belief that the conviction of such a sacred 
integrity could compel the direction of experience. Henry brought the consistency of art to his 
conception of life — "His mind and life composed a single order of desire," says Kazin — and 
he was finally impatient with everything that did not square with their ambitious view of the 
creative life. He shunned grand, synthetic ideas, and held that no theory or etiology could add 
anything to a supple understanding of the creative consciousness: these merely vulgarized the 
imagination. William was mystified by Henry's deeply literary view of consciousness, by his 
brother's belief in it as a moral agency supplanting traditionally naturalistic interpretations of 
life. His own "pragmatism," however, expressed an equally noble view of man's ability to take 
himself for the central fact of life. To Kazin, it was nothing less than "an ontology as plastic as 
life and true of every last thing in it... [squaring] the 'irreducible facts' with the highest fact of 
his own nature" (L, 12). 
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Kazin believes William James's mind was remarkable for its porousness to its environment 
James's philosophy of pragmatism sponsored a transcendent view of human destiny while 
rejecting any claims to supernatural truth As psychology, it relied on man's exultation in his 
power to initiate a response to whatever situation he finds himself in, as moral philosophy, it 
stressed this aspect as the necessary condition of all human thought In creating a central role 
for the mind in matters of experience, William, too, created a universe in accordance with the 
central human image He gave no quarter to fashionable pessimistic determinism Similarly, he 
circumvented the spiritual anxiety of Henry James Semor's religious mysticism Kazin portrays 
William James working at the crossroads of science and religion, combining a lingering Puritan 
sense of an ulterior purpose to be made manifest through individual grace and the positivist 
belief in the social benefits of experimental philosophy His work is a criticism of those realists 
and naturalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, covered in On Native 
Grounds, whose essentially closed view of reality in America and defective understanding of the 
relation of mind to reality prevented them from seeing "America" as a creative idea William 
James did support the idea of America, in the cumulative, individual forms of expression, and 
accepted this as proof of a collective moral identity "What he was getting at in his pragma-
tism was not only a more eclectic sense of reality, a more honest and imaginative perception 
that all life and thought begin in discrete individuals and are shaped by their differences, but a 
need to show that what was not real experience to an individual had no existence that one could 
name and take account of' (L, 13-4)29 
William favoured an operative morality, a faith in moral free will, over the kind of intrac-
table metaphysics which he examined in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) Varieties 
is the most radical formulation of his ethical philosophy and his claim that the truth of religious 
experience is its pragmatic value William James believed that individual human nature was 
adaptive and purposive, capable of initiating a meliorative response to unsettling external 
influences or psychic disorders of a constitutional nature For this moral will to operate in both 
spheres, he had to assume that the reality of the human cosmos is one and undivided Yet, this 
fit in well with his high regard for the radical moral stature of the individual personality he 
believed that people could anticipate and reinforce particular patterns of experience if they 
would only consciously rely on such experience to validate certain working hypotheses concern-
ing the moral life He even believed that restoring the mind's health may cure somatic disorder, 
and translated his experience of psycho-somatic disease into his understanding of the moral life 
What he called "the will to believe" was in his eyes an indispensable constituent of man's moral 
genius, namely to consider his own power of initiative evidence of hidden moral purpose in the 
world Like any romantic thinker, he bent his conception of the universe to his understanding 
of himself This obviously implies meliorism Later on in his career, when he was setting up the 
philosophy of "pragmatism," he would even argue that truth is a hypothesis which can be 
changed in order to make it work better 
This, to Kazin, marks the unfortunate side of William's speculative mind For his conception 
of the role of ideas was that the mind initiated them for them to become meaningful as a 
coherent force around which experience might organize itself Thus, thinking was a purposive 
act, the expression of moral will Ideas took on a certain moral luminousness and were hence 
an instrument of redemption To win over the doubters, William stressed his point by referring 
to this particular aspect of the mental and moral life as the "cash value" of an idea In the wider 
context of American culture, this unfortunate term solidified the cash nexus in the popular mind 
With a variation on Trilling's attack on the moral foibles of the liberal mind in America, he 
claims that William James, "like so many American naturalistic thinkers took a certain 
necessary definition of the good life for granted whereas it is the unrelenting consciousness of 
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it that is most lacking" (L, 15). Presumably, James had too exalted a view of the instrumental, 
mediatory value of ideas and had neglected the aims to be realized through them. 
This matches On Native Grounds' concern with the histoire morale of American literature 
from 1880 till 1940; the James study adds a measure of self-knowledge to the pressing question 
of America's cultural identity. Strikingly, Kazin describes Henry James's inexhaustible ambition 
for the novel, too, as "histoire morale": "The novel for him was to be histoire morale, a branch 
of history that sought the close textures and hidden lights of painting, but the highest morality 
was not so much in the story as it was in the exercise of the creative principle behind it" (L, 15-
6). Kazin's narrative interest in Leaf is to present that creative principle in operation, to show 
it as not isolated in any single work of art but to catch its ramifications in the life of its creator 
as it broaches elementary questions of selfhood. He holds it up as the unifying factor behind 
Henry's and William's essentially disparate interpretations of the role of the human mind 
dealing with the phenomenological welter of experience, because he believes that both were 
motivated by a comparable ethical concern for the autonomous self. They possessed an inde-
structible faith in its power — not just pure mind — to penetrate the circumambient, plastic 
reality and to mould it in its own image: "Just as William's vision always came back to a loose 
sea of empiricism in which man could hold on only to himself, so Henry's was to define and 
to fill out the moral history of composition. His theory of art was not preparatory to a manipula-
tion of experience, it was experience" (L, 16). In Kazin's view, Henry's extraordinary need for 
critical reflection on the novelist's work — he wrote prefaces to his novels which examined 
every last modulation of their creative intention and effect — testified to his ulterior conviction, 
expressed in the introduction to The Ambassadors, that "the whole of anything is never told; one 
can only take what groups together." This defined the limits to the novelist's putative role as a 
moral arbiter, while holding him fully accountable for the vision emerging from the act of 
composition. To Henry, this expressed the highest service towards a comprehensive conscious-
ness of life considered. Any aspect of experience was to be discounted except as it entered into 
a mutually illuminating relationship with other aspects. Life was to be vindicated only in the 
created pattern of the work. The great victory of the novelistic central intelligence was to reveal 
evidence of coherence at the heart of an ostensibly contingent universe. This, Kazin believes, 
was a feat of moral genius. 
A clear sense of occasion informs the essay. The kind of creative intelligence Kazin portrays in 
the philosopher and the novelist, and in their father, targets the moral-intellectual life of his own 
day. He remarks that, given the considerable financial and cultural background of the James 
family, "the only revolution either could envision was in new ways of knowing..." They had a 
strong belief in "the full and final efficacy of the 'self' — which Kazin in 1962 claimed he 
doubted — and rather assumed that the problems cluttering human existence inevitably recede 
before the imperative of consciousness.30 Kazin believes they looked on life with a supreme 
innocence that minimized the resistant quality of the contingent world. That, he argues, provides 
insufficient guidance for the postwar era. The individual must struggle to find confirmation of 
his own moral anguish. That the Jameses's "revolution" turned inward testified to 
the Emersonian faith of their culture, in all its genteelism and instinctive trust in individuality.... 
The highest aim... was to be an author. But there is no very great sense of tragedy in either of 
them (compare them with the Adamses), no sense ofthat world process which is something more 
than William's metaphysical novelty and pluralism; the great depths of life are not in them. (L, 
18) 
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Kazin is concerned with the possible uses of the Jamesian intelligence in "the age of liberal 
guilt," when proliferating totalitarian systems and the concomitant ideological "realism" of ex-
liberals have undermined the Jameses's placid notions of the selfs spiritual autarky. The grand 
idea of History was being eclipsed by the ironic sensibility featuring in much modernist 
literature, whose protagonists usually nourished an extreme sense of historical impasse and 
exhibited a tendency towards apocalyptic interpretations of man's plight, questioning "both 
teleological ends and secular progress." This describes the particular outlook of modernism 
during the later stages of its development, when it absolutized its retreat from the world through 
prodigious acts of subjectivity and illustrated its mental exhaustion through a procrustean ordeal 
of self-reflexiveness. Henry James falls outside these categories. He rather illustrates the origins 
of the modernist sensibility in Romanticism, altogether the product of a historically innocent 
age.31 
The New Critics attached specific importance to Henry James's work. Allen Tate, for one, 
attacked the liberal faith in what he called the "myth of reason," denying any ground to the 
assumption that rational intelligence, or positivism as a method of enquiry, may produce viable 
insights into the historical condition of modem civilization. Tate believed that positivism, "the 
temper of our age," had pandered to the regrettable influence of the social sciences on "our 
politics and our education," holding up "a pseudo-mystical and pseudo-democratic utopia on the 
Wellsian plan." "Methods" of inquiry had supplanted that exquisitely "formed," humane 
intelligence which alone could "maintain and demonstrate the special, unique, and complete 
knowledge which the great forms of literature afford us." Both "knowledge," which Tate c.s. 
considered in its purely phenomenological derivation, and human uniqueness were presumably 
given consummate articulation in the operation of Henry James's consciousness.32 
Arguably, Kazin's juxtaposition of Henry and William serves a polemical purpose, for 
William's naturalistic psychology, too, respected the inviolable integrity of an individual 
experience. And yet the melioristic ontology underlying his moral empiricism was at right 
angles with the New Critics' predominant interest in the phenomenology of unique experience, 
the most articulate instances of which they saw in literature. Kazin makes his point by showing 
the different orders of the creative intelligence in William and Henry, which he then traces to 
the same origin, that is to say their father's flinty distrust of the metaphysical deficiency of 
human nature vis-à-vis its "projected union with God" (Z,, 13). Gay Wilson Allen has pointed 
out that William parted with his father over the question of selfhood. The father subsumed 
man's individuality in the selfhood of God, whereas William asserted his selfhood in order to 
survive. William's empiricist philosophy strengthened his idea that man was a sovereign being. 
The idea of selfhood, of an integral system of discrete individual experiences asserting universal 
moral law, suggested itself with increasing force as evidence accumulated that the harmonious 
cosmos of human experience plotted a redemptive course all by itself and that this freed man 
from bondage to the theological concept of "grace." William could not bear his father's accep-
tance of man's ethically indeterminate state. On the contrary, he abhorred overtures to 
antinomian saintliness: 
In philosophical-psychological terms, the conflict was between uncompromising spiritualism and 
a naturalism such as William found in Goethe's writings. In a real sense, William felt himself 
compelled to choose between his father's theism and Goethe's pantheism, and Goethe was to him 
more congenial and more healthy-minded. Reading Goethe worked no immediate cure, but Goethe 
did help him to accept evil as an inscrutable fact in nature, not as something ordained by God (as 
Henry Sr. believed), and therefore capable of being defined and dealt with by practical energy.33 
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As the concept of selfhood took on a more luminous reality, William, the naturalist and 
empiricist, confronted the ultimate question facing positivists of a similarly speculative cast of 
mind: was it possible to penetrate the limits of the realm of necessity and determinism, and to 
picture human nature as a morally free agent?34 Paradoxically, the naturalist and the moral 
philosopher joined hands in the attempt to overcome rational disbelief and to bring the "moral 
law" more directly in accordance with the discrete elements of individual experience. Experience 
was to illustrate the moral law, to become the "stuff for it. Yet, as I have indicated, this did not 
blind William to the problematic side of his philosophy. Indeed, his self-conscious posture vis-à-
vis what he considered his father's non-optimistic view of human nature sensitized him to the 
undeniable reality of evil in the moral life, and certain events in his personal life convinced him 
that "tragedy is at the heart of us..." He proceeded cautiously, feeling chastened: "My first act 
of free will shall be to believe in free will." Unlike his father, he did not think that some form 
of transcendence toward the purely good would furnish an adequate description of man's moral 
condition: "Not the absence of vice, but vice there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems 
the ideal human state."35 
There is an unfortunate emphasis in Kazin's assertion that William James lacked "the unrelent-
ing consciousness" of the good life. I have indicated that James's philosophy of the moral life 
aimed to refute the religious doctrine of grace and its emphasis on human limitations. Kazin 
may have found the staid Emersonian self-trust in Henry and William a liability in an age when 
the self was under constant attack from the moral theologians whose traumatic weaning from 
political radicalism had given them every incentive to raise the duplicity of the human heart to 
the level of doctrine. In William's case, however, this was a tempered Emersonianism express-
ing a maturer view of selfhood than Kazin seems willing to admit. William certainly did not — 
nor even did his father — take the ideal conception of the good life for granted. In any event, 
it would appear that Kazin's very attitude to Emerson at the time was in a transitional stage 
between summary rejection in On Native Grounds and the inspired revaluation of Emerson: A 
Modern Anthology sixteen years later. The anthology, a project in which his friend Daniel Aaron 
cooperated, throws certain preoccupations in Kazin's literary thinking in the Fifties into relief. 
The point is that Kazin considers Emerson a superlative instance ofthat creative intelligence that 
enabled William James to rebel against the idea of determinism, replacing the block universe by 
a pluralist world of indeterminate actualities "floating] in a wider sea of possibilities from out 
of which they are chosen..." Kazin insists that, most of all, Emerson's radiant faith in the 
central, autonomous self had contemporary relevance. In an age when science is eroding so 
many myths and painting a bleak picture of man's ambition to be the master of his own fate, 
Emerson shows "the overwhelming personal importance of a point of view about the world." 
Kazin believes this personal point of view to be "an essential attitude" still valid, because it is 
based on "a picture of man's lot... justifying] his instinctive striving, his ineradicable hope for 
himself in the universe." Such an inspired view of man's "necessity and importance in the 
universe," Kazin claims, is the key to "all genuine religious thinking," because it insists on 
man's fundamental "ability to sustain a wholly individual relation to the divine..." Most importa-
ntly, Emerson had the literary gift of believing his own individuality to be the central fact in it. 
He produced the most intensely literary testimony of the coherence and the consistency of the 
individual, inner experience: "William James in a positivist climate had great trouble finding 
objective reasons for his religious promptings. He was to conclude in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902) that such promptings must not be denied as evidence of God's existence. 
From despising Emerson's attitude of fixed benevolence, James came to admire him, and to 
envy him."36 
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William James came to regard Emerson's luminous conception of an inward divinity as 
genius. A similar working hypothesis about the autonomous self enabled him to liberate himself 
from both the dreary naturalism of the determinist philosophers and his father's view that man 
is dependent on divine grace. What he found fascinating about Emerson is what Kazin stresses 
as Emerson's image of man's essentially transcendent, inwardly creative identity: 
The truth is that Emerson is one of the supreme examples of a kind of literary genius which is 
nearer the actual life of the mind, nearer to what really goes on inside of us all day long, as 
thinking, than to what is forcibly created, by an act of will, in dramas or novels.... And while this 
thinking is not as obvious as the doing that we observe in the novel, the thinking is, in the actual 
process of life, what we are nearest to... In an age which has turned away from external realism 
in all the arts, which recognizes the prime importance to human affairs of symbol and myth, of the 
unconscious residue in us of forces which speak to us through the mind and nowhere else, 
Emerson's conception of man as constantly knowing, seeking, perceptive, inward-dwelling, is 
particularly recognizable and illuminating. He believes that life is thought, that man is a reflective, 
noticing, seizing creature...37 
Emerson sponsored a radically poetic view of life, particularly through his gift for capturing the 
revelatory power of intensely realized moments of personal experience. The Emersonian poetic 
self absorbed and digested experience and infused it with the morally exhilarating quality of 
ideas that have to be lived. This made Emerson a model for William James's moral empiricism. 
Both Emerson and William James may have had a deeper stake in the world of experience 
than Kazin suggests. We can see, however, why he should have felt tempted to put down 
William's achievement as "metaphysical novelty," and to impute to both William and Henry a 
lack of tragic sense of the "world process." For one thing, he is working toward a new inter-
pretation of selfhood in an age when the totalitarian state perpetrated every possible enormity 
upon the self and made an oddity of the Emersonian gospel. With the incipient turn away from 
"external realism" in the arts and the increasing appreciation of myth and symbol as instruments 
of understanding, Kazin is concerned to stress the empirical component of experience. Walker 
anticipated this concern. 
Also the writer-critic of The Inmost Leaf recognizes that any valid projection of self must 
account for its embattled state amidst the contingency of naturalistic fact, that is to say, its 
position in "this" world. Yet, unlike Walker's writer-protagonist, he shuns the religious passion 
for harmonizing the contradictions of existence. To be sure, in The Inmost Leaf he is an inspired 
defender of selfhood, but he is even more concerned about the integrity of experience versus 
specious metaphysics. His effort should be seen against the background of the history of liberal 
ideas in modem America, more particularly the reorientation on religion among former radical 
intellectuals in the postwar era. I have already sketched the relation between this particular 
change in the intellectual life and the cultural authority of the ironic personality featuring in 
modernist literature. Kazin's approach here — and how appropriate it is that he should make his 
point in regard to Henry James's work — is a radical departure from, as well as a criticism of, 
this trend. His diary entry for 31 July 1955 makes clear that The Inmost Leaf is a study of the 
creative imagination dealing with our sense of "the conditioned," of the world at the heart of 
consciousness. Kazin redefines selfhood in terms of the world we must somehow learn to 
master: 
[The Inmost Leaf] is also an attempt to define and set up and to justify the individual... the idea 
of personality [as in Walker].. .. I want to present [henceforth] this individual's vision, not to set 
him up.... In this sense... I have worked too long behind the individual who was at the center of 
my picture [in Walker, and in pieces about Kafka, Melville, etc.].... The trouble is that I have 
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always worked behind this figure, trying, as it were, to justify him, to support him, to get him to 
emerge. And suddenly I want to move through, to the path of "art,"... rather than of religion, 
insofar as art represents the more direct, tangible, sharable thing.... I do want to... deal in the 
materials rather than the man, to show the vision rather than to announce it." 
In his review of Leaf, Hans Meyerhoff very aptly located its central thesis in its concern with 
the "creative function of naturalism." Meyerhoff believed that Kazin was exploring a classical 
artistic dilemma, namely how to secure the integrity and the unique inner life of each individual 
work of the imagination and yet show its attachment to the world at large. He awarded Leaf the 
honorific tag "moral" for its "respect for the integrity and intrinsic worth of the artist's vision 
[and] its sensitivity to the complexity and ambiguity of human experience translated into the 
symbols of art," and praised Kazin's defence of the '"moral passion'" against the '"duplicity of 
the intellect.'" Above all, Kazin received encomiums for protecting the '"individual vision'" of 
each writer from social or ideological contamination.39 
Meyerhoff pinpointed the main thrust of The Inmost Leaf, namely its concern with the 
possibilities of creative vision in an age crippled with political distrust of human nature, 
existentialism, and gloomy philosophies of relativism. The review was an eye-opener. Kazin was 
astonished and gratified at the same time to see Meyerhoff put his finger on a possible incons-
istency, or rather vacillation, at the core of his argument, really a reluctance to follow it through 
to more radical conclusions. He admitted that Meyerhoff had made him aware just how relevant 
his work was with a view to the rout of the radical liberal intelligentsia in America, and had 
reaffirmed the value of his own independent radicalism in ideologically adverse times: 
my experience is that of the baffled generation — a generation brought up to ideas of radicalism, 
of freedom and independence and revolutionary militancy, brought down to a period more or less 
statist, "big," bureaucratic, reactionary. [Kazin explains his recent preoccupation with Emerson as] 
a way of feeling my way back to the beginnings, the spiritual fires, of the "modem" movement. 
[Also the related attempt to] come to terms with that whole set of miserable reactionary lit. 
philosophers, Eliot & the Southerners, goes back to the immense and terrible defeat suffered by 
so many free men as a result of the 1 st world war. [He perceives a marked continuity from the 
threat of "chaos" after the war to Hitler's authoritarianism and the reactionary, "ultra-slavic" 
philosophy of the Thirties, which hemmed the free writer in.] ... The new generation, bom in the 
30's, is not baffled, but "inside the whale," bom to the comfortable slavery of the suburban 
culture and the permanent war state.... But my generation, bom in the war that brought an end to 
democracy as a living real movement, to the generous hopes of the "century of hope," has been 
that contradiction of its own basic élan.... confronted as we have been by the snivelly philosophers 
of slavery, the Eliots and the Tates and the rest... the job has been to stand up and to shout as 
loudly as one could for these old generous ideas and ideals, for all those things so easily con-
demned these days as "sentimentality," for feeling that is a moral judgment on the world, no 
matter how directionless it seems.... Can it be that the Walker was written out of a nostalgia for 
my poor, old, revolutionary home — can it be that my obsession... with the heroic isolation and 
external fightingness of the real Jews, the true Jews, deals with the longing for the old militancy, 
the old expanse? ... Odd that it should be Lou's [Kazin's ex-wife's] husband, Hans Meyerhoff, 
who in that review of The Inmost Leaf, pounced on my tendency to blame the writer, not the 
world. [He admits to having been "stupidly" faithful to his old ideal, "my old prewar rousing 
flag," and having easily fallen into the trap of fighting himself] Interesting to remember... that the 
insistence on man's guilt & sin comes from the Southerners who have been brought up on the 
guilt of slavery, and not only feel guilty themselves but want everyone else to feel so too. A pox 
on these everlasting nay-sayers and reactionary little tates, dead ones indeed! We are baffled 
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allright, I am and Saul [Bellow] is and most of us old fiery ones are — but let us not forget why 
we are so! 
Fundamentally, the dilemma of the "baffled" generation concerned the choice between belief 
and ideology, and, the choice made, their ability to resist the temptation to entertain the belief 
merely as a spiritual panacea. The "baffled" generation was a landmark in the intellectual history 
of the United States. As Kazin has pointed out, they formed the backbone of radical liberal 
thought at a time when Marxism was still a fashionable instrument of social analysis. With its 
collapse, however, the traditional picture of the intellectual's role changed completely, and it 
began to feed upon itself, recoiling from the irrational drives of modern history. It made the 
matter of salvation an increasingly private affair, to be pursued through the self and for the self 
alone. Kazin believes that the intellectuals' "bafflement," and by all means also his own, 
emerged "as a pattern in the transformation of my [and their] political hopes": "But this retreat 
from curiosity, from interest in the outside world as continuously interesting, comes from our 
lack of politics, our lack of faith in the possibility of change, above all from the change of 
problems, so that the easy socialist-meliorist philosophy of the past no longer has any meaning 
for us..." In other cases, it certainly also led to an internal migration of the spirit, a marked 
attrition of the critical function of the social intelligence, and a dogmatic insistence on man's 
sinfulness.40 
It is only natural that Kazin should have been piqued by Meyerhoff s review. Meyerhoff 
noted Kazin's preoccupation with themes of revolt, anger, and madness in modem literature, and 
marked the essays on Blake, D.H. Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Flaubert and Faulkner as the set pieces 
of the collection. He criticized Kazin's suggestion, however, that these writers "were fighting an 
inner struggle" over their artistic success, or lack of it, much "as if there were no enemies 
abroad." Meyerhoff concluded that this "renders the great literary rages relatively harmless; it 
sets up an artificial division between the writer's intensely subjective imagination and personal 
anguish, on the one hand, and the objective significance of his work, on the other." One is led 
to believe that Kazin overcompensated for the loss of his old socialist ideal — "the spiritual 
fires of the 'modern' movement" — with a redoubled devotion to the interior life. Meyerhoff 
may nevertheless have underestimated the role which history and society — symbols of the 
external world — continued to play in Kazin's criticism after "the transformation of my political 
hopes." In The Inmost Leaf, Kazin is no devotee of a poetics of internality. Nor can we assume 
that the message of the epigraph to his book, which he took from Melville, is that the innermost 
resources of artistic genius must shrivel upon contact with the hard reality of daylight. Quite the 
contrary, the entire collection finds its point of balance in a further exploration of the idea of 
personality as pursued in Walker, in the contradictions and divisions which the writer-protagon-
ist must face and reconcile. As Kazin points out, he is not so much concerned with the man's 
identity as with his vision, that is to say, with that touch of the poet which vindicates man as 
man.41 
In a preparatory note to Leaf, Kazin makes the connection between man and his world 
unmistakable: 
The REAL MAN, THE IMAGINATION... The world is transformed by a human thought; it 
resists a human wish. Art continually transforms reality, as only human beings can. "Where man 
is not," says Blake in Marriage of Heaven & Hell, "nature is barren." And what man's creativity 
mostly is, would seem to be the imagination, which is not an assault on the external, a running 
after one's object, but a discovery within. 
Obviously, Kazin does not wish to psychologize the pathology of modern writing. He is rather 
concerned to present a reality modelled after the central human image and so to lift it beyond 
164 
reductive political or ideological interpretations. The only politics he professes in Leaf is a 
politics of vision. Nevertheless, Meyerhoff may have sensitized him to the old antagonisms 
lingering within himself, more specifically his "untiring awareness of the rift of our culture." If, 
in Leaf, Kazin wants to "move through to the path of 'art,'" and if art is, as in Melville's 
conception of it, the attempt to restore unity among the broken pieces of the Godhead, then 
Meyerhoff was certainly warranted to point to a certain torment at the heart of Kazin's point of 
view.42 For the "inmost leaf' concerns man's gift to confront the truth of his own soul anterior 
to all deterministic philosophies and religious dogmas. It deals with man's ability to accept his 
ethically indeterminate state, his internal divisions, and to allow these to make up the poiesis of 
his conscious — hence creative — life. 
This opposition between man's power to define reality by creative means and his ulterior 
inadequacy before the tragedy of the "world process" also features in the essay on William and 
Henry James, which poses serious questions about the contemporary uses of the Jamesian 
imagination: 
In a time like our own, when men are so lost in themselves because they are so lost from each 
other, the Jamesian integrity can seem small comfort to us. We can take no social form for 
granted; we cannot possess or be possessed by those explorations in human consciousness which 
only parallel — or at least reveal — our quest for security. To say this is not to make a judgment 
on the Jameses, but to define our predicament. Our enforced sense of evil has nothing so creative 
in it as their innocence; and their legacy is still most precious for its symbolic integrity, its trust 
in mind, its superiority to our "failure of nerve." (L, 18-9) 
The Jamesian symbol of a self-contained mind clashed with the contemporary mood of defeat 
among literary intellectuals. For all of its innocence vis-à-vis the modem political temper, the 
Jamesian mind presented a rousing image of the value of man's essentially creative function. 
Precisely this was the central human image which many intellectuals in an age of existential 
dread had lost sight of. 
William Blake: A Radical Poetics for the Era 
Also included in The Inmost Leaf is Kazin's introduction to The Portable Blake, published by 
The Viking Press in 1946. It has a suggestive subtitle, taken from Blake: "The real man, the 
imagination." The essay is based on the assumption that Blake's work reflects an exemplary 
view of mind and experience for Kazin's own, "baffled" generation. For Blake carried within 
him "the divisions of our time." A creator, he was quick to grasp what twentieth-century 
radicals in their bitter experience of revolutionary social hope quashed by the destructive power 
of the totalitarian state only gradually became aware of, namely the reality of death in life. 
During Stalin's consolidation of power, American intellectuals discussed the question whether 
scientific socialism was at all compatible with ideas of man's moral perfectibility. In these 
circumstances, their concern with literature as the principal vehicle of human inquiry emerged 
in a new light. Totalitarianism having revealed the deep epistemological crisis of secular liberal 
politics, many of them urged a definitely ahistoric, personalistic, immaterialist and metaphysical 
approach. Social science, particularly the Marxist variety introduced in the Soviet Union, had 
not brought about the moral reconstruction of man so much as violated his integrity in the name 
of the State. Several intellectuals were therefore rather inclined to see the human estate in 
modem society as one stage in a universal, religious drama, with man teetering on the edge of 
purgatory.'13 
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Defenders and critics of scientific historicism alike, viz. Hook's instrumentalist interpretation 
of Marxism and Herberg's latter-day Christian concern with "the spiritual alienation of man" 
respectively, tended to see contemporary manifestations of man as incidental to the long-term 
goal of his ultimate redemption. Both stressed the telic aspect of the human experience, though 
one stressed the social basis and applicability of experience and the other sought to determine 
man's spiritual essence free from socio-historic contingency. Kazin found evidence in Blake to 
repudiate both views, marking Kazin's own intellectual regard for the complex question of 
historicity. That contemporary liberalism was still unequipped to deal with ideas is obvious from 
Kazin's discussion, entitled "On Melville as Scripture," of Richard Chase's Herman Melville: 
A Critical Study, which is included in Leaf. For the moment, let us concern ourselves with 
Kazin's belief that Blake's poetic thought could reinvigorate 'exhausted' liberals abandoning the 
frustrating intellectual battles being waged in the name of 'History,' finding solace in myth 
instead.44 
The Blake essay dramatizes an artist's mind in action whose constructs are in all respects 
anterior to politics and even subversive of them. But though Kazin is a sympathetic student of 
Blake's exuberant creativity as an agnostic and a libertarian — Blake was "an eighteenth-century 
radical more vehement, daring and imaginative in his conception of freedom than others" (L, 60) 
— he suggests that the Blakean order of mind inspired an absolute and incontrovertible personal 
myth. Such a politics of vision, he hints, may well prove inadequate vis-à-vis the realm of 
necessity which is modern politics. And though the theme of politics in this particular essay is 
elusive, it should be noted, particularly since Kazin is writing from a deep concern about the 
contemporary déconfiture of rational, liberal politics. 
The historic development of Blake's artistic stature never generated such associations with 
continuity and tradition. Gifted, Blake was no social genius. In fact, Kazin crisply observes, "his 
only interest in ideas outside his own was to refute them." He showed little interest in the world 
and its historic travail — to him the idea of history was not telos but spiritual waste and self-
delusion — and the world in its rum was coldly indifferent to him. Kazin's interest in Leaf'is 
in the "vindication of the idea of personality," and he points to a redeeming feature in Blake's 
work: "He was entirely preoccupied with... the burden... of the finiteness of man before the 
whole creation" (L, 37). Though Blake may have misjudged the relations between the free, 
autonomous self as pure consciousness and that part of the universe which is beyond man's 
sovereign control, he cultivated a majestic vision of man's powerful, inward essence and primal 
unity. This conviction was so strong that it permitted him to appear a grab-bag of contradictions 
himself: 
Blake was a lyric poet interested chiefly in ideas, and a painter who did not believe in nature. He 
was a commercial artist who was a genius in poetry, painting and religion. He was a libertarian 
obsessed with God; a mystic who reversed the mystical pattern, for he sought man as the end of 
his search. (L, 38) 
If Blake had worked within a tradition, this would have compelled him to set up an argument 
with himself. He abominated dualism and dialectics alike, however, and had no use for the 
ethical transference which Platonists had historically claimed to witness in the arduous process 
of man fitting himself to the universe. He likewise opposed the Christian notion of moral 
consolation for a soul in conflict with itself. Everything rather converged in the powerful vision 
of man's unlimited spiritual power released by the imagination. He took it that both "moral law" 
and the world blended there. Blake opposed ethical abstractions guiding man's notions about his 
state in nature. 
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Kazin believes that Blake's stature at the present time owes much to the fact that he devel-
oped an outstanding and very early example of a poetics of internality. He affirms Blake's 
modernity by making a comparison with modem surrealism, which had also revolted against 
settled religious and ethical convictions and the liberal fetish of rational progress. But though 
Blake, too, thought poorly of liberal politics — he had "lost faith in political action as a means 
to human happiness" (L, 44) — he never cultivated alienation as a personal value. Art certainly 
was the quicker route: 
As he [Blake] hated church dogma, so he hated scepticism, doubt, experimentalism. He did not 
believe in sin, only in "intellectual error"; he loathed every dualistic conception of good and evil; 
the belief that any human being could be punished, here or elsewhere, for "following his 
energies." But he thought that unbelief— that is, the admission of uncertainty on the part of any 
person — was wicked. He understood that man's vital energies cannot be suppressed or displaced 
without causing distortion; he saw into the personal motivations of human conflict and the many 
concealments of it which are called culture. (L, 40) 
Blake was a passionate critic of society who possessed an intense libertarian vision of man's 
imaginative freedom. This featured man acting on his creative gifts and keeping the powers that 
would fetter him at bay. Yet, Kazin believes that the contemporary revival of interest in Blake's 
work is cultural in origin rather than poetic, for Blake presents an image of mind asserting itself 
in and over the age: "[Blake is] peculiarly of our time, with the divisions of our time" (L, 41). 
This phrase is charged with political significance at a time when division was rife in the 
revolutionary socialists' ranks. Fashionable critical interpretations of Blake's work just after the 
Second World War seemed to suggest that he was quickly being enlisted in one of two ideologi-
cal camps. But Kazin felt that the arguments for Blake's support of either rational experimental-
ism in the service of dialectical materialism or his iconization of man's moral fallibility were as 
dispiriting as, and no doubt this time more harmful than, the fruitless search for leadership in 
American cultural nationalism which had dominated the literary debate in the early Forties and 
which had set up entirely arbitrary divisions between Whitman and James. The dilemmas of 
postwar liberalism threatened to invade Blake's work. Kazin does not wish to see him as 
liberalism's handmaiden, however, and seeks to protect him from the reductive "moral realism" 
employed by the New Liberalism. At the same time, he points to the heart of Blake's modern 
appeal, sounding an oblique warning: 
Blake is very much a man of our time [because he] speaks to us with prophetic insight of our 
nihilism and insensibility. He was so frightened by what he could already see that he found his 
security only in an absolute personal myth. It is a trait that has become universal in politics in our 
time.... men will apparently distort and destroy anything to find their way back to the mystical 
faith of the child in his parents, the medieval man in his God, and the Nordic in the pagan forest. 
Blake is peculiarly contemporary in his anxiety, his longing for a faith that will be absolute and 
yet insurgent, his fear of evidence that will destroy the fantasy of man as the raison d'etre of the 
universe.... Far less than Blake have we solved the problem of restoring to modem man some 
basic assurance, of giving him a human role to play again. (L, 61-2) 
Here, among encomiums, Kazin's worry about Blake's modern uses becomes obvious. 
Battling "nihilism and insensibility," doubt and uncertainty, Blake had actually slipped into the 
fallacy of taking his own intense need of the total unity created by the imagination as his focus 
on the world. From this followed an absolutism of personal vision, or rather personal vision 
absolutized: "Blake's whole pattern, as man and artist, is that of one for whom life is meaning-
less without an absolute belief' (Z,, 61). Here, Kazin puts his finger on the weak spot in the 
167 
socio-political rationale of the Blakean heritage, for intellectual conviction such as this is sooner 
or later shown up by history. Kazin seriously questions Blake's fervent wish to see the world 
dominated by the human image. Blake may have been revolutionary in his insistence on 
uprooting "everything that submits, mortifies, constricts and denies" (L, 44), but he was a poor 
observer of the plight of historic people. Necessity, as the dominant quality of modern existence, 
he never accepted: 
For Blake accepts nothing — not the God who is supposed to have proposed it this way, or the 
man who is constrained to dispose of it in any way he can. Blake begins with a longing so deep, 
for all that is invisible and infinite to man under the dominion of God, matter, and reason, that he 
tears away the shell of the earth, the prison of man in his own senses, to assert that there is 
nothing but man and that man is nothing but the highest flights of his own imagination. (L, 42-3) 
Though this metaphorical cast of mind served to rebuild shattered liberal morale, it bore no 
relation to the interest in existentialist phenomenology fashionable among postwar literary 
radicals. Kazin suggests that the latter, too, was a sign of the times, and that this had to be seen 
as additional evidence that fashionable interpretations of Blake were inspired by the general 
disillusionment with politics, especially of the radical kind, and a basic inability to see the realm 
of necessity as a resource. To be sure, Kazin does not press this point, but it resumes notions 
about the relationships between literature and society developed early, in On Native Grounds, 
and continued in fValker. Blake's persona in "London," he claims, is that of "the walker in the 
modern inhuman city" (¿, 48), but the remarkable difference with Kazin's protagonist is that 
Blake's artistry is downright hostile to the idea of constructing a human identity from historical 
material. Like the critic in Leaf, Walker's protagonist derives his identity from a creative 
engagement of '4he conditioned." His mode of existence is a highly stylized dialogue with 
Jewish history, the experience of the Pale. Part of Kazin's argument in the Blake essay is to 
restore consciousness of the creative contradictions of human existence. Blake discounted these 
and actually dismissed much of the historical progress made in his own time as inherently 
harmful to the unity of man's essential being and a mockery besides. To a large extent, his 
poetic self is self-enclosed, hermetic. Blake "begins with so absolute a challenge to the religion 
that was dying in his age, and to the scientific materialism that arose in it, that he transcends 
them both — into a world... of which he alone saw the full detail" (L, 43). Proclaiming his 
immunity from both, however, Blake likewise claimed his radical freedom from all prescriptions 
about man and life that his own furious imagination did not sanction. To Kazin, that is what 
makes Blake truly "modem." Still, he thinks Blake's achievement flawed: "We do not believe 
enough in the power of man to change the world; Blake came finally to believe in nothing 
else."45 Blake's mind finds no comfort in any chastened sense of the "conditioned" world. 
Nevertheless, Kazin thinks there is much that the reader of the Fifties can take away from a 
reading of Blake. For Blake's utter impatience with dualistic conceptions of the human estate 
originated in a grand "symbolic synthesis [, that is to say] an image of man pressing, with the 
full power of his aroused creativity, against the walls of natural appearances" (L, 53). We see 
in his work a poetic self urgent and imperious under the pressure of its own creativity. Its 
extraordinary commitment to the imagination is proportional to Blake's own hatred of 
Voltairean rationalism. The result was a peculiarly urgent, because personal, use of symbolism: 
The symbols always have an inner relatedness that leads us from the outer world to the inner man. 
The symbols live in the ordered existence of his vision; the vision itself is entirely personal, in 
theme and in the logic that sustains it.... The characteristic of his genius is to lift his unexpected 
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symbols for the inner world of the imagination into a world in which they stand apart from the 
natural world and defy it. (¿, 54)46 
Only there, it would seem, could they uphold the unity that Blake thought was being adulterated 
by Christian ethics, positivism, and scientific materialism alike. 
Blake's work, Kazin believes, reflects "the mystic's tormented sense of the doubleness of life 
between reality and the ideal." This by no means implies that Blake observed the mystic's ritual 
of physical renunciation to be consummated in spiritual union with God: he abominated the idea 
of man's dualism and his subservience to a Higher Being. He rather tried to "resolve" that 
doubleness "on earth, in the living person of man." That did not make his poetic thought more 
accessible, for despite his love of the world of "vegetated" forms, he regarded them as just a 
transcendent stage toward the symbolic vision of unity. He rebuilt the eye but continued to think 
poorly of reality and the empiricism of fact. What Blake added to current philosophies of the 
human condition was a certain "complexity... in the human image. The complexity is not in the 
nature of man, but in the infiniteness of his relation to himself, against a false education and an 
inhuman society, and therefore to the world" (L, 44). To Kazin, Blake's use of the world of 
natural forms as moulds for his own symbolic ideas frees the naturalist aesthetic of its traditional 
associations with negative determinism. 
The Blake essay reclaims the world as a prime object in the modern imagination. The 
charged personal mythology sustaining Blake's sense of natural phenomena suggests a signifi-
cant link with the definition of naturalism that Kazin proposes. In certain key respects, however, 
that definition rejects the direction of Blake's thought: evidently, Kazin seeks to trace the roots 
of the naturalistic vision to an exuberant creative will similar to Blake's. A related assumption 
is that naturalism presents a completer picture of the individual conditioned by the culture and 
society of his time: 
[Blake] shared in the mystic's quest, but he was not going the same way. But we can see at the 
same time that he was not interested in natural phenomena, in the indestructible actuality of what 
is not in ourselves but equally real.... The creative function of naturalism has been to establish... 
a measure of objective knowledge — whether in the description of matter and energy, man's own 
life as a biological organism, his economic society, or the life urges which civilization has pushed 
into a world below consciousness. Naturalism is a great and tragic way of looking at life, for with 
every advance in man's consciousness and in his ability to ascertain, to predict, and to control, he 
loses that view of his supreme importance which is at the center of religious myth. Naturalism 
helps to postpone death, but never denies it; it cannot distort objective truth for the sake of 
personal assurance; [instead] it finds assurance in man's ability to know something of what lies 
outside him. There follows from its positive insights an advance in man's consciousness of his 
own power that is more fertile and resourceful than any anthropocentric myth can inspire. 
Naturalism declares limits, and discovers new worlds of actuality between them. It is tragic, for 
by showing that man's experience is limited it gives him a sense of his permanent and unremitting 
struggle in a world he did not make. But the struggle is the image of his true life in the world, 
and one he deepens by art, knowledge, and love. The quality of tragedy is not sadness but grave 
exhilaration; it defines the possible. (¿, 56) 
This is a plea for an ampler awareness of man's infinite relations to himself and the world. As 
such, it serves as a footnote to both the optimistic rationalism of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment and the optimistic political theories this inspired on the one hand and the 
nineteenth-century heritage of liberalism on the other, which inspired the fatefulness which 
postwar ex-radicals commonly associated with the progressive view of 'History.' It deals a blow 
to the pessimism of the post-liberal moral theology. It likewise argues, even face to face with 
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shattering evidence of the breakdown of the human economy, that man must continue to try and 
make his world inhabitable by a "leap of the imagination," finding sources of the transcendent. 
A plea for a chastened view of self and will, it continues to put its faith in history as the 
designated realm of man's deliverance. Clearly, Kazin's analysis of the Blakean imagination sets 
up a political focus for contemporary use. 
Kazin's moral interpretation of history rests on the claim that naturalism adjusts man's con-
sciousness of his power to the limits within which he must operate, sharpening his sense of 
reality. Tragedy, he claims, compels the recognition that life is a struggle whose stakes become 
clear only as resistance increases. Blake's poetic thought addresses the self-serving views of the 
imagination conventionally held by contemporary postradical liberalism. A case in point was 
Dreiser's fate at the hands of the liberal ideologues of the great American cultural consensus in 
the Fifties. Trilling's "Reality in America," so Kazin points out in The Stature of Theodore 
Dreiser, inspired the reaction against Dreiser: "This essay expresses for a great many people in 
America just now their impatience with the insurgency that dominated our famously realistic 
fiction up to the war..." Trilling drew up an unsparing indictment of the "liberal imagination," 
with all its attendant lapses of the social and political intelligence, making Dreiser its figure-
head. The Blake essay was conceived in the wake of that debate, and it is hardly a coincidence 
that Kazin should bring his deepest critical convictions to bear on the metaphysics of "reality" 
in literature. His point was that the consensus liberalism of the Fifties, with its dispassionate 
view of human nature and its presumptuous glorification of the status quo in the psychological, 
the political, and the historical realms, had clearly misplaced notions of how Dreiser's literary 
intelligence operated. Its proponents summarily dismissed Dreiser's work as blighted by the 
faults of "the common man," who they believed was a latter-day avatar of the literary Stalinist 
of the Thirties. In standing up for Dreiser, Kazin criticizes both the "old" radicalism and 
contemporary intellectual culture: 
There is no "common man" — though behind the stereotype (how this executioner waits!) stand 
those who may yet prepare all too common a fate for us all [viz. the blight of a doctrinaire, 
proletarian aesthetics]. Literary people, as a class, can get so far away from the experience of the 
other classes that they tend to see them only symbolically. Dreiser as a "common man" once 
served a purpose; now he serves another. The basic mistake of all the liberal critics was to think 
he could ever see this world as something to be ameliorated." 
Kazin argues that, like Blake, the "liberal imagination" envisioned a redemptive destiny for a 
world beyond the grasp of supernatural authority, but he adds that, unlike Blake, it did not see 
that any political programme aiming at social amelioration would ultimately be inadequate. 
Blake spurned the materialism of the radicals and substituted vision for politics. This saved him, 
as a libertarian, from the disillusionment inherent in revolutionary politics and moved much of 
his creative thought beyond any "contemplative acceptance of this world," of a shared reality. 
Kazin concludes that Blake's poetic self, though resisting any claims of the contingent, offered 
a valuable clue to the liberal mind's dilemma, viz. its failure to overcome its lingering material-
ism: 
Blake is not a naturalist; he believes in apprehension, not in being; in certainty at the price of 
reality. He does not believe that anything is finally real except the imagination of man.... He 
refused to believe the evidence of his senses that the human mind — however it may qualify or 
misread reality — is bombarded by something outside itself. We are eternally subjective; but there 
are objects. (L, 56-7) 
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Kazin is referring to Plato's distinction between essence and truth, in the myth of the cave, 
which explored the mind's role in shaping reality, but Plato invariably saw selfhood in relation 
to a higher realm of being. Blake rejected such dualism altogether, projecting his abundant 
perceptions onto the self: 
...the truth is that he was not trying to prove anything philosophically at all; his greatness depends 
not on his conception of the world but on what he created through it. In defense of his own 
personality, and in defiance of his age, he imagined a world equal to his heart's desire. He refused 
to admit objective reality only because he was afraid man would have to share the creation. (L, 
57) 
The Blake essay accomplished a major critical reorientation at a time when Reinhold Niebuhr 
preached "the ironic mode of history" and when moral philosophers persistently saw human 
destiny in terms of existential Angst.4' To Kazin, Blake gave support to modem man as a 
solitary and unsupported individual, while his gift of conviction provided a major criticism of 
"our" nihilism and insensibility. Hence Kazin's claim that all of us who find ourselves strug-
gling to believe in the moral and spiritual telos of history must feel indebted to him. 
Leaf centres on the idea of history, encouraging the contemporary readership, in an age of 
increasing depersonalization and outward hardness fed by personal anxiety, to cherish it as a 
vital source of selfhood. Attuned to the reversals of the historical sense in modem times, Kazin 
becomes "the historian of the beleaguered self." He takes his inspiration from the metaphysical 
anguish that Melville expressed in his well-known letter of June 1851 to Hawthorne, stating that 
the "inmost leaf' of the bulb need not prophesy the flower's "fall[ing] to the mould," but that 
it could also mark the theme of the "unconditioned" selfs necessary entrance into the historical 
world. R.W.B. Lewis pointed this out when he distinguished two subjects in the collection: the 
earlier sections deal with the distinctive American theme of loneliness, whereas in "the later 
essays — on Melville, Simone Weil, Dreiser, Dostoievsky, Faulkner... — the American theme 
becomes enlarged, becomes something metaphysical and universal, a historical and geographical 
wistfulness which turns into a theological agony and merges swiftly with the angst of the 
existentialists." Lewis thought the development flawed. He blamed Kazin with not having "a 
sharply defined metaphysical conviction" and with being "a trifle modish: we are all anxious to 
be anxious these days." Allegedly, Kazin had failed to formulate any cogent ideas, although his 
interpretations of Melville, Anderson, Dreiser, Weil and Dostoevsky certainly indicated a 
"pattern of fire." Lewis concluded that Kazin's assessments constantly gravitated towards the 
religious: the essays voiced either a Lawrentian call for total emotional release, or they depicted 
the sacramental nature of experience. Both modes, however, reveal the telic movement of the 
human experience, the indestructible sense that life is purposeful. They locate transcendent 
orders of being at the heart of the modem self. What Lewis may have missed is precisely 
Kazin's conviction that no apriori knowledge exists about the form salvation ultimately takes. 
Lewis asserted that 
there are surely other modes of truth [than Lawrence's], and they exact from us an equally strict 
obedience. I do not mean only the truth of logical statement [captured in the language which 
Kazin's "religious" ideas resist]. I mean... the truth of action. 
It is here that Mr. Kazin's disinclination to attempt any sustained analysis of works of literature 
operates to his disadvantage.... By focusing on the lyrical ejaculation, by isolating the lambent cry 
even in works that are by nature dramatic (imitations, not of private feelings, but of actions), Mr. 
Kazin sees to it that the source and meaning and cogency of the cry itself never quite get persua-
sively explained. 
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With the message of Walker barely sunk in, Lewis may not have realized that Kazin had for 
some time already been exploring feasible modes of aesthetic selfhood. He may quote Kazin to 
the effect that all great works of literature are "dramatic entities which give us worlds, not 
entities," but that does not provide much of a basis for an attack on Kazin's formal ideas, 
particularly not since Kazin devotes so much space in Leafs keynote essay to the limited 
dramatic and historical purview of Blake's thought. Kazin's dilemma was inherent in his 
material. Moreover, the post-ideological interest was in sensibilities rather than theories.49 
William Faulkner: The Declining Order of Society 
The essay on Faulkner in The Inmost Leaf explores the vast resources of human integrity. 
Faulkner's faith in man, Kazin explains, was founded on human characteristics that were 
singularly beyond cultural definition. Faulkner's work often presents Southern society as 
objectively in decay and seeking compensation in myth. Rather than cherish the particularity of 
experience as it unfolds, the Southern mind tended to annex all experience into a grand synthesis 
supporting an ahistorical ideal. Faulkner's protagonists embody the tragedy of their culture, for 
they find that their actions typically lock them into an incalculable dynamism whose terms they 
may hope to establish only in retrospect. Their creator's subject, as Kazin states elsewhere, is 
ambition crushing the moral order of society. They "could realize [their] experience, but only 
after [they] had lived it." In Absalom, Absalom!, for instance, history is anterior to, and inac-
cessible to, the aesthetic will. The act precedes the thought; thought no longer serves to mediate 
purely aesthetic modes of selfhood and reveals their inescapable frailty. History in Faulkner 
mirrors the unrefracted reality of the human heart. Taking off from Benjy Compson's incoherent 
mental effort, in The Sound and the Fury, to find a reason for his sexual attack on a school-girl, 
Kazin argues that none of Faulkner's characters are purposive historical agents: 
Each Compson... brings home the dream that is continually present in our consciousness. The 
relating of this dream to the dramatic world of human action is the function of literature.... In 
Faulkner all sentences are really moments of a single sentence. All history makes up a single past. 
The past is completed, but its reverberations inside the human mind are continuous. All one's 
effort as a man must be to understand what has been done, what is the meaning of the saga that 
must be lived before it can be told.50 
In On Native Grounds, Kazin doubted whether Faulkner's protagonists possessed the moral 
intelligence required to achieve historical deliverance. That book established a precarious 
awareness of a putative moral design in American writing — viz. the spiritual creativity that is 
the cohesive force in society — but Faulkner's oeuvre fell short of this standard. Kazin con-
sidered Faulkner's ideas "curiously dull, furiously commonplace, and often meaningless..." And 
though he acknowledged Faulkner's originality and even devotion to form, he insisted that all 
"this remarkable energy... did not spring from a conscious and procreative criticism of society 
or conduct or tradition..." The complex exchange between the intellectual will and the 
uncomprehended motives for action do feature in his later assessments of Faulkner, but in 1942 
the requirements of the "structural imagination" led him to write Faulkner off as an exacerbated 
sensibility, beyond even the extreme contemporary manifestations of naturalism and realism. 
Two additional observations rounded off Faulkner's place in the moral history of contemporary 
writing traced in On Native Grounds. The first was that Kazin regarded Faulkner's work — 
together with Thomas Wolfe's and Henry Miller's — rather positively as the record of the 
lonely individual sensibility in a period of dissolution. They exposed the pervasive materialism 
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in contemporary affairs. Secondly, however, they were certainly no Laurentian crusaders for the 
integrity of the self: "There is no religion in these writers; there is only the religious intensity 
brought to the understanding of men's alienation from each other today."51 This was not a plea 
for a revaluation of religion in the contemporary situation so much as an attempt to establish the 
terms for cultural unity in America. In the given context, however, it stressed the absence of a 
sense of continuity of effort among American writers and creators, and lifted this beyond 
cultural criticism to the level of moral indictment. "Men's alienation from each other" separated 
the modern self from the American promise of a libertarian society that still inspired Kazin in 
On Native Grounds. 
Dominating the literary situation in the early Forties were the New Critics, led by John 
Crowe Ransom and Allen Tate. Kazin resented their claim that art was post-ethical as well as 
their veneration of "poetic strategy," or rather literary form, as the source of the critic's 
"personal sense of order" in a world which they argued had no order. He believed that they 
were motivated by a distrust of history. Having made the alienation of historical men from mind 
the leading theorem in their cultural analysis, they cultivated a self-consciousness and 
"humiliating sense of exile, a loneliness of the spirit and even the political intelligence." What 
Kazin missed in the New Critics was a recognition that the historical sense, that is the ability to 
make historical change meaningful, is a central aspect of civilization. They promoted a type of 
cultural intelligence which expressed itself mainly as an emphatic need for orthodoxy, leery of 
the new, open forms of experience generated by modern democratic-egalitarian society, and 
which gravitated towards a sacred image of the cultural past. What they claimed to have 
salvaged was an extremely critical sense of poetic strategy, which they considered the only 
activity worth pursuing in a situation of marked cultural decline. Thus, Kazin argued, they drove 
a wedge between literary expression and the historical experience. He doubted whether the New 
Critics saw any causal connection, save that "poetic strategy" could compensate for tattered 
versions of the self. That, however, was scarcely enough when the very idea of society, and the 
material it supplies the imagination with, was at stake. And though the change in historical 
sensibility between On Native Grounds and The Inmost Leaf indicated that Kazin, too, feared the 
encroaching meaninglessness of the idea of society, he continued to explore the possibility of a 
narrative mode for the historical self. This persona might create, by sheer virtue of experience 
retrospectively redeemed, the missing elements of a new historical ethos.52 
Leaf only marks the early beginnings of the new directions in Kazin's historical thinking. It 
portrays the self in the formative process of its exposure to the historical experience. Particularly 
Faulkner's story "The Bear," Kazin maintains, 
suggests that history is only retrospect.... [The past] can only be mediated and retold. Each of us, 
as we review the past, becomes as old as thought itself as we look at our younger selves blindly 
rushing through the past. And this is what makes the final moral development of Ike McCaslin in 
"The Bear" so beautiful a legend in itself, for admitting that slavery was a curse, Ike lightens 
himself of its burden; he becomes his own redeemer. This growth is possible only when the 
chronicle of man's past lives in a man's mind as if he had lived all of it and were now responsible 
to all of it.53 
Faulkner's personae encounter the past as an inscrutable record of causality: their only hope of 
historical deliverance is through a retrospective view of what triggered historical events. That 
surely is a chastened view of man's stake in history, yet the most truthful version of his historic 
predicament. The metaphysics of self Kazin studies in Leaf is definitely inspired by Whitman, 
hinging on the necessarily contradictory alliances that the self forms. As he explored the 
imaginative reaches of this conception in Walker, so he was prepared to test its validity in the 
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work of a number of writers, notably Faulkner's, who emerged at crucial moments in the history 
of the modern Western world. 
Kazin believes Faulkner was definitely a troubled heritage to the contemporary literary mind. 
He comments on a recent article in Partisan Review showing the literary mind's schizoid 
attitude to Faulkner's style: 
Your thoroughly sensible critic finds Faulkner a talented man who unfortunately tends to get lost 
in floods of excess; your humanist critic, that he rants; I have recently heard a Marxist criticism 
that he is simply a floridly uncontrolled reactionary brooding over the decline of his class. Even 
someone who understands him so well as Malcolm Cowley [in The Portable Faulkner] thinks that 
the defects of his style can be attributed to the traditional isolation of the American writer. (¿, 
259) 
Faulkner's version of the historical experience, however, resisted the reorientation in the 
intellectual community of the Fifties on consensus models in cultural and political history. The 
price he paid was the epithet of being "alienated" and beyond consensus. He is clearly in dissent 
of Fifties liberal culture, which, in Richard Chase's analysis of it, had "recently been showing 
anew its nearly fatal tendency... to collapse into middlebrowism, compromise, centrality, the 
middle way."54 The neurotic mental violence characterizing many of Faulkner's protagonists 
proved that the culture did not know where it was going; the style merely reflected this instabili-
ty. The "discontinuities of American culture" so hotly debated among intellectuals in the Fifties 
were magnified by the picture Faulkner painted in his novels of a distraught historical mind. 
Accordingly, Kazin claims that Faulkner presents 
the living state — not merely ourselves caught for a moment above the motion of life, but of 
everything within our ken and which we color with the violence of our state — astonished and 
furious and outraged... yet still trying to be impervious, to believe ourselves implacable, and by 
claiming our own intactness, showing that we seek to endure. And it is a state that is known to his 
characters and about each other not in moments of contemplation only, for that would arrest the 
momentum, but — like the constant echo of the ground bass we hear in Bach — as that particular 
knowledge to which they must all return. (Z, 263) 
Modernist literary practice never subscribed to a continuity of "conscious morality" such as 
Kazin explored in On Native Grounds. Instead, as Lukács has pointed out, literary modernism 
abandoned the idea of linear historic development and resorted to interpretations of history as 
circular, "mired in endless crisis" and "pullfing] toward entropy."55 That is not the promise that 
Walker's protagonist extracts from his experience of history, whose literary potential he exploits 
as the medium of 'becoming,' of reaching through to authenticity. Similarly, Faulkner's work 
conveys the experience of history as the integral and inescapable reality of the human state. The 
objection that his style is "uneven" reflects an unwillingness on the part of his critics to 
acknowledge the selfs necessary compromise with history and the resulting obligation to find 
justification and a purpose for the selfs own role in it: 
But the primary reason for our objections to Faulkner's style is our refusal to believe that what he 
writes about is entirely real even to him. Most of his critics show a genuine indifference to his 
point of view. 
By point of view I mean not a writer's social opinions, which he may and usually does share 
with many people, especially if he is a Southerner; not those psychological interpretations by 
which we now so easily interpret and think we entirely reveal someone's character; not even his 
moral philosophy, whether on its most realistic or exalted level. I mean the angle of vision from 
which one recurringly sees the universe — that native disposition of mind which plants in us very 
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early those particular words, those haunted stresses and inflections, those mysteriously echolaic 
repetitions to which we most instinctively return — and which at our best we accept with joy, and 
sometimes even understand. 
It is his point of view, his personal conviction of the shape life has, that presents any writer 
with that resurgent theme from which he chooses the subject of his art and even many of its 
devices. For a real artist never simply borrows a technique even when he may seem to, but uses 
it as if no one had used it before him. It is by his point of view, surely, that we know Dostoevsky, 
who is more than the sum of his reactionary social opinions; Proust, who is more, even, than Aw 
sensibility; Melville, who is more than his pessimistic abasement before the magnitude of the 
divine. It is a writer's point of view that gives us our immediate experience of his mind in all its 
rich particularity. It is in his point of view, though not necessarily for his point of view, that we 
read him. (¿, 261) 
On Native Grounds urged American literature to reconsider the terms of its continuity, whereas 
in Leaf Kazin argues the inviolable autonomy of the past and its continuation — as "the shape 
life has" — into the present. The "mysteriously echolaic repetitions" tum the past into a 
metaphysical resource, and they are the nearest analogue to Melville's urge to restore the 
Godhead broken up at the Supper. 
Likewise, several of Faulkner's protagonists, and the scions of the Compson family in 
particular, scramble for an explanation of just how history, their history, lost its coherence and 
purpose. They are caught between self-actualization and the historical process. They grow aware 
that the culture they affirm is a construct giving way to the forces of history and find out that 
the selfs cherished notions about the unity of action and will may actually breed unforeseen and 
irreparable division in society. In Faulkner's fictional world, man 
could realize his experience, but only after he had lived it. The doing and realizing are inaccess-
ible to each other, and this is the human tragedy — the heart is blind, hot, passionate, and 
ambitious beyond anything we can admit or express, mad for glory and mad to acquire. Man 
explodes himself in the service of his passions, his ambition constantly destroys the society he 
thinks the foundation of moral order. Yet once the deed is done, is irrevocable, he has to put the 
story together by thought — the unavailing thought of the artist or the chronicler going back into 
the havoc created by the past. 
Faulkner's idea of the relation between thought and action is surely an apology for the South. 
To Kazin, this apologetics was Faulkner's great strength as well as a possible weakness. Its 
historical object — the Civil War and the ensuing disruption of Southern society and culture — 
showed Faulkner as the product of that crisis. The crisis told heavily on those who presumed to 
be living in the eye of tradition, and certainly on those literary intellectuals who, with Eliot, had 
come to dismiss contemporary history as an "immense panorama of futility and anarchy." This 
given, Kazin believed, they virtually enshrined the past in language, and understood it "only as 
living in the mind's right perception and reordering of it... The past, the tradition, ceases to 
have any authority in its own right." Aestheticizing the past, they immobilized it, and so 
separated it from history: "The seemingly 'timeless' quality of the past in these antihistoric 
minds... means that the past is not really felt to exist, that it is only our 'idea' of it, and so it 
does not move and grow within us and upon us, as organic beings do, but is moved, like a dead 
weight, or is worked on, like a chemical substance (precisely the image on which Eliot ends his 
essay)." Kazin counters with Faulkner's belief that "the past is never dead. It is not even past." 
Historicity in Faulkner's novels is a metaphysical issue, much as the rush and tear of his 
sentences suggest the ultimately unbridgeable gap between the total reality captured in the 
moment — history as the holistic framework of our complex and contradictory experience of the 
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past — and the tragic ambition of language to convey this. Though past acts threaten to disrupt 
existing society's order, Faulkner's protagonist Ike McCaslin, for one, attempts a retrospective 
interpretation of the family legacy which amounts to an act of redemption. Not only does he 
hold himself accountable, but he also re-enters history anew as a consciously moral agent, 
recasting the troubling heritage of old sins: 
Action and recognition are fatally separate; man is a creature of passions over which his rational 
will has no dominion. But the retrospect of history is man's only real power of understanding. 
And the humility and charity that come with this awareness, symbolized in Ike McCaslin's 
development from the boy eager to play an honorable role in the hunt to the old Ike who detaches 
himself from all ties and comes to love the wilderness for its own sake, constitute Faulkner's 
deepest belief, which is that virtue is powerless, that virtue intervenes only when power is gone." 
Ike breaks through the barrier that keeps haunting the South. Contemporary Southern literary 
intellectuals preoccupied with aesthetic experience, Kazin believes, have a desire to roll back the 
historical tide and freeze it just prior to that particular moment when a fateful act — the attack 
on fort Sumter — seemingly turned history into rigid determinism. Adapting their image of the 
past into the purity of literary metaphor, however, they misjudge the role of the moral intelli-
gence as a factor in historical interpretation. Instead, Kazin argues, the moral imagination — not 
the aesthetic will isolating universals in the historical experience and interpreting these within 
a framework of religious symbolism — forms the heart of the historical sense, because it is the 
product of the later generations' ongoing creative encounter with history: 
For there was a great guilt incurred in the South.... Faulkner does not excuse this guilt, he does 
not apologize for it, he does not evade it — man must live with himself. Man's immortality, if he 
can be said to have one at all, reaches into the past, not into the future: it lies in a tragic sense of 
history, not in the hope offered by religion." 
One distinct liability of Faulkner's point of view, however, is the dominant gravitational pull of 
the past. Kazin sides with Jean-Paul Sartre on this point, who claimed that Faulkner "cuts off 
the past." If the past is unchangeable, which Faulkner certainly believed, there is a risk that "one 
must forever be old in spirit in order not to betray those who were rash in their youth." This 
given, the retrospect of history actually destroys historical idealism and the belief in meaningful 
historical action; it perpetuates the standoff between action and reflection. Kazin's strictures here 
appeal to the radical will and its commitment to the future. Faulkner "interrogat[ing] the 
Southern past" did not really manage to avoid evidence of determinism. His image of the past 
heavily mortgaged the idea of an open future.58 
The possibility of transcendence, supplanting the eroded belief in linear historical progress, 
has been a constant concern with Kazin ever since, in On Native Grounds, he took issue with 
the moral cynicism and benighted materialism of the new naturalists. On 24 January 1944, he 
noted in his diary that the transcendent view is the product of the moral imagination, and that 
"to call oneself a transcendentalist... is beautiful.... to be greater than the seeming necessity by 
knowing what the necessity is..." He felt stimulated by certain aspects of the contemporary 
intellectual temper: "The public optimism is false; the real inability to entertain final pessimism 
is entertaining and vital." By the early Fifties, when the exodus of radical intellectuals from 
scientific Marxism was well under way and when many of them had espoused religious expla-
nations of man's plight, Kazin continued to stand up for the moral framework of history: "No, 
I do not believe in the supernatural, but in the marvellous: only in that which is known through 
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man, and of himself looking up, saying, My God, my God, I can... actually... stand apart from 
my own hunger." He would repeatedly stress this belief in the spiritual purpose of the world of 
human limitations, and considered it indispensable to his personal metaphysics. His diary entry 
for 17 December 1951 quotes from an abandoned project of his — a book on "the extraordinary 
inner liberty of American writing" to be entitled The Western Island — to the effect: 
It is because it can be loved by us, it is because it is beautiful, that the universe is a country. It is 
our only country here below. This thought is the essence of the wisdom of the Stoics. We have 
a heavenly country; but in a sense it is too difficult to love, because we do not know it; above all, 
in a sense, it is too easy to love, because we can imagine it as we please. We run the risk of 
loving fiction under this name. If the love of fiction is strong enough it makes all virtue easy, but 
at the same time of little value. Let us love the country here below. It is real; it offers resistance 
to love. He has willed that it should be difficult yet possible to love it. 
On 21 September 1955, finally, Kazin takes off from an article by Rudolph Bultmann, "The 
Quest for Meaning in History." He recapitulates his attitude to the recent revival of Christian 
eschatology among intellectuals. Bultmann proposed an alternative to both mechanistic nine-
teenth-century historical science, which had itself supplanted the Christians' ideological 
interpretation of history, and to the related phenomenon of the dissolution of truth leading to 
nihilism. He stressed man's basically voluntarist role in history and the future as an open road. 
About the nature of the historical self, Bultmann noted: 
Personality is a possibility which must be realised over and over again.... The meaning in history 
lies always in the present as far as the present demands the decision of man and thereby offers the 
possibility to become a self, a personality. With all this the freedom of man is asserted. Freedom 
belongs to the genuine historicity of man.... Responsibility and freedom belong to his story. 
Bultmann sketched a picture of history as a twin continuity of moral action and self-affirmation 
that appealed very much to Kazin. Kazin finds clues in it for his own "hebraic" faith, which he 
opposes to what he considers the intellectual verbalism of Christian supematuralism. Hebraism, 
Kazin reasons, 
insists that the creation is one, made by one creator and all in the same spirit.... I do refuse to 
believe that man may have promptings that are entirely self-generated and that are not connected 
with nature. If this is true, then man's intelligence is vain and illusionary, and at most, func-
tional... So I reject dualism as I most deeply reject the divorce between the secular and the holy. 
And even more strongly do I reject the kind of possible hypothesis as to nature which starts from 
the assumption that it is a blind screen on which man lavishes his own longings and comes forth 
with a riddle. [About dualism:] the insistence on life as having some extra margin of spirit as 
magic. Spirit is not a different element; it is life conscious of itself at the highest, life in its 
inherent ability to visualize, to consummate, and, in the most natural sense, to transcend itself.59 
These observations mark Kazin's renewed interest in the Emersonian-Whitmanian poetic self 
spanning the "contradictions" that make up the world. To Kazin, Emerson's faith in individual 
transcendent power was obviously relevant to the mid-twentieth century American mind. And 
in Emerson's wake, Whitman showed the redemptive poetic potential of the "simple, separate 
person"; more than Emerson, he showed that historicity is the selfs "hardest fact." The 
Emersonian-Whitmanian stance, however, faced potent dilemmas, and in the "Preface" to An 
American Procession, Kazin doubts whether the poetic self could permeate and leaven 
society.60 
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In Faulkner's historical world, the criterion by which to assess the costs of action is experie-
nce, or moral consciousness. Experience reveals the transcendental potential of the human 
situation. Christian dualism is ruled out: 
Faulkner is a Southerner; very much a man of his class. But let us not forget that for him the guilt 
of slavery is tempered by the realization that the exploiter, too, is a man; that no more than the 
slave can he be dismissed from the other end of the relationship. Yet it is not entirely fair to him, 
it conventionalizes him, to assume that he sees all these things simply under the general and 
individual rubric of human guilt. Faulkner does not give the impression that so many Southern 
poets and critics do — that their highest aim as writers is to become good Christians again. He 
seems more intent on understanding the human situation than on being saved. (L, 267) 
This adds resonance to Kazin's interpretation of Blake's poetics. The Inmost Leaf derives its 
thrust from the interplay between Faulkner's imaginative world and the Blakean order of 
imagination, which chiefly paints ideas and eschews the sense of dramatic relationship that 
underlies the experience of society. Faulkner's world releases the drama founded on man's 
tragic role in history and the moral vision arising from it. Central to that vision is the recogni-
tion that the self achieves actualization within the historical situation. Only through an act of 
retrospective commitment does Faulkner's Ike McCaslin, for instance, realize his complex role 
in the family tradition and in the larger context of history as moral continuity. Hemmed in by 
historical, social and racial constraints, he yet undertakes to transform the heritage of guilt into 
a lasting asset. Thus, he enhances his moral stature: the full impact of his historical burden is 
to turn him into a unique and vital force in a moribund culture. Self and history become 
mutually sustaining; the former's constantly inward realization — heightening the meaning of 
the "inmost leaf' — mitigates the sense of historical determinism. History itself is given a new 
definition: 
Faulkner's insistence on embracing all actuality in the moment...is an attempt to realize continuity 
with all our genesis, our "progenitors"... with all we have touched, known, loved.... The greatest 
horror his characters know is to feel they have been dropped out of this stream of being, to think 
of themselves as "self-progenitive" or "sourceless." .... We may live in our tradition, be haunted 
by it as Southerners are: but we are not our tradition; we are individual and alive. (Z, 271) 
Voluntarism in historical matters, however, does not destroy evidence of historical causality, far 
from it. Nor does Kazin make any overtures to religious dualism: his Hebraic point of view 
remains firmly rooted in the naturalism of the world's processes, history being the pattern 
revealed by the self under construction, which fills it with its own metaphysical needs. In 
Melville's letter of June 1851 to Hawthorne about coming to "the inmost leaf of the bulb," for 
instance, this sense of self and of the imaginative mode of being sustaining it is so urgent as to 
eclipse the historical current. Yet, the pressure of the historical process in Moby-Dick virtually 
dictates its own, purely reflective counterpart, expressed in Ishmael. The Faulkner characters Ike 
McCaslin, Joe Christmas's mother and Dilsey have a similar function. They witness and 
comment on the tragic course of history, and in doing so they either break the pattern of moral 
outrage they detect in it, as does Ike McCaslin, or they desperately seek to recover the comfort-
ing vision of a historical world not yet ruptured by the inevitable consequences of violent and 
heedless human action. Mrs. Hines, Joe Christmas's grandmother, for instance, cannot possibly 
face the fatal chain of events set going by Joe's act, which was in its rum largely inspired by the 
psychic trauma of his racial identity: 
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I am not saying that he never did what they say he did. Ought not to suffer for it like he made 
them that loved and lost suffer. But if folks could maybe just let him for one day. Like it hadn't 
happened yet. If it could be like that for one day. 
Kazin stresses that the historical experience does not grant such a reprieve. The sentiment, 
however, came naturally to Southern literary criticism, which found sustenance in Eliot's bleak 
view of historical developments. During the great liberal retreat in the late Forties and early 
Fifties, Southern intellectuals generally relied on an exegesis of the human predicament to link 
the Southern cultural record with the universal human tragedy. In a later assessment of 
Faulkner's stature, in Bright Book of Life (1973), Kazin specifies his reservations about South-
ern, post-liberal interpretations of history: 
Every experience was fitted to the fashionable terms of [Southern literary] criticism. History 
seemed to Americans peculiarly, unjustly intractable in those years after the war when everything 
conspired to make liberals "disillusioned" and conservatives paranoid. The kind of intellectual 
removal more naturally at home in English departments than anywhere else, made it natural to 
repeat... after Robert Penn Warren in All the King's Men that man is conceived in sin and raised 
in dirt from the didie to the shroud. Corruption was the natural order of things, goodness could 
rise only out of badness. The images of perfectibility so dear to the more credulous Americans, 
less experienced in defeat, had to be replaced by the Southern experience.61 
The Inmost Leaf is directly concerned with the created self shaping the image of history, and in 
so doing it follows the development of the imaginative modes of being described above. Perhaps 
even more than the retreat from politics in American intellectual life during the late Forties and 
Fifties, it was the resultant sense of the loss of traditional sanctions for the self, of pervasive 
social breakdown and impasse, that necessitated a revaluation of the self. In this respect, it is 
worthwhile calling to mind Kazin's later assessment of Celine's literary stature.62 
A similar erosion of the traditional idea of society, and of the experience of society as moral 
texture bome out by "the dramatic sense of relationships [that] haunted Whitman all his life," 
was very much noticeable in postwar American writing. Nor was Kazin the only one to have 
observed the contemporary crisis in the conceptualization of society. Whatever unifying focus 
was found was linked with the self, which figured prominently in contemporary formulations of 
tradition. Particularly in the Fifties, when the idea of society and the secular faith in a rational 
politics disintegrated, the self became a major intellectual issue. The religious revival among 
intellectuals at the time, however, suggested that many doubted its adequacy vis-à-vis the moral 
and political exhaustion that occurred after the Holocaust. In literary discourse, it suffered from 
a dualistic interpretation. Lionel Trilling, for instance, noted that 
society's resistance to the discovery of depravity has ceased.... Indeed, before what we know now 
the mind stops; the great psychological fact of our time which we all observe with baffled wonder 
and shame is that there is no possible way of responding to Belsen and Buchenwald. The activity 
of mind fails before the incommunicability of man's suffering. 
Trilling made this remark in the context of the growing popularity of "desperate perceptions of 
our life" — resistance to "the discovery of depravity" having ceased — in literary and intellec-
tual circles. The recent political history of Western civilization, he suggested, had coincided with 
a process of long standing in Western literature, namely a turn towards "desperate" ideas of 
modernity. Mark Krupnick recalls that Trilling's reaction against the glamour surrounding the 
"modem imagination of evil" was precipitated by an idea broached in Hannah Arendt's The 
Origins of Totalitarianism. How close Trilling came to a de facto revaluation of the liberal 
179 
image of history, which he had criticized along with Communist interpretations of historical 
progress dominating the intellectual debate in the Thirties, is clear from the following passage 
from Origins, which he included in his essay on William Dean Howells: "To yield to the 
process of disintegration has become an irresistible temptation, not only because it has assumed 
the spurious grandeur of 'historical necessity' but also because everything outside it has begun 
to appear lifeless, bloodless, meaningless, and unreal." Trilling reinstated those values which 
essentially resist formulation in rationalistic, radical-progressive social schemes. From his 
previous championship of the imagination of moral complication and variousness, Trilling had 
oscillated towards a position calibrating, in carefully modulated fashion, "life's possible goodne-
ss." In the teeth of the blackest prospects for mankind featuring in modernist and contemporary 
writing, he hoped to "encourage a more balanced view of the human condition." As Mark 
Krupnick has noted, however, the figure and the work of William Dean Howells scarcely 
provided an adequate basis for an attack on the modern imagination of evil. They rather served 
as pointers in Trilling's revised cultural polemic. For with the disappearance of Stalinism as a 
pervasive influence in American intellectual life, Trilling proposed to use Howells's work to 
point up the limitations of the radical will. He linked contemporary neglect of Howells to the 
insistent effort of the modem will, in both culture and politics, to escape from the conditioned 
realm into an ideal state of pure, spiritual being. Weary of incessant historical change, like so 
many other ex-radical liberal intellectuals, he probed below the historical actuality of raging 
conflicts and counteracting pressures for a central image of the mind's total self-fulfilment in 
tranquil contemplation. But to hold up Howells's world of the 1880s as an ideal to the "baffled" 
generation of the Fifties amounted to, in Krupnick's words, a retreat "from the world of time, 
of contingency and responsibility, into a timeless idyll."63 
Kazin's understanding of the writer's "point of view" as defined in the essay on Faulkner 
takes him the reverse route from Trilling's. Richard Chase, in "The Illusion of the Middle Way" 
included in The Democratic Vista (1958), argued that there was a link in the Fifties between the 
widening consensus on cultural and political affairs and the tendency to discredit all oppositional 
forms of politics, leading to the loss of society as the middle ground in criticism. In this context, 
Kazin on Céline argues that the modern individual maintained an increasingly difficult relation 
with his society, causing the erosion of public values. He refutes both Trilling's claims about the 
American scene in "Manners, Morals and the Novel" and those who, yearning for some absolute 
faith, have declared the present age to be postpolitical and who have accordingly abandoned the 
notion that a Whitmanesque "dramatic sense of relationship[s]" is society's only and necessary 
defence.64 
Kazin finds evidence in the lasting appeal of American literature for postwar Europe, its own 
humanist traditions shattered. The "vogue [of American literature] pointed to... Europe's crisis 
of faith itself." What Europe found in American literature to sustain it in its "dismemberment 
and feverishness... immediately after 1945" was confirmation, in the hard-boiled and nihilist 
vein, of the nineteenth-century tradition of humanism: 
But there was more to the new fashion than this stereotype of American hardness. As Europe lost 
so many of its own traditions, there was a new appreciation of the American as an original — the 
writer who, having no tradition of his own to copy (or to lose), found himself, like many another 
American, having to invent things for himself. Admiring James's fantastic performance in The 
American Scene, Auden noticed that the really interesting American writers gave the impression 
that no one had written before them. 
With European writers and intellectuals casting about to create images of order, the tradition of 
American writing was in a sense prophetic: 
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I should call ours an age of American literature, for the key elements in many American books 
seem to mirror the human situation in our epoch. Our perpetuation of the romantic tradition carries 
to both Americans and Europeans — in books like Walden, Moby Dick [sic], Leaves of Grass, 
Huckleberry Finn — a kind of racial memory of the wildemess we have all lost. The truly 
unexpected, the explosive, the dynamic quality of the undefined, man's awareness of himself 
moving through an utterly new situation — this is the great fact of life in our time and was 
prophesied by the Ishmaels, the Walt Whitmans, and other world-wanderers of nineteenth-century 
American epic literature. 
Kazin discerns a historical continuity operating through a metaphysics of self, a self-originating 
and self-fulfilling process of discovery. This — profoundly literary — idea of the self could 
compensate for the sense of political exhaustion among the liberal intellectual community: 
the feeling [dominates] that such character as our period has for the writer is one that he has 
discovered for himself. No one knows what the times are like any longer; the writer must draw the 
secret out of "the haunted air." The writer now discovers his reality and he makes his own bargain 
with reality; there is no objective solid presence out there that he can fully trust or believe in. But 
his solitariness is accompanied by a constant sense of discovery. Every idea, every fresh inroad 
into the true nature of things is one that the writer has brought back out of the ash heap of 
destroyed faiths around him.65 
In a later article, entitled "The Critic as Creator," Kazin presents a variation on the theme of 
the self healing the fractured historical sense. He argued that the great writers to emerge from 
the Twenties did so on the strength of their conviction that "truth" was freely accessible. 
Sharing Hemingway's sense of living under a different dispensation, Kazin submits that 
the great writer [of the Twenties] was an evangelist of the undisclosed truth... Faulkner now seems 
to me a moving example of a man with an almost religious trust in the power of truth to carry 
him on his way as a writer. He expresses the agony of an upper middle-class Southerner lamenting 
the loss of a tradition which came to an end with the Civil War. But his compassion for the Negro 
in the Light in August or for Dilsey in The Sound and the Fury goes deep into the internal pathos 
of the individual struggling against death to "have his say," as Faulkner puts it. Faulkner... 
manages to sum up a whole tradition, as Whitman sums up the last of the romantic, expansionist, 
confident America. He seems to me, in fact, the last American writer of great vision — the last 
in the tradition of Emerson or Whitman or Melville, the last writer who said to himself, "I am the 
axis on which the world turns." And that is why Faulkner looks so marvellously independent. 
Faulkner, then, was a peculiarly late, modern recrudescence of the classic American sense of the 
self which originated in Emerson. History in Faulkner is the tantalizing record of 
uncomprehended acts; it elicits the burden of the "egocentric predicament" as much as it 
retrospectively releases the furore of history, and so provides a private theatre for moral 
regeneration. Faulkner affirmed that history had to be lived as experience before it could be 
really understood. This was an appropriately chastening note to the intellectual climate of the 
Fifties, when radical historical interest was at a low ebb. But even more, Emerson's literary 
thought offered clues to historical deliverance. When he pondered several opening gambits for 
the preface to a book on the American literary imagination he would never actually write, Kazin 
was looking for common ground between Emerson's portrayal of man as the "reason" for reality 
and Dreiser engulfing him in the tyranny of the "real" world: "But the real subject was always 
the attempt, essential to art, to keep the imagination in view, not to drown man in the gloomy 
abstractions of a scientific reality." In these terms, Kazin added, Emerson "re-emerges as the 
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real genius of the 'modem.'" Though the accompanying sense of "reality" was missing in 
Emerson, it was the more vibrant in Walt Whitman, Emerson's torch-bearer: 
Whitman... finds the true balance, shows us that man's imagination has a home & a creative 
function in the world reality... show[s] us the needed connection to hislory, which from the point 
of view of the artist can be defined as the sense of the common forces that give unexpressed 
dimension to existence. [Whitman] sees much of the grandeur of life as such.... In Whitman we 
can see the first beginnings of the feeling for life itself as a mystical and organic entity which 
reaches its high point in Dreiser's portraits of the city...66 
To conclude, The Inmost Leaf explores a triple polarity in American literary thought after the 
liberals' retreat from radicalism. Kazin formulates a metaphysics of the individual self based on 
its dramatic relationship with reality, the self deriving its authenticity from its "gift of convicti-
on," and the interaction of these leading to an integrated, radical vision of history. By implicat-
ion, the self achieving legitimacy through the dramatic texture of its socio-cultural associations 
affirms the idea of politics as possible and viable moral action. Self, politics and history become 
mutually sustaining and creative propositions. In this respect, Kazin diverges sharply from Eliot 
on the selfs role. For the fact is that Kazin considers the self to be the carrier of tradition, 
whereas Eliot proposed "a continual extinction of personality" on behalf of tradition. Moreover, 
Kazin believed that the peculiarly metaphysical cast of American writing in itself ensured the 
continuous validation and revalidation of the tradition: 
the basis of [the] modem search for integrity lies in the lack of any philosophy, of what to think. 
Or rather, in the fact that each individual has been summoned up to the ark to read of the book 
of life for himself... The gift of conviction is the gift of belief... the living experience [of man's 
harmonious relationship with the universe]. Lack [of faith is] ... to create an image of order rather 
than to feel it.... 
For me... real writing is always in this relatedness — or it does not exist.67 
A Sensibility Defined 
Many observations Kazin has made in the course of his career put the selfs complex relation-
ship with the world at the centre of literary poiesis. At the same time, he continues to take a 
stand on the ongoing validity of a naturalist metaphysics while creating the vistas of historical 
possibility. Itself the initiator and the subject of poeticization, the self must nevertheless aspire 
to a critical consciousness of its dialectical relation to the world and of the empiricism of 
historical events. Its purpose in that capacity is to effect a "reconciliation with reality." Kazin 
is well aware that this confronts the American literary self with an old dilemma, viz. to what 
extent such extraordinary reliance on the self yields "knowledge." In other words, is the world 
to be regarded, as the Romantics did, as "an object to be gained," or as "part of an already 
existing relationship"?68 Leaf explores specimens of such relationships at the crossroads of 
Western culture and history. It discusses writers from revolutionary eras or considered revo-
lutionary by virtue of the slashing truth of their individual perceptions. They present individual 
worlds of experience whose complexity and vigour transcend liberal cultural doctrine. However, 
Leafs structure reflects a certain hierarchy of minds — and sensibilities — in the development 
towards the "already existing relationship." Essays on James Joyce, William and Henry James, 
and Marcel Proust open the compilation; Dreiser, Dostoevsky and Faulkner close it. The motif 
underlying this arrangement is the increasingly urgent sense of society's antagonism to the self 
and the increasing alienation of the creative intelligence in it. Kazin argues that the former 
taught writers coming after them "to see experience with new eyes" (L, 5), like Joyce, or, like 
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Proust, conferred eminent moral value on literary style as "forcing...the farthest limits of [their] 
own consciousness" (¿, 22). Also William and Henry James conveyed through their style an 
"innocence of personal spirit... that trusted in all the data of their inquiry, took the social forms 
for granted, and based life upon the integrity of the observing self." The Jameses exemplified 
"the Emersonian trust of their culture, in... its... instinctive trust in individuality" (L, 18). But the 
particularly contemporary relevance of Kazin's critical focus on the individual gift of conviction 
is his admission that the force of these writers' expression derived to a large extent from their 
strong associations with the historico-cultural foundations of their society: "They... worked in 
that period of modern history when the trust of man in his power to know was at it its highest, 
when the revolution of modern political democracy, science and materialism carried along even 
those who were skeptical of the idea of progress" (L, 19). Dreiser, Dostoevsky and Faulkner, by 
contrast, found themselves having to cope with a different cultural and social situation. The 
leading images in their work are those of social crisis, political disorder, revolt and cultural 
breakdown. The society of their time no longer showed the plasticity and receptiveness to 
creative thought that it had to some extent had for writers preceding them. To them, society was 
an antagonist, or, in its peculiarly modem failure to establish the conditions for its rational 
progress, the public embodiment of an inquisitorial, statist rationale stamping out independent 
critical thought. Dreiser, Dostoevsky and Faulkner took their material from the gradual alien-
ation of the social reality from the "common weal" — the ancient, Platonic origins of modern 
politics. Precisely this, viz. the crisis of society as tradition, makes them exemplary contempo-
rary minds. For Kazin believes postwar man was no longer able to "tell in his atomic insecurity 
how much his inner conflicts, human duplicated, contribute to the social disorder and how much 
they are made by it" (L, 255). William and Henry James suffered no such ambiguity in their 
social and cultural affections, and that is what both exalts and limits their contemporary uses» 
This analysis is given a basis in the postscript to the 1955 edition of On Native Grounds, 
which caused that book to emerge in a new light, since it was originally conceived on the 
assumption that "the age [was] working... with the writer." Kazin claims that he continues to 
have "the strongest identification" with his old, radical ideals, however much compromised these 
might have become in the shift towards consensus politics in the Fifties. These include the 
conviction that "truth" arises from their dramatic encounter with the "social forms." The selfs 
experience of society governs its basic conditioning in reality. Thus, the contemporary American 
writer faces a double challenge: 
we are all too busy discovering the nature of the world around us to think of transforming it. It 
is not hopelessness one sees today, as the Marxists would say; it is a manifest feeling of strange-
ness before a kind of life that has actually outrun all the names we can give to it. The writer who 
is always reaching out into this strangeness to say what things are really like... cannot feel the 
kind of old-fashioned force, the tonic resistance, that writers felt when the world had a more 
secure character for them, when it was still solidly there, for them to change. In our age the good 
writers give the effect of being explorers into cosmic space; and the individuality they want, and 
need, is not that of the "non-conformist." Society itself is fundamentally too disorganized in it its 
values to exact conformity; what it wants is obedience, in order to convince itself that its exists at 
all. 
The key word in our time is not rebellion but knowledge. Man's very nature is a predicament 
to him, and society is not a collection of philistines who have rigid values which he opposes but 
a collection of people whose own traditions are dead and who are looking for convictions. This 
is why the critical imagination plays so large a role in modern-day culture, for ideas bring life; 
and why the best writers of our time — whether it be Malraux in The Voices of Silence, or 
Edmund Wilson searching into the deep, deep well of the past — have the effect not of opposing 
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a status quo but of creating the new reality of mind where, in all our unexpectedness, we can 
live.69 
The American writer's creative effort must therefore be geared — like Edmund Wilson's — 
toward the defence and the continuity of the public intelligence, for the image of history in 
Wilson's work is an enduring touchstone. 
Sherman Paul has aptly noted that the sense of doom reverberating in the title of the compi-
lation presently under discussion refers to the public realm. The title's reference intones the 
standard of Kazin's critical assessment in all the essays, viz. to map the habitat of human 
perception and creative experience. In an age of intellectual despair and social breakdown, Kazin 
has sought to establish this as the core of a new tradition — "the new reality of mind" — in the 
public, political intelligence. Paul believes that this "inalienable central creative self' had a 
counterpart in the dominant cultural dialectic of the Fifties, viz. Lionel Trilling's notion of the 
"opposing self." In a collection of essays of that title, Trilling delineated a quality of self 
"beyond the reach of cultural control," motivated by a profound need to retain a clear focus for 
a comprehensive cultural critique filling the space once occupied by scientific socialism. 
Trilling's subject matter in The Opposing Self studies instances of personal crisis — Keats's 
anticipation of imminent death, Dickens suffering a midlife crisis, Henry James mourning the 
death of his mother — in an effort to avoid facing the deplorable public record of the radical 
will. The essays evince a residual immunity from social conditioning: they possess a more 
highly calibrated, because disillusioned, sense of the inherent constraints of their situation than 
Trilling's radical contemporaries did. Whether their views in any way adumbrated, or provided 
guidance in, the international crisis of civilization facing the intellectual class of that time, was 
a point Trilling carefully avoided broaching. The essays actually appear to plead a deliberate 
standoff, a resolve not to get caught in the act of reckless militancy against the classical 
humanist virtues of moderation, balanced judgment, and moral reserve. What was at stake was 
a certain redefinition of "the modem" which, in Trilling's view, after Stalin's destructive 
paranoia and the Holocaust, had shown an excessive and neurotic fascination with the violent 
extremes of modern history. He argued that this type of modernism actually performed a 
"negative transcendence of the human" through its obsession with morbidity and perversity, with 
nihilism and despair. Modem literature, he protested, could not emulate Wordsworth's placid yet 
exhilarating acceptance of the limits life sets on the human will: " We are in love, at least in our 
literature, with the fantasy of death. Death and suffering, when we read, are our only means of 
conceiving the actuality of life." Trilling's polemical interpretation of modernism enabled him 
to advance the moderate outlook of earlier bourgeois humanism as a vital element in modern 
culture. In his essays on Howells, Keats, and Wordsworth, he deprecated the tendency of 
advanced literary intellectuals to separate thought from the conditions of life, thus sanctioning 
the extremity of their own opinions. At the same time, as Krupnick observes, these essays could 
be read as "prayer[s] for a certain kind of selfhood." Trilling particularly praised Howells for 
"the benign relaxation of the will," enabling him to grasp life's essential goodness and its 
"charm of the mysterious." Krupnick, however, has convincingly argued that the ensuing 
emphasis on the relaxation of moral judgment was culturally inappropriate in the post-Holocaust 
era.70 
The Inmost Leaf features the self gradually coming to grips with the contradictions of modem 
Western civilization. None of Kazin's essays invoke classical humanism and Howellsian virtues 
as counterprinciples to modemist despair. While acknowledging the pervasive modern sense of 
crisis, they ultimately cohere in the libertarian potential of radical selfhood. It is through acts of 
self-interpretation and self-articulation, Kazin believes, that modern man achieves some measure 
of inviolability and asserts his full reality in the face of his own gift for converting potential 
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good into immediate evil. The continuity of modern literature provides the most suggestive 
evidence of that articulated full reality. Fittingly, Kazin concludes his book with an essay on 
Faulkner, who extracted his creative vision from the spiritual and moral turmoil that is history's 
only, and retrospective, sanction. This is the writing selfs raison d'être. Leaf maintains the 
tragic balance between the selfs claims to its inward realization and the inevitability of the 
historical process. 
Beyond any assertion of the radical historical will or retrospective moral justice, Kazin's faith 
in the self reflects its capacity to acknowledge, as well as to achieve the fullest consciousness 
of, the naturalism of its living state. This requires a high degree of tragic awareness, of dramatic 
interest in the enigma of modern society. For the highest imaginative — and political — truth 
could only emerge from the persistent effort to probe the heart of the modern crisis and so 
recover an indestructible image of the universal human condition. From the example of 
Dostoevsky's "heroes of truth" Kazin derives his abiding insight that imaginative sanctions do 
not include historical panaceas. In the cultural context of the Finies, this did not so much 
qualify Dostoevsky as a reactionary but rather made him a superb universalist mind: "Just as the 
revolutionary seeds planted in the Russian October have sprouted into all the real political 
conflicts of our time, so Dostoevsky's notes on nineteenth-century futility, sloth and yearning 
for a new faith emerge as the real parables of modern character and of [the] 'neurotic personal-
ity of our time'..." (I, 254) In the sequence of essays discussed, Kazin marshals evidence to 
show that historical ideals have continued to be vindicated by personal, creative vision. At the 
pitch of genius, as in Faulkner, such vision may fuse with history: 
All history makes up a single past. This past is contemplated, but its reverberations inside the 
human mind are continuous. All one's effort as a man must be to understand what has been done, 
what is the meaning of the saga that must be lived before it can be told. 
In a culture desperate for possible visions of the future, Kazin has created one out of his critical 
encounter with the experience of the past, granting it contemporaneity. He fully endorses 
Edmund Wilson's concern for "a new reality of mind where — in all our unexpectedness — we 
can live."71 
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History into Future: Contemporaries 
The Opening and Closing of Historical Minds: Abraham Lincoln, Moral Hero 
An interpretation of the significance of tradition in the present, Contemporaries also addresses 
the future. On November 4, I960, Kazin noted the following in his diary: 
The essay book turns on the definition of the future. The future as death, too easily predictable in 
scientific terms, as today. The future as equal to man's ideas, man's will (the revolutionary — 
Enlightenment idea). The future as that which is implicit in man's present sensations — the 
necessary next step... 
...The necessary future is the future yet-to-be-imagined.... Today it is exactly the predicted and 
predictable future, the rationally constructed future, that afflicts us. As it is the purely curative 
rather than the philosophic (-orphie-) truth of psychoanalysis that pervades American opinion. 
The phrasing and the sustained moral tone recall Whitman's concern for the Republic in 
Democratic Vistas. Whitman coupled a trenchant analysis of contemporary America's civic state 
to an orphie disclosure of the future. His poetic celebration of the Republic's beauty was 
perhaps most vividly expressed in "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd." "Lilacs" 
celebrates the climactic moments of the Republic's crisis and culminates in a resounding 
affirmation of its divine cause. It celebrates the ongoing creative strength of the civic-political 
heritage in the figure of Lincoln.' 
Lincoln's place in the history of the American mind may illuminate what Kazin regards as 
the proper subject of the historical imagination, viz. "the totality of man's effort." Writing on 
the occasion of the centennial of the War Between the States, in 1961, he deplored the facile 
arguments used by contemporary historians to suggest that the war could have been averted "if 
only people had been sensible": "The inescapable fact is that if you look at the passionate 
writing that helped to bring the war about, that in turn came out of the war, and that, among 
Southerners at least, has never ceased to come out of the war, you can see why even the endless 
debates between American historians as to the causes of the war seem dry and inconclusive by 
contrast with the torment of principle, the convulsion of experience" (C, 71). This supports 
Kazin's view that the course of history will be justified by a full understanding of the moral 
dilemmas that are its driving force. He agrees with the gist of Allan Nevins's historiography of 
the war, which awarded Lincoln a vital degree of moral lucidity and a profound capacity for 
embracing the contradictions at the heart of the political Union. Lincoln, said Nevins, was the 
staunch and eloquent defender of "our ancient faith," of a national consensus threatened with 
destruction by political fanaticism. Kazin explains : 
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In a country like the United States, ceremoniously founded on certain propositions of political 
theory, effective political utterances have naturally tended to invoke principle for purposes of 
common rhetoric. It was agreement upon a common basis of political aspiration, not the common 
experience of a "folk," that in one sense held the country together — this consensus was, indeed, 
the country's only real tradition. All political speeches had to attach themselves to '76, the 
Constitution, the Founding Fathers, the great and noble experiment in liberty and self-government 
that was the United States. Even the most extreme proslavery arguments, so reactionary in their 
views of human nature, appealed to the Constitution and to the enlightened political theory behind 
it. It is always this profound commitment to the Republic as his absolute political standard that 
gives Lincoln's writing its assurance. 
...Lincoln's style itself expresses the patient hope for the future that was the essence of his 
position. (C, 72-3) 
Lincoln's genius was to pursue enlightenment and liberty despite "the tonnent of principle and 
the convulsion of experience." He saw these as the theme of human existence, pointing the 
necessity of unremitting moral determination. Lincoln as the leader of the war-torn Union 
epitomized Kazin's conviction that the liberal interpretation of history must take into account the 
tragic contradictions of the national experience on which Lincoln sharpened his moral sense. 
The latter, Kazin implies, certainly did not arise from moral pragmatism. Contrary to Louis D. 
Rubin's assessment of the ideological legacy of the war, which Rubin describes as "impressing 
upon the American people the dangers of rigid, abstract moral or legal positions, and the virtues 
of pragmatic tolerance, accommodation, compromise," Kazin argues that the American experi-
ence at the time was marked by irreconcilable contradictions and that these continue to have an 
impact on historical consciousness. Lincoln named slavery as the cause of the Civil War, and 
Kazin agrees: "What other cause could there have been but slavery, the contradiction of 
democracy which made it impossible for other men to be free?" (C, 83). Whitman's Specimen 
Days, in Kazin's view the best book on the Civil War, arose from the complexities of the 
democratic experience; it expressed the democratic condition itself through Whitman's poetic 
urge.2 
The expression of that condition is an exercise of the historical sensibility, and it takes the 
form of ideas when it enters literature.3 Not unlike Faulkner's exacerbated historical conscious-
ness, Kazin's secures history's open-endedness." He does not tolerate the high-minded moral 
claims of political ideology but rather stresses the counterforces that life in society produces, 
which break them down. In Kazin's work, as in Faulkner's fictional world, any assertion of 
purposive historical, even moral action, founders on the ambivalence that experience breeds: 
"Action and recognition are fatally separate... the retrospect of history is man's only real power 
of understanding."5 It is this Faulknerian "burden of awareness" that provides the focus of 
Kazin's idea of history: 
In later times... it became easy for historians to argue that slavery was not the cause of the war, 
since most people, even in the North, had certainly not been against it. But if most people in the 
North were not against slavery, slavery was certainly against the freedom of most people in the 
North. There is a curious, statistical way of thinking today which claims that the cause of a 
conflict must be something that most people are consciously aware of and want to go to war for. 
But the deepest interests are often those which we are not entirely conscious of, issues we cannot 
escape. 
The Negro was such an issue and he remains one. So long as he was a slave, no one else in 
America was really free. As soon as people even anticipated his freedom, they had to look further 
and anticipate his becoming a citizen like themselves. So Allan Nevins is right when he says, at 
the end of his conclusive review of the events leading up to the Civil War, that the war broke out 
over slavery and the future status of the Negro in America. Look around you. (C, 83) 
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To Kazin, a key insight of the historical imagination is that the past is completed, final, irrevoc-
able, but that its contradictions continue to haunt us with unabated force. The issues facing us 
today are to a large extent determined by the conflicts of the past, hence the shape of the present 
is the continuation and confirmation of the integral past. In accordance with Faulkner's insight 
that "the past is never dead... is not even past," Kazin continues to try and discover its design 
and to sort out its impact on the present. 
The Opening and Closing of Historical Minds: Edmund Wilson, Images of Crisis 
Contemporaries is concerned with "the definition of the... necessary future... as equal to man's 
ideas, man's will..." The peculiar historical sensibility it targets is committed to a critical sense 
of perspective and an awareness of continuity, together exemplifying the virtues of the cultural 
imagination. Kazin unmistakably follows in Edmund Wilson's footsteps. He shares Wilson's 
conviction that the complex resources of tradition are increasingly neglected at the present time. 
To clinch his point, Wilson reported looking with disbelief on the America depicted in Time 
magazine. A similar ambivalence sets the tone in many pieces in Contemporaries: "The disquiet 
of the present prompts this book, but the imagination in it turns to the past," says Sherman Paul: 
"The tone of Contemporaries is harsher than that of the previous collection; there is desperation 
in it, and its taste is sour. The present is shutting down. Kazin finds nothing auspicious in it..."6 
Kazin is not Wilson's epigone, however.7 Himself eager to capture "the beauty of history 
itself," he chides Wilson for cultivating a defiantly self-centred and biassed view of historical 
evolution. As early as January 1950, Kazin wrote to Wilson that "you sometimes give the 
impression of indifference to contemporary books (i.e. in your published criticism)." Barely six 
months later, Kazin found enough material in Wilson's play The Little Blue Light (1950) to 
blame him for a certain bleakness of historical outlook: 
I literally grew up, as a critic, on your books — read and reread every last one with a feeling of 
such instinctive sympathy, pleasure and admiration, that afterwards it astonished me to realize that 
we fundamentally disagreed on many things, and that our approaches to literature, to the world, 
could be quite different. 
I first realized this when reading Europe Without Baedeker — the last part troubled me 
profoundly, as I had been troubled by a certain après nous la deluge pessimism and disdain in 
your novel [Memoirs of Hecate County, 1946]. And now your play is a new case in point.... One 
of the things I have noted most about your recent work, and notice very sharply in the play, is 
what I can call your calamitousness — a feeling that everything has gone to rack and ruin, that the 
younger generation has never known what it is to have any fun in life, the great power machines, 
the slick mass magazines, the totalitarian parties... have frozen us all hard into a situation from 
which there is no relief, and no appeal — except for a few old-fashioned democrats who believe 
in freedom, and practice it. Well, the situation is horrible, and is getting worse all the time.... But 
what is wrong, to my mind, is the curious suggestion that your work often gives off that the 
situation is closed, that the younger people have never had enough experience of old-fashioned 
freedom to see how bad it all is.... I do feel that there is an exaggerated kind of pride behind all 
this.... Every last thing you say in your play is true; [but] the way in which you say it... is 
peculiarly without that love — which itself is hope.... [This is] what I do feel to be a certain 
disdainful pessimism in your attitude toward the contemporary scene... 
Wilson replied promptly, skirting the issue: "...The Little Blue Light was intended as a satire & 
warning: as Hecate County was. In the long view, I am not pessimistic (though disgusted with 
a good deal that is going on)..." Kazin believed Wilson's despair was that "the classical republic 
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might be a lost tradition," but that he failed to see that history is the reflection of man's tragic 
moral condition. Nor could Wilson muster the imaginative and moral resources to back a 
historical vision. In To the Finland Station, for instance, he had used his literary skills of 
selection and association, producing a gripping account of the series of events that catalyzed the 
social appeal of Marxism. But it struck Kazin that the book contained no evidence whatever that 
Wilson had become either a believer in Lenin's Socialism or a convert to the radical cause. Par-
ticularly its historical dénouement, viz. Lenin arriving at the Finland Station in Saint Petersburg 
to spearhead the revolution, contrasted sharply with the public outrage, when the book came out, 
over Stalin having sold out the radical heritage to the German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop. 
Nothing in Wilson's stylized account had prepared for such blind spots in the evolution of 
Marxism. And for that matter, Kazin claimed, Wilson lacked the political imagination to see to 
what extent the impact of complex social issues compromises the radical will: 
Wilson tended to be uneasy and fussy in dealing with political ideas that removed him from the 
personal and historic context. His greatest interest in any subject was his learning it. Socialism was 
not an ideal but an obligation to himself to remove every intellectual obstacle in his exploration 
of it. He liked to affirm himself a materialist, an atheist, even a behaviorist. My fascination with 
Wilson was not based on these professions of ideas.8 
Where Wilson fell foul of Kazin was in his account of the new society riveted together by 
the economic and social forces unleashed by the Civil War. Wilson had been cool in his praise 
of On Native Grounds, had grumbled that he considered the historical era it covered his own 
special province, but Kazin surmised that the era of the Great Barbecue "was the crisis period 
that haunted him." Wilson's cherished image of the late nineteenth century, of History as the 
august communication of Great Minds, had been exposed as untenable.9 
Patriotic Gore epitomized Wilson's attitude to his material. Reading its introduction, Kazin 
was "properly shocked." Wilson cut a figure as a "small-town American atheist and crank"; the 
tropisms of his reductionist historical interpretations Kazin dismissed as "animalism."10 Like 
a cranky, old-style, small-town American intellectual, Wilson had sought to preserve his 
immediate, but essentially circumscribed, cultural setting. A narrowly defined cultural sense had 
always backed him up and he was not prepared to see its peculiarly intellectual calibre, which 
was virtually his family heritage, compromised. Wilson's was a protestantism similar to that of 
the traditionalist Southerner: 
How can he feel fundamentally any different from the Southern agrarians? Against centralization, 
against bigness, against, above all, the Calvinist God or history-as-God; against all the 'big' ideas. 
Thinks that all ideas of history are religious or superstitious. 
...Wilson [is] revealingly American in that the thinks we can get away from a conception, a 
mythology altogether. So he introduces his little fables of the animal world [in the introduction to 
Patriotic Gore]. 
To Kazin, this attitude denied the possibilities for a transcendent interpretation of history. 
Wilson's cranky individualism, his 'agin'-ness, proved his unwillingness to believe that the 
contemporary social material, viz. democracy and mass society, could ever hope to earn the 
imaginative sanction of a work of art. For true contemporaneity to be established "after the 
decay of the tradition," and so preserve some sense of "history behaving organically, through a 
hundred filaments and cells of the social body" (C, 411), Kazin suggested, would require a 
belief in history as the possibility of form, just as the authenticity of the self would be accom-
plished by its living relationship with the world. Wilson himself never conceded that his own 
role in history could be problematic: "there was some patrician belief that through style everyt-
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hing, even in his disordered country, would yet fall into place.... Wilson... depended on 'style' 
in an aristocratic-political sense more familiar to English universities and the House of Com-
mons than to American intellectuals." Wilson's view was that the evolution of history could be 
exemplified only in the biographies of superior men and women. Patriotic Gore, in particular, 
featured Oliver Wendell Holmes, Noah Webster, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Abraham Lincoln, 
Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman. Their biographies formed an eminently literary 
texture, heightening the impact of "this greatest of all national American experiences." In 
addition, Wilson applied a degree of historicization that turned the personages into 
"commanding figures in a great American epic": 
There, in the heroes, the writers, the sensitive consciences, the faithful diarists of the conflict, was 
Edmund Wilson's own story. There was no real social history in his book..., no grasp of the real 
social issues and movements behind the war and nineteenth-century America. History to the "old 
radical" was still, as it had been to Emerson, biography." 
The preface to Patriotic Gore proved that certain requirements of intellectual style distort 
historical meaning. While the body of the book offered compelling historical narrative, Wilson 
nevertheless opened his book with a preface that read as if composed to drive off anyone still 
holding the illusion that the Civil War was historically necessary. As if the title (from "Maryland, 
My Maryland") were not surly and sarcastic enough, Wilson compared the Northern "refusal to 
grant the South its independence" (certainly an unhistorical way of putting it) to the Soviet 
suppression in 1956 of the Hungarian revolt. The history of the United States was nothing but a 
big power drive. 
This was the kind of "moral extremism" that Kazin also objected to in Arthur Schlesinger's 
historiography of the New Deal. In Wilson, it was a self-willed traditionalism, or rather a 
romantic isolationism that could not cope with recent historical developments. Wilson applied 
his conspiratorial theory of history to just about any major contemporary event, insinuating that 
Roosevelt had deliberately tricked the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor, ascribing sinister 
motives to both the United States's bombing of Hiroshima and their Cold War policy of 
containment, blaming Washington for frustrating Castro's Socialist revolution so that he came 
to see Moscow as a natural ally. He evidently had no use for Whitman's view of the develop-
ment of democracy in the United States as an "open road." But above all, Wilson had been 
"wild enough to write that though Jews had strong reasons for fighting Hitler, it was wrong of 
them to support the war, since 'the extermination of six million Jews was already very far 
advanced by the time the United States took action.'" The burning moral passion and the faith 
in American moral heroism informing Patriotic Gore was evidently reduced to calamitous 
political realism in its preface. To Kazin, the book conveyed "the decay of tradition" within the 
span of a single mind: apparently, there was not even a remote possibility that Wilson could 
bring the moral heroism he had so lovingly traced in the literature of the Civil War to the relief 
of the European Jews facing extermination. Wilson's single-minded interest in literary effort, 
which was the primary characteristic of his style, came out as fatalism and philosophical 
determinism. As a historical mind, so Kazin believed, Wilson was incapable of contemplating 
a historical continuum other than that which existed in the informed individual mind and 
persisted in the "old radical'"s conviction of it as plain biography. Wilson led one to believe 
that the glory of the republican idea had died with Lincoln and that superior minds in America 
had been in flight from the pressures of modern mass society ever since.12 
Wilson's interpretation of the historical current was rather defensive, and it relied altogether 
too much on the role of the mind isolated from the protean nature of society, on a narrowly 
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defined set of cultural assumptions, on taste and civic intelligence. Matters beyond his immedi-
ate purview could not lay claim to his genuine imaginative interest, Kazin asserts. He was blind 
to the antagonisms of the political democracy that emerged after the Civil War. And quite in 
keeping with his cultural traditionalism, he stuck to altogether patrician and rigid notions of the 
function of the political intelligence in modern America. He regarded Lincoln as a superior mind 
frustrated by the frayed populist sentiments of a divided, fledgling democracy.13 His conviction 
that it was great minds that determined history's course occasionally expressed itself as 
"unthinking" dogmatism. Wilson's position could even be described as historical suspicion, bred 
by the need to stand apart from the rabble and its pretensions as well as the ambitions of those 
in power.14 Both the preface to Patriotic Gore and the book itself proved that Wilson saw a 
deep chasm emerging between the form of the past and the experience of the present. Accordi-
ngly, despite Contemporaries' s dedication, Kazin denies Wilson the status of "contemporary." 
His book aims to succeed where Wilson failed, viz. in creating the transcendent glow at the 
heart of the literary sense of "contemporary" history. Kazin traces the idea of history as an 
"open form," of society as its medium, and of the relationships governing the American selfs 
identity. 
The "Modern," Enemy of the Contemporary 
Kazin's concern with the quality of contemporary liberalism and the modes of selfhood it 
sponsored inspired his criticism of Edmund Wilson's historical work. Its loss of momentum in 
the course of the Fifties has been extensively documented. Irving Howe, among others, dis-
cussed its origins in the "genetic myth" of the "polity" in America, viz. as envisioning a politics 
explicitly concerned with the idea of society. He argued that its paramount expression was in the 
work of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman. Howe believed that the grassroots demo-
cratic process was the mainstay of nineteenth-century expression in America: "The mundane 
vulnerability of the republican arrangement enabled our literature to rise to that imaginative 
autonomy that distinguishes it in the nineteenth century.... The sturdiness and roominess of a 
stable liberal polity allow literature the freedom to 'transcend' it, and even oppose it in the name 
of higher values." The cultural impact of the Civil War, however, had presumably blunted its 
spiritual edge and it deteriorated into "social liberalism," ultimately little more than "a politics 
of making do." Bitterness and disenchantment over the intractable nature of social reality caused 
liberalism in the late nineteenth century to turn inward and become ironic, muted, wary and 
despairing. By the 1920s, literature had apparently lost its connection with "the collective myth" 
of the national experience in the nineteenth century. Even Edmund Wilson, Howe observed, in 
finally mounting "a truculent resistance to the cant of our time... [evinced a certain degree of] 
bafflement and disappointment with the liberal heritage," whereas initially it had figured for him 
"as an American memory." Increasingly, the liberal virtues proved to be doubt, hesitation and 
irony.15 
In the lead essay of Contemporaries, "The Background of Modern Literature," Kazin 
explores the relation between literature and liberalism in the wider context of Western cultural 
history. Its conclusion, that "the modern" has become "the enemy of the contemporary" (C, 24), 
provides the keynote for his entire work after Walker.16 He argues that the classical tenet of 
liberalism, viz. the feasible, rational management of society under political democracy, has 
worked a radical dissociation of past and present in the modern mind. In effect, the essay is an 
indictment of the contemporary generation of liberal intellectuals, whose disillusionment about 
scientific historicism caused them to adopt patently unhistoric models of tradition. Kazin 
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believes it was "liberal" followers of T.S. Eliot in particular who espoused "an unhistorical piety 
about the past" (C, 16). 
The dissociation of historical consciousness set in with the emergence of "modem" literature 
at the end of the eighteenth century. Modem literature was bom under the aegis of Romantic-
ism, which Kazin defines as a moral-philosophical defence of a personal cosmos. Romanticism 
sought to restore the unity of the poetic imagination, which had been broken up by the authority 
of pure reason. The Romantics felt that the conventional scientific view of the world — and of 
man's place in it — had narrowed down the scope of human possibilities, fragmenting cons-
ciousness: "The great insight of the Romantics — and of those who have become the fundamen-
tal type of modem writer in our day, Joyce and Proust and Yeats — is that the world which 
science seeks so laboriously to understand must be grasped through man, not despite him... the 
modem writer, as early as the eighteenth century, took his stand on human consciousness as the 
key to reality" (C, 4). In order to emancipate the power of vision from the experience of 
necessity, the Romantics had plied a precarious dichotomy between world and mind. Romanti-
cism deliberately sought to capture the world in symbols and so humanize it, but its claims to 
that effect were historically overstated: "the language in modem poetry... is... often regarded by 
the poet as 'ultimate' and irreducible in its truth." This was particularly the case with Symboli-
sm. Although Romanticism, too, endorsed the view that the process of poiesis yielded the most 
authoritative version of human consciousness, it regarded the literary artefact as a product of the 
power of revelation, and hence still maintaining a vital relationship with the world rather than 
as a self-referential realm of consciousness beyond the impact of external reality: "Where 
Symbolism broke with Romanticism was on the question of form, not belief. Romantics like 
Whitman assumed that the revelations they made in their poems were in line not only with their 
own unconsciousness but with the moral order of the world, and that the 'rapt' inspiration of the 
poet was in perfect correspondence with God, society, science, and truth" (C, 6).'7 Kazin 
reaffirms that Romanticism is an essential element in the nineteenth-century American tradition 
of social-civic thought. Elsewhere, he notes Whitman's concern with the new social self. The 
Symbolists, however, actually derived much of their poetic justification from their unremitting 
opposition to historical and social modes of selfhood. By implication, they denied imaginative 
sanction to all experience of the actual world as possible subject matter: "By opposing sensation 
to conscious understanding, the poem to prose, the poet to society, the Symbolists diverted 
poetic imagination from the transcendental to the subjective." Under the Symbolist aegis, 
"modem" literature cultivated an intense dialectic of word and world, and granted priority to 
imaginative order which, presumably, the former readily conveyed and the latter disrupted. 
Symbolism was reluctant to deal with social concepts of self; it disregarded the very essence of 
life in society, which is characterized by change, conflict, the explosive dynamism of 'external' 
events. It was particularly out of step with the drama of social existence, indeed, with historicity 
itself. Kazin suggests that its "implied despair of the outside world [and] commonplace human 
experience" may have been an expression of modernity and the marginalization of enlightened 
thought in mass democracy (C, 7). 
Kazin believes that this particular strain of "modem" literature obscured the value of 
experience as the most reliable index to reality. "Nature," he points out, is the sphere in which 
man realizes his consciousness of his infinite relationships with the world. Self and not-self 
share common ground there, setting the stage for the drama by which they know and define 
each other: "Even the most famous Romantic definition of Shakespeare's creative power — 
Keats's conception of 'negative capability,' that the poet in himself is nothing but becomes in 
tum all the personages he creates — implies that genius is as mysteriously recreative of itself 
as nature is" (C, 7). This correspondence between experience and the revelatory quality of the 
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natural realm underlies Kazin's view that the moral genius of history, viz. its creative continuity 
and progress, does exist and can be made visible. 
The reality and interpretation of history figure prominently in Kazin's case against Symboli-
sm. He ticks off "genteel" poetry, Kipling's "athletic" celebration of empire, Harvard 
aestheticism and the Georgian cult of beauty alike as pointing to "that dependence on literature 
as consolation rather than as exploration of reality which was soon [i.e. by the beginning of the 
twentieth century] to mark off traditional poetry from that of the modern group" (C, 10). That 
group, under the tutelage of Eliot and Pound, reacted strongly against the diffused poetic 
tradition of the Romantics and condemned the Romantic faith in the poet as the paramount 
expression of a social entity, presiding over an august national destiny. In fact, both Eliot and 
Pound at some point cultivated a posture of ironic social detachment in poetry. Particularly Eliot 
reinterpreted the Symbolists' penchant for hermeticism as the experience of peripheralness: the 
times had apparently gone out of kilter and the poet, deprived of his traditional resources, could 
only provide a mimicry of deteriorating social and cultural forms. Kazin stresses that this was 
the role Eliot deliberately cultivated in his early career. He adds, however, that the superlative 
dramatic texture of Eliot's early poems — "Eliot went beyond the trancelike effect of Symbolist 
poetry... to catch the unaccountability of modern experience" — kept Eliot's poetic evocation 
of the emptiness of modern life itself from lapsing into meaninglessness. He caps his point with 
the observation that the presently clichéd analytical tools of modern criticism — paradox, 
ambiguity and tension — once served Eliot to define his position vis-à-vis a faltering tradition 
and to instill a basic knowledge of its ongoing contemporaneity. The leads in these poems were 
all contemporary, and "though he himself gravely attributed his literary debts to the Jacobean 
dramatists, the seventeenth-century metaphysicals, and marginal figures in French poetry like 
Laforgue and Corbière, it was the immediate dramatic verve of his poetry, besides its content 
of fashionable hopelessness, that made it so tonic and effective" (C, 11). Thus, Eliot, despite his 
disdain for the contemporary democratic experience and his avowed preference for the tradi-
tional past, comes out as a contemporary. 
Pound went beyond Eliot and advanced the view that the poetic medium and reality are 
disjunct. He extended this dichotomy to include a poetic theory of language as the prime 
generator of experience. To Kazin, the resulting self-consciousness of language was a watershed 
in the history of American writing. It constituted a radical break with the American tradition of 
the Romantic self exhilarated by the creative correspondence between nature's and its own 
realization. The "Postscript" to the 1955 edition of On Native Grounds describes American 
literature as offering "a training in the world sense... in the fantastic freedom of the imagination. 
[...] a powerful and poetic sense of the individual's identity..."18 Eliot's and Pound's work 
lacked this vital sense of the dramatic interaction of the self with the world of actuality. Their 
work promoted the mind's consciousness of itself, particularly its fascination with its own 
perplexing complexity. Kazin claims the result was "a glorification of contemplation and a 
minimizing of the actual world process." He believes Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, 
Kafka's The Castle, and Virginia Woolf s and D.H. Lawrence's novels signified "the 'poetic' 
reconquest of the novel" (C, 12), for the modern movement was typically experimentalist, with 
a marked anti-democratic view of society. It showed a defiant, avant-gardist determination not 
to become bogged down in the world of historical happenstance, actually furnishing its antithe-
sis. It had no taste for the democratic idea as a unifying vision of modern life, nor did it 
subscribe to the classical civic faith in manifest historical evolution. Contrary to the public role 
that Dickens, Balzac and Dostoevsky, for instance, cultivated, "the great seminal figures in the 
modern movement remind one in their early days of old-fashioned conspirators and revolutiona-
ries. And like modern revolutionaries, they were leaders and instigators, not brothers of those 
they led"(C, 13). 
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Kazin traces the unfolding dichotomy of past and present in the history of the modern 
literary mind to this lack of a sense of community. If the experimental writer despaired of the 
cultural conditions of democracy to support him, he was similarly loath to identify with the 
democratic experience. Identification, as Kazin has pointed out elsewhere, requires the "dramatic 
sense of relationship" that Whitman poeticized all his life as "the fusing explanation and tie — 
what [is?] the relation between the (radical, democratic) Me...and the (conservative) Not Me...?" 
The Whitmanesque self — and the permutations it develops 'after the tradition' — was to 
become central to Kazin's work in the Fifties and after: "Just to pose that 'relation' shows 
political imagination." This social mode of selfhood appeals to both the civil intelligence and the 
historical imagination. Kazin sees the self— which "the modern group" believed illustrated the 
decline of tradition in modem times — as the appointed medium of tradition and 
contemporaneity. He includes it in a view of politics as a struggle for freedom and against 
rootlessness. It is a major resource against the widely postulated erosion of the public realm in 
the postwar era. The present matters anyhow: "All history I know well enough to write is 
contemporary history."19 
Melville and the Creative Human State 
Kazin's 1955 postscript to On Native Grounds is an appropriate epilogue to the historical vision 
its narrative conveys. In "Ishmael and Ahab," the leading essay of the section in Contemporaries 
entitled "The Relevance of the American Past," he emphasizes Melville's attempt "to create an 
image of life itself as a ceaseless creation" (C, 29), reaffirming his own conviction that the 
nature of mankind's common historical realm is revelatory, transcendent and providential. He 
makes Melville's work central to the modem liberal mind's problematic relation to reality. The 
essay also formulates an indictment of the anti-historicist, mythic bias of the modemist ethos 
and its tendency to glorify language as the prime modem heroic protagonist. The picture of 
existence presented in Moby-Dick 
becomes an uncanny attempt to come to grips with nature as it might be conceived with man 
entirely left out; or, what amounts to the same thing, with man losing his humanity and being 
exclusively responsible to primitive and racial memories, to the trackless fathomless nothing that..., 
in contradiction to all man's scriptures, had no divine history, no definite locus, but just was — 
with man slipped into the picture much later. (C, 38-9) 
This restores some sense of man's puniness as a historical actor and is a reminder of the extent 
to which the glory of his position in the natural world, though hard-won, is entirely self-
generated. Yet, the book's vision simultaneously creates the means to retain a sure grip ofthat 
world: a dialectics of language and world, of metaphysics and "nature," with the latter emerging 
as the guiding principle in man's perennial effort to explore the limits of his existence. 
Kazin carefully distinguishes Melville's achievement in Moby-Dick as a peculiarly modem 
one, while retaining the essential dualisms of Melville's vision that Richard Chase's "new 
liberalism" aimed to attenuate. The essence of Ishmael's single, reflective, narrative voice 
"sum[s] up the whole creation... and yet keeps at the center of it one American whaling voyage" 
(C, 30). A modem avant la lettre, Kazin argues, Melville was also, by some quirk of cultural 
history, a "contemporary." As such, his revival among postwar generations of baffled liberals 
was similar to Dostoevsky's. Dostoevsky was concerned with the grand delusions of the human 
heart and pictured man as the microcosm of society's larger conflicts. Melville rather affirmed 
the transcendent power of the subjective individual consciousness: 
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Always it ¡s this emphasis on IshmaeFs personal vision, on the richness and ambiguity of all 
events as the skeptical, fervent, experience-scarred mind of Ishmael feels and thinks about them 
, that gives us... the new kind of book that Moby-Dick is. [The book is] peculiarly personal, like 
so many twentieth-century novels, in its significant emphasis on the subjective individual cons-
ciousness. The book grows out of a single word, "I," and expands until the soul's voyage of this 
"I" comes to include a great many things that are unseen and unsuspected by most of us. And this 
material is always tied to Ishmael, who is not merely a witness to the story... but the living and 
germinating mind who grasps the world in the tentacles of his thought. 
The power behind this "I" is poetical in the sense that everything comes to us through a 
constant intervention of language.... But the most remarkable feat of language in the book is 
Melville's ability to make us see that man is... a mind that constantly sees meaning in everything 
it encounters. In Melville the Protestant habit of moralizing and the transcendental passion for 
symbolizing all things as examples of "higher laws" combined to make a mind that instinctively 
brought an inner significance to each episode. (C, 31) 
But Kazin emphasizes that Ishmael, even as homo signiflcans, is subject to all the rigours of the 
world of circumstance. The sheer violence of the living human state resists his reflexive cast of 
mind. It is particularly that, as Kazin implies, which typifies his condition as a modem man, for 
Ishmael remains locked up in an unending search for clues worth taking up and exploring: 
"Indeed, this agony of disbelief is his homelessness" (C, 32). The quest enjoined upon Ishmael 
supports Kazin's case for the transcendent dimension of human existence: only the mind's action 
may presume to create a meaningful design within the natural world. Salvation lies at the other 
end of the literary act. 
At a different level, Kazin's essay exemplifies an established insight of both liberalism and 
modern literature, viz. that thought and action will always maintain a dialectical tension. He sees 
Ahab as representing the peculiarly Romantic idea of willpower, the human will insisting on 
seeing the world in terms of its own needs. Ahab's Romantic excess is unmistakable: 
As Ishmael is all rumination, so Ahab is all will. Both are thinkers, the difference being that 
Ishmael thinks as a bystander, has identified his own state with man's utter unimportance in 
nature. Ahab, by contrast, actively seeks the whale in order to assert man's supremacy over what 
swims before him as the "monomaniac incarnation" of a superior power... 
Both actor and thinker ultimately meet over the terrible, protean character of their relation with 
the world: "But this Ahab does indeed speak for all men, who, as Ishmael confesses in the 
frightening meditation on the whiteness of the whale, suspect that 'though in many of its aspects 
this visible world seems formed in love, the invisible spheres were formed in fright'" (C, 34). 
Kazin stresses the heroism of Ahab's effort, which eclipses Ishmael's. He suggests that the 
ruthless momentum of Ahab's action prefigures the murky truth looming in the background of 
contemporary American writing, viz. the recognition "that such character as our period has for 
the writer is one that he has discovered for himself...[he] must draw the secret out of 'the 
haunted air.'"20 Ahab's rebellious spirit redefines that pregnant void: his attempt, as a "hero of 
thought," is to "reassert man's place in nature" (C, 35). Certainly, this provided moral consola-
tion for the generation 'after the tradition,' but the ultimate result of Ahab's intransigent will is 
to show that deliberate human motive dissipates as it precipitates into action. Yet, Ahab's 
impatience with a vacant universe sets the scene for life itself as the resounding drama of man's 
pursuit of meaning. Blind to the consequences of his own excess, he seeks to fill that cosmic 
vacancy with a metaphysical vigour rivalling the lost God. Kazin believes Moby-Dick makes a 
case for the power of transcendent vision while remaining thoroughly anchored in the ceaseless 
action of the contingent world. It is a defence of the imagination upsetting latter-day liberal 
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sentiments such as intellectual exhaustion and political consensus. Operating on this level, the 
imagination becomes the antithesis to the anxiety of modern thought and the liberal view of 'the 
irony of history.' It captures a new vision of society and a new order of mind: 
For the ancient covenant [with God] is never quite broken so long as man still thirsts for it. And 
because Ahab, as Melville intended him to, represents the aristocracy of intellect in our democ-
racy, because he seeks to transcend the limitations that good conventional men like Starbuck, 
philistine materialists like Srubb, and unthinking fools like Flash want to impose on everybody 
else, Ahab speaks for the humanity that belongs to man's imaginative vision of himself. 
...Moby-Dick is a representative of the passionate mind speaking, for its metaphysical concern, 
out of the very midst of life.... Melville insists that our thinking is not swallowed up by practical 
concerns, that man constantly searches for a reality equal to his inner life of thought — and it is 
his ability to show this in the midst of a brutal, dirty whaling voyage that makes Moby-Dick such 
an astonishing book. (C, 36) 
Melville's vision addressed the crisis of American liberalism at midcentury. Variously dubbed 
"new" and "revisionist" at the time, it effectively replaced "those pressures of conflicting classes 
and interest which make for sharply defined ideologies." Such pressures no longer featured in 
contemporary intellectual discourse, and the major effect of liberalism accordingly was to 
"bleach... all political tendencies." Irving Howe pointed out that the ensuing conservatism, when 
left "in the hands of serious imaginative writers," could "become a myth which, through 
abrasion, profoundly challenge[d] modern experience." Many contemporary liberals, however, 
did not endorse this vital role of the imagination in the cultural situation. They promoted the 
virtues of moderation and took pride in the deeper harmonies of social existence in America.21 
The American imagination of the past, Kazin believes, desperately seeks to recover the living 
sense of an as yet mystical centrality in human affairs. There, the enduring drama of the human 
predicament is enacted: man's attempt, and his ultimate failure, to control his fate by redesign-
ing the parameters of existence as aesthetic objects. The world is a constant reminder of man's 
imperfect vision, of his lasting moral and metaphysical deficiency. Consciousness may presume 
to approximate Nature, but it cannot create or change it. Ahab, Father Mapple, Starbuck, Pip 
and Ishmael alike suggest man's perennially tenuous hold on the natural world. Only Ishmael's 
narrative voice exemplifies the metaphysical resources that man has at his disposal to weave his 
multiple relationship with the world into a sustaining fabric: 
Man is not merely a waif in the world; he is an ear listening to the sea that almost drowns him; 
an imagination, a mind, that hears the sea in the shell, and darts behind all appearance to the 
beginning of things, and runs riot with the frightful force of the sea itself. There, in man's 
incredible and unresting mind, is the fantastic gift with which we enter into what is not our own, 
what is even against us — and for this, so amazingly, we can speak. (C, 40) 
Kazin's interpretation of Melville's mind extends beyond the definition of modem selfhood to 
the dissociated state of modern consciousness. Modernism-Symbolism found its raison d'être in 
its withdrawal from the experiential and historical worlds, creating a new epistemology eagerly 
adopted by former radical intellectuals in search of a new faith. Its analysis of the cultural 
situation, however, relied in great part on the self-conscious stylistic requirements of modern 
literary experiment, expressing "a despair of the present age" (C, 15) and threatening the very 
autonomy of the past as a discrete body of experience. An emergent strain in Kazin's work 
during the Fifties is precisely that the era's fashionable cultural thought trumped up versions of 
the past to suit its present polemical needs.22 If it was following in Eliot's footsteps, it was not 
doing so from any desire to formulate a comprehensive poetic theory, but rather in order to 
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provide a philosophical basis for a systematic attack on the past, to apply a merciless revision-
ism for the sake of a dialectics of pure, speculative thought. It slighted the significance of 
historical action and furnished an apologia for a metaphysics of unreconstructed indeterminacy. 
It represented the mind exercising unlimited censorship of experience. 
Robert Penn Warren and the War Within 
"The Southern 'City of the Soul'," a review of Robert P. Warren The Legacy of the Civil War 
published in the centenary year of the conflict, particularizes Kazin's criticism of self-contained 
readings of the past. He argues that Warren's sympathy for the Southern case tempted him to 
formulate a universal theory of human nature. Warren displayed the typically Southern 
intellectual's fascination with defeat, expressing itself as "a certain mordancy about human 
nature in general" (C, 178). His social ethos and philosophy of history, accordingly, were based 
on his view of the split in human nature and on his belief that all human effort ultimately 
cancels out to zero. He was emphatically concerned with the flawed, paradoxical and essentially 
destructive role assumed by modern man, whose belief in a social and historical eschatology 
Warren repudiates as the epitome of intellectual illusion. Kazin faults him for historical nostalgia 
reclaiming unhistoric states of innocence and perfection. 
In presenting his case, Warren used the Civil War as a moment of crisis expressing the loss 
of innocence and the limited possibilities for self-knowledge. The War features in his 
historiography as the grand historical cataclysm from which there was to be no recovery in 
modern times. He absolutized the human fallacy, using it to produce his own historical ideal, 
which was anterior to the record of democratic complication and in keeping with the convictions 
of "Higher-Law" apologists: "To judge from the recurring scene in Warren's novels of lovers 
guiltily expecting to be discovered, his harsh concern with guilt seems to be psychological as 
well as historical — and in fact [his] more recent novels have replaced with 'Freudian' explana-
tions what in the first and perhaps best novel, Night Rider, was presented in theological terms" 
(C, 179). 
For all of Warren's philosophical peregrinations, the abiding image is of historical crisis as 
the great equalizer in human affairs. Kazin, by contrast, believes a sense of the complications 
of the past is a vital condition for acquiring knowledge in the present: the divisions that rack us 
today are a necessary sequel to conflicts that arose in the past. To him, history confers both a 
unique opportunity and responsibility upon every single individual. He sees history as a radically 
open proposition, and distrusts Warren's tendency to picture the war as evidence of the self-
divided nature of human experience on both sides of the issue, rejecting it on the grounds that 
it tended to evaporate the sense of conflicting motives and ideas as historical agents: 
For any Southern failing, he [viz. Warren] has a Northern one to match it...The war did away with 
the inhuman abstractions of the Abolitionists as well as with the inhuman fantasies of unlimited 
power held by the slaveowners. The North was not for the Negro but for the Union; the South was 
full of people who felt more loyalty to the Union than they were able to avow. Human nature was 
the same on both sides... (C, 181) 
Kazin points out that Warren's historical analysis is essentially static. It reflects the Southerner's 
wish to believe that all history after the first shots were fired at Fort Sumter constituted the 
further adulteration of the sage, august character of prewar Southern culture. This includes the 
conviction that all experience is immutable, even under the pressure of rivalling and destructive 
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ideological states such as occasioned the Civil War. Thus, Warren denied the historical impetus 
present in particularized experience. 
Kazin recalls that it was many an unreconstructed Southerner's wish '"to feel different, but 
so far I can't help it,'" viz. to put his faith in a timeless morality. The corollary view of a 
certain centrality in human experience becomes very vivid in Warren's sequel: "Even if the 
Southerner prays to feel different, he may still feel that to change his attitude would be treach-
ery — to that City of the Soul which the historical Confederacy became... to the dead fathers, 
and even to the self. He is trapped in history." Kazin argues that the idea of historical stasis 
prevailing in the Southern mind ushers in the dissociation of self and history cultivated by many 
modem literary intellectuals. Warren's neglect of the historical dimensions of the human realm 
of action deprived historical thought of a vital sense of contingency and turned history into a 
timeless pattern of symbolism: 
The war is of course analyzed by Warren as the great school of experience in our history. But 
even when he shows the lessons it brought, you feel that it figures for him as the event which 
more than any in our history symbolizes the loss of innocence. He notes that Washington and 
Jefferson can never interest us now as do Lincoln, Lee, and Stonewall Jackson; the latter we see 
as "caught in dark inner conflicts." (C, 181) 
The war apparently epitomized the human condition as a nee plus ultra, whose depths were to 
be forever unrivalled in history. The upshot of this, to Kazin, is that the study of cultural and 
political genesis in the contemporary era suffers from the bias that human experience is essen-
tially beyond change. The peculiar urgency of realized experience bleaches under the strictures 
of the historical status quo. The inner and outer spheres, the public and private realms, the 
contingent world of historical actuality, private and national conflicts become fused. No longer 
an object held and shaped by the mind, history thus moves beyond human amelioration. What 
Kazin repudiates as Warren's '"pragmatism"' is its implicit distrust of the historical will, of life 
and history as 'open forms,' and of the self providing imaginative sanction for both: 
[Warren] seems to have taken on ["pragmatism"]... as a personal philosophy that accepts our split-
up, contradictory human nature and that views life as a matter of endless experiment. What 
Warren means by pragmatism, I would guess, is the symbol it furnishes of the American mind's 
usual opposition to dogma and fanaticism and the excessively theoretical. But can an imaginative 
artist really proclaim himself a pragmatist in this purely critical and even negative sense of the 
term? Can pragmatism — not as a philosophy in law or economics such as came out of the Civil 
War — serve a novelist in applying its lessons negatively to human nature? 
The truth is that no matter what philosophy of life a novelist may claim..., literature itself 
consists in saying "Yes" to life — not just to the "open" life that Warren praises, but to the life 
in every man, whether he is an Abolitionist or a slaveholder. Warren shows us the lessons that 
Americans learned from the Civil War, that we can learn still.... But should theories of human 
nature interest a novelist this much? ... Whatever it may be in general, life, perhaps for the artist 
alone, is life in particular, the life that in some deep sense never can disillusion or dismay. (C, 
182-3) 
For Kazin, "life in particular" is the vivid expression of the self, whose development 
Warren's almost theological conviction of man's inner division constrains within a pattern of 
defeat and disillusionment. Warren's practice as a novelist turns the self into a cultural relic, a 
"literary-radical version of Pauline doctrine." This dissolves the vital bonds linking the self to 
the context of social and political actuality, and leads to its disintegration. His own concern is 
to salvage its immediacy and integrity as the most significant setting for historical knowledge, 
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for he believes that the successive layers of its inward realization -— never reaching the irreduc-
ible core of being — argue that the nature of the historical experience is essentially a process 
and not a state. The historical process, and with it an authoritative image of the human condi-
tion, is captured not so much by formulating its ultimate goal as by granting its value as 
movement, as the creative development of "what groups together." And that is the specification 
set for the imagination when taking the self for its object: "The opposite of Warren's 
'sacramental' vision is not, as he suggests in the essay on Conrad, the 'sceptical' vision; it is the 
imagination working with what cannot be entirely construed as ideas and meanings; it is the 
imagination delighting in its own power."23 
Keats and the Radical Poetic Self 
Included in the revised edition of Contemporaries, which came out in 1982, is an essay entitled 
"Rome: A Meditation on Keats," which was first published in 1976 and addresses the complex 
relations between history, style and the self with greater cogency and in a broader perspective 
than any preceding. Several strands of Kazin's reconstruction of the self in the 'postpolitical' 
Fifties and after indicate that he was sensitive to the cultural dialectics Lionel Trilling was using 
to develop his idea of the "opposing self." Both critics had witnessed the destruction of their 
radical faith in a moral design for history and had tried to compensate this loss by developing 
a different, although equally radical, political-cultural position. In the political ice age of the 
Eisenhower era, a predominantly cultural definition of such radicalism seemed called for. 
Trilling was to contend that the old liberal radicalism needed to slough off its innocence and 
accept the chastening complexities of experience. Beyond that, he sought to correct the "radical 
instability in the modem self' that had resulted in the social, cultural and political ravages of 
two world wars and totalitarianisms of both left and right. In the Fifties, it was being rather than 
becoming, the latter involving an evolutionary view of man's stake in social and political 
processes, which commanded his interest. He promoted a naturalistic interpretation of the 
primordial human state, buttressing his views with extensive appraisals of Wordsworth's show 
of "ego-strength" in The Prelude. The concept he espoused for this purpose was "the biologi-
cal," and he described this as "a certain insouciant acquiescence in the anomalies of the moral 
order of the universe." It involved a reorientation on custom, nature, the organic. It dispensed 
altogether with the species of radical will that was the prime factor in scientific Marxism, and 
it represented to all intents and purposes a postrevolutionary, deeply conservative outlook. 
Trilling abandoned his still lingering liberal faith in historical activism altogether, promoting a 
sentiment of historical inertia, of the circularity of all historical development. He evidently 
believed that liberal radicalism had played out its role, and he apostrophized the contradiction 
of the radical will as a moral-cultural ideal. That ideal, expressing a sharp attack on the spine-
less scientism of vapid postradical liberals, he nevertheless associated in The Opposing Self with 
"the life of surprise and elevation, of impulse, pleasure and imagination."2,4 Though acutely 
aware of the dangerous impulses of modernist culture, Trilling's attitude to it was downright 
equivocal. 
Mark Krupnick has described Trilling's divided loyalty to the modemist heritage as follows, 
providing an excellent basis of comparison with Kazin's concern with a revitalized, transcendent 
sense of selfhood: 
Trilling himself often seems sympathetic to [the modemist] dream of absolute freedom. An 
example is when he writes of Jay Gatsby, who "sprang," as Fitzgerald says, "from his Platonic 
conception of himself." Unlike Gatsby, however, Trilling accepts "the conditions." He even seems 
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at times to be grateful for them, however much his ideal of "gratuitous" choice of selfhood would 
seem to imply a denial of limitations imposed by the past. 
In the Forties and Fifties, Trilling's interest in the various manifestations of the modem self was 
focused by the latter's "intense and adversary imagination of the culture in which it has its 
being." Krupnick has noted the wider implications of this, pointing to the "Freudian schema" 
that was the organizing principle of so many of Trilling's essays in the Fifties. Their basic 
argument invariably traced a conflict between a radical and a conservative principle, and 
Trilling's philosophical peregrinations around this polarity reflected his need to create a frame-
work of dialectical tensions rather than accept their resolution in the interest of a certain ideal 
of self. In this respect, the concept of "biologism," opposing inertia to historical vision, served 
to offset "a culture sick from the hypertrophy of the radical will."25 It offered protection from 
the lesions of modern culture, providing a soothing image of the past as cohering and unifying 
all experience, which was allegedly cyclical. 
Throughout Contemporaries, Kazin rejects the notion that the past furnishes an integral and 
static account of man's striving and of the nature of his experience. His own concern with a 
transcendent mode of self aims for a different analysis than Trilling's concept of "sincerity," nor 
does he conceive of the self and culture as maintaining an intransigently adversary relationship 
expressed in Trilling's idea of "authenticity." Most of all, he steers clear of Trilling's 
Freudianized "biologism."26 Kazin does share with Trilling what Krupnick calls an interest in 
"styles of personality," not as a modernist masque but as a useful moral frame of reference 
when addressing the decay of tradition which has occurred in the course of twentieth-century 
cultural history. He reports on that sense of dissolution in several essays and reviews included 
in Contemporaries, particularly in "The Background of Modern Literature," commenting on the 
antagonism between the aesthetic ideals of literary modernism on the one hand and the socio-
political and moral solutions proposed by its devotees for a culture in crisis on the other. In an 
implicit attack on T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, he deplores what he considers the loss of the 
creative spiritual tradition that was the life-blood of the "modern movement": "The 1930s 
marked the end of the modern movement. One can tell this very easily: the essentials of 
freedom, spontaneity, individuality, were openly rejected by writers themselves. Whatever 
'modernism' may mean, it does not mean a fear of freedom" (C, 24). The highly charged 
rhythms of early twentieth-century industrial civilization sponsored a culture that was peculiarly 
receptive to the explosive and disruptive energies of modem art as found in, for instance, 
Stravinsky, Cummings, Cubism, Honegger and Varese. American culture itself became synony-
mous with the modem ethos: 
And it is this that from the outset put Americans directly at the center of the "modem movement," 
and that, in unison with the increasing mechanization of American life, reversed the traditional 
thinness, academicism, and moralism of American art. Eliot said that "myth," or the sense of 
tradition, had made the modem world possible for art. It would probably be more true to say that 
only he who can assimilate the modem world — not perhaps on its own terms, but at least with 
an effort to discover what its terms actually are — can make art in the modem world. It is this 
élan of writers in the 1920s, which corresponds to the high spirits of so many Americans at the 
time, that helps to explain the extraordinary technical achievement behind Scott Fitzgerald's The 
Great Gatsby (1925) and Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury (1929), the rise of important new 
magazines like the American Mercury, Time, and the New Yorker, the social criticism behind 
Sinclair Lewis's Babbitt and Mencken's Prejudices. (C, 19) 
Kazin clearly believes that later crises in American culture were crises of the self. He restates 
the central heritage of "modem" art in terms of the primacy of personal vision and libertarian 
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will. The most powerful expressions of the self in America originated in a personal Protestant-
ism and are wholly anterior to the aesthetic versions projected by modernism. Compelling 
figures in American literature such as Melville's Ishmael and Fitzgerald's Gatsby were either 
ironic observers of American Romantics trying to possess the world's body or were themselves 
involved in the attempt. They witnessed the world's elusive character first-hand, and the 
knowledge they wrested from their existential crises they revealed in the deeper mystery of 
selfhood. Kazin emphasizes the selfs dual capacity of spanning both man's interior life — "his 
sense of some unexplained continuity" — and the profusion of protean, multiplicitous forms of 
contemporary existence.27 In the absence of traditional certitudes, the self faces the task of 
assimilating the modem world on its own, even though the world fiercely resists attempts to 
clarify the terms on which this may be done. This uncertainty about the main bearings of the 
modem world, as Kazin implies, is of a piece with the great rift in the past. Trilling's 
"biologism," by contrast, invoked the past as the focus-point of universal human experience 
entirely beyond the radical visions of the hypertrophic modem will, holding up past society and 
its culture as an aesthetic ideal. The moral conservatism implied was shown up by the inad-
equate intuition such latter-day culture heroes of Trilling's as William Dean Howells and Henry 
James had of the momentous changes in the culture of their time. James in particular, on 
account of his radical pursuit of a wholly aesthetic identity, had come unstuck from the main 
developments of modem culture. Trilling, however, saw James as a key figure in the culture of 
modernism, but he called James's aestheticism radical only because he used it to counter the 
modemist visions of inexorable change. James became a principal object of interest in Trilling's 
postradical phase. 
Trilling's reassessment of Howells's cultural stature coincided with major essays on 
Wordsworth and Keats. His leading interest here was in modes of selfhood sustained in their 
poetry, much less in their putative stature as mediators of the cultural situation. Weary of the 
afflictions rained on modern man by his immoderate exercise of abstract reason, Trilling 
championed "the benign relaxation of the will,... of moral judgment," the conservative instinct, 
the life of moderation. In this respect, Wordsworth's "Leech Gatherer" and the figure of Keats 
offered valuable counter-principles to violent change, and, like Howells, they presented a 
distinctly anti-modernist ethos. Trilling's outlook features the past as the great moral absolute, 
a state to which all moral vision eventually reverts. Not only did the "opposing self' oppose the 
general sense of the larger culture but also withdrew from the present and the future to embrace 
the past. The self-ideals of the past possessed sufficient coherence and gravity to oppose the 
disintegrative multiplicity of the modem scene, hence Trilling examined styles of selfhood 
converging in the idea of the immutable, viz. the denial of death by dialectical means: 
His criticism raises again and again the question to what degree we are the products of the culture, 
and his anxiety focuses on whether there is anything in the self that can withstand cultural 
determination. Are we merely playthings of history, as Trilling's early historical relativism might 
suggest? ... 
Trilling's great theme is freedom, but he is never really clear about how much freedom he 
thinks we have in defining ourselves. From the early fifties on he argued against the modernist 
dream of "unconditioned" freedom. But if he was suspicious of eschatological thinking, so he was 
also increasingly cool to the idea of the self as an active, history-making agent.28 
The very passage from Keats's letters that Trilling used to elucidate his idea of the 
perdurability of the self is cited by Kazin in "Rome: A Meditation on Keats." Conceived in 
Rome, the essay reveals the deeply historicist nature of Kazin's interest in Keats. Keats's image 
of selfhood includes the experience of contingency central to Kazin's idea of history: 
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The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and the superstitious is a "vale of 
tears" from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary interposition of God and taken to 
Heaven — What a little circumscribed notion! Call the World if you Please "The Vale of Soul-
making." Then you will see the use of the world. 
Short of advocating a transmutation of all values, Keats finally ruled out any dualistic reading 
of the world's phenomena. He replaced God as the conjunction of natural substance and 
supernatural purpose by the imagination as the vital centre of all experience. Kazin apostro-
phizes Keats's extreme receptivity to both spiritual and physical experience. Aware of his 
imminent death, Keats had experienced a "violently accelerated self-discovery as a poet" spun 
entirely from the "gyrating expressiveness of [his] sensations" (C rev, 299).29 With annihilation 
threatening, Keats in his major phase developed an ecstatic grasp of every last morsel of his 
experience, seeking "transcendence in and through the body.... Geography for Keats has come 
down to the body rather than to the world. He reads the world from his body" (C rev, 300). 
Kazin's stress on the physicality of Keats's poetic persona — which was totally receptive to 
unmediated experience and signified an unparalleled affirmation of life — plays a significant 
role in what is clearly a historico-cultural argument, viz. that modernism's exploitation of 
modern man's "hollowness" provided no certainty about the nature of man's exchanges with the 
world. Of all great Romantic poets, Kazin points out, Keats was the least concerned with 
drawing spiritual principles from the passion of his creative experience: "Keats was a libertarian 
radical who happened to be not that much interested in politics." He was even blissfully 
oblivious of style as a moral precedent, which is why he was free to ignore the poetic conven-
tions of his time. This, particularly, makes him a prime figure for contemporary culture, which, 
in Kazin's view, believes itself to be posttraditional and is obsessed by the notion that only art 
can reverse the threatening dissolution of the modem personality. It also makes him less 
susceptible to a cultural analysis based on Trilling's emphasis on manners. Kazin's Keats is 
clearly different from the antivitalist standard — as a cultural point of gravity — which Trilling 
was developing in the Fifties: he rather discovered his self-ideal in Shakespeare's lessons of 
"profusion, variousness, and inconsistency" (C rev, 301). Kazin uses Keats's rejection of dualist 
philosophy and supernaturalism as evidence that "Truth" — the persistence of tradition — 
matters less than the imperative of the "Beauty" conveyed in intensely realized personal 
experience. Tied in to that is his criticism of Eliot-Pound's assumption that 'the tradition' has 
decidedly pedagogical uses: 
It is the physicality of Keats's poetry, the allegory it expresses of our own emergence, maturation, 
and decline, that explains why Keats has been important to our time as a life in poetry rather than 
an influence on the practice of poetry. To this must be added his intense agnosticism. Keats's style 
was artificial even in his own time. It was disliked by Byron, patronized by Wordsworth and 
Shelley. (C rev, 300) 
Keats, then, functions as a contemporary by virtue of his ability to assimilate and lend 
cohesion to the discrete elements of experience that define a life lived in history. An agnostic 
dying of tuberculosis, he yet mustered a vital and creative sense of life's copious arrangements. 
The matter of style with him was very much one malgré lui: in Keats, the full reverberations of 
his experience — the realization of selfhood — took precedence over the requirements of any 
external metaphysical order or tradition. Such order as exists, Keats assumed, is to be revealed 
by the man of genius, viz. the individual poet "repeating God's work on earth... the deputy of 
God in the endlessness of creation." 
Kazin criticises the contemporary uses of selfhood, which are often based on historically fluid 
entities deriving from the kind of antihistorical dialectics which absolutizes the antagonism 
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between past and present. To his mind, Trilling fostered an ahistoric ideal, a virtual transcen-
dence of history, that was hard to visualize in American culture at midcentury, which assigned 
moral value to 'libertarian,' erratic change per se. Kazin employs the pregnant metaphor of the 
soldier walking up to the battery to contradict Trilling's placid cultural definition of selfhood: 
self-making is a continuous, abrasive process of revealing and realizing the dilemmas that 
threaten the self. Essentially, it is an act of abandonment. In anticipation of being annihilated by 
a round of drumfire, the hero-victim acknowledges — as Trilling would deny — that there is 
no escape possible from the historical process. Life is relinquished by natural process — the 
question of belief cannot alter that — but the killing bullet cannot wipe out the exhilarating 
image of the soldier's courage challenging the slender margins of possibility against all odds. 
Kazin rejects the view that the pattern of life evidences a wholly self-contained metaphysical 
telism, Trilling's "nicely proportioned life" that is, and he affirms Keats's insight into historical 
circumstance putting a gloss upon the selfs autonomy. The peculiar orientation of Keats's 
poetry was that it offered a prime occasion for a fruitful metaphysics of self and the role of the 
non-self — be it history, culture, society, or tradition — in it. Keats recognized the ultimate 
fragility of the historical self and linked history to biography. Kazin finds particularly useful 
Keats's corollary view that the promise of the individual life is uncompromised by the larger 
historical context. This formed the basis of Keats's insight into Shakespeare's "negative capabi-
lity." To see the pursuit of Beauty as the quintessential poiesis conveyed by the historic process 
is in itself an act of the political imagination, one that Kazin wished to perform in 1976, when 
he wrote the Keats essay, included for its polemical effect in the collection under discussion. 
Evidently, for Kazin at midcentury the poetics of selfhood replaced the uncertain vision of 
political and cultural democracy explored in On Native Grounds. At the same time, he firmly 
rejects the modernists' impatience with contingent existence. The great mind in human affairs 
that both Keats and Kazin conceive of as the fountain-head of tradition is unswervingly, as 
Keats has it, in "the service of the time being" (C rev, 301). 
Kazin reading and interpreting Keats's work in 1976 performs a similar service to the 
contemporary mind by revealing the deep insensitivity to Keats's true genius that has marked 
the history of his reception. Keats's historical stature was uncertain because his work was 
marginal to the canon of modern literature, which invested the poetic voice and style with the 
authority of historical retrospect. This ties in with Kazin's complaint that the modern literary 
canon represents a subtle displacement of experience, or content, by style, or form. Any 
peripheral position in the contemporary literary situation such as Keats's could easily be branded 
as anachronistic and not fit to serve as a model. Even the Twenties — whose spiritual exuber-
ance and exhilarating naturalness matched Keats's — considered him "luscious and stagy, the 
human stance in his poetry too passive, poignant, and exclamatory" (C rev, 304), such was the 
unconsciously modernist orientation of the era's literary taste. 
Kazin points to the sustained contradiction between Keats's poetic achievement and the 
modernist view of the selfs role in the tradition. Modernism was profoundly antagonistic to the 
historicity of the poetic subject: 
the real problem for the modem poet is that Keats does believe that the task of the poet is to 
portray himself mastering his own experience. One great discovery of modem poetry is that the 
poet need not do anything of the kind. The poem must work, but it does not follow that the poet 
is or should be the hero of his solitary quest. (C rev, 304-5) 
Modernism thrived on the conviction of the irreparable complication of modern history, setting 
up a rigorous dialectics of poetry and the world, between the dependable tradition in poetic 
expression and the enigmatic nature of experience. It cultivated style as a mode of being 
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providing protection from the "chaos" of modern history. Kazin notes that Eliot's "artfully 
broken voice, with its stealthy subconscious persona," established a veritable tradition in 
academic literary thought. Keats, by contrast, "who in poem after poem does indeed walk like 
a soldier up to the battery, and as regularly gets mown down, presents us with another, older 
idea entirely: the poet openly one with his life, style as affirmation, experience as a problem to 
be solved, life as full possibility" (C rev, 305). Keats was sufficiently free from any intellectual 
bias vis-à-vis the continuity of poetry to reconstitute it as the centrality of the self and the selfs 
experience. Indeed, the concept of "negative capability," which he formulated to address the 
problem of poetic identity, also covers his own emancipation from formal considerations. Kazin 
claims Keats did not have "a poetic tradition of his own." The deepest realization of "negative 
capability" was as constant revelation, and this did not tolerate any conceptual constraints. Kazin 
argues that Keats's practice is a powerful plea for the imagination in modern times: 
or as he put it, the authenticity of the imagination. What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be 
the Truth. The poet discovers that he can write, and write at any time, to any length, as in the four 
thousand lines and more of Encfymion; that he can imitate, parody, extend himself in his rhetorical 
country of mythology because he trusts the sequences of his own mind. (C rev, 306) 
'Contemporaneity' in this sense informs the central point of view in Contemporaries. Kazin 
uses it to challenge the politics of the encysted self promoted by the modemist canon. It reflects 
a libertarian individualism openly at war with modernism's static interpretations of the human 
condition. It is an aesthetic declaration of historical faith 'in our time.' Kazin locates the idea 
of history in a strong sense of self: 
the drama of reading him emerges as Keats's mind working itself out through (and sometimes 
despite) the formal occasion set up by him. Formal indeed: the poet faces his theme as a priest the 
altar. There is invocation, high ceremony. But even more there is a contest of strength and wit, 
Jacob wrestling with the angel. The subject can be subdued but must not be absorbed entirely into 
the poet as his only protagonist. (So much "radical selfhood" is modernism.) (C rev, 306) 
A poet of 'contemporaneity,' Keats, in an age of post-liberal exhaustion and the selfs increasing 
retreat from 'social conditioning,' invoked a sense of living under a new dispensation. The 
abiding image in Keats is of radical attachment to the world. He did not indulge in the 
Romantics' dismissal of it as somehow de trop or defective; instead, Kazin assigns to him a 
maverick position in the modernist canon, which features the individual Romantic genius — 
Carlyle, Ruskin, Arnold, Shaw — as teachers-instructors and pedagogues revitalizing a callow 
culture. Keats is the poet celebrating the experience of continuity by consciously pursuing it in 
his own individual mind. This, too, is style, and it reveals a mode of selfhood that flatly 
contradicts assertions of the diminished self — vide Kafka and Beckett — featuring in the 
modernist ethos. His ecstatic engagement with the world as non-self, Kazin suggests, resurrects 
the historical as the possible; the metaphysical pressure Keats generates in "Ode to a Nighting-
ale" transmutes the reality of death into the promise of life. There, his "firmness of style" 
lending substance to the entire cycle of life is in "the most wonderful contrast to the exhaustion 
pictured" (C rev, 307). The existential and the historic are seen to vie with the dream-world 
which is the ostensible motif of the poem's aesthetic action. Keats resolves the dualism inherent 
in his position by acting on "the growing faith that Imagination can be Truth [and can lead] into 
the heart of the mystery..." That mystery is in the release Death offers from the "fever and fret" 
dominating the realm of the contingent. To give maximum expression to this secures the poet's 
authenticity both as self and as a historical agent. The nightingale's song becomes "an absolute, 
a stunning transcendence of the mortal condition... But... the song and the poet divide — poetry 
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is an ecstasy that can enchant, drug, create, but cannot redeem our mortal condition" (C rev, 
308). The self reading the texture of the natural world produces images of available fulfilment, 
of "knowledge of contrast, feeling for light and shade," which, as experience, are a source of 
historical hope. They are assertions of the selfs internal harmony rolling back the fear of 
annihilation felt by the modernist 'ironic' personality. Kazin concludes that this accounts for 
Keats's minor stature in the tradition of "modern" poetry: 
No other Romantic poet was to go so far into the dream absolute on a purely natural basis — 
without Coleridge's drugs, without Blake's wholly spiritualized universe, without Wordsworth's 
natural piety, without Shelley's illusion that Prometheus will make war on Father Zeus for our 
sake. No other Romantic poet was to divide life from death, death from life, so absolutely within 
himself— and all this within the letters of fire that are the style of John Keats. (C rev, 309) 
In the new and revised edition of Contemporaries, Kazin restates his belief that the individual 
imagination is capable of uniting man with the world and give it meaning. The broad social 
canvas presented in the original edition, which included a radical study of the modern crisis in 
the public realm, has disappeared. Substituting for it is a vision of history drawing on the 
creative dimensions of the individual self. 
Self-Making and the Historical Realm 
A section of the revised edition of Contemporaries retitled "History" explains how the idea of 
history in modem times has become a threat to the free development of the self and, by 
extension, how "tradition" has come to oppose "thinking." Kazin traces this development in two 
separate essays, viz. "The Self as History" (1978) and "Uprooted Writers" (1980). 
"The Self as History" deals with a persistent paradox in the twentieth-century mind: "We 
tend to emphasize the self as a creature of history and history as a human creation." Kazin 
traces the origins of this view to R.W. Emerson. Emerson's hostility to the formalist, the 
traditionalist, the intellectual, gave the American citizen a charged sense of self which has been 
peculiarly effective "in words" (C rev, 414).30 He was nevertheless worried that a self-con-
tained spiritual world should tum out to be so hard to obtain, and he finally doubted that the self 
could stake out its territory at will. In the course of his career, Emerson was forced to take 
account of increasing evidence of the conditioned and incorporate this in his doctrine of the self. 
This is typical of the modem literary experience, Kazin believes, hence Emerson's stature as a 
'contemporary.' 
Kazin argues that writers as diverse as Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, Henry Adams, 
Henry James, William James, Ernest Hemingway, Edmund Wilson, James Baldwin, Malcolm X, 
Claude Brown, Saul Bellow, Conrad Aiken and Frederick Exley are in the Emersonian tradition. 
The effect of this claim is to distinguish between those writers who spin fictions from their 
personal experience — a strain of undiluted Emersonian dualism — and those who present the 
self as "the history of a particular moment and crisis in human history" (C rev, 416). The latter 
type of autobiography is rare, Kazin points out, and it is essentially different from the fiction 
writer exploiting his experience of life to secure personal salvation.31 He claims that autobi-
ography maintains a symbiotic, lucid relationship with history, highlighting the public self. 
Autobiography deals with the heroic, embattled self building its own moral universe from 
scratch. Essentially, it dispenses with the fictional element which is a powerful gloss on the 
human situation but which is of no avail in actual life. Instead, 
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wholly personal documents like Whitman's Specimen Days, Adams's Education, Conrad Aiken's 
Ushant, Malcolm X's Autobiography can be more lasting than any novel. What preserves such 
books is the news they bring us of history in a new form. In every notable case of this form, from 
Franklin's Autobiography to Richard Wright's Black Boy...vie have the epic of personal struggle, 
a situation rather than plot. The writer turns himself into a representative sinner or Christian or 
black or Jew... 
This person, as we say to ourselves as we encounter Franklin arriving in Philadelphia, has lived 
history... 
To "live" history is not of course to command it, or even one's fate in life. To live history is 
to express a most memorable relationship to the past, to a particular setting, to a moment... (C rev, 
416-7) 
Edward Gibbon's history of imperial Rome and Henry Adams's Education provide instances of 
this. In Adams's case, the autobiographical self lived "history as its own fate": "History as our 
own fate is what the grandiose theoretical last chapters of the Education have to teach us. And 
that is the deepest meaning of 'autobiography,' historically considered" (C rev, 418). 
Kazin clearly seeks to roll back modernism's dream of the transcendence of history and to 
locate the ideal of the self squarely in the historical realm. That ideal is based on a highly 
calibrated sense of the experiential self, deeply conscious of its creative ambivalence as both 
historical subject and agent. It runs counter to Trilling's concern with the "shaped self," which 
tended to sacrifice the evocative drama of man's life in history to the moral tranquillity that 
comes with the aesthetic representation of history as a finished object. Kazin's interest in 
Adams's Education, for instance, is to see the self enacted as a mode of historical perception; 
in Whitman's Specimen Days and Drum-Taps, he sees history itself, a tragic figure, among the 
dramatis personae: 
A certain light plays on the characters, the light of what we call history. And what is history in 
this ancient sense but the commemoration of our common experience, the unconscious solidarity 
of a people celebrated in the moments of greatest stress, as the Bible celebrates over and again 
history as the common experience of the race, from creation to redemption? 
But nothing new has entered into twentieth-century experience. We no longer identify our-
selves with history. Joyce's Stephen Dedalus [holds that] "History is the nightmare from which I 
am trying to awaken." (C rev, 420) 
This vital link having dissolved, 'autobiography' in modem times has begun to mirror the 
seeming dissolution of the public realm. History in our day, Kazin affirms, has become subject 
to so many conflicting interpretations that it has virtually become a media event.32 The real 
problem for "personal history" now — for the self in contemporary writing seeking to realize 
itself as a public figure — is "how to render this excess of outer experience as personal but not 
private experience" (C rev, 421). For the vanishing faith in the self as a meaningful historical 
and moral entity has generated a sense of rootlessness incurring guilt; the problem of identity 
has tended to inspire public confessions of futility and weakness. Contemporary confessional 
writing, accordingly, portrays the individual psyche against a purely mental backdrop and not 
the dramatic interplay of minds that decides public issues in the broader context of society. 
But Kazin insists that history, which he takes to be the common experience of the public 
realm, does exist and that its existence authenticates mankind's historic destiny. In a revealing 
observation, he contrasts the created pattern in personal writing with what Wallace Stevens 
called "the violence without": life as accident, blind fate, oppression, spiritual bondage, political 
terror, existential nihilism, nullified will, the dislocation of traditions. Too much of contempo-
rary literary effort, he claims in Contemporaries, has been a lament over the vintage American 
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illusion of control in the public domain, over the selfs inability to assert itself within it and 
despite it. There has been a tendency lately to view the social backdrop as entirely external, as 
unrelated and even inimical to the selfs aspirations to integrity. This has caused every criticism 
of the purely private experience to be branded as immoderate and deluded liberalism. It is via 
insights such as this that Kazin arrives at a comprehensive cultural statement linking the 
modernist ethos and the totalitarian mind: 
Violence is distinguished by gaps, discontinuities, inconsistency, confusion condensed into power 
— but no less blind and chaotic for that. The life of mere experience, and especially of history as 
the supposedly total experience we ridiculously claim to know, can seem an inexplicable series of 
unrelated moments. But language, even when it is most a mimicry of disorder, is distinguished 
from violence, atrocity, deceit, by relating word to word, sentence to sentence, thought to thought 
— man to his final construct on a page — always something different from mere living. 
So that is why I write, to reorder an existence that man in the mass will never reorder for me. 
[Writing involves so much unconscious reordering] that even the naïve wish to be wholly 
"truthful" fades before the intoxication of line, pattern, form. (C rev, 423) 
The precise nature of the "violence" Kazin refers to is not evident in "Uprooted Writers." This 
essay is an attack on "alienation" as a superior mode of moral perception, and it marks the selfs 
central yet tragic place in the historical arena. Rather than "alienatoes" or exiles, the main 
figures in "Uprooted Writers" — Vladimir Nabokov, Hannah Arendt and Thomas Mann — are 
"rebel" minds who have successfully coped with selfhood in a world increasingly without 
tradition. All of them exiles from either leftwing or rightwing totalitarianism, they have reconsti-
tuted the tradition — their tradition — by imaginative means, and so rescued it from political 
violence. In each case, tradition, reclaimed and engaged, has become the focal point of a 
progressive spiritual order, a separate strand in history. 
"Uprooted Writers" clearly moves on from the postliberal analysis of the dialectics of self 
and society in the 1962 edition of Contemporaries to the existential issue of survival within 
history. Though he increasingly aims for its aesthetic resolution, Kazin holds out against the 
postmodernist illusion of reducing history to its "interpretations." His favourite — and most 
hopeful — descriptive metaphor of the modem historic predicament is the monkey drawing the 
bars of its own cage. The image is a metaphysical statement on the central experience of the 
age, viz. "the unequal contest between the individual talent and murderous totalitarianism" (C 
rev, 391). This has been true for an entire generation of writers and intellectuals, many of whom 
did not survive the confrontation. Some did — notably Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, Franz 
Werfel, Vladimir Nabokov, Hannah Arendt, Erich Auerbach and Jacques Maritain — and turned 
their exile in America into a fountainhead of freedom. 
In the case of Thomas Mann and Hannah Arendt, Kazin portrays two independent minds 
deriving their peculiar strength from their opposition to the intellectual degradation of their 
native cultures. Both expounded an abundant sense of the past, of the heritage of the past as 
seminal democracy and of the possibility of uniting life and thought. "Uprooted Writers" is a 
defence of the past as a source of wholeness and a spiritual epic undertaken by those whose 
sense of the continuity of their own personal experience was far stronger than any continuity 
which history could possibly provide. Referring to writers in exile such as Herbert Marcuse, 
Wilhelm Reich, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Erwin Panofsky, St.-John Perse, Franz Werfel and Nelly 
Sachs, Kazin explores what he considers the selfs necessary dualism in incorporating both the 
past and "History": 
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A common theme in the face of Nazi destructiveness was History as the human memory, our 
common past, the human labyrinth Think of Freud's insistence that our past is always within us, 
of Thomas Mann's concent in the Joseph novels with what he called the deep well of the past, of 
the Greek polis as the background of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy, of the way in which 
tradition and the break with tradition haunted Nabokov and Lévi-Strauss no less than the Germans 
An irony in the Fascist age was its war against people who above all else believed in continuity 
— and so were never as death-fascinated as their tormentors were 
Continuity means not just the past but the past behind the past we think we know The real 
drama of European exiled writers in America —- I limit myself to Mann and Arendt — is the 
contrast between their instinctive European sense of history and the optimistic American belief 
that the future is as real as the present Only a great European poet, Rilke, could have defined 
poetry as "the past that breaks out in our hearts" Americans, especially of recent immigrant 
vintage, thought of the past as a mistake The America that began to rearm in 1940, miraculously 
recovered from the depression, had a bounce, a new faith in progress as its destiny, that contrasted 
with the exhaustion and fearfulness of many exiles (C rev, 394) 
On this Kazin bases his belief that for history to form a clear pattern — the epic of "our 
common past" — it must be made available as personal experience Both Arendt and Mann, he 
holds, were supreme moralists and storytellers their intellectual origins devastated by Fascist 
ideology, they restored a new sense of coherence and clarity from their experience of exile as 
rediscovery 
Hannah Arendt and the Unthinking Jewish Victims 
Hannah Arendt's native German intellectual culture yielded an acute sense of the tradition of the 
Western civic mind She had a vibrant interest in the philosophical origins of the res publicas, 
the classical Greek political ideal of the nation-state supporting the public virtues of civility, 
moderation, and public discourse A traditionalist by inclination and temperament, she was 
probably "more influenced by Christianity than by Jewish tradition" (C rev, 397) She had no 
affinity with Judaism, Kazin observed in "Woman m Dark Times," a review of Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl's biography Hannah Arendt For Love of the World (1982), and lived by "what 
she canonized all her life — philosophy as a daily activity," tracing the rootlessness of modem 
political thought to the break in tradition performed by the totalitarian mind Arendt had studied 
at Marburg, with Martin Heidegger, with whom she had a lately much publicized but essentially 
obscure love affair, and later — at Heidegger's insistence and for reasons of privacy — at 
Heidelberg, with Heidegger's friend Karl Jaspers, under whose supervision she wrote a disserta-
tion on Augustine's concept of love Kazin first met her in New York in 1946, at a party for 
Rabbi Leo Baeck He felt attracted to her on account of her absorption in the theoretical 
underpinnings of modem political systems deriving from the Greek polis, while she responded 
intellectually to him, and "by no means unerotically " During the course of the Fifties, however, 
their acquaintance deteriorated 
though she had shifted from the supposed unworldhness of German philosophy to political 
thought, and during the Origins of Totalitarianism [1951] period constantly recited Montesquieu 
and Tocqueville, her interest turned out to be more in Nietzschean prejudices about the "elite" 
and the "mob" than in the kind of empirical observations with which Tocqueville had filled his 
great book on the revolutionary spectacle of "democracy in America " 
209 
Origins grated on many Jewish sensibilities, because it made Arendt seem an exponent of Jewish 
self-hatred at a time when the intellectual debate about affirmative Jewishness had barely got 
underway. Contemporary commentators pointed out that she definitely had a "Jewish problem," 
one which as an upper-crust, acculturated German Jewess she had developed in the course of the 
Twenties in Weimar Germany, when rising political anti-Semitism raised fundamental doubts 
about her own Jewish identity and self-image. She feared becoming an intellectual and cultural 
pariah, and self-consciously conformed to the myth of the well-educated Jew to retain her 
cultural status. By the same token, she rejected the experience of her 'benighted' fellow Jews 
in the East European Pale. Kazin roundly calls this the "conflict between the Jew and the 
German...," between the experience of political necessity and philosophical voluntarism.33 
The so-called Jewish problem had featured prominently in both Fascist and Leninist ideology, 
prompting Arendt to study the Jewish identity as a focal point of modem political violence. 
Rejecting the social and economic determinism which Karl Marx and Isaac Deutscher had used 
in analysing the Jewish problem, she emphasized tradition as a conscious resource — which she 
believed consisted in the act of "thinking right" — and so ignored "the extent to which the 
Jewish masses of Eastern Europe, faithful to their religion, had no Jewish problem: just 
enemies" (C rev, 398). Kazin believes Arendt took altogether too lofty and detached a view of 
the political necessities the persecuted Jews faced. There was no way that the Jewish victims of 
the Holocaust could have escaped the trap the Nazis set for them, as she was to claim in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), and certainly not by relying 
on the classical traditions of enlightened thought and conduct. The Eichmann book actually 
completed a pattern whose groundwork was already conspicuous in Origins, where Arendt had 
imputed the historical persecution of the Jews to the foolishly apolitical behaviour on the part 
of certain segments of the Jewish community in Europe. One letter Kazin received from a 
complete stranger in 1961 in response to an article of his entitled "Eichmann and the New 
Israelis" must have sensitized him to the issue. The article had broached the delicate issue of the 
extreme passivity with which Orthodox Jews in particular had surrendered to the Nazi execu-
tioners, an attitude which obviously formed an embarrassing political heritage for the militant 
"New Israelis" in the early Sixties building Zion on a countermyth of armed power. 
Having great respect for you as an important (Jewish) thinker, I am deeply saddened by your last 
article in Reporter... I wish only to let you know that as a young non-Jewish mother, I have 
looked toward the leading American Jewish thinkers for POSITIVE contributions on the Eichmann 
situation. There is no need to provide the non-sympathetic amongst us with the uglier motives of 
certain Israeli segments.... Is it for the distinguished Jewish intellectual to draw attention to the 
fact that some (Jews) died "tamely" or even "shamefully," or that documents of resistance do not 
make such a heroic testimonial? What in your (personal) image as a Jew has forced you to [make] 
such a destructive commentary?34 
These comments came at a time when the American-Jewish intellectual community and others 
were weighing the benefits of what Irving Howe called "the reconquest of Jewishness," which 
was a broad cultural debate about affirmative Jewishness, or Jewish self-pride. Kazin's cor-
respondent anticipated Arendt's 'sensible' political approach to what was essentially the horrible 
enigma of the Holocaust: how was it possible for the Nazis to complete the planned mass 
murder of possibly six million Jews without even incurring military reprisals? And why did not 
the victims organize an effective resistance movement to avert their fate? Arendt's suggestion 
that the Jews facing Nazi repression could have saved themselves if only they had conducted 
their affairs in a politically "responsible" manner bordered on intellectual frivolousness, and the 
fact that she targeted "collaboration" by the Jewish Councils with the authorities in Nazi-
occupied territory did not endear her to the Jewish intellectual community in the United States 
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— including Kazin — and outside. Her harsh condemnation of the Ost-Juden in Origins, as I 
have observed, set many intellectual tempers on edge.35 Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals 
criticizing Arendt reasoned that no amount of 'critical thinking' can save a person from the 
threat of physical extinction, certainly not under the conditions that applied at the time, and that 
Nazist racial policy simply was not based on moral-philosophical discourse. Arendt's ideal 
republic of great minds bore the mark of the elitist philosopher's immunity to the political 
condition of the common man generally and East European Luftmenschen in particular. In the 
last analysis, she was insensitive to the destruction of the individual identity pursued by modem 
totalitarian systems: 
Arendt was religious in a very private sense. Her emerging political philosophy, drawn from a 
host of classical authorities, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, John Adams and other conservatives, came 
down to a vision of the Greek polis as the great political condition and of the rootlessness of the 
individual, the incessant struggle of politics, as symbols of some underlying modem disorder. 
She was indeed very theoretical. Even her acquired taste for republican liberty rather than 
social meliorism reflected her basic conditioning in the profound sense of the self at the heart of 
German Protestantism and German philosophy. Her constant maxim was "we must think what we 
are doing." (C rev, 398) 
This made her historical scholarship too insistently didactic, Kazin believed, explaining Hitler, 
Nixon and John Adams alike with reference to the august Western tradition of political freedom 
which she, as an exile from totalitarianism, identified totally, and rather uncritically, with the 
American constitution. So much faith in its philosophical virtue certainly caused her to misjudge 
some issues. 
Though motivated by a historian's interests, Arendt's Origins exerted a basically literary 
appeal. Her commitment to philosophy strained against a desire for "political and moral 
commentary and what she called intellectual action." Her former mentors Heidegger and Jaspers 
vied for priority in her thinking, producing what must have been her essential attraction for 
Kazin. Judith Shklar has observed that for both Heidegger and Arendt philosophy constituted 
"an act of dramatizing through word play, textual association, bits of poetry, and other phrases 
from their direct experiences" amounting to "passionate thinking." Kazin must be responding to 
— though not necessarily affirming — this quality of Arendt's mind whenever he recites Rilke's 
saying — which Arendt fondly quoted — that "poetry is the past that breaks out in our hearts," 
meaning that it afflicts us directly without the powers of moderation and control that belong to 
literature interceding, and that the historical mind must not waste its effort on trying to assimi-
late anomalous and accidental historical processes. The Heideggerian strain in Arendt's thought 
— his belief in "thinking" as an autonomous activity — fascinated and worried Kazin, because 
it pointed at an essential element of alienation in her experience: 
Poetry as a spell from the past was part of Heidegger's appeal for Arendt, who wrote a plaintive, 
stricken kind of lyric verse and who naturally saw poetry as central to her philosopher's ability to 
wonder at the phenomenal world. What Heidegger emphasized as Denken was really revelation — 
perfectly poised attentiveness to what is "concealed." This encouraged and intensified in Arendt 
the connection between thinking as dialogue with oneself and her natural sense of solitude.... 
"homelessness" played a dominating role in her sense of herself as exceptional and a "pariah"... 
... Of course, she found it easier to think of herself as "pariah" (totally independent) when 
intellectual America resounded with her name, than she would have to find herself a "pariah" in 
Treblinka. 
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She had so marked a penchant for theorizing that Origins was "still more about Origins'" than 
about the actualities of state terror in German and Soviet society. Her concentrated effort to 
select and marshal her material in evidence of her grand theory of totalitarianism thrived on 
clearly literary effects, Kazin argues. Her objectives may have been political and moral, the total 
impact of Origins was one of methodological sleight-of-hand and rigorous logic yielding a 
biased historical perspective. For Arendt's historicism disdained to account for seemingly 
unrelated historical detail. Its inclusive design ignored events and phenomena outside its 
professed burden of proof. She argued that Eichmann, who was beyond a doubt a major actor 
in the chain of command organizing the Destruction of the Jews, was a paltry historical figure, 
virtually negligible on account of his inability to "think well." This dismissal was proof that her 
working hypothesis derived from a wholly mental conception of 'the tradition' in politics. 
Arendt, as Kazin crisply reminds us, balances the odds against our age: if poetry, in Rilke's 
sense, was the agonized cry from a still authentic past not yet prey to dislocation and alienation, 
then totalitarianism, in Arendt's words, was "the burden of our time [emphasis added]."36 
Arendt was convinced that the rise of totalitarianism (in all its modem aspects) was brought on 
by a major flaw of the modern mind: in politics — still a major instrument for the deliverance 
of the expectant democratic masses in the Western world during the first half of the twentieth 
century — it caused its own déconfiture by forcing a "break with tradition." She associated the 
widespread phenomena of social atomization, estrangement and militant opportunism in post-
Weimar Germany, which permitted Nazist ideology to take root, with the loss of a respectable 
philosophical outlook. It was the present that was deficient. 
Kazin attributes the popularity of Arendt's style among modern intellectuals to her dominanat 
tendency to see the issues involved in the human condition purely in terms of political theory 
as philosophical drama. She rather derogatorily interpreted history as a tragic account of ideal 
mental states called noumeno being adulterated or otherwise modified by processes of historical, 
social, and political attrition. Indeed, writers rather than scholars responded to Arendt's sugges-
tion of control, of purely mental activity as the backbone of historical continuity. And despite 
her profound training in philosophy, the phrase "the banality of evil," which she used to suggest 
that political and individual morality in modem times were at such a low ebb that virtually 
anybody could have played Adolf Eichmann's role in the destruction of six million Jews, could 
only have been tossed off by a writer: 
Hannah Arendt was a great moralist. She held firm views on what the condemned Jews should 
have done in the face of the Hitler terror. One reason Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) disturbed 
many people was its unrecognized German egoismus, from the sidelines of philosophy, at the 
expense of people who were not in a condition to "think" freely.... To think and to think well was 
not the prerogative of the Nazi murderers anymore than it was of their victims... 
So we are led back to that fatal discrepancy between German intellectuals and political 
beastliness. (C rev, 399) 
"Woman in Dark Times" focuses on her complacent dismissal of Eichmann as a non-'thinking' 
bureaucrat, as profoundly boring to the philosopher's view from Parnassus. Kazin objects 
fiercely: "This was appalling intellectual swank. It has not become less injurious to 'thinking.' 
Many a journalist and television commentator refers to the 'banality of evil' with a confidence 
that makes one sick."37 Arendt did not manage to close the gap between thought and experience, 
idea and reality. If in Origins she conclusively showed the radical weaknesses of political 
traditions in modem times, the Eichmann also claimed that man in the mass has traditionally 
been incapable of realizing the redemptive power of ideas. Kazin rejects this as the 
philosopher's arrogance, speaking up for the tragic condition of the democratic experience and 
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protecting this from her condemnation based on her conception of republican virtue. The 
continuity of the democratic idea, he believes, can only be sanctioned by works of the 
imagination. Arendt's literary resources, however, may have been more attuned to more readily 
exploitable models in the political philosophy of both Western antiquity and America's classical 
age and this may have tempted her to slight the historical chasm between the Greek polis and 
the political rapaciousness of totalitarianism. The attraction of a flawless, harmonious civic past 
certainly exerted a spell on Arendt's mind. It may well have prompted her to disparage certain 
aspects of contemporary egalitarian society as her classical heroes never did: "I do not know 
how much her gratitude for America included the recognition that her admired John Adams was 
in politics all his life, or that the noble Jefferson, our Goethe, was not ashamed to play the 
political game. His only regret, and ours, is that inferior men played it more successfully" (C 
rev, 399-400). Arendt's political philosophy ignored the increasingly pluralist nature of the 
modern democratic experience. The tradition she espoused did not include the recognition that 
the great catastrophes in the American democratic experiment — as in all Western systems of 
self-government — were historically real and unavoidable, and that they were natural develop-
ments from crises — judicial and administrative as well as moral and spiritual — that erupted 
in the past. 
This conviction is central to Kazin's concern with the self as tradition, which reflects his belief 
in the metaphor of democracy as historical deliverance. No other concept conveyed the 
immediacy, comprehensiveness and contradictoriness of tradition as a living resource. Kazin 
rejects the wholly aesthetic mode of selfhood that caught on among modernists. Any viable 
identity for the self must take account of the pressure history exerts on its participants. A further 
analysis ofthat is given in An American Procession, where Kazin deals with the highly devel-
oped consciousness of self on the part of great modern American minds such as William James, 
Henry David Thoreau, John Quincy Adams and Abraham Lincoln: "Can we always think what 
we are doing? No. But can we do what we have been thinking? William James said we should. 
So did Emerson, Thoreau, John Quincy Adams, and Lincoln before him" (C rev, 400). This 
literary sense of selfhood, and its application within history, is the heritage Kazin recovers in the 
revised version of Contemporaries. In that perspective, Bright Book of Life: American Novelists 
and Storytellers from Hemingway to Mailer (1973) is polemical with a sense of occasion — a 
grudging analysis of what ails the contemporary literary situation — rather than an evolving 
vision of self and history. It is nevertheless a useful statement of issues, particularly with regard 
to the currently widespread belief that history is "a record of seriously diminished possibili-
ties."38 
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"The Stars Do Not Shine in the Postwar Era"1 
Contemporary Fiction: The Moral Writer and the Political Scene 
The central premise of Bright Book of Life: American Novelists and Storytellers from 
Hemingway to Mailer (1973), as Kazin observed on March 22, 1970, was to be the final 
dissolution of the nineteenth-century belief that man, whose total moral enlightenment was 
immanent, would be the measure of history: 
The one & the many was the signature... of the Imagination and Society Book [a project Kazin 
never completed]. The signature of the post-war fiction book is the different versions of the one 
(self, person, ego, etc.) + the Oneness of the Power-Leviathan-Environment. The One constantly 
engaged in strategic defenses + ruses against The Big One. Language as the defense and as ruse. 
The immense self-provocativeness of the self— no longer pioneer of reality (as in modem lit.) 
but rather the opponent of the Environment and the agent of its self-protection. 
Bright Book is about this widening fissure in contemporary literature between self and society, 
with society finally eclipsing the self. Although Kazin concedes elsewhere that the twentieth-
century self was the product of a necessary aesthetic revolution, social projections of the self 
gradually being supplanted by aesthetic ones, he is convinced that its emergence signalled the 
collapse of the "created" world, turning it into a meaningless fiction. Underlying that process 
was a reductionist view of history as the drama unleashed by the pressures of minds and motives 
that make up society. In postwar times, the self as the last outpost against the totalitarianism of 
the state was likely to become hypertrophic, and Kazin privately noted its new role as early as 
17 April 1957. He distinguished "two generations" of writers, viz. the "destroyers," who broke 
the mould of nineteenth-century orthodoxy and thus created "a new image of man," and the 
generation 
"inside the whale" [including George Orwell and Henry Miller].... the whole thing comes down 
to the man outside — the man creating a new image... new values; and the man inside... living life 
according to its regulations. [Kazin includes Emerson, Dreiser, Nietzsche, Frost, Lindsay, 
Cummings, Faulkner.].... the effort was basically for each man to consider himself a revolution, 
to consider one fundamentally necessary.... Now each man asks first, not what can I do, but where 
do I fit in. The sense of values already regulated for you, of life already made. 
...the new orde[r]-thinking began with the exhaustion of the rebels / with the tuning in on 
themselves of the victims rather than as symbolic material (O'Neill);... the cult of the self which 
prevails in today's psychological literature is just the opposite of the new faith in the individual 
which the romantics started from.... the faith in the private individual's access to knowledge left 
him. [Kazin finds evidence of this in science, the city, the organization man.] It isn't... that man 
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has ideas of change which he is afraid to express; it's more that his ideas are uncertain — i.e. they 
are criticisms, not a philosophy. He no longer shares in the old security of the rebel... the prot-
ester: Aw state is now anxiety, not anger. 
The self is now regarded as an end — we seek it for "security." 
Bright Book traces the development in postwar fiction of aesthetic styles of selfhood encroach-
ing upon the historical experience, turning that into dystopia. The ephemerality of social 
concepts and values spawned an urgent need for the stability of "religious-philosophical supposi-
tions," forging a cult of the self from the demise of society — in the absence of any stable 
social backdrop the self could no longer pose as a "rebel" and dissenter — and contrasting its 
pleasing suggestion of the finished product to the deceptions of modern history.2 
For Kazin to negotiate such a sweeping position, however, caused some amount of dissatis-
faction both among Bright Book's reviewers and on his own part. The "man inside" the whale 
and his counterpart "outside" inhabited separate worlds, with no interlocking patterns to suggest 
a shared, public sphere. Public and private man engaged in a stand-off, the former's identity 
restricted to history, the latter's to art. In his review entitled "Writers at the Mercy of the Age," 
Robert Gorham Davis puts his finger on Bright Book's abiding weakness, viz. that it seeks to 
unify these disparate realms by some form of sheer literary illusionism. He claims that even if 
Kazin sought to create "a personal sense of time," his need to "save" us from being "at the 
mercy of the age" actually signified a desperate attempt to gain a reprieve from the course of 
history. Himself a veteran of the old-style literary radicalism that blended so easily with socially 
activist views, Davis objects to Kazin's catholic assessment of "the sharply differing points of 
view of the authors he considers [and feels no] need to oppose his own position to theirs. It 
would appear that the eclecticism denied the creator is a virtue in the sympathetic critic." To 
correct this withholding quality of his book, Kazin should have addressed our "common 
condition": murderous, mechanical society, run on terror, where irrationality and relativism 
reign, traditional ideas become fragmented, inspiring "an encompassing sense of evil." It strikes 
Davis to see Kazin so "neutral and acceptant in the face of it all" and painting so bleak a picture 
of the world that "his" writers could not possibly hope to change. What is at stake in Bright 
Book, as Davis points out, is the continuing relevance of the liberal imagination. When Kazin 
reports on the senselessness of the crime central to Truman Capote's In Cold Blood, for 
instance, he shares in the guilt it incurs by "adopting the attitude he describes." An irreconcil-
able opposition results, with the novel making possible "the 'freedom' in a society where 
otherwise none of us is free." Davis takes his reservations one step further and holds up the 
cultural situation unfolding in Bright Book against the demands made by Blake and Lawrence 
— both of whom are sources of inspiration to Kazin — on both the individual and his society. 
These "had meaning," he explains, because "they presumed a future [which] myths and imagin-
ation could help shape." No such sense of a future, still a real possibility in On Native Grounds, 
survives in the pages of Bright Book. The texture of history having evaporated, the novelist is 
freed "totally as fantasist." Davis denies that this was necessary or unavoidable. If Kazin relies 
on Nabokov to provide some relief from the mercilessness of history, he definitely moves away 
from the definitions of self he explored in The Inmost Leaf and Contemporaries: 
the writers Kazin praises are themselves at the mercy of the age because they have nothing to 
oppose to it. The freedom they offer is regressive and illusory. Instead of dramatizing the struggle 
with the cruel, the perverse, the irrational — an internal struggle that is the only way to knowl-
edge — they invite us to surrender to evil as "delicious," magic, unreal. Implicit in Bright Book 
of Life is a radical opposition of fiction as liberation in an antiworld of mere seeming, and fiction 
as a testing ground of values that are realizable only if the literary and real worlds are indissolubly 
linked. On this question the two books in Bright Book of Life and the two Kazins who wrote them 
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— Kazin young and old, moralist and appreciator — take, understanding^ but frustratingly, 
totally incompatible sides 3 
Although some of the book's lack of thematic cohesion may be attributed to the fact that it 
is a compilation of the Ewing Lectures Kazin delivered at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, in 1969, the journal notes indicate that he conceived oí Bright Book's theme in exactly 
these terms He was not unduly worried about any incompatibility of perspectives, however, and 
saw the split between the moralist and appreciator in the context of a broader cultural debate 
That debate would include statements on the modem historical experience and tie in with "his 
critique of the older generation's [Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Dos Passos, Cummings] modernism " 
Taking his cue from an unspecified source, Kazin observed 
The rate of change [indeed] the great fact of our present time [particularly obvious to those who 
see themselves as "standing still" and "custodians" of an ideal] In these terms the narrator is 
always "moral " The scene is always "political" The Southerner is never political, always moral 
— viewing History as "his" — stemming from some great "idea" that never came true — 
History as myth + as saga, not History as History 
This dualism, he observed elsewhere, arises from the inability of contemporary culture to 
capture the pervasive sense of change underlying so many fictional assertions of life's moral 
irony Kazin saw this illustrated in L Rust Hills's Нон We Live Contemporary Life in Contem­
porary Fiction, whose editors he took to task for suggesting that fiction is not unique and its 
message eminently "paraphrasable and summarizable and morahzable " Hills and his wife had 
turned the artistic content of short stories by such writers as Flannery O'Connor, Ivan Gold and 
Peter Taylor into capsule sociological comments, turning art into the reality of contemporary 
middle-class society, dominated by compromise and domesticized moral dilemmas Similarly, 
Kazin detected a pedestrian concern in much American short fiction — and he included work 
by Bellow and Mailer as well as Updike — with "the things we all are, the things we all live 
and know, the things we are always reading about and questioning in ourselves " In the Euro­
pean literary situation, by contrast, no such foreshortening of imaginative scope had occurred 
In European fiction since the war the central subject, the presiding fact, has been death and the 
terror of non-being Nothingness is a specter to many European minds, and new forms have 
been called in to describe the European joumey through hell In Sartre and Camus, in Günther 
Grass and Uwe Johnson, one sees how naturally new forms and styles spring out of the rational-
ization that accustomed social forms, classes, and beliefs have disappeared But in American 
fiction just now even the creative originality which Southerners and City Jews once brought to 
their experience of social dissolution has been swallowed up into the pervading middle-classness 
of American living and thinking and feeling4 
Kazin attributes this to the cluttering, equitable consensus of contemporary American 
liberalism The liberal mind is hardly equipped to deal with Melvillean, radical and deeply tragic 
permutations of the self It cultivates irony and sameness centring on timid admissions of failure 
The consensus, Kazm asserts, stifles the vigorous and courageous vision of the self central to 
Romanticism, which involved a principled opposition to the larger cultural setting There being 
"no longer any romance to fiction," he wonders where the storyteller's distinction, viz his 
ability to create "an imaginative world of [his] own," is to come from, and he observes that the 
contemporary literary situation in America by no means provides the creative impulse that it did 
to Fitzgerald's generation "the age of 'modernism' is now quite behind us" 5 That generation 
compensated their loss of faith, civic and historical, by cultivating its dramatic and adversary 
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relation to social convention. The postwar generation European intellectuals and writers, for 
whom the experience of society was in many cases indistinguishable from the murderousness of 
the state, turned to literature to explore modes of existence offering immunity from the political 
violence generated by radical ideologies. In each case, society was a fiercely resistant force. 
With the onset of the affluent society in the Fifties, however, the polarity between self and 
society broke down. 'Modernism,' which had originally in America been the key contribution 
to the criticism of the bourgeois mind, had by the Sixties lost sight of society as an adversary. 
In this connection, Peter Shaw has observed that Kazin's "critique of the older generation's 
modernism [in the opening chapter of Bright Book] begins to lead to his conclusion. For he 
interprets the perpetuation of formal concerns by the postwar writers as also no more than 
bourgeois in inspiration." The contemporary writer's ulterior motive for writing was often his 
desire for self-aggrandizement, usually expressing a sense of deep alienation from and facile 
denunciation of society. Malcolm Bradbury places the contemporary writer in the context of 
liberal culture and states that Kazin's interpretation of it discloses liberalism's major dilemma. 
For Kazin argues that 
our fascination with the writer as individual is not because he is wise but because he is except­
ional; in speaking to his interviewer [in the Paris Review series], then, the writer plays a part, 
knows he is asked to be ideal — 'a wholly free individual artist-man, a unique force, a truly free 
man.' This seems true and not true. The writer's life, a generalised bohemian style, has a broad 
attraction for others seeking freer lifestyles; but respect for the writer as a person belongs to 
liberalism, which is what we're now being ironic about.... for isn't the problem that in any case 
writers, committed also in the direction of craft and culture, have a way of jumping out of history, 
of not meeting our passion for confrontation? 
Bradbury proceeds to remark that the opposing concepts of selfhood within and outside history 
form the main issue in the contemporary literary situation. He claims that history itself has come 
to imply that the arts "are suffering the temptations of history, and... history has come more and 
more to imply a revolutionary concept." Bradbury's overriding criticism of contemporary 
fiction, however, is that, except in individual cases such as Bellow, Cocteau and Cendrars, it 
offers no clues to the historic predicament: "It is not only the liberal imagination but literary 
creativity that is being hard pushed in this new age we are slipping with such intellectual 
readiness into."6 
In "Our Middle-Class Storytellers," Kazin reaches a similar verdict. With the attractions of 
individual selfhood being smothered by the cultural consensus, "style" becomes the writer's last 
resort in putting his point of view and his values across. Gone is the social heritage of the early 
twentieth-century bourgeois literary vanguard. The consequent exposure of the self in fiction 
leaves "no private worlds... to the middle-class imagination." And since middle-class values are 
so often identical to liberal ones, liberalism unites political inertia to a retreat from history. In 
the fiction published in the New Yorker — a mouth-piece of the middle class — there is 
rarely any action. This is the plight of the middle-class imagination: always to feel oneself a 
spectator, a conscience, a memory only; to inhabit a world that is only the reflection of one's 
conscience and memory; that is so full of yearning, guilt, angst, and literature, of "the death of 
God," the "imagination of disaster," vicarious reflections on Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Mississippi, 
South Africa, Harlem. The people in these [ЛЬ Yorker] stories initiate nothing and change 
nothing... The "outer world" seems to be furiously asserting itself all around us, but in fiction it 
exists only if it is a force that calls force out of us, that exists to change us and be changed. This 
does not significantly happen in our middle-class fiction... 
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Kazin echoes John Cheever's well-known cultural complaint and concludes that the contempo-
rary literary situation offers no scope to a viable liberal politics based on historical vision, 
"because, in a world where things once difficult have become too easy, our moral attitudes have 
also become too easy." It reflects the status quo, based on private man's resignation at living 
'inside the whale' and holding his own counsel.7 
Bright Book's motto anticipates Kazin's call for a reconstructed historicism: "It is with fiction 
as with religion. It should present another world, but one to which we feel the tie." The book 
opens on a criticism of the heritage of American literary modernism, which culminated in 
Hemingway's "absolute identification of life with literature." It ends on a scarcely bashful paean 
to Nabokov's imaginative antiworld. Bright Book's reviewers doubted if this route could offer 
inspiring vistas and wondered whether the "tie" had not been dissolved to the extent of 
absolutizing modem man's sense of being historically dispossessed. The internalization in 
contemporary fiction of much that was previously the province of historical study and moral 
inquiry brings about a re-ordering of the "outer world" entirely from the point of view of the 
self, with the latter positioning itself arbitrarily within or without it. Theodore Colson, reviewing 
Bright Book together with Tony Tanner's City of Words, argues that the last chapter offers a 
certain forced perspective and constitutes a break in the book's generally "unspoken progression, 
not chronological, but in matters of style, of tone... of moral imagination." He compares this 
discontinuity to the theme of entropy in Tanner's work. Bright Book's conclusion allegedly 
abandons all "belief in civilization." True, Kazin has denounced the contemporary American 
scene as a prig's paradise, but his alienation from it is not ideological as in Richard Poirier's A 
World Elsewhere (1966), and much more personally felt. Nor does it have a speculative concept 
for its theme, as does City of Words. As Colson notes, Kazin significantly concludes with 
Nabokov, whereas Tanner begins with him. Tanner's thematic interest lies with those modern 
American writers who attempt to build an aesthetic sanctuary from the ever depleting energies 
of 'the world outside' and use this as the sole mode of selfhood available to them, whereas 
Kazin's cultural interest is with those whose belief in the vitality of civilization was strong 
enough to serve as a medium for artistic expression. Hemingway, for instance, proved his grasp 
of a vital cultural centre through his "particular ability to render the natural world as concretely 
as possible."8 
In Hemingway's case, style is narrative method linking selfhood to the contingent, historical 
world. What Kazin aims to preserve in Bright Book, is the moral conviction held by early 
twentieth-century social visionaries such as Randolph Bourne that history — in whatever 
obscure form — sides with the self, despite the selfs radical independence from society. The 
modernist self endorsed moral vision and continuity, making the possibilities of society the 
object of the imagination. He was a rebel rather than an outcast, testing the moral calibre of the 
world he resisted. Colson, accordingly, illustrates Kazin's different viewpoint from Tanner's 
using the climax in Henry James's The Ambassadors. Lambert Strether, its main character, 
who had perceived himself all day as within the frame of a picture, sees the picture completed as 
a boat with two figures appears. But then the boat veers; the ethical has invaded the aesthetic, as 
it always will in life. It seems that recent writers are trying to have it the other way; the aesthetic 
"world elsewhere" takes over from a real world which is subsiding in entropy. 
A similar imperative informs Kazin's analysis of contemporary writers' motives for writing 
fiction. Paradoxically, says Josephine Hendin, it also characterizes his admiration for Nabokov, 
whose catholic imagination turned life into "the experience of multiple realities." Nabokov, who 
had a background of cultural and political dislocation, tried to relieve his alienated state by 
creating an "antiworld that could take one out of exile." Central to that attempt, says Hendin, 
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was Nabokov's "'patterning' of life, death and personality," and this radical freedom from 
cultural, psycho-social and political doctrine constitutes his attraction to Kazin, since it frees the 
self as the master of its own fictional fate. And that, surely, provides sufficient moral currency 
at a time of widespread cultural nihilism and political despair.9 
Unlike many reviewers, Peter Shaw does believe that Bright Book contains a thesis. The 
book examines the loss of faith by Hemingway, Fitzgerald, John Dos Passos and Cummings. He 
extrapolates from this "critique of the older generation's modernism" to describe postwar fiction 
as modernism gone hollow. Shaw particularizes Kazin's achievement and points out that his 
concern is actually "the novelist himself." Almost every writer discussed in Bright Book, Shaw 
notes, is at a loss to account for the larger force directing his experience, viz. society. Kazin's 
dismissal of the nonfiction novel — which exists "in order not to change the American situation 
that makes possible so much literary aggression against it" (BB, 236) — proves that he is in the 
tradition of liberal cultural criticism. Kazin specifies his animus even further in his chapter on 
"The Absurd as a Contemporary Style," where he describes the dominant sentiment in the novel 
of the absurd, viz. meaninglessness, as "a [contemporary] middle-class state of mind" (BB, 245). 
Shaw believes that Bright Book, in the final analysis, deals with the contemporary crisis of 
culture. This can also be inferred from the book's relative critical neglect, though he stresses the 
contradictory reactions to it. Jack Richardson, he notes, blames Kazin for giving an impression 
of flaccidity and "inconsequence," whereas Richard Poirier resents its "sputtering putdowns" of 
Mailer, Vonnegut, Burroughs and Heller. These may even, as Shaw admits, have been occa-
sioned by a "politically conservative fear of their anti-establishment rage." Furthermore, 
Richardson's observations about Kazin's reluctance to reveal the theoretical underpinnings, if 
any, of his critique 
account for some of his own difficulty with the book. Add to this the paradox of Kazin's blaming 
novelists for failing to confront American society but not blaming them for their own imaginative 
failings.... The trouble with the novel... may be traced to the decline of our culture. 
Apparently, postwar fiction has recorded the break-up of middle-class society and its related 
values. The contemporary literary sensibility is primarily motivated by "pervasive social 
anxiety," and in fiction this has largely been allowed to stand as an unmediated fact: "There is 
much brilliance, mad humor, and invention abroad, but, with the exception of Nabokov, no one 
is able to succeed on a large scale. The novel remains the bright book of life, but few are 
writing it." Shaw regrets the absence in Bright Book of a comprehensive analysis of the state of 
contemporary fiction, but he supports Kazin's attempt to resolve the highly complex relations 
of the writer to his culture, between the 'moral' and the 'political': "...the novel has suddenly 
stopped seeming important in the same way that, a few years ago, the explication of poetry 
stopped seeming important. As for the state of the culture, that forgotten problem seems to be 
discussed only at the back of the New York Times Book Review and in the boardrooms of 
foundations."10 Shaw's conclusion is that Kazin's critical narrative presents a forgotten mode 
of radicalism. 
The Decline of Society as a Dramatic Form 
Bright Book does not offer an alternative ideology of the self. It rather records the former 
radical's dismay at the ever widening gap in contemporary literature between the self and 
society. The book's tone derives in part from the cultural crisis that Trilling addressed but it 
ultimately rejects his bleak view of the social visions of traditional humanism." One of its 
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seminal ideas Kazin explored in an article entitled "Autobiography as Narrative," explaining the 
special relevance of autobiographical writing to the contemporary cultural situation. He claimed 
that the sterling faith of classical American liberal radicalism had waned: "Society is no longer 
a backdrop to anybody's sensitivity." Yet, society was "the form that we must learn to express 
even when we have no hope of mastering it." He was not advocating a return to the classical 
social doctrine of naturalism: he continued to believe in "the power of language rather than of 
concepts to create forms." Naturalism, which had traditionally been seen to sacrifice the 
personality to the forces moulding it, must now yield to the self creating a moral order all its 
own. Here Kazin was exploring the space between the modern self-ideals that Trilling labelled 
"sincerity" and "authenticity." The former's appropriate definition within a wider context than 
the self evidently yielded greater possibilities of resolution in historical forms, whereas Kazin 
associated the latter with the antisocial visions of literary modernism, whose conviction was that 
"consciousness alone could save [the writer] from the abyss of non-being" and which hence 
believed in nothing so much as "the power of language to create forms." In "The Literary 
Mind," published in 1965, Kazin distrusted the conflation of language and reality. One of his 
tenets was the "radical insufficiency of language" to present us with an inclusive picture of the 
world. Were it to fulfil its old Romantic ambition, it could only fail, and so confirm the convic-
tion of man's disinherited state, as in the case of Stephen Crane, who, he argued, had based a 
whole oeuvre on "the creed that man and the creation have no moral connection with each 
other." Crane had perpetuated the fundamental disjunction of the writer's perceptions and the 
social order, which was to become a feature of twentieth-century literary consciousness. Kazin 
pejoratively labelled Crane an "advance sentinel of twentieth-century dogmas of absurdity."12 
Writing on the eve of the Seventies, Kazin characterized the contemporary literary ethos as 
one of harried self-concern and defensiveness. The Sixties had not brooked masterpieces, he 
observed, and had driven many sensitive minds to seek "a kind of inviolability from the age" 
instead. Politically and morally, the age had had an unrivalled experience of the American 
philosophy of progress in a state of undress. As a result, many writers had maintained shifty 
relations with the actual world, the life of society. They had taken for granted "the disjunction 
of person and event, the tragic recurrences of history, the labyrinthine perversions of the human 
heart," and were now disposed to proclaim the "permutations of the human fancy" — genius 
being, as Sartre said, not a gift but a way out one invents in desperate cases — as the only 
realm of freedom. This was a total reversal from the synthesis envisioned by early twentieth-
century modems such as Randolph Boume, who believed that radical social thought and moral 
criticism would restore the health of society. The contemporary experience, Kazin believed, 
showed no signs that such a moral resurgence was underway in the Seventies. Filling the void 
was "History," or rather, as the emerging consensus in the contemporary mind would have it, 
power. Apparently inassimilable extremes, these met in "politics." Kazin considered the contem-
porary variety to be a response to the collapse of the social machine in the Sixties, to the 
conviction of the irrevocable disruption of the world's external order. Fictionalized "History" 
was believed to remedy this situation. During the Sixties, facts, and the reasons behind them, 
became the object of much literary stylization. Experts in various departments of life could pass 
themselves off as writers and did. These developments created an awkward dilemma: 
History as a science is at the peak of technical efficiency but as a form of literature is in a bind. 
Can one still believe in "history" as a form of truth? How much can one count on an interest in 
tradition in a society where more and more intelligent people believe that history is nothing but 
the blind exercise of power? [Yet, t]he writing of history has... a special urgency at a time when 
the inherent conservatism of all national cultures does not seem to impede the destructiveness of 
technological "progress."13 
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Academic studies at the end of the Sixties visibly failed to produce of unifying perspective 
on contemporary history, turning the historical field itself radically susceptible to the entice-
ments of literary "treatment." This was perhaps illustrated most conspicuously in Edmund 
Wilson's Patriotic Gore, a book that mixed a loving fascination with America's great leaders in 
with biological metaphors of the power drive presumably making up the nation's political 
history. On a similar note, Vonnegut's observation in Slaughterhouse Five that World War II 
"certainly made everyone very tough" made clear that Hitler's real legacy was the endless 
repetition in modern life of arbitrary and destructive violence. There was a conspicuous strain 
of excess in the modern experience and, since it was so easy to locate, it virtually invited 
extensive reporting and representation. In the literature of the Vietnam war, as in Truman 
Capote's In Cold Blood, John Hershey's The Algiers Motel Incident and Joyce Carol Oates's 
them, the ulterior motif is "the duplicity and theatricality of the human personality in the spell 
of violence." The interpretation of historical events lost its moral actuality to the suggestive and 
shifting perspectives of "treatment." Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, on the other 
hand, was intended to eradicate the widespread misconception that the century's worst crimes 
could not possibly be accounted for. Arendt sought to put Eichmann 
on trial before the whole Western moral tradition. But as was shown by the bitter controversy over 
the book, the "real" events, because they go on being real, are open to the most violent disagree-
ment even among people who suffered them together. The fictionality of our world sometimes 
seems all too extreme...14 
The contradictions previously held in check by the liberal view of history came alive with a 
vengeance. To Kazin, there was a direct connection between the moral disaster that was Nazism 
and the discomfiture of the contemporary liberal mind. The liberals failed to combat the State's 
increasingly destructive policies in Vietnam or its crack-down on supposedly revolutionary 
movements at home. In order to cover up its weakness, the liberal mind occasionally found 
more evidence of design than existed. In historiography, for instance, Arthur J. Schlesinger Jr.'s 
studies of the New Deal "illustrate in their literary intelligence, their dramatic workmanship..., 
their unalloyed President worship, how 'history' is moved to become 'literature' for the sake of 
'politics'." Literature of this kind focused on the naturalism of power as a proper subject of 
fiction. Similarly, Kazin noted, Norman Mailer's nonfiction was designed to gain him "political 
influence." Mailer's polemicism, however, also threw him open to a very American, contempo-
rary dilemma: "Although Mailer wants to be a political leader through everything he writes, he 
also wants his writing to raise him above the struggle that arises from his addiction to America 
and his fear of its power." Kazin implied that no writer of the Sixties accomplished this, owing 
to their disproportionate sense of control over their experience. They found shelter from the 
violence of the contemporary scene by the pursuit of form as the nearest analogue to the old 
humanistic ideal of the created self. Elsewhere, Kazin observed that the pursuit of form was 
originally, immediately prior to 1914, meant to fuse artistic experiment and social innovation. 
After the Great War, however, it increasingly came to mean "not a liberation in history but a 
revolt against the decimation by history itself." T.S. Eliot's poetic-cultural programme, Kazin 
argued, consolidated this. In fact, Joyce, Eliot and Pound "believed in form because of a 
tremendous historical pessimism." The democratic experience did not enter into their prescrip-
tions for culture. They chose to define culture and tradition in terms of a fierce rear-guard action 
against the chaotic forces of mass civilization, and they drew their values from the characteristic 
outlook of, in Henry James's words, "that inexhaustible finality, ...the artist." Only he was 
capable of achieving the synthesis which would stand and triumph over the ruins of time. 
Coupled to an extreme form of heuristic pedagogy cultivated by the New Critics, Kazin argues, 
222 
this led to "unbelievable claims of the primacy of art." It also caused a serious loss of historical 
bearings in art, since many students of literature accepted Joyce, James, Eliot and Proust as holy 
writ and used such writers against "everything that was new and fresh and chaotic in contempo-
rary literature."" 
What survived into the Sixties was the stature assigned to the artist. The difference was that 
it sanctioned the new cult of "anti-form." Kazin defines this as the "psychology of self-
expression," or rather "psychological authenticity." Unlike Trilling's conception of the 
"adversarial self," with its insistent will to become detached from any kind of social existence 
and to achieve "authenticity," this expressed itself as a form of antagonism to, rather than the 
negation of, the pressures arising from conventional social forms. It was a vitalism of biological 
and psychic identity that was profoundly antisocial, mocking the tremulously groomed style of 
the Jamesian mind or the aggressive intellectualism of Joyce's Stephen Dedalus. It performed 
a drastic break with modernism, however, in its claims for the social potential of its own ethos. 
It exhilarated in forms of social dialectics. Particularly, it saw 'repression' as evidence of the 
progressive state of disease of the social organism. By the same token, the Sixties cult of "anti-
form" apostrophized "spontaneity" as the most effective remedy, posing that as the nexus of 
social experience. Kazin believes it was 
based on a pessimism as great in its own way politically speaking as the cult of art before and 
after the 1914 war. But the great modem school of Joyce and Yeats and Eliot felt that history was 
really always tragic, but that the cycle of history, as Joyce proclaimed in Finnegans Wake, really 
lived up to the prescription of the great Italian theorist Vico, a series of recurrences. Now to the 
young men, the young poets... the young hippies, the young people to whom poetry in many ways 
is a form of tenderness rather than of art, "art" has become another way of saying "I must beat the 
system."... 
...the whole idea of escaping history through art has now become a way of change — a form 
of beating the system through what one might call art for my sake. This is the basis of anti-
form.16 
For this reason, the liberal mind turned to politicizing contemporary culture. It saw society 
dominated by forces tilted against the freedom of the individual mind and the individual's power 
of self-determination. Accordingly, being 'against the grain' came to be civic virtue, whereas the 
constitutional, political safeguards of liberal democracy were rejected as the instruments of "the 
system," viz. the State. As a result, the typical Sixties literature ranged from trenchant social 
exposé to frantic paranoia. The "system" had become morally and politically discredited, with 
no authority available to fill the void. There was a pressing sense of forces straining away from 
the centre. In literature, cast loose from its traditional moorings in society, the self moved 
desperately 'free,' intent on extricating itself from society's maze. 
In addition to its residual political animus against the State, this type of ethos was helped 
along by the staple insight of twentieth-century literary consciousness that "truth is always 
private and subversive, that the writer always stands apart from the social order even when he 
is admired by it." Kazin therefore traces the roots of his view to Stephen Crane's work. This 
contained the characteristic themes of twentieth-century literature, which " — never more so 
than now — revolve around D.H. Lawrence's realization that 'man has his excess always on his 
hands.' To a writer like Crane, as to many a writer today, man is always imaginative man, and 
imagination and society are unrelated." At the basis of this is the Romantic faith in the suprem-
acy of "mental events," a heritage which Kazin argues exercises great power over contemporary 
writers increasingly convinced of the incompatibility of the individual and society. It also fed 
the liberal fascination with society's "influence" on writers and its faith in the primacy of 
"commitment" to political ideas. These reflected poorly in the dominant literary ethos, however, 
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for "the writers themselves were getting more and more absorbed in the drama of human 
creativity — a plastic stuff, seemingly limitless, fierce in its insistencies." In matters of political 
and social intelligence, as of self-definition, this led to auto-intoxication and megalomania: 
"...the passion to be an 'artist,' to follow the dictates of 'imagination,' permits a dreamlike 
confidence in the 'absurdity' of everything else. Art has become too easy, a gratification of the 
self— and the self is terrible in its demands on our taste." The "absurdity" was reflected in the 
essential inimicality of "the system," and the fashionable remedy in literature was to expose 
society as raw power. Kazin worried about the energy wasted in this unbridled antagonism: "The 
devaluations proceed too rapidly [and increasingly] the raw American ego becomes conscious 
of having its excess on its hands [masking] these marginal irritabilities [as] creativity and 
genuine concern." He concluded that preciously few American fiction writers managed to make 
the world inhabitable.17 
In that sense, the prevailing outlook of the Sixties represented a watershed in the history of 
the American literary imagination. Even the traditionalism of the New Critics — who shared a 
"disbelief in political progress [and] an obstinate faith in the possibility of Americans remaining 
different from each other" — was backed by the moral design of their faith in a possibly better 
world. These critics' real influence, Kazin claimed, 
is seen now not in the faded polemics but in the moral coloring of certain exquisite early pieces 
by Robert Lowell — deeply influenced by John Crowe Ransom — and the stories of Peter Taylor 
and Flannery O'Connor. The Southern critics, as critics, backed an abstraction called Southern 
history. But as the novelists have shown, the real struggle in the South has been between the 
Faulkners and the Snopeses, the Robert Penn Warrens and the Willie Starks, the John Crowe 
Ransoms plus the C. Vann Woodwards against the George Wallaces. The Snopeses and Starks and 
Wallaces were not interested in the Southern past but in the typical American future of unlimited 
national expansion, power, and domination. 
Equally, the critics of the Old Left — the "only real challenge" to the traditionalism of the 
Southerners — through the exposure of their moral visions of history had experienced the 
inevitable difficulty of clarifying history's redemptive design. Both schools shared one great 
virtue, however. They had "given a moral design to their studies," whether the better world they 
envisioned was "the fiction of the old South as the Greek republic or the new Russia as a 
humane culture."18 
This moral strain was ignored by later generations of critics trying to cope with the post-
radical dilemma, and it was to be regrettably absent from the literary ethos of the Sixties. Kazin 
challenged Trilling, for example, for trying to settle the complexities of modern society "by 
critical argument alone." He also attacked Leslie Fiedler for giving full expression, in An End 
to Innocence, to "what was to be so dispiriting about radical disillusionment even in the title of 
the book..." Fiedler's account of history's betrayal of American liberalism's Edenic faith served 
no purpose, Kazin argued, since it was not so much "wisdom" that Fiedler brought to bear on 
"innocence" as "knowingness": 
And with knowingness alone one does not write The Great Gatsby or In Our Time or The Sound 
and the Fury.... Position-taking has never been of the slightest use to art.... Conflicts remain at the 
heart of every achieved work of literature. They are resolved without being dismissed, and in such 
a way that we gratefully re-experience the conflict. But such conflicts now became, in the 
characteristic American soul-engineering of the postwar period... oddly enough something for the 
critic to expose." 
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With the sense of conflict muted, human experience lost its transcendent potential. All ideas of 
History, insofar as they proposed to be liberal-progressive or transcendent, became suspect, with 
post-liberal versions of the myth of the Fall replacing them. That given, History was no longer 
seen to provide an avenue to the future. It became cyclical, dismissive of progress, borne along 
by sentiments of postlapsarian disillusionment. 
Kazin noted that a similar cast of mind dominated the history of literary studies. An entire 
generation of literary students had learned "only what their teacher could absorb from a few 
pundits more clearly teachable than all the rest." It was the "cultural authoritarianism" of the 
New Critics that had sponsored the idea of tradition as an immutable, static order. Its pedagogi-
cal format impressed students of contemporary literature. 
The training in critical method based on a few selected works was now all too often one's literary 
education. This parodied Eliot's famous dictum that the great works exist in our consciousness as 
simultaneous order, that every important new work recomposes the past. It turned out that we 
stored up only those works that we could most readily "explain." 
History — which to Kazin properly speaking is always "contemporary history" — became the 
object of ever greater knowledge but remained self-enclosed, yielding no new creative insights. 
The corresponding interest in form and design, however, was culturally significant, since it 
aimed to find terms in the present for understanding the crises of the past. Kazin mentions four 
exiles from Nazism — Erich Auerbach, Walter Benjamin, Erich Heller and Hannah Arendt — 
whose state of exile was the perfect metaphor for the "break in tradition." Their work featured 
a deeply moral concern with restoring a vital sense of tradition in art, literature and philosophy. 
Auerbach's Mimesis, Kazin holds, 
is also a work of politics — a tribute to what in the European spirit could not be obliterated by 
Hitler. Mimesis incorporates the true spirit of the civilization from which the humanist was ejected 
by the Nazi.... [Most of all it recreates] the wholeness of tradition.... As one who was also in 
exile, he made real, as a scholar, Dante's ideal of a book as an allegory of perfection. Mimesis 
will live as the most heroic idea of order in civilization created by a contemporary literary scholar. 
It is the contemporary critic's mission to restore such a sense of history, to trace the (orderly) 
development of the human spirit from universal origins, to throw out lifelines across the waste 
stretches in cultural history blasted by Nazi cultural politics. Thus, he addresses the question of 
history and identity which Kazin believes is sadly missing from significant portions of contem-
porary literary discourse. Sadly, since all literary effort is ultimately aimed "to carry out a 
design." In the course of time, literature "changes but can never improve," returns to its origins, 
"conservative by nature." The persistent note of the human situation it provides constitutes its 
moral interest and value, which the contemporary literary mind should recognize and cultivate. 
"Literature has in fact been a continuous record of man's repetitive expression of his natural 
destiny."20 
Kazin identifies several factors in recent history that have largely cancelled out this insight: 
mass killings, political fanaticism and repression, the awareness of so much unrelieved suffering 
that led Sartre to denounce the discriminations of literature for the sake of "a new revolutionary 
puritanism," combining with the "still incalculable thrust of science into the future," were 
creating "the discontinuity of our generation from the past." To counter this is Kazin's task in 
Bright Book. There has been a large deal of ideological pressure from several quarters — 
including literature — to obscure the possibly telic nature of history and to lend authority to the 
aesthetic constructs of the post-modem "literature of exhaustion" instead. The apparent motive 
of such literary doctrine was to phase out the self, all individuality, as the pathetic vessel of 
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historical hopes and illusions, and to avoid all historicization of the aesthetic construct. Never-
theless, Kazin counters, even the most outspoken of all literary ideologies about man's negli-
gible role amid the forces of the environment moulding him, viz. literary naturalism, has turned 
out to be remarkably dependent for its success on the writer, including his sense of historic 
identity: "Zola, Maupassant, Dreiser created better than they knew — better than their theories 
promised. The naturalist yielded to — his doctrine was 'proved' by — himself as an artist." In 
contemporary writing, however, the creative instrument is no longer the ideology but the 
ideologue. The perceptions of art have moved from the tale to the teller, and the artist has 
become a virtuoso of "anti-form" in his opposition to the forms of consciousness dictated by 
"our technology, the too-powerful and militarized state, ...a planet groaning with the misery of 
'superfluous' millions."21 The artist has become the medium, performing his own successive, 
shifting, anti-historical permutations in evidence of his regained sense of freedom in a crisis-
ridden culture. A split has ensued between the dramatization of moral and political values in the 
public realm on the one hand and the uninhibited self-gratification posing as spiritual 
enlightenment on the other. 
This view informs Bright Book as literary history. It offers an interpretation of postwar litera-
ture, a subject that has suffered major historical lesions: 
There is no great mystery about the shift from "modem" to "post-modern" in the minds of literary 
historians and similar passive observers [today]. No other class is so quick to praise historical 
despondency, "silence" and "exhaustion," though the fact is, literature never really ends — there 
is always a nouveau roman to tell us that Camus or Proust or Joyce is old hat. But "modern 
literature," from the Romantics to the Second World War, was radical, secular, insurrectionary, 
finding no gods except those in the human brain. 
Kazin sharply criticizes the contemporary, stylized literary ego for shuttling between the 
conviction that history is a played-out convention and the corollary notion that aesthetic 
considerations determine human destiny. The 'post-modern' tries to wrest 'art' from any public 
occasion, as is evident in Richard Poirier's collection of essays The Performing Self, and 
substitutes that for the allegedly disintegrating 'vital centre' in society. Kazin is dismayed by 
Poirier's "wistful desire that not only rock music but rock performance and rock festivals be 
recognized as works of art." Poirier headed a significant reversal of values, mocking the ethical 
dimension of public conduct, when he denied that the Rolling Stones Altamont concert in 1969 
— when lead singer Mick Jagger's irresponsible act whipped the crowd into a fury causing the 
violent death of Meredith Hunter — was reason to believe that there was a connection "between 
the deaths of more than one young person at Altamont and drugs, the Hell's Angels, Mick 
Jagger, and the Rolling Stones."22 What Trilling had circumspectly called "modernism in the 
streets," the uninhibited acting out of ego-ideals of 'authenticity' during the Sixties supplanting 
vital social roles, Kazin denounced as a direct attack on the continuity of values. The shiftiness 
of the 'post-modem' identity, as well as its apocalyptic confrontation of society and the State, 
disqualified it entirely when it came to addressing the overriding problem of the postwar mind, 
viz. the legacy of the Holocaust. Against its background, Kazin's deepest concern is with the 
criticism of values and their transmission, with restoring a vital sense of continuity with early 
twentieth-century Romantic modernism and humanism, whose literary ethos had confronted 
issues of self, history, society or the State. Accordingly, Bright Book sees History as a tonic 
force in the public mind, consciously at play within the confines of human destiny. Its appear-
ance in contemporary literature, however, is now indeterminate and protean, now a juggernaut 
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squashing all assertions of individual identity, now a farcical convention no longer able to 
conceal the absence of a vital centre. 
Faulkner: Young Hearts and the Fate of the Social Compact 
Kazin offers a reinterpretation of Faulkner's work to deal with modernism's ambivalent outlook 
on history. Hemingway and Faulkner, he points out, are antipodal minds joined by their animus 
vis-à-vis history: 
[Faulkner] showed narrative not as a triumph over experience, but as the struggle of language to 
find support for the mind in its everlasting struggle with the past. 
... Hemingway died of Faulkner as much as he died of Hemingway. In Hemingway's last years 
it was Faulkner... who was to be a constant shock and bewilderment to Hemingway in the new 
age of ambiguity. Faulkner was another name for a world — for history — that could not be 
reduced to a style. (55, 20) 
While Hemingway's rigorous stylization featured the self as the necessary end product of 
literature — "unmistakable," hence beyond history — Faulkner identified the creative life with 
historical identity. Kazin is sensitive to images of the historical experience in Faulkner's work 
as a tragic progression reflecting man's inward division. Their structural function suggests a 
view of history not as chaos but as a moral quest: Faulkner's fiction brings home a sense of 
havoc and conflict, of human storm, blood madness and the irrational, of the unconscious pos-
sessing the human spirit but using it, as Hegel's World Spirit used man, to make history. History 
always implies meaning. There is a pattern, moral even when it is post-Christian. Everything in 
Faulkner came back to man as a conflict which pressed for expression as history, not for solution. 
(55, 26) 
This brings the self back within the scope of history, even making it its medium. It liberates 
history from the eschatology of Christian tradition, which proclaims defined patterns of human 
destiny and in the process denies that individual experience, vividly captured, is history in the 
making. It also restores the self to full consciousness of its position in the contingent world. For 
recognition always follows action, and history reflects the attempt to recover the act or event 
and give it its fullest meaning in time: "Facing on every side the consequences of the human 
tendency to abrupt action, his characters would go on meditating the consequences of their 
action — not from any hope of moderating what from the first moment had been beyond them 
— but from the inevitable need of thought to live with the consequences of action" (BB, 26-7). 
In Faulkner, the self madly pursues its ambiguous relationship with the "world" and seeks to 
establish its terms of understanding, epitomizing the vital connections of past and present. 
Several members of the Compson family experience the presence of the past as the linchpin of 
their existence, while Ike McCaslin makes it the object of a deeply personal commitment: his 
idea of the future is to redeem history. This is seminal in Bright Book: the role of the past as the 
storehouse of images of human nature, particularly its divisions, indicates the uselessness of 
man's attempt to gain control over events, to direct history. A true sense of history may be 
acquired in retrospect, and then only by the disinterested ordering of the universal elements of 
human experience: 
Faulkner showed a Shakespearean sense of language as parallel to action,... able to write history 
but not change it. In the beginning was the deed [quite contrary to Christian tradition]. Man... 
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could realize his experience only after he had lived it. The doing and the realizing are inaccessible 
to each other, and this is also the human conflict. The heart is blind, hot, passionate... Man 
explodes himself in the service of his passions; his ambition constantly destroys the society he 
thinks the foundation of moral order [emphasis added]. Yet, once the deed is done, it is irrevoc-
able; thought alone puts the story together — the artist is a chronicler going back into the havoc 
that has never ended. (BB, 28) 
A political statement, this undermines ideologically doctrinaire visions of the future, particu-
larly those of the Marxist variety. Neither, however, does Kazin subscribe to the philosophical 
implications of the human situation in Faulkner's work: if "the doing and the realizing" remain 
inaccessible to each other, history will forever remain without purpose, a string of random 
events rendering conscious human effort futile. If the artist is not constrained by the processes 
of the contingent world, he will assume the status formerly held by the visionary civic intelli-
gence. Ipso facto, Faulkner would rank as a greater historical mind than Abraham Lincoln. 
Though Kazin finds this hypothetical duality of history insufferable, he believes it was central 
to the modernists' creative hubris. Taking up a position as a retrospective observer, the writer 
will provide ex post justification of events and claim superior knowledge of historic motive. 
This leads to mental quietism, Kazin points out, the reason being that, to all intents and pur-
poses, the experience of language transmutes and replaces what could not be averted as histori-
cal fate or borne as a historical burden: 
...the retrospect of history is endless, the irrevocability of action, tragic. And the humility and 
clarity that may come with this awareness, symbolized in Ike McCaslin's development from the 
boy eager to play a man's role in the hunt to the old Ike who detaches himself from all ties and 
comes to love the wildemess for its own sake, constitutes Faulkner's deepest belief— virtue is 
powerless, and extreme powerlessness, as in Benjy the "Christ-figure," is virtue. Virtue intervenes 
when power is gone. The South in 1861... is unconscious of the burdens of war which its 
descendants will be struggling with in the twentieth century. Faulkner... feels older to himself than 
his ancestors do. His burden of awareness makes him a seasoned old man by temperament, 
contemplative and alone by contrast with the Jeb Stuarts and other romantic Confederate leaders 
who in his work appear dashing, young, suicidally romantic and innocent. They rushed into war, 
they took on an opponent clearly stronger than themselves, they were magnificent in their folly. 
It was left to their descendants, turned middle class and into writers of books, to tell the story. 
(BB, 29) 
As experience, history must take account of the dualism of thought and action. This polarity 
expresses the tragedy of the human situation: the proliferating complexities arising from 
unpremeditated action can only be grasped by the "inevitable need of thought to live with the 
consequences of action." Such complexities do not comport well with Christian notions of 
salvation, however, and the historic must not be confused with revelation culminating in 
deliverance, for that would distort the essence of human experience. Kazin holds that the Christ-
figures in Faulkner's novels are virtuous because they are unable to act: Benjy Compson is 
mentally handicapped while Joe Christmas has always been so much other people's victim as to 
have never lived. They lack the poignant experience of triggering events recoiling on thems-
elves, of willpower defeating understanding and human excess playing havoc with human 
motives. Their souls are not in conflict, hence they are the powerless, incapable of commanding 
the retrospect to put their plight in perspective and regain wholeness: "Man's immortality, if he 
can be said to have one at all, reaches into the past, not into the future; it lies in a candid sense 
of history, not in the hope afforded by orthodox Christianity" (BB, 31-2). Nor do the rest of 
Faulkner's protagonists command their fates: "Those who act, who have power, those who in 
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imagination one can still see riding across the scene of history, can never alter the course of 
action" (BB, 32). But then it is their tragedy to have confined their mental scope to the immedi-
ate effects of their action. Impatient with the limitations imposed by circumstance — viz. the 
workings of society — the self hypertrophies. Youth becomes the objective correlative of the 
excess of self driving modem man's effort to breach history. Eventually, however, the self 
collides with the pressure from historical fact, as was the case with Hemingway. It turns out to 
be a brittle fiction and is overtaken by history. 
A key motif in Faulkner's work, this strengthens Kazin's case against "the full and final 
efficacy of the 'self.'"23 Centrality, innocence, promise, integrity, and hope become obscured 
when heedlessness and obstinate willpower throw the world out of kilter and lay the axe at the 
very foundations of society. A dominant sentiment in Faulkner, accordingly, is the wish that 
"the past had never happened — or what for a Southerner can be the same thing, that the Civil 
War is still in the balance, that the worst hasn't happened yet and perhaps won't" (BB, 30). 
History would still be congruent with revealed purpose, and society strong enough to contain the 
pressures it generates from within. Confirming his assessment of Faulkner in Leaf, Kazin 
classifies Faulkner's "The Bear" once more as a supreme instance of the moral imagination in 
history. He believes it features Ike McCaslin's moral development as "legend," as retrospective 
disclosure of the weakness of human nature defeating human progress. "The Bear" suggests that 
the past may and must become subject to instantaneous review at any time: 
Each of us... becomes as old as thought itself as we look at our younger selves blindly rushing 
through the past. And this is what makes the final moral development of Ike McCaslin in "The 
Bear" so beautiful a legend, for admitting that slavery was a curse, Ike lightens himself of its 
burden; he becomes his own redeemer. This growth is possible only when the chronicle of man's 
past lives in a man's mind as if he had lived all of it and were responsible to all of it. (BB, 31) 
Having the grace of retrospect, Ike can picture to himself the moral upheavals colouring the 
broad historical canvass that remains blank to each of the protagonists acting within it. To 
Kazin, Ike is a moral hero and a prime historical mind. He is sensitive to every suspected 
injustice perpetrated among and upon past generations. His sense of responsibility to the past 
takes the form of action filling the gap between historical existence and historical consciousness. 
Only the fullest recognition of "what has been done" will bring redemption, not for the protago-
nists, whose action is irreversible, but for the storyteller, who conserves the moral foundations 
of society. 
Kazin's interpretation is a serious moral complaint against both the modernist ethos and what 
he was to refer to in An American Procession, as the major effect of "Eliot-Pound," viz. to have 
"abolished among the literary all historicism and to [have] coerce[d] the whole past into fashions 
of the present."24 Initially, Kazin criticizes the radically relativistic perspectives of the historical 
experience cultivated in contemporary writing, but he modulates this criticism to indicate that 
Faulkner refused to see that the writer is in a position to actualize in his present life the 
openness and promise the past once held before it closed in and became the realm of 
determinism: 
Sartre was right when he said of The Sound and the Fury that Faulkner cuts off the future. That 
was necessary to Faulkner, for as Sartre's own erratic development shows, to "choose" the future 
over everything also makes the intellect impatient and manipulative, takes the heart out of art. To 
be so much bound up with the past, to locate it entirely in one's own work, was a luxury that 
"modem masters" like Faulkner were able to enjoy before the rate of change took over the 
contemporary novel. Faulkner in his greatest works was willingly old in order not to betray those 
who had been rash in their youth. In no other American writer is the obligation to the past so 
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complex as in this greatest Southern writer — who more than most writers has interrogated the 
past and has not been able to escape it in one moment of his thought. (BB, 32) 
Historical determinism is so intense as to leave only room for speculative recollection, and 
Faulkner's willingness to be "old" in order not to betray certain historical protagonists in their 
magnificent folly comes close to quietism, with history's dilemmas assuaged by the grace of 
retrospect. Thus, the past explodes in a stunning plethora of entropie forces, leaving the crisis 
of the present to generate necessary forms of consciousness. 
Kazin argues that Faulkner's late career, which virtually took the form of an inclusive gloss 
on the human condition, bore the marks of this. Entropy became Faulkner's favourite 
iconography of the past. The centre would not hold since there was no centre, unless perhaps it 
existed in the writer's own Olympian perspective. In his later works, Faulkner's image of the 
South and Southern history became fixed, and 
...the need to complete and round out a design that has carried us this far [has become] actually 
more pressing than any particular story.... A Fable gives us not the old "Christ-figures," Benjy the 
idiot and Joe Christmas the vagrant, who represent total exposure to suffering, but Christ himself 
disguised as a French corporal leading a mutiny in 1917. For Faulkner the most widespread 
"fable" is now more than the story of an actual man could be. (BB, 33-4) 
Here the present is not open and unfolding, let alone transcendent. It rather conforms to patterns 
of revelation transmitted straight from the past. Nor does Kazin think that Faulkner's version of 
social change matches the South's cherished notion of the historic cataclysm that had overtaken 
it, for the Snopeses turned out to have very few social ambitions after all. They finally did 
manage, however, to wrest power from the established order — viz. Faulkner's own ancestors 
— though they did so merely by persisting in their "unkillable obstinacy" (BB, 34). Kazin 
believes that the history they produced is rather a reductionist version of man's image of 
himself, turning it static. Accordingly, the past produces little else but vengefulness, whereas 
Faulkner produced no vision offering inviolability from its violent expression in the present. The 
enduring human condition comes full circle, exploding liberal visions of the future. It is Kazin's 
view that the novels Faulkner wrote after The Sound and the Fury, Light in August and 
Absalom, Absalom! were rather 
continuations of an instinct. Faulkner's insistence on carrying his "saga" to where there was no 
saga was based not on the fascination of one class (or race) accommodating another as on his 
belief that people never change. Endurance is all. Obstinacy is character. He pushed his design 
through — he did not carry it out — at a time when even the characters in his own novels were 
inconsistent with what they had been, when the novel as a form — his own not least — was 
eluding every attempt to identify it with "permanent" values, the "moral order" behind History. 
But in all these last books one sees... the wholly contemporaneous belief that American history is 
a cycle that may have played itself out. The returns are all in, one can see with Darwinian 
completeness the whole scale of evolution on this continent. The site on which the courthouse 
stands in Requiem for a Nun has seen everything. (BB, 35) 
Whereas in 1963 Kazin distinguished between Faulkner's vision and the modernist ethos, 
characterizing him as "living not by the aesthetic will but by a surrender to his own thought in 
all its ramifications," the pervasive disenchantment with liberal interpretations of American 
history following the heyday of modernism in the Fifties compels him to review Faulkner's 
stature, now emphasizing the strain of historical defeatism in his later work.25 Faulkner as a 
"spokesman to America in its now rueful imperial greatness" (BB, 36) characterized the writer's 
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self dominating the cultural scene and distorting the historical experience. "Story," which Kazin 
believes is the necessary extension of the past into the present where we gratefully re-experience 
it, was displaced by so-called authoritative statements on the nature of the contemporary 
experience. These, however, 
seemed a poor substitute for the great novels. The intense sense of place, of the South to itself 
alone, of human personality for /te own sake, was being unloosed and undone. It was the self-
sufficient thickness of the immediate scene, the unalterable amount of circumstance, a "world" 
made so by persons who were nothing but themselves, that had made Faulkner's books so right 
to our minds. It was a world full of persons who... were not registers or conductors of anything. 
Yet they did not conceive of themselves as their own agents and their own highest interest. They 
knew themselves to be limited, and driven, part of a process, put in motion by the "Player"... Life 
was an agon or contest, never a free fall. (BB, 36-7) 
And Kazin uses this sentiment to define the historic bias of Southern writing in general: 
The Southern writer always knew himself to be part of History, a larger meaning, whether it was 
America the colossus, the juggernaut, the great melting pot into which he did not want to melt; of 
the process of "sin and error," as Southerners liked to say about slavery and more than slavery; 
or the sheer accumulation of ancestry, history, race superstition as second nature. The Southern 
writer felt himself expressed by a force larger than himself. There was an unconscious depth to his 
writing. {BB, 37) 
Bright Book explores that force as moral vision negotiating the constraints of history and the 
pressures of society. It punctures the Southern myth of certain genetic forces determining the 
course of social development. The South's traditionally dialectical interpretation of society — 
revealing its receptiveness to the antagonisms featuring in the devil theory of history — 
becomes progressively discredited. Social Darwinism, Kazin believes, is as rampant in the South 
as it is in the North, replacing Higher Law as the index to the national destiny. It has also 
invaded political life in the South, creating a disabling discrepancy in the Southern experience 
between its prelapsarian version of the past and its general revulsion from modem culture. 
Similarly, Faulkner misunderstood the nature of contemporary social development in the South 
and used "impotence [as a] symbol for the gangsters from Memphis and Flem Snopes from 
Frenchman's Bend. The great-grandson of Colonel William Falkner, who wrote The White Rose 
of Memphis, could not use the real war at home — between the Falkners and the Bilbos, 
Vardamans, Huey Longs, Willie Starks and Lester Maddoxes" (BB, 42). 
Some Southern Sensibilities 
Southern writers like Peter Taylor and Walker Percy were less inclined than R.P. Warren, for 
instance, to postulate such an inevitable clash between history and the moral life.26 Similarly, 
Carson McCullers and Flannery O'Connor present "changes of consciousness" (BB, 49) shifting 
the locus of society in the individual mind. As women writers pledging allegiance to the South, 
they record first-hand the solitariness which accrued to Southern women in the care of crumb-
ling genteel traditions and which impelled them as writers. This makes them prime witnesses of 
tradition's head-on collision with reality, and they are more sensitive than any group within the 
power élite to the forces shaping society. Central to Kazin's interpretation of McCullers's work 
and O'Connor's is the absolutism and the unchanging quality they ascribe to human psychic 
attributes. 
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O'Connor's work characteristically features not so much "personalities" as stock elements 
from legend or fable reduced to "the belief that human beings are absolutely limited" (BB, 55). 
Sexual love being irrelevant to them, her characters symbolize a radical retreat from faith in 
normal social processes. Invariably, place and situation combine to enhance the tragedy of the 
human condition, highlighting "this recurrent fault in ourselves" (BB, 57). Unlike many South-
erners, however, who have pounced on this to explain the "guilt" of slavery, O'Connor really 
believed in original sin. This reflected her total revulsion from conventional social experience, 
yet she was receptive enough to the promise and power of social fact to absorb the orthodox 
elements of Catholicism into "the greatest possible independence and sophistication as an artist" 
(BB, 57). By extension, so Kazin suggests, there has been little understanding so far of the 
psychological sources of her fiction: "She inherited the dread circulatory disease of lupus, died 
of it before she was forty, knew she had it from the time she began to write. Her short career 
was a progress by dying — the sourness, the unsparingness, the constant sense of human 
weakness in her work may not need as many translations into theology as they get in contem-
porary American criticism" (BB, 58). What drove O'Connor's imagination was that her personal 
and physical experience of doom gave her access to elements of the human situation not 
recognized by the genteel custodians of the Southern tradition among whom she was raised and 
whose slow, sapping decline she witnessed at first hand. Her attraction as an artist to Kazin is 
that she rips apart the rigid pretense perpetuating Southern moral righteousness and releases the 
destructive violence lurking just below the surface of contemporary society. "Tradition," the so-
called ontological truth of Southern history, denies the creative sources of O'Connor's fiction, 
since it links the sense of historical crisis and the need for religious authority: 
I am fascinated by O'Connor's severity — by its authority, its consistency, and wonder at its 
personal source... 
... The psychological sources of her fiction are so neglected by her closest friends that one 
might think that Flannery O'Connor wrote fiction only to explain the true religion to the heathen. 
Yet these are less important than the criticism she makes, as a woman more reduced to inaction 
than most women, as a Southerner even more suspicious of "America" than most Southerners, of 
power. 
She links power, ownership, authority to violence. People move into violence by a disposition 
to treat the world as entirely theirs. [O'Connor]... is severe about the illusion... involved in the 
despotic show of will. (BB, 58-9) 
This excess typifies her characters' mental scope, which is in ludicrous opposition to such 
actions as they are capable of. Their incompetence depoliticizes them, for they never consciously 
act in the service of a particular liberal-redemptive view of society. Social life itself they 
consider to be a huge mistake bred of compromise: 
The world is necessarily an empty place for O'Connor; the external is just a trigger. Her art is 
unhistorical. The only real issue is the primal fault. What people do is always grotesque. (BB, 60) 
The great attraction to Kazin of Walker Percy's The Moviegoer is that it breaks down the 
polarity found in O'Connor between the absolute morality associated with "the tradition" and the 
historical forces that ushered in its decline. Percy's role in Bright Book is crucial. Acquainted 
at first hand with the historical forces of progress that the Confederate mind rejected and which 
shaped America the powerhouse, 'Binx' Boiling, The Moviegoer's main character, develops a 
deeply ironic view of contemporary society. An intellectual loyal to his upper middle-class 
origins, Binx nevertheless senses the uselessness of trying to restore the South's grand traditions 
— which are also his creator's — to the contemporary scene. His major resource in countering 
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the pervasive Southern faithlessness — in a psycho-cultural sense — is a mental commitment 
to discovering the concealed spiritual drama in the lives of people around him. One of his habits 
is watching movies and penetrating the crisis at the centre of the human drama. This provides 
an inclusive metaphor of his relation to his world: he is a seeker of hidden spiritual treasure, a 
redeemer of the commonplace. Binx is capable of piercing the world's inconsequence and 
transcending jaded, worn-out attitudes and perceptions to bring about a new sense of signific-
ance. Mediating this experience of conversion, he is a Salvationist, a "clinician and diagnostician 
of the soul" (BB, 62-3). On a different plane, and central to Kazin's argument, Binx links the 
increasing vapidity of the Southern historical mind to the contemporary existentialist mood, 
testifying that the crisis of the past germinated the contemporary sense of "abandonment, our 
Verworfenheit, as the existentialists used to say — our cast-off state." To Kazin, Binx's ironic 
view reveals the fundamental untenability and destructiveness of the Southern historical myth: 
"...[Binx] shows [that] it is the South itself that today makes outsiders of its people, breeds a 
despair that will never know it is despair" (BB, 63). Therefore, The Moviegoer goes to the heart 
of the cultural debate in Bright Book, dramatizing the two contending propositions, viz. a 
creative vision of society versus a theory of history. The 'tradition' of the upper middle-class 
élite that is Binx's natural background cannot possibly redeem his feelings of estrangement from 
his environment. It actually causes them. To recover a basic sense of faith, Binx must relinquish 
the traditional past and become a dedicated observer of the contemporary. Similarly, Kazin, as 
a historiographer of traditions "on native grounds," champions the cause of histoire 
contemporaine. The spiritual crisis that Binx's attentiveness aims to redeem arises from the 
dissipation of the Southern aristocrat's myth that a type of society organized around his own 
perceptions and values will hold. It results from the clash between the latter's dream and the 
reality, between a Biblical view of the continuity of moral values and the fierceness of contem-
porary social naturalism. Walker Percy himself weighed the social views of his uncle William 
Alexander Percy, who raised him, and attacked his notion that the traditionalist power elite had 
"not [been] sterile": "The Gavin Stevenses have disappeared and the Snopeses have won... Not 
even Faulkner foresaw the ironic dénouement of the tragedy: that the Compsons and the 
Sartorises should not only be defeated by the Snopeses but that in the end they should join 
them."27 
Kazin notes that Percy's carefully groomed style counters the sense of spiritual disorientation 
and drift among his contemporaries. It belongs to the major issues established in Bright Book. 
These include the need for a truly spiritual life in faithless times as well as the determination to 
rule out the writer as the engineer of the historical experience: 
Typically, it was the religious existentialist Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, not Faulkner and the 
Southern genius, who influenced him. He became a Catholic. This was one of his many actual 
"conversions": he underwent an unusually significant personal change, a change of faith within his 
change of profession. Although he is a natural writer, downright, subtle, mischievous, his novels 
seem to be essentially the self-determination of a religious personality, a seeker who after being 
ejected from the expected and conventional order of things has come to himself as a stranger in 
the world. 
In much experimental fiction, such strangeness fosters the discontinuity of time, self and 
experience, which Kazin argues elsewhere in Bright Book utterly fails to account for the 
contemporary sense of dissolution. Percy opposes a unifying spiritual vision to the disintegration 
occurring in modern Southern society. In fact, he is his own expert of strangeness, for Binx 
"feels himself in the grip of a profound disorder, and... as a result cultivates from outside the art 
of looking. [He claims that he is] 'more Jewish than the Jews I know. They are more at home 
than I am. I accept my exile'" (BB, 66). Here Kazin the critic identifies his subject with the 
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complex interaction of his own private self and his society, of alienation and accommodation, 
which he delineated in A Walker in the City. More in particular, it is the alleged Jewishness of 
the Southern experience that makes Southern literature central to Bright Book. Walker's Jewish 
protagonist and the Southern intellectual depicted in The Moviegoer share a profound sense of 
their fate as outsiders vis-à-vis the increasing hollowness of modern society. Both strive to over-
come their state of alienation by a strategy of mental recoupment rather than social activism. 
They are free to do so because their ties with their respective ethno-cultural backgrounds have 
to a large extent dissolved. In fact, they extend the "rebel hero" as the typical literary personal-
ity who had sprung up in the wake of the crisis following the First World War. A modern 
invention, the "rebel hero" had pitted his flinty independence against decaying social forms 
hoping to expedite their demise and so to confirm his own principled outsiderdom. To him, 
"alienation" from conventional social mores was a state of grace resulting from his attempt to 
supplant these with the centrality of the self. He pursued a vision of wholeness, and was not an 
exponent of solitude and self-pity. His native Protestant radicalism was in a line of writers and 
poets whose power of conviction made themselves feel "fundamentally necessary." Kazin 
believes that Southern writing continues that native, Protestant genius: 
...it has been the genius of Southern writing in our time to keep traditions alive. It has been the 
South's writers, not its politicians, who have maintained our interest in the South as another 
country. The Southern writers have in fact perpetuated the idea of the South by personalizing its 
history, by their obstinate moralism, their scom for corruption, their belief in a true country of the 
spirit — and their compassion for the Negro. 
So Walker Percy seems to me very much a Southern son who believes in the existence of a 
spiritual tradition, another Southerner] orphaned by modem history who still believes in the great 
cause of Christian truth, not the "lost" cause of the Confederacy.... Walker Percy becomes clear 
only when you realize how much he is a pilgrim of faith who believes that there is a true way, a 
lost tradition, that he will yet discover. 
... The Southern writer feels that he is still in a state of defeat, of exile, of classic outsidedness 
and apartness. It is the Southern writer who remains "unreconciled" at a time when dominant 
elements in the South have become the voice of our spurious Americanism.28 
Percy's spiritual sensibility militates against revealed truth and exegesis: his work rather 
features the private self responding to the dissolution of authority. It goes against the grain of 
the theory held by Brooks, Warren, Tate and their followers that human nature is irretrievably 
divided against itself and that this was an ontological fact in the tradition they espoused. In fact, 
Percy limns the fate of sensibility in the South, exposed to the aggressive mercantilism and 
political corruption of Northern, egalitarian democracy. His work presents the case of private, 
individual vision in an increasingly faithless world. Although a purely private consciousness 
constitutes and projects this wholeness, its strength lies in the protagonist's sense of exile: 
opposition to 'the powers that be' inspires an unremitting concern for "another country [of the 
spirit]."29 Accordingly, Kazin values Percy's sustained dissent from a society more destructive 
of its own past than any historical enemy. Percy is a major contemporary writer to have 
effectively recorded the alienation of the self — and its sensibility — from the social process. 
In all respects, society has become a trap, a travesty of classical civic virtues, and the modern 
rebel-hero must go without the traditional heritage of the older, more vibrant culture. Binx notes 
wrily that he knows "less than I ever knew before,... having inherited no more from father than 
a good sense for merde, for every species of shit that flies." Bright Book gauges the growing 
apartness of the modem literary self from the forces of history and finds that the relationship 
has become wholly tangential and incidental: "The Southern writer's secret is still to believe that 
the world is moral, historical, meaningful" (BB, 67). 
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War: The Crisis of the Civic Order 
Joseph Heller's Catch-22 and Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five apostrophize war as 
apocalyptic madness, totally subversive of human motives Kazin calls Catch-22 a "farcically 
antihuman setup" (BB, 83), a dystopia created by a system so insane that it requires the rare 
individual capable of exposing it to adopt the system's own logic Its main character, Yossarian, 
thus reveals that the ulterior purpose of social organization is to destroy the humanity of all 
those who are trapped in it Catch-22, Kazin believes, is a disturbing document, because it 
reflects the growing conviction among postwar intellectuals that war "as an actuality, bound by 
space and time, an event that literature 'could do justice to'" (BB, 82), which had been the 
typical experience of the generation of 1914-1918, had turned into universalized War It had 
become the antithesis of cosmic order, suggesting "War as the continued experience of twenti-
eth-century man" (BB, 81) As an expression of the dissolution of society, this is much more 
damning than the enforced sensibility of the "internal emigre" under totalitarian systems or the 
postwar intellectuals' retreat from politics Catch-22 transcends the existentialist idea of "the 
absurd," which Camus defined as the pathos of the Romantic individual's hubris in self-realiza-
tion, to posit the defeat of all politics, particularly of the liberal kind "Accountability" is a key 
term in Ka7in's analysis, both Vonnegut and Heller anticipate an existence totally dominated by 
war "without limits and without meaning " So, in addition to postulating the defeat of politics, 
Catch-22 projects the plight of the liberal imagination 
But how can one construct fictional meaning, narrative progression, out of a system in which 
virtually everyone but the hero consents to madness, willingly falls into the role of the madman-
who-pretends-to-be-sane'? The answer is that Catch-22 is about the hypothesis of a totally 
rejectable world, a difficult subject, perhaps impossible so long as the "world" is undifferentiated, 
composed with man's angry heart itself — but expressive of the political uselessness many 
Americans have felt about themselves since World War II (BB, 83)30 
The failure of contemporary writers to devise a political because public setting for their 
narratives links up with Kazin's earlier analysis of the modern selfs religious sense of estrange-
ment from the historical experience and its radical impatience with social modes of selfhood In 
New York Jew, Kazin was to make a definitive statement on contemporary political disillusion-
ment, tracing it to the shattered promise of socialist radicalism m the first half of the century 
On every side the chorus now went up that the old liberal civilization was at an end because man 
was vile "There is a Hitler in each of us " The unpolitical excuse for the Nazis seemed to gratify 
ex-radicals by confirming their disappointment with human nature There was a positive accept-
ance of some "universal" guilt whose real purpose was to make the Holocaust ordinary, even to 
sweep it under the rug In the Village, Franz Kafka was being turned into the only accurate 
theologian of our time 3I 
In a world where events apparently happen 'unaccountably,' the gap between the individual and 
any perceptible moral framework within history yawns wide The unstated admission is that the 
public world behind "the literature of disillusionment" is careening out of hand and has therefore 
become expendable Kazin's own experience as a second-generation Jew and his outlook as a 
chronicler of histoire contemporaine, however, argue the contrary His individual assessment of 
his Jewishness in A Walker in the City, for instance, culminates in the poetic vision of 
Manhattan's bright lights which, seen from the periphery of the Jewish ghetto of Brownsville, 
symbolize the creative contradictions at the heart of his search for a cultural identity The move 
beyond alienation into the public world, by contrast, inevitably raises moral-intellectual 
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dilemmas, since the tradition has lost its authority and the individual self must create its own, 
contemporary bearings. In this respect, the pursuit of selfhood undertaken by Walker's boy-hero, 
which is really a policy of moral and creative self-legitimization, finds a parallel in the narrative 
strategies and their moral designs of writers such as Norman Mailer, Ralph Ellison, Saul Bellow, 
Walker Percy, and Vladimir Nabokov. These in some way enact Kazin's conviction that a 
society of creative minds may successfully resist the decline of the public realm and defy the 
constraints of their particular situation. Nevertheless, and this may be considered to be Bright 
Book's critical fallacy, they do not altogether satisfy Kazin's demand that they furnish a 
necessary and robust vision of the civic ideal to be cultivated within the context of the present 
culture. In Bright Book, the critic imposes the terms whereby the new society of minds is to be 
identified, effectively ignoring the writer's fugitive relationship with his culture during much of 
the twentieth century. Kazin uses a metaphor from American cultural and political history, viz. 
the fall from innocence, to expose a persistently apologetic strain in American liberal culture 
reflecting historical defeatism if not nostalgia. Vonnegut, he claims, has no politics, because he 
is not prepared to cope with evil: "Thus all evil is eliminated from the war which Hitler started 
but which, as Vonnegut says over and again, made everyone 'very tough.' By now we are 
morally perishing of so much toughness; our innocence is proved by opting out of the system" 
(BB, 89-90). This is a cultural indictment and an admission that the American historical 
experience has increasingly gravitated towards isolationism.32 As a student of histoire 
contemporaine, Kazin feels both implicated in the situation and committed to redressing it. 
Strikingly, he enlists Louis-Ferdinand Céline as a model of the writer's political commitment. 
Celine's "bluntness, his graphic power..., incorporate his willingness to take sides, his deep 
political outrage at the specific American 'tactic [at Dresden] of total squashing and frying in 
phosphorus'" (BB, 90). To an extent that the contemporary liberal mind was altogether incapable 
of, Céline grasped the moral outrage at the heart of the modern conduct of human affairs. He 
is more perceptive as regards the background and implications of the Allied destruction of 
Dresden than the American eye witness Vonnegut. Céline expressed a willingness to be pitted 
with the violence and dissolution of modern society. The liberal mind, by contrast, has devel-
oped a symbolical politics of guilt, evading society rather than engaging it. 
The Figure the Narrative Makes 
Kazin's dual inscription to the chapter "Professional Observers: Cozzens to Updike," taken from 
J.H. Plumb and John Updike respectively, suggests that analyzing the crisis of society yields 
hope. Using J.H. Plumb's confident cultural statement that American capitalist society, being 
"socially acceptable to all classes, is also the society in which the novel still continues to 
flourish...," Kazin does not think this applies to the contemporary novel in general. The con-
straint applies to John Updike, whom Kazin considers to be the foremost contemporary writer 
to rely on the cultural impact of narrative style. In the Paris Review interview series, Updike 
expressed an unshakable faith in the power of expression, laying himself open to the charge of 
ahistoricism. He confessed he typically engaged in a tender relationship with his characters 
keeping him from "making violent use of them": 
In general, the North American continent in this century has been a place where catastrophe has 
held off. All my novels end with a false death, partial death. If, as may be, the holocausts at the 
rim of possibility do soon visit us, I am confident my capacities for expression can rise, if I live, 
to the occasion. (BB, 95) 
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To Kazin, Updike is the most confident of contemporary writers about narrative style prevailing 
over historical crisis and shaping the writer's identity. He concludes that Updike's hypertrophic 
literary self-ideal displaces the classic faith in civic virtues that makes the political reality of 
society inhabitable. 
As a preliminary, Kazin presents his view of the increasingly symbolical and brittle role of 
society in works by James Gould Cozzens, John O'Hara, John Cheever and J.D. Salinger. While 
Kazin dismisses O'Hara outright for his "trust in American capitalism as exclusive reality" (BB, 
110) and his "scarcity of motive" (BB, 108), he sees the others plotting society's progressive 
decline as a moral tradition and, finally, its total irrelevance to the pursuit of personal salva-
tion.33 
James Gould Cozzens's Guard of Honor reflects a society that is "challenged but [will] hold" 
(BB, 97). Kazin believes Cozzens possesses moral intelligence, his craftsmanship enabling him 
to fit a "structure [the army, as a metaphor for society at large] together" (BB, 99). Guard of 
Honor is not concerned with the contemporary protagonist's typical flight from a society that 
generates too many insoluble private dilemmas. Instead, Cozzens's "scepticism [and] detachment 
about the... human limitations created by social roles" (BB, 98) offers naturalistic insights into 
the mechanisms of society and a dispassionate view of the processes binding its participants 
together. His stoic scepticism effectively reveals liberalism's historical faith unhinged, while his 
"curt devaluation of excessive liberal notions of human possibility" argues that any collective 
social scheme turns out to be self-limiting in practice. The individuals in Cozzens's fiction 
therefore meet the dissolution of contemporary society with a totally different mental apparatus 
from the anomie and social dissolution felt by the modern protagonist. They distinguish them-
selves by the classical virtues of "principles, ability, self-control, measure" (BB, 99). Kazin's 
careful positioning of Cozzens's fictional characters vis-à-vis conservative interpretations of the 
historical experience and the unworldliness of the liberal outlook both redefines the moral 
tradition and shows professional intelligence being displaced from the cultural centre of gravity. 
The novel's existence as an act of faith is presented as the dilemma of compensating in form 
what is lost in content. As the relevance of traditional ethics vanishes, history loses its clear 
edge to the shaping self: 
No Cozzens protagonist will stand up any longer to the New Disorder. The center will not hold. 
But possibly a minutely organized, well-made novel may? Guardo/Honor offers in structure and 
style the vision of moral intactness that the chosen few have lost in everything but memory. An 
old-fashioned solidly worked up novel set against a bad time and getting worse! (BB, 102)34 
Taking the theme of the dereliction of tradition in modern society one step further, Cozzens's 
By Love Possessed proves Kazin's assertion that social disarray as subject matter reflects nothing 
so much as the novelist's crisis of mind, particularly political disorientation and loss of social 
intelligence. Its protagonist, for instance, blames "emotions" for the personal tragedies afflicting 
him, revealing the liberal mind's uneasy hold on external reality. Likewise, contemporary 
liberalism has lost control of morality as a political instrument. Its loss of faith in society's 
intactness reflects its basic escapism before the aggressive forces taking hold. Similarly, By Love 
Possessed uses an altogether "archaic psychology of 'reason' and 'emotion' [and] an ideal of 
'adulthood' by which only the crippled cuckold, Julius Penrose, is satisfactorily 'the man of 
reason'" (BB, 103). The gradual dispossession of the intellectual elite afflicts Cozzens as much 
as it does his protagonists, and, reversing the modernists' faith that the pursuit of style may 
offer a reprieve from the 'anarchy' of contemporary history, Kazin once more argues the case 
of contemporary history as an exercise of the moral imagination. In By Love Possessed, by 
illustration, "the style broke down, [resulting in] a complicatedness that reflects Cozzens's loss 
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of respect for his own class" (BB, 104). Apparently, Cozzens failed to handle aspects of the 
modern social experience not covered by "'the law," thus suggesting the increasing irrelevance 
of the latter in the contemporary era. 
John Cheever's work concerns this loss of centrality and purpose in society to the point of 
turning it into its dominant subject matter. In his case, Kazin's call for a creative vision of 
modern society, for substance rather than form, for evidence of spiritual community, becomes 
a trenchant exposé of the vitiating dilemma involved in literary style posing as substance. He 
quotes Cheever to point out his inability to move beyond social atomization: "[Why, in this] 
half-finished civilization, in this prosperous, equitable and accomplished world, should everyone 
seem so disappointed?" (BB, 110). Cheever's fictional America evidently fails to produce the 
creative 'society of minds' capable of stemming the tide. The protagonists peopling it are mere 
reflexes of cultural strain. Their significance to Kazin is their fundamental remoteness from any 
faith in a constructive social identity. They feel thwarted as purposive beings, proving Kazin's 
criticism of the liberal view of self and society as concentric circles that never intersect. They 
mainly cultivate a consciousness of the cyst, affirming the basic remoteness of their individual 
lives from the social matrix. The sort of self-fulfilment they pursue blasts any commitment to 
the social organism: 
The subject of Cheever's stories is regularly a situation that betrays the basic "unreality" of some 
character's life. It is a trying-out of freedom in the shape of the extreme, the unmentionable... 
Loneliness is the dirty little secret, a personal drive so urgent and confusing that it comes out a 
vice. But the escapade never lasts very long. We are not at home here, says Cheever. But there is 
no other place for us to feel that we are not at home. (BB, 111-2) 
In Cheever's fiction, social discourse, which is the cornerstone of democratic literature in 
America, breaks down as the individual character's precarious position in society turns melo-
dramatic beyond relief. In the absence of the social imagination, Cheever's narrative style takes 
over: "So there is no mastery in Cheever's story except Cheever's... Just as his characters have 
no feeling of achievement in their work, so they never collide with or have to fight a society 
which is actually America in allegory. All conflict is in the head" (BB, 113). 
Updike: Society as Fable 
Kazin rates John Updike pre-eminently as the "novelist of 'society'" (BB, 120) to have emerged 
from the Fifties. Updike's work has been characterized as placid, inner-directed, and averse to 
political radicalism. The label may include such qualities as dispassionate, if not quietist and 
unpolitical. It is the distinctive character of Updike's prose, Kazin points out, that reveals a 
moral stance, if not political significance. For Updike "writes as if there were no greater 
pleasure than reconstituting the world by writing — writing is mind exercising itself, rejoicing 
in its gifts" (BB, 119). He does not use his mental acumen as a social force, and so perpetuates 
the liberal fallacy of self and society. The "brilliant actionlessness" (BB, 120) of The Centaur 
and Rabbit, Run suggest that the underlying motif is the defeat of politics. All creative interest 
in these novels is committed to cultivating personal mythologies that stand quite apart from the 
pressures of collective social experience in America. Historically, Updike's characters have dual 
identities. They are visible against the peculiar historic background of their era but they do not 
themselves represent historical forces. All narrative action drives a metaphysics of self oblivious 
of social and political fact: 
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Updike fancies [his characters] as many-sided and intellectual designs... They always mean... But 
these characters who represent so much never struggle with anything except the reflections in their 
minds of a circumscribing reality that seems unalterable. Updike is a novelist of society who sees 
society entirely as fable. 
And he immobilizes history. Older American "novelists of society," Kazin reminds us, were not 
used to society resisting imaginative treatment. Fitzgerald, for instance, was able to "show 
society as a dream..." (BB, 121) His protagonists' individual lives were metaphors of society's 
ability to change: 
Where there are no alternatives, even in one's memory, the proliferating surfaces encourage myths, 
transferable symbols — a sense of situation, not opposition. Updike is... an intellectual novelist, 
a novelist of paradox, tension, and complexity who as a college wit in the Fifties learned that we 
are all symbols and inhabit symbols. His easy mastery of social detail never includes any sense of 
American society as itself a peculiar institution, itself the dynamo, the aggressor, the maker of 
other people's lives... Society — our present fate! — shows itself in marvellously shifting colors 
and shapes. (BB, 121-2) 
Updike's heroes face trials that are most of all metaphysical, arising from various unresolved 
issues of selfhood. They recall the classically Romantic antisocial ethos in their extremely 
personalized sensibility, but the difference is that they do not see their experience of society as 
potential knowledge, as a gateway to the 'world.' Kazin believes that the main effect of Roman-
ticism in the contemporary era has been to depoliticize the world. There is a fundamental sense 
in Updike's fiction that "the only vision of freedom is the individual's recognition of God" (BB, 
124). The pursuit of God — and, by implication, redemption — addresses private crises only 
and is diametrically removed from the type of creative vision that enabled Whitman to conceive 
of the individual's organic rootedness in democratic society as 'leaves of grass.' Nor do 
Updike's fictional settings include the singlemost important force in twentieth-century society, 
viz. the emergence of the all-powerful State. Style in Updike is a mental strategy for erasing the 
'Other.' 
By 1988, Updike had not risen in Kazin's esteem. The journal entry for 22 April 1988 rated 
him below O'Hara, claiming that Appointment in Samara, "though written by a man consider-
ably dumber and more primitive than Updike, is a better novel than any of Updike's produc-
tions. Deeper emotionally and fundamentally striking to the roots of American life in a way that 
U[pdike]'s sexual conundrums do not..." 
The Jewish Self: The Idea and the Experience 
The disparate forces of self, consciousness and historical actuality interact most strongly in the 
contemporary Jewish experience. Due to their internationalist orientation and their traditional 
affinity with political and cultural radicalism, and by force majeure, Jews have often been 
leading exegetes of the human condition. Specialists in alienation and assimilation alike, 
custodians of the Judaic tradition and creatures of culture in a totally political age, they were 
"close to the central moral problems in modern literature." They derived their cultural authority 
from the mystery of their continued existence, and Kazin believes the moral-spiritual genius of 
the Jewish heritage is totally relevant to the contemporary, postradical age. Having strong reser-
vations about orthodox Judaism, he nevertheless stressed that the cultural contradictions of 
Jewishness offer prophetic insights into the present age. This was particularly apparent on the 
occasion of Milton Hindus meeting Louis-Ferdinand Céline, when Kazin privately observed that 
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"by being constantly forced into this contradiction, the Jew wears the great burden of history... 
a prophetic burden.... we point to the essential principle." It was the apparent strain of redemp-
tion and deliverance at the heart of Jewish history that, in his opinion, kindled antisemitic 
sentiments in the work of T.S. Eliot, Graham Greene, and Céline, all of whom were sceptical 
about the course history was taking. Opposing their view that history is cyclical, degressive 
rather than telic, entropie rather than redemptive, is Kazin's residual Jewish belief that there is 
a single secret written in a single book, that life is tragic yet purposive, its pattern to be dis-
closed only through great powers of perception.35 This does not deny the poignance and the 
anxiety of naked existence, however, vide Bellow's fictional hero Augie March, who in trying 
to do away with his spurious, adopted nationalism acts as a social corrosive instead. Kazin's 
journal entry for 27 July 1956 deals with Augie's ecstatic and vibrant aspirations, delineating a 
self-ideal which Kazin believes to be universal among Jewish intellectuals: 
[Augie forms] a living bond between the intelligence & the world. His real problem is always to 
think of his origins not as exotic but as necessary and even, in terms of each human being's 
aspiration toward freedom, symbolic... [He] took on the masquerade of the half-bum, half-philo-
sopher, the man who would not be taken in, innocent and tough, sceptical and lyrical at once. The 
man whose greatest dream was fullness of experience, for he saw himself sailing from orthodox 
bonds & the chicken coop of the ghetto into the imagined fullness of the modem world. Infinitely 
self-resourceful, yet imaginatively, in'describably dependent; empirically, thoroughly learned yet 
always feeling himself sharply in need of a new dispensation, a great new idea. His great value is 
that he possesses a past and has no plans for the future; that he is in touch with history but 
contemptuous of ideology; that he believes in history, respects the accumulated stream of things, 
society, the masses... but above all he wants to be himself, free, a person. 
Jewish literary creativity essentially reflects the internalization of Jewish history. As Kazin 
argues in a review of Moses Rischin's The Promised City: New York Jews, 1870-1914 entitled 
"Remembering Jewish History," Jews themselves have been particularly lacking in historical 
objectivity and information, despite major attempts to create a cultural atlas of East European 
Jewry before the Holocaust. An "inner consciousness" generated by the unchanging rhythm of 
group experience within the European Pale of Settlement bred a difference from the environ-
ment that was not just linguistic but cultural and spiritual. It "took precedence even over its 
civic relations with the 'outside world,'" displacing historical actuality. Alienatoes by tradition 
and heritage, the Jewish immigrants initially gravitated to their ancient, sacred history rather 
than any secular interpretation of their situation. Their inner group-mindedness persisted even 
when they lost the sense of participating in sacred history, "dulling their historical awareness 
about themselves [and making] them more objective about the condition they share in common 
than about the facts of this condition." They continued to display a "religious indifference to the 
'world' [, which] was encouraged by the fact that theirs was obviously not a Jew's world."36 
A prominent feature of American-Jewish fiction to Kazin is that it conveys this sense of all 
experience cohering within a common, shared past and the conflicting desire to break free from 
the confines of Orthodoxy. American-Jewish writers seek to extract images of unity and 
centrality from the violent instability of modem Jewish life in the Diaspora. To encompass 
these, narrative has proved more efficient than ideology, whether social or political. Nor could 
religious sentiment fill that need: orthodox Judaism turned in on itself and did not tolerate the 
experience of modernity. Besides, narrative naturally filled the mental space created by increas-
ing doubt about the sacred nature of Jewish history. And finally, the promise and practice of 
democratic egalitarianism typical of the majority culture in their adopted country forced 
orthodox Jewry to take account of forms of experience from which they had traditionally been 
alienated. In "The Jew as Modern Writer," Kazin recalls that many European Jewish intellec-
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tuais after their embourgeoisement in the nineteenth century adopted a brand of radical human-
ism. He adds, however, that their newly secularistic culture, marked by philosophic rationalism, 
by socialism and cultural humanism, existed side by side with the searing memory of "the 
intensity of their existence" in the Pale of Settlement: "The 'dark' ages and the 'modem' age, 
the ghetto and the revolutionary movement, persecution and free human development, were 
conjoined in the Jewish mind." The reconciliation of these two cultures explains the sudden 
prominence of the Jewish mind in modem painting and political radicalism, vide Marc Chagall, 
Isaac Babel and Leon Trotsky. These pioneers performed "the 'historic' task of desacralizing the 
European [Judaic] tradition." They were not primarily motivated by the greater promise of goy 
culture so much as by 
a vision of history that... was fanatically all of one piece, obstinately "Jewish" and "intellectual" 
— a vision in which some subtle purposiveness to history always managed to reassert itself in the 
face of repeated horrors. But what their critics could not recognize was that this obstinate quest 
for "meaning" was less a matter of conscious thought than a personal necessity, a requirement of 
survival, the historic circumstance that reasserted itself in case after case among the Jews, many 
of whom had good reason to believe that their lives were a triumph over every possible negation... 
The proliferating contradictions within the Jewish situation naturally caused them to "see 
existence as tension, issue and drama." To resolve these would require a considerable level of 
politicization of Jewish life. In religion, this would encourage heterodoxy, attacking the central 
tenets of Judaism. A prime instrument for exploring this condition, art may appear to "hold 
these conflicts, to compare them, to allow the human will some detachment."37 
Kazin is attracted to the Jewish idea of the "absurd" and the residual force of the past. Its 
typos, he believes, is "the contrast between the hysterical tenderness of the Oedipal relation and 
the 'world.'" It projects the clash between the extreme provincialism of the shtetl psychology 
and the intellectual aspirations of the culturally hyphenated Jew. Chaim Potok, a supporter of 
orthodoxy, once claimed that it was aesthetically impossible to capture both traditions, to which 
Kazin responded that a good novelist like Isaac Bashevis Singer is committed to more than 
aesthetics. Singer, Kazin claimed in defence, despite his retreat from the spiritual symbols of 
Jewish religious mysticism, remained just as concerned with the "truth" as any orthodox Jew. 
The Jewish novelist's pull against his conditioning in orthodoxy causes him to "find truth 
always protean and amazing because this is the way God actually thinks and moves."38 
Singer's work casts the 'world' as "the mind of God" and not, as the orthodox tend to do, as 
His will. Singer affirms the uncertain yet telic motif of the Jewish experience, fully recognizing 
the value of its secular aspect. Moving beyond the reach of the mechanistic God of the Jewish 
cabbala, he supplants Him with the rich unaccountability of the 'world' itself. To Kazin, this 
is a normative interest, for it reaffirms a conscious continuity with "the historic circumstance," 
viz. the wish to stave off the sense of breakup brought on by the experience of 'modernity.'39 
Singer manages to remove the Jewish mind from its mystical, internalized conviction of a 
wrathful, mechanistic God ordaining universal cataclysm and the constant threat of evanescence. 
He 
represents the transformation of old Jewish history into fiction, fable, story. He accepts it for his 
own purposes. He is a skeptic who is hypnotized by the world he grew up in. [Singer] stems... 
completely from the orthodox and even mystical East European tradition [, yet only he] has turned 
'/Ae tradition' into the freedom of fiction, the subtlety and mischievousness and truthfulness of 
storytelling. {BB, 157) 
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Kazin detects in the capacity for transcendence that Singer's narrative brings to its subject 
matter, while thriving on his genius for capturing the stark ironies of the human condition, the 
residual spiritual component of his lapsed faith. Singer's focus on existence shifts from total 
obedience to God's wrathful authority to the distinctly human factor, the world's wickedness, 
God's mysterious ways and collective Jewish idiosyncrasies. Both interpretations argue that total 
self-reliance as a social mode of existence — with the self setting itself up as its own tradition 
— is untenable. Like a naturalist, Singer basically accepts the forces dominating and determin-
ing existence but his main interest is to redeem the 'world' as the promise of redemption. He 
wants to press home the irony of existence as the actuality of history, which he achieves by 
closing the gap between the inwardness of Jewish religious law and the reality of the world 
divested of God's purpose: 
There was a horror of the "unclean" — that is, the world itself. In his memoir, In My Father's 
Court, Singer describes his father firmly closing the windows of his study on the screams of a 
woman being raped in a Warsaw street. But his son the storyteller... showed his independence by 
finally, one day, going out on the balcony to look at the life of Warsaw. He was to write about 
everything he knew in this unholy world, to sit apart from the tradition in order to describe the 
human experience of it. (BB, 158-9) 
This illustrates a "deep spirit of acceptance not of God but of fact" (BB, 159). Their spiritual 
sensitization to forms of experience outside the tradition represents the East European Jews' fall 
into history. Their experience itself represents the internalization of history. It is this aspect of 
contemporary Jewish fiction that Kazin uses to support the moral-historical bias of Bright Book, 
viz. the revelatory and transcendent power conveyed by a creative moral analysis of the present. 
There remains one caveat, however: 
This mysterious fidelity, total obligation, meant that not individual characters but their way of life 
is the real matter of a Singer story. What the reader sees is never the individual's effort to 
determine his own life [as Bellow's Augie does], but the fact that he is constantly being acted on 
— like the poor cuckold and unconscious saint in Singer's best story — "Gimpel the Fool" — by 
the whole force of his culture. 
The sense of self explored in this type of writing is too fragile to take the impact of histori-
cal reality; the metaphysical and cultural identity of the group overrides the relevance of 
individual perceptions. The narrative theme of contemporary Jewish writing is often a "wholly 
willed, insistent claim on existence" (BB, 161), but Singer's personae remain subject to a 
rigorously split consciousness. Their spiritual loyalties prevent them from developing into 
historically actualized selves. Cultural hyphenates at best, their political identity was subject to 
merciless tropisms, since as survivors of Stalin's and Hitler's concentration camps they para-
doxically faced condemnation rather than sympathy: "The world is twice wicked because they 
cannot understand it. It has done everything to them, and still they do not live in it. They live 
in their imagination, as they did when they were believers." This split leaves the Singer hero too 
vulnerable to circumstance to rank as a modem self-ideal. 
Norman Mailer: The World as a Self 
Central to the chapter entitled "The Imagination of Fact" are the wider implications of Mailer's 
egotistic literary self. Kazin criticizes Mailer's vaunted literary ambitions as a historical actor, 
which apparently involve an unremitting intentness on the crises and excesses facing the 
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contemporary public mind as well as cultivating the radical promise held out by technological 
innovation. Emblematic of Mailer's "reportage" of the 1967 march on the Pentagon, the 1960 
and 1968 national conventions and the first landing on the moon is the self strenuously holding 
out for a leading edge on the hyped-up experience of the New Frontier. The attempted 
historicization of himself as a representative genius against the kaleidoscopic gaudiness of the 
contemporary scene generates brilliant literary effects but does not produce the type of mental 
concept that informs historical action. Kazin detects in Mailer's work a major moral flaw 
affecting the political validity of liberal sentiments, viz. the "move... out of the concentrated 
humanity of the novel into the 'world' itself— politics, technology, spiritual bitterness — as the 
great contemporary story." This suggests the permanent separation of self and world, whose 
unity had been the cornerstone of the homo universalis of the Enlightenment and the Romantic 
poet-prophet. Novelistic interest of the kind Kazin sponsors — bending the historical experience 
to the selfs creative destiny — thus recedes before evidence of the increasing radicalisation and 
atomization of modern culture. In fact, Mailer's lust for confrontation — his personal "quest for 
salvation through demonstration that is to be effected by subjecting oneself to harsh materials" 
— battens on the overriding sense of uncontrol within the civic realm. By the same token, the 
idea of the centrality of the self, of operational autonomy and certifiable individual identity, 
tends to waste on account of the disjointedness of the surrounding culture. Evidently, this type 
of social treatment has not inspired any vivid sense of community: "Mailer has both lived and 
written his life with the greatest possible appetite for the power and satisfaction open to 
successful Americans since 1945; but his reportage has become steadily more baleful and apoca­
lyptic — not least because his subjects soon lose their interest for everybody but himself." 40 
Mailer's shrewd intuitions into the secret niches of American power relations fail to produce 
any coherent and assertive vision of selfhood. The omission, Kazin believes, typifies the plight 
of the historical sense in modern times and exposes it as largely a tropism of the cultural crisis. 
Mailer's attempt in Of a Fire on the Moon to produce "some portentous world historical 
consummation," for instance, does not provide the type of historical imagination to suggest a 
particular redemptive motif at work within the contemporary scene. Instead, it is "a book about 
a novelist trying to write instant history." And the writer-protagonist is undecided as to what 
sort of cultural motif to develop, finding them equally challenging or suspect, moving from one 
to the other in deference to some personal norm or eclecticism. Kazin's observation that there 
has never been "such a concerted consciousness, in the name of history, of how little history is 
leaving our minds and souls" confirms that need for a normative moral interpretation of the 
contemporary experience. It also illustrates the extent to which historical processes in recent 
times have been perceived to develop quite independently from any vital issues of self. Contem­
porary definitions of selfhood have therefore tended to be formulated in direct opposition to the 
historical experience. Of greater cultural significance still, Kazin suggests, has been for historical 
materials to be given a distinctly novelistic treatment. With the very status of history, historical 
ideas, and the historical experience being put to certain narrow and doctrinaire uses, the public 
realm itself has come under fire: 
Never have there been so many techniques for distributing facts and dramatizing them. Real 
history, partisan history and commercial history are so thick a part of contemporary history that 
it is as if History had come back to revenge itself on its upstart rival, Fiction — not with Fiction's 
own techniques, as one can see nowhere better than in Mailer's allegory of himself as history.41 
Mailer's sensibility in Of α Fire on the Moon is characterized by a defeating duality between the 
requirements of the self — verging on absolutism — and the independable nature of the 
contemporary historical promise. Writing in 1966, immediately after the publication of Mailer's 
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An American Dream and its "uninhibited fantasy" typical of the era's excessiveness, Kazin still 
believed its main literary objective to be the romantic's harrowing suspicion that society will 
"give way under his blows." Such confrontationism was a visionary force and indeed repre-
sented a vital social imagination: Mailer "is a chronicler of American power in the grand 
realistic mode that made the novel in this century." The great difference from that earlier 
generation of realists — which actually reveals a historic change in the cultural concerns of 
liberalism — is that the contemporary scene largely promotes the romantic agony. Rather than 
project himself as an agent for social and political change — which was the moral objective of 
the old-style realists — Mailer is buoyed, and limited at the same time, by his voracious sense 
of intimacy with power. He is "maddened, as only romantic poets are, by the gap between the 
artist's conviction of his value as magician and clairvoyant and saint, and a society that feeds 
the writer's fantasies of unlimited personal perception but is actually indifferent."42 
Kazin sketches the cultural dilemma, if not hazard, involved: like Oppenheimer and Kennedy 
and several other "tragic protagonists of our period," Mailer has fallen victim to power precisely 
on account of his attraction to it. This is also, in Kazin's view, the tragedy of contemporary 
American culture at large and the besetting weakness of contemporary writing. For he believes 
that "power on the new scale creates nothing human proportionate to its release of energy." So 
there has been a foreshortening of both the classical American vision of historic and civic 
promise and of the autonomous selfs role in it. In Mailer's work, the very texture of historic 
vision is supplanted by a process of stylization, creating a language "born in the envy of Moby-
Dick and manifest destiny [and which] suggests that there may yet be political hope in so much 
mechanical energy" (BB, 240). But the opportunism and the unsparing encounter with the 
culture which typify the New Journalism precisely act to widen the gap between the "elusive" 
world and the political hopes that Mailer the novelist-as-reporter projects. Mailer's "art-journali-
sm" reduces the American self to its native state, showing its ambitions to be grossly in excess 
of anything it could truly initiate and control within society. He reveals its scientific hubris, its 
commitment to sexual warfare and the hype of incessant media coverage it inspires. But above 
all, "Mailer has shown himself to be a political novelist whose inescapable subject is the price 
we have paid for our power: the loss of our supposedly democratic uniqueness and its legendary 
virtue..." This suggests a deep-seated political disenchantment with the liberal experience and a 
lasting despair that the seemingly concentric circles of self and "world" could be made to 
intersect.43 
Mailer's work effectively perpetuates a persisting weakness of the American literary sensibili-
ty, viz. its overt reliance on the mechanics of society to justify the existence and quality of an 
internal, spiritual life. In the preface to On Native Grounds, Kazin had linked the characteristi-
cally aborted literary career in America — and the failure of American literary generations to 
benefit by the "piecemeal elucidations" gained by their predecessors — to precisely this lack of 
a solid mooring in cultural and spiritual affairs. Yet, his praise of Mailer is unequivocal, if 
limited: Mailer's work clearly suggests "the possibilities of imagination in our age." More 
particularly, Mailer has revealed the dark side of the liberal vision of society. To a certain 
extent, this has involved a sacrifice of self, the writer embodying the disjointed perspectives at 
the heart of the liberal experience. But in essence, it reflects the strains of the culture at large, 
which contemporary literature fails to respond to properly. Mailer's ambition, Kazin believes, 
is misguided: 
[Mailer's work lacks] the patience and depth of fiction itself, the world reconstructed in that 
personal sense of time which space centers know not of but which is our treasure, imaginatively 
speaking. Despite all our rapture about them now, the great nineteenth-century novels were not 
and certainly are not the "world." The world is a world, dumb as nature, not a novel. The world 
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as our common experience is one that only the journalist feels entirely able to set down. It is a 
confidence that those who stick to fiction do not feel, for if the "world" is not an experience held 
in common, still less is it a concept on which all can agree. It is not even as close as we think.44 
Kazin had been developing the theme of "The World as a Novel" in its embryonic state for at 
least four years prior to Bright Book's publication. The journal entry for 12 April 1969 reads: 
The Novel really began with the discovery of "the world" (the real world) as opposed to the 
microcosmic world that is the individual self writ large. The novel began with the discovery that 
the individual was not a clue to the world — a symbolic key to it — but only one of many actors 
in it. Self and world are not the same. But now it turns out that the world is a kind of self— that 
is dramatic, projectionable, various, picturable, like a novel. The individual has finally conquered 
the world for his artistic purposes by turning it into his mind. And this is the secret of... fact-as-
fiction. It is a picture of the variousness that we so long tried to limit to our own intelligence, but 
which has suddenly turned out to be a man himself. As the "world" gets more fabulous and 
"unbelievable," it becomes a novel — it becomes drama and picture, and perhaps above all 
improbability : to be described, not to be mastered. 
Kazin's sense of the world as a self — an Other — rather than a reflection of the individual 
mind has a dual origin. It stems first of all from his desire as a son of Jewish immigrants to 
bear witness to the poignance of the immigrant experience and to point up the special role of 
necessity in it. Secondly, he is mindful of the concept of agon and believes that a central 
position in morality and politics can only be arrived at gradually through persistent struggle.45 
The retreat of the modem self from the historical theatre suggests its fundamental sense of 
inadequacy in controlling events. 
That is why Kazin urges a revaluation of the Emersonian tradition as a cultural corrective. 
In "The Literary Sixties, When the World Was Too Much With Us," which is an assessment of 
a decade of literature published on the eve of the Seventies, he characterizes the era contrasting 
its temper with Emerson's belief in the autonomous individual as the superlative social fact: 
"For us, in our belated American recognition of how difficult and even fictitious the progress 
of understanding can become, the open secret has become the disjunction of person and event, 
the tragic recurrences of history, the labyrinthine perversity of the human heart." As a moral and 
political ideal, the autonomous self has well-nigh vanished from contemporary literature, leaving 
the field to a host of defensive postures. Such masterpieces of the Sixties as there are, Kazin 
argues, are remarkable not so much for the wholly original powers of perception that come with 
genius as for the selfs personal need to achieve "inviolability from the age." The Emersonian 
tradition — the self as the world's "open secret" securing "the tie between person and event" — 
has obviously withered. This has prompted a marked shift in the type of values traditionally 
underlying the American mainstream novel of social fact, effectively even of the res publicas 
itself. Accordingly, Kazin observes, the contemporary novel is no longer a powerful statement 
of a particular social vision; it is rather "a surprising device... of mind [emphasis added]" and 
a "stratagem... for fresh thinking." Yet, the exhilarating mental play that has become the 
contemporary writer's main resource stems from the pervasive despair about the social compact: 
"There is a sense of the shifting, turning, unexpected combinations and permutations of the 
human fancy as our only real freedom."46 The prevailing view of society stresses its moral 
callousness and its political treacherousness, necessitating unflagging vigilance. Similarly, the 
contemporary novelist records the steady erosion of 'society' by the protagonist's urgent 
rethinking of his relation to the surrounding world. The dominant sentiment driving both is to 
achieve personal immunity from the age. 
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The loss of the traditional faith in the progressive potential of the social machinery places a 
corresponding pressure on the individual self not to succumb to anomie. Failing this, the self, 
both as writer and as protagonist, typically evinces a degree of social dissociation. The ensuing 
"literature of the absurd," Kazin argues, typifies the experience of helplessness. It accepts 
conventional social arrangements only insofar as it can parody them, or savage them, featuring 
the selfs obsession to remain inviolable. This has prompted a shift in the meaning of 'politics,' 
Kazin observes, which has come to be pursued mainly in order to destroy the conventions 
underlying society. In particular, politics no longer subscribes to the key liberal faith in social 
repair. Instead, it posits an absolute dichotomy between the "system" and the self, suggesting 
that "'politics,' whether as rage, fantasy, panic in the audience or outrage and inhumanity on the 
stage, so dominates the imagination of fiction and poetry that I often wonder how, in our midst 
just now, there could exist an Ivy Compton-Burnett (to say nothing of a Franz Kafka or Wallace 
Stevens) oblivious to the news of every hour on the hour."47 
Kazin's resentment of the contemporary culture and its fetish of instant history equally 
reflects on the national fascination with "external progress, social man and the social machine..." 
For these engage the national consciousness to the extent that the writer, whether fascinated by 
the Saturn booster lifting off at Cape Kennedy or shattered by the Vietnam war "and other 
diseases of the national ego," will hardly find "words of his own." Thus, the prominence of 
"politics" erodes the tradition of the protestant, Emersonian self. The nineteenth-century faith in 
the centrality of the independent self — viz. its ideal of the individual self comprising the 
'world' — has become eclipsed by the staggering rate of technological change transforming 
society. This has inspired a literature of private sensibility among those who have flown off the 
wheel of social change, incapable of sustained social and political inquiry and ignoring the 
drama of society. They tend to see "history" as the singularly progressive moral deterioration of 
the public domain, as a ubiquitous conspiracy against the autonomous self. By the same token, 
they condemn any social convention as hostile to the integrity of the self. Their relation to their 
society is that of "internal emigre's" fundamentally suspicious of all social arrangements.'18 
But for American literature to fulfil its traditional promise for the self, Kazin insists, it would 
need to pursue history as meaning: "How much can one count on the interest in tradition in a 
society where more and more intelligent people believe that history is nothing but the blind 
exercise of power?" Quipping on Saul Bellow's criticism of the modem public distemper, Kazin 
observes that "History is all too much with us now." Indeed, there is a distinct triumphalism in 
contemporary literature in regard to the Allied victory over Hitler Germany and Fascism, but 
"the horrors have never faded" nor have they been properly addressed. Still, the Second World 
War is the focal point for certain contemporary uses of history: 
...lately there has been a conjunction of this unforgettable legacy with the long agony of the 
Vietnam war, the American fear of revolution, the guilt of direct complicity that so many are 
bringing back from Vietnam. There have been so many mass murders, racial murders, seemingly 
meaningless murders, that a prominent literary device has become the all-too-dramatic "treatment" 
of actual crimes. [This type of writing is] meant to bring home to us the unprecedented danger in 
the air, the duplicity and theatricality of the human personality and the spell of violence. 
Such sentiments confound liberal views of history, and Kazin heckles the apparent incompetence 
of contemporary liberal culture to put Fascism on trial before the Western moral tradition. Both 
his published writing and his journals register his dismay at the moral confusion and the 
duplicity evidenced by the response to Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem. He is worried 
by the persistent lack of a clear focus in the contemporary interpretation of the Holocaust, 
allowing a certain historical bias to serve as an apologia for the pervasive violence — whether 
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it be political, sexual, psychic, national, tribal, racial — rampant in the postwar era Its scale and 
temper, like the Holocaust, has caused it to be regarded as "senseless " Obviously, the contem­
porary sensibility cannot encompass the enormity of the Holocaust and fails to present a moral 
framework by which to judge it This being the case, evil seems universal, unrelated to any 
dominant moral scheme, something gratuitous perpetrated by paltry men And this is what Kazin 
calls the chief heritage of the Second World War, ι e the despair of significant meaningful 
moral inquiry inevitably sapping historical faith and civic hope alike49 
It may be that literature and visions of society clash in this regard Philip Roth may have 
apostrophized the unparalleled imaginative resources of social reality in America, Kazin rather 
links this view to a peculiar deficit "The fictionality of our world sometimes seems all too 
extreme because certain things remain unbelievable So there is a literary passion for document­
ation, a striking need to push us to that knowledge of evil which our literature in particular has 
long repressed " Both the contemporary infatuation with the inviolability oí the individual self 
and the apparently diminished role of the novel — or rather of novehstic treatment — as a 
valuable form of inquiry reflect the deep crisis in the perception of history The objective of the 
New Journalism — or "the new fact literature," as Kazin calls it — has been to present the 
audience with the "knowledge of evil" in a form more readily capturable than the novel, that is 
to say history Kazin condemns the notion that the traditionally liberal convictions of the 
American literary mind should have become so jaded as to accept this equation "I don't think 
that fiction is less capable of dealing with evil than is history — certainly not less capable than 
instant history or what Capote shrewdly called the non-fiction novel But the problem of the 
novelist is the single person still, while 'history' does deal m public events " Kazin is convinced 
that the widespread contemporary use of novehstic techniques in the treatment of historical 
matenals has by no means automatically produced good novels Rather, it has expressed a 
dominant need to add drama to plain historical fact disseminated at a furious pace by the 
media50 
Nabokov's Hard Act, A Humanist's Last Resort 
The one contemporary writer to tum the opposition between self and society, between con-
sciousness and reality, into a significant creative advantage was Vladimir Nabokov The major 
subject oí Bright Book's final chapter entitled "A Personal Sense of Time," Nabokov's oeuvre 
is m several respects the book's focal point, but it is not its resolution When reflecting on the 
enduring mystery of the past to Jews and their struggle to make contact with it — viz their 
cultural 'homecoming' in America — Kazin anticipated the dominant concern of the literary 
sensibility in the Sixties 
And it is exactly this mystenousness, even to the writer himself, of what he actually feels most 
about life, that constitutes the essence of his privacy, the genius of his vocation 
But taken as pure flight of mind pure imagination, this is the real "freedom," not alienation, 
afforded the truly creative individual by modem social organization The more most social 
energies are directed toward the welfare state and scientific planning, the more those creative 
energies which so long went toward the "betterment" of life are left free for the flight of creative 
imagination But this means an immediate separation, in the arts themselves, of the primary 
imaginative talents from the more humdrum ethical ones 
Whereas Kazin was addressing the declining relevance of radicalism to the literary mind, his 
analysis recalls key concerns of the modemist aesthetic Also Lionel Trilling, in The Experience 
of Literature (1967), was to broach this theme of the gradual withering away of any convincing 
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social framework for promoting a modern self-ideal. Mark Krupnick defines Trilling's interest 
in The Experience of Literature as being chiefly concerned with "one special kind of initiation: 
dying to nature and history and being reborn to a higher, timeless order of being." Trilling 
tended to give a predominantly mythopoeic interpretation of texts of the modernist canon even 
if these were suffused with historical detail, a shift which marked the intellectuals' rite of 
passage from radicalism. The pull away from history counterbalanced a deep concern with 
"validat[ing] the personality" on Trilling's part.51 Also the American absurdists were apparently 
overseeing a cultural transformation, since they, too, were quick to grasp at the philosophical 
sham turning conventional culture into a disposable commodity. Nevertheless, though their 
impatience with the hierarchies of history and nature showed clearly in their work, they culti-
vated no vision transcending these. It is Kazin's view that Nabokov did. 
Yet, Nabokov, too, did "not believe in time." More particularly, he was deeply distrustful of 
any claims to a comprehensive interpretation of man's state in nature, be they historical, psycho-
sexual, political, sociological or philosophical, as witness his principled opposition to scientific 
Marxism, Freudianism, and the spirituality cultivated by such champions of a traditionalist 
society as Dostoevsky.52 Kazin emphasizes that Nabokov denied to "ideas" any libertarian 
potential in the public realm: 
Nabokov made fellow Russian exiles "uneasy" by his disdain for all doctrines of salvation, 
whether by politics or the religion of the word. [He] was not sociological and "humanitarian" in 
the well-known style of Russian progressive thought; he was equally indifferent to the God-hunger 
and the various esoteric and mystical traffickings among Russian poets. And despite his self-
conscious virtuosity of style, he was not a symbolist looking to proclaim a system of meaning 
through his own enraptured word-juggling. (BB, 297) 
Nabokov's peculiar significance in the contemporary literary situation to Kazin is that he refused 
to succumb to the facile suggestion of deadlock on every hand that tempted other writers to 
rationalize their own loss of spiritual bearings as "the crisis of the novel." In Nabokovian 
fashion, Kazin highlights certain biographical aspects to suggest Nabokov's genius for turning 
his statelessness, viz. the fact of his cultural disinheritance, into supreme freedom. He makes 
much of Nabokov's pointed transposition of certain layers of reality, probably in an attempt to 
salvage the political relevance of the Nabokovian consciousness. He notes, for instance, that 
Nabokov's "fantasy extravaganza" in Ada is such a virtuoso interpolation of totally opposed 
socio-political systems that the novelist "was able to have his Russia in America" (BB, 304). For 
the exile Nabokov, America, the host country, would become a comprehensive, redemptive 
metaphor off-setting the political tyranny that had driven him from Russia. In fact, Nabokov felt 
warranted to present America as 'montage,' viz. a collection of cutouts most stimulating to his 
sense of possibility. In Kazin's terms, Nabokov gains this sense of freedom as he moves from 
the hilariously effective resistance to totalitarian philosophical systems in the Russian novels to 
the dizzying, kaleidoscopic allure of the cultural setting in the American ones. This analysis 
indicates Kazin's commitment in Bright Book to examining modes of selfhood that are immune 
to the politicization of experience brought on by the modern state. More specifically, the 
projection of this self, not merely as an artefact but rather as a cultural and political fact, seems 
to be the resolution to Bright Book that he seeks. Certainly the timing — Nabokov occupies all 
of the last chapter — would suggest this. 
The reviewers were not sure that Kazin had evoked or formulated the self-ideal that is the 
contemporary era's main literary pursuit. Kazin himself was to retrace the dilemma more 
pertinently in a later essay about the crisis mentality in contemporary literature, "We See From 
the Periphery, Not the Center: Reflections on Literature in an Age of Crisis." Contrasting the 
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heritage of modernists such as Eliot, Hemingway, Stevens and Valéry with the settled 
antihumanism of Céline, who was also squarely in the modern tradition, Kazin linked the 
philosophical underpinnings of Sartre's vision of universal human renaissance under Marxist 
socialism and Solzhenitsyn's libertarian moral fervour to Nabokov's effort to render the realm 
of exile inhabitable: all were "giving moral supremacy to words rather than to traditions and 
systems." As language in the modern world becomes the sole repository of the human — all 
other traditions and systems having failed — it increasingly reveals that "we are trying to 
retrace, back to its inherent beginning in our minds, what as a finished product literature no 
longer offers: a clue to the human condition." On these lines, Kazin seeks to negotiate a sense 
of alienation so extreme that his favourite landmarks for modern man's progress — history and 
the autonomous self — pale before the "haunting forms of consciousness entirely private" 
explored in the work of John Ashbery, Thomas Pynchon, Vladimir Nabokov, A.R. Ammons, 
and William Gass. These forms have come to serve as subject matter in contemporary poetry 
and "advanced" fiction, disengaging them from their solid grounding in social mechanisms and 
the visions of earlier generations of American writers: "There is nothing for [the writers just 
mentioned] to leam from transmitted forms." Contemporary writers face an acute sense of 
disinheritance, of having to identify and order their material under a different dispensation. They 
have been compelled to work from the periphery, the centre having been obliterated. But Kazin 
likes to believe that contemporary literature still retains the ability to "sustain us by surprising 
us," exploring discontinuous and destructive human states to reveal the enhanced quality of 
experience that arises from an awareness of these.53 
That is not Nabokov's relevance to the age, for he is just as leery of any socio-political 
interpretation of reality as of any transcendental vision proclaiming History as moral telism. His 
attraction for the contemporary readership is rather that he is primarily a revisionist of reality, 
construing nature like a triumphant Ahab, untouched by philosophical anxiety, patterning it at 
will. Unhampered by any belief in moral continuity or even moral necessity, Nabokov feels free 
to overrule circumstance. He even considers these mutually exclusive: 
There is no "world," no model or replica that will unify the various strands of our imagination.... 
Life is too complex, as we are too specialized, for any reflection of "epiphany" or symbol of 
something higher than itself to emerge from fiction. Life and death are fascinatingly patterned 
phenomena, endlessly foldable and unfoldable, the beautiful variousness of nature: the thing in 
itself. (BB, 302) 
Nabokov applies Darwinism to literature: either the mind's rigorous effort succeeds in creating 
the experience of life, or it withers away in contemplations of death. He suggests that the 
scintillating contradictions he relishes are life, so any claim to their resolution — or "truth" — 
equals death. All such ontologies deny the variousness that augments the sense of life expanding 
in all directions. 
Nabokov epitomizes the modem mind's disgust with inclusive theories and seeks to assert the 
selfs primacy in an increasingly alien and hostile environment. He suggests the total interdepen-
dence of subject and setting. This may have made him a potent panacea for the postradical 
hangover, though Kazin would stress that Nabokov does not manage to change the world so 
much as that he is in retreat from it. To be sure, the Nabokovian vision originates in the ethos 
of exile and uprootedness. His eccentricity and fierce independence are unlikely to take root in 
the kind of civic vision that was at the heart of the nineteenth-century American democratic 
experiment. But first and foremost, Nabokov has a genius for profiling himself in the American 
scene, which Kazin touches up with lightly associative mental pencilling: 
249 
In Germany and France, Nabokov quietly noted in his autobiography, he had made hardly any 
friends and had found people "spectral illusions." In America, Nabokov become [sic] a college 
teacher — now his sense of authority, his intense Russian belief in literature, his autocratic 
paternalism and the modesty of American undergraduates combined to make him the most 
mischievous and insistent of teachers.... 
In America, indeed, Nabokov became the princeling he had not been since his childhood in 
Russia, the aristocrat of fiction in our battered mass society, the opulently flowing mind, the happy 
wizard-Poe that he could not have been in the coldness of Cambridge and the loneliness of those 
European cities in which his only friends were Russians and Jews. (BB, 304-5) 
Nabokov's virtuoso adaptation of America as "montage" — Jean-Luc Godard's term — or as 
an American "plastic," in Gore Vidal's phrase, suggests a personal sense of freedom that many 
contemporary writers have desperately sought but never acquired. It is the nearest equivalent 
Kazin evokes in Bright Book to the 'society of minds' whose decline during the first decades of 
the century spawned the apocalyptic sensibility of modernism. The book's opening gambit — 
Hemingway's violent version of 'Paradise Lost,' in our time — is offset by Nabokov capping 
its argument with personal intimations of Time Regained. Exile and expatriation are the topoi 
of twentieth-century modernism, yet Nabokov's experience of these is unparalleled. He is in fact 
a paragon of the modernist — and "pre-Soviet," as Kazin would stress — traditions of 
'"advanced art' and free imagination." Nabokov is a fascinatingly resourceful minister to many 
popular delusions, particularly those posing as political doctrine, and Kazin believes there was 
much in his personal background that predisposed him to play that part.54 
"Exile" may be a suitable metaphor for Kazin's own deep disaffection from the contemporary 
culture. His final judgment on Nabokov can be seen in this light, for it suggests a popular 
panacea for the intellectual crisis of liberalism: 
So, with Nabokov, we come back to something that everybody else has doubted: the indissolubil-
ity of life with fiction. When we see life as purely a story, and story as the natural projection of 
a mind wholly curious rather than moral, we grasp what Nabokov has gained by seeing life wholly 
as the truth of what seems. We escape the clutching at relevance, the effort to establish relations 
between life and art. Perhaps this unusual freedom is possible only when a writer is so deep in his 
exile that exile becomes his life... (BB, 311) 
This is very much the modernist's plight, and one which Kazin emphatically does not relish: the 
self no longer forced to grapple with "their" world instead creates the terms by which to ensure 
its own inviolability from it. No doubt, Nabokov's fiction may work a redemption within the 
context of his 'anti-world,' but he is certainly occasionally guilty of loosening the tie between 
fiction and reality. For any modem writing to lay claim to the power of salvation, however, 
would need to take the unspeakable defeat of the liberal civic experiment at Auschwitz into 
account: "There is indissolubility, too, with the human condition in our time that leaves its 
'shadow' on our 'mirror' — to use two Nabokov key words" (BB, 312). If illusionism is an 
inseparable strand of Nabokov's performance, it fails conspicuously to compensate for the loss 
of the tragic human situation that should have been at the heart of his "brilliant transposition of 
Russia into America..." Indeed, the pressures of the age may have forced Nabokov into his illu-
sionist act, much as many others "have felt themselves pressed beyond 'art'" (BB, 312).55 
Far from imputed monomania, the contemporary artist — that modem survivor — must 
enhance his individual gift of conviction with the excess which alone creates a clear design. 
Thus, Humbert Humbert's obsession focuses the human condition, more particularly 
modernism's desperate revolt against "life without moral definition."56 Wholly consonant with 
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the type of vision emerging from the experience of the culturally hyphenate protagonist of 
Walker, Kazin's concern is to bring the Nabokovian mind within the orbit of naturalism, more 
particularly its creative interpretation of 'necessity.' What he believes Humbert Humbert's 
creator hopes to achieve is an ideal of self-affirmation whose integrity itself will be a landmark 
of spiritual tenacity among the petty constraints of "their" world. Kazin invokes the existentialist 
quality of the naturalist's tragic belief: this world must be lived in no matter how ludicrous the 
figure one makes in it. The Nabokovian vision thus glorifies the power of consciousness to 
make the most of possibilities for design. His consummate artistry offers a rare reprieve from 
the era's fascination with the human deficit: 
[His] sense of himself is like nothing else in contemporary art. It is not cosmic conceit but a 
cosmos. He necessarily proclaims himself the grand master of modern fiction, the pure artist 
opposed to such "idea-mongers" and creators of "trash" as Dostoevsky, Balzac, Conrad, Mann, 
Faulkner. (BB, 310) 
Their work has reflected modern man's need for some central truth in explanation of the human 
condition. Nabokov, by contrast, promotes a heightened artistic awareness of what he is pleased 
to call the "non-utilitarian delights" nature offers to the initiated. Reality, he claims, is a 
supreme fiction created by the artist's ecstatic union with the variousness of his object to 
heighten it "far in excess of a predator's power of appreciation." Nabokov thus firmly rejects 
any social or political prescriptions. Nevertheless, Kazin argues, as an expert in the vagaries of 
political radicalism he is not immune to modern liberalism's major foible, viz. its difficulty in 
devising a self-ideal capable of purposeful interaction with 'the world.' It is not the independent 
status of any course of action within that world that ensures Nabokov's powers of redemption: 
his fiction thrives on proud mimeticism and ultimately forms "the antiworld that could take one 
out of 'exile'" (BB, 311). When reviewing Vladimir Nabokov: Selected Letters, 1940-1977, 
Kazin explained why Nabokov's imaginative world makes some people uneasy: 
Not only is it rarely our world, it is not a world that conceivably explains or replaces the one we 
know. But there are many others, perhaps more akin to Nabokov's imagination, who gratefully 
accept him at his own valuation. That can be bracing to non-believers like myself. In a time 
thirsty for genius, it brings back a familiar glow.57 
Kazin is aware that Nabokov is probably the last "modem" writer of the twentieth century, and 
"self-hypnosis" is the nearest equivalent to a home within history that the heritage of modernism 
has managed to carve out for itself. Coming at the end of the tradition, Nabokov's is a power-
fully anti-historical mind. His genius refuses to give in to obtrusive historical fact, directing it 
instead like a variety artist. Self and history in Nabokov are totally separate, suggesting "a world 
elsewhere" as the only solution to man's historical predicament and making a mockery of 
'History': 
Time fin Nabokov's work] is essentially personal: we are its only creators. Past, present and future 
leak into our consciousness from every side; we live in a creative disorder unpredictable, 
unassembled, witty and gay. The recouping of life through the imagination of time is happiness, 
enchantment, the delicious absurdity of rising above all stated connections. Time is the open 
reality of sour senses, space the deception, death a misinterpretation. (BB, 316) 
Such radical disavowal of historical contingency promotes endless diffractions of the self, whose 
integral existence may be restored only by simultaneously conjuring up all the disjointed time 
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frames and fragments of the 'self they comprise "to make the antiworld that every novelist 
needs." To make the self so much the substance of fiction suggests total freedom, yet its appeal 
is largely focussed in opposition to the experience of necessity in modem mass society. Under-
standably, as Kazin would argue, Nabokov wished to redress History by exploiting the genius 
of its upstart rival, fiction. Nabokov's pursuit of the unattainable in Lolita, however, creates the 
terms of an existentialist dilemma, for Lolita is primarily about madness and the ensuing "most 
urgent theme in our world: man afraid of himself." Nor does Ada offer any authoritative 
Ideological resource, but by devising a wholly personal sense of time Nabokov has "saved us 
from being always at the mercy of the age" (BB, 317). Kazin considers this a mixed blessing in 
an era when the real world threatens to crush the freedom of the spirit and the imagination. 
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Part3 
TOWARD A MYTH OF AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS 
253 

An American Procession 
History and Consciousness 
Kazin's critical inquiry in Bright Book of Life into the main bearings of the contemporary 
literary situation found no suitable models of selfhood. The book's final tone of disenchantment 
is the reverse of the truly prelapsarian origins explored in the opening chapters of An American 
Procession of the self overseeing its own construction. In plotting the emergent crisis of the 
American self amidst the ebullient braggadocio of civic hope and entrepreneurship in the 
nineteenth century, however, Procession prepares the terms for Bright Book's inquiry. In this 
sense, history truly is complication, and Bright Book registers the foreclosure of the selfs 
possibilities in the twentieth century as well as the various stylistic permutations it developed to 
secure its own deliverance in a world increasingly hostile to it. Kazin's journal entry for 8 July 
1981 traces a similar but infinitely more elusive sense of decline in the later book: "The 
Procession's plot: the conviction that we can build 'our own world,' and the subsiding of this 
from selfhood to 'world': and at the last, in Emerson a final vision of Nature not in man's 
control but moving majestically to its own grand and mysterious evolution — to the 'meteor 
mind' falling invisibly through the universe." 
In his review of Procession, "The Return of the Native," Denis Donoghue sets out a number 
of critical reservations about both the apparent destination of Kazin's procession and the route 
it takes. In particular, Donoghue regrets seeing Kazin's arguments "serve the purposes of the 
sociologist rather than a literary critic. A discursive category is not a literary form, though the 
insouciance with which it presents itself makes it hard for literary criticism to insist upon its 
business." Donoghue postulates an unbroken continuity between On Native Grounds, which 
traced "an ambivalent relation... between consciousness and the world" in American literature, 
and Procession. That book, he believes, explores the theme of privately cultivated consciousness 
in relation to civic confidence. And, allegedly, Kazin focuses too intently on possible benefits 
from the writer's artistic effort for the public realm, more particularly Kazin's own role in this: 
how is the literary act to provide moral space to live in? Donoghue faults Kazin's assessment 
of Emily Dickinson's poetry, for instance, on the grounds that it rules out the possibility that 
"this poet is imagining forms of experience and not merely transcribing her own." To a large 
extent, this echoes the most critical of Bright Book's reviews, which had also questioned Kazin's 
requirement that for fiction to be effective it must engage the world, not escape from it. In the 
case of Procession, Donoghue focuses on Kazin's methodological heterodoxy: 
Even when he starts with the work, the attention he gives it is pointed towards its culmination in 
the life, the pattern it fulfills. [Kazin's remarks in Bright Book about John Cheever] may be true 
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of Cheever, but what I note in the sentence [under discussion] is that Kazin's interest fulfills itself 
in the man, not the work, and that the pattern to be disclosed in the end is psychological. 
This does not a fortiori disqualify Kazin's interest, but rather exposes a bias that Donoghue 
takes to be inappropriate and self-defeating. For Donoghue holds that Kazin's "biographical" 
method disowns T.S. Eliot's axiom in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" that the artist should 
strive to achieve in his work the perfect transcendence of his state. Donoghue's view is not 
without its aptness, for Kazin's journal notes frequently explored the implications of Eliot's 
thesis for his own work. I believe that contrary to Donoghue's assertion, however, Kazin's 
critical method in An American Procession rather relies on a particular empathie style and use 
of the history of ideas, the biographical method being instrumental. The book traces the devel-
opment of disparate sensibilities under the combined influence of personal viewpoints on the one 
hand and larger cultural and historical forces on the other. Eventually, it ranks these according 
to their power of transmitting experience. 
I propose a look at two review articles Kazin published just prior to Procession's publication. 
Both illustrate his concern with the past as the realm of necessity modified only by a particular 
style of mind, and serve to defend him against Donoghue's allegation. In his review of James 
R. Mellow's Nathaniel Hawthorne in His Times, "A Genius of Dark Necessity," Kazin makes 
much of Hawthorne's belief that we are implicated in the "record of human sinfulness [viz. the 
past] that acts on us like second nature." Hawthorne allegedly believed that the self cannot and 
must not break free from the burden of the past, which, when actualized, creates a crisis of 
mind. Like Karl Marx, he believed that past generations form an undeniable moral presence in 
our experience, though he arrived at a radically different conclusion: 
But unlike Marx, [he] felt that we should include ourselves as sinners. No human party is free... 
though no moral order may really exist, responsibility for order has fallen on the sinner himself. 
So his relation to the moral order in modem, faithless times is problematical, endlessly difficult. 
It is his own darkness of suffering and preoccupation that he must live with. There is nothing to 
guide us but "soul"... 
Mellow's meticulous and opportunistic patterning of even slight biographical details, Kazin 
points out, suggests that Hawthorne possessed a happier nature than is evident in his writing. 
Nor did Hawthorne's attitude vis-à-vis the social and political issues of the day testify to a 
sterling moral character. He was essentially a divided man, and so was the artist. This was 
particularly evident in his inclination to let "the power of blackness" which he believed was 
central to the historical experience, rather than the image of unclouded nuptial bliss with his 
beloved Sophia, set the stage for his fictions. Kazin fails to see why the past should dominate 
the present to this extent, distorting the origins and continuity of moral experience. Both as man 
and as artist, Hawthorne kept aloof from the dilemmas devouring the society of his day: 
Although he was human enough to have qualms about the Fugitive Slave Law, which [President] 
Pierce [, who was a personal friend,] had supported with his usual fear of Southern secessionists, 
Hawthorne always defended Pierce's concessions to the slave party. In the midst of the Civil War, 
when Pierce was hated all over New England as a Copperhead still trying to mollify the South, 
Hawthorne obstinately dedicated a book to Pierce. 
Thus, Kazin reasons, Hawthorne's "soul" has only a very indirect relation to the moral frame-
work of history. It suggests that moral action is of necessity separated from a useful context. 
Kazin challenges Mellow to reach beyond the rosiness of Hawthorne's limited social setting and 
grasp the peculiar quality of his fascination with the 'dark' past: "a writer's external circum-
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stances may have nothing to do with the decisive quality of mind that makes him compelling — 
to himself above all."1 
Hawthorne's compelling interest to Kazin is that this writer's incisively moral view of the 
past is not extended to Hawthorne as man: the imaginatively, and convincingly, generated claim 
of guilt and responsibility evaporates as we make the transition from the past to the present, 
from the work to the life. Apparently, there is a 'dissociation of sensibility.' As a subject of a 
specific society in specific historical circumstances, Hawthorne was apparently quite capable of 
straddling the moral dilemmas which his fiction absolutized and sought to bring to the bar of 
judgment. The contrast between vindictive ancestral religion and the historical promise expressed 
in Hester's spiritual independence in The Scarlet Letter Hawthorne never reconciled in the flesh. 
Instead, the writer Hawthorne projects magnified versions of his own inner contradictions onto 
the past. Kazin's corollary is that Hawthorne achieved in literature what he was not able to 
assimilate as vibrant social experience, let alone as politics: 
How did a writer financially anxious most of his life, bitterly critical of the American "credit 
system," the one famous New England writer to join the Utopian Brook Farm experiment, get to 
be such a reactionary party Democrat? What did his obstinate Calvinism have to do with his 
fictional derision of all politics and his contempt for do-gooders? [Nor does] Mr. Mellow [offer 
any discriminations about] the Democratic Party in New England and Hawthorne's perfect 
willingness to have the Union broken up.2 
Kazin's disenchantment with this figurehead of the American Renaissance derives from his 
view that any consideration of a particular writer's stature must span the genesis of his operant 
beliefs in and their development from the past. Hawthorne, he claims, seems to have made this 
intellectual journey in reverse. Spiritually uncomfortable in his own circles, Hawthorne definite-
ly lacked the heroic moral defiance shown by his protagonist Hester. Thus, a dominant motif in 
any consideration of Hawthorne as writer and man must be the alienation, partly self-inflicted, 
which he felt from his fellow men, even those very near to him, most notably Melville. 
Such observations illustrate Kazin's view of "histoire contemporaine" which by his own 
admission has been the dominant motif of his historical interest in American literature from On 
Native Grounds onwards. Procession is based on the view developed in "Faulkner in His Fury," 
in The Inmost Leaf, that the history of American literature records the transmission not so much 
of values — be they moral, political or aesthetic — but the gradual development of a particular 
'point of view' forming the leading edge of historical consciousness. This prompted Kazin's 
early fascination with the theme of abortive literary careers in On Native Grounds, without him 
quite knowing what his fascination was about. America's mission — and Kazin has never 
doubted it has one in both the literary and the political sense — is to overcome this lack of 
available creative space in American culture and to hold up a certain civic ideal. One peculiarly 
evocative symbol, as Kazin testified in Walker, was Walt Whitman's poetic persona. 
Whitman reconciling opposites is clearly a factor in Kazin's juxtaposition of Hawthorne and 
Melville, another one of Donoghue's critical reservations. Donoghue argues that Kazin's 
extensive use of this technique of juxtaposing, which he calls "a nuance of the biographical 
method" but which is actually a key element in it, may have been psychologically motivated, as 
is evidently the case in Kazin's cameo study of Hawthorne and Melville, or rather designed in 
opposition to Eliot's view of the perfect separation in art of "the man who suffers and the mind 
which creates...": "Kazin assumes that the work and the life are a continuous, seamless web. 
Even when he starts with the work, the attention he gives it is pointed toward its culmination 
in the life, the pattern it fulfills."3 
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Actually, Kazin does not assume factual continuity between the work and the life but focuses 
on the American self searching for the quality of its condition to the depths, the life certainly 
being a component of the condition. This accomplished, it could hope to secure its sovereignty 
and achieve historical deliverance. This is exactly the objective historical fact that Americans, 
during the Twenties, were closer to than any other Western democracy would ever be — the 
national experience becoming a blueprint of their civic hope — and that warrants the universal-
ist cast of Kazin's American procession. In this respect, too, Donoghue minimizes the difference 
between the natural history of the creative life in America in the past two centuries and that in 
Europe: 
Kazin regularly looks for an American writer's precursors within American literature. The chapter 
on Henry James has little to say, and nothing specific on James's relation to Balzac, Flaubert and 
Turgenev: Howells occupies their space, although James took him lightly. Reading Faulkner, 
Kazin hears Melville where I hear Conrad. 
But then Kazin has frequently argued that European writers have a different quarrel with 
existence, much as naturalism in America has never had the ideological charge and philosophical 
standing it had in Europe. His method actually develops from Van Wyck Brooks's early 
pathology of writership in America, though he pointedly abstains from Brooks's defeatism. It 
examines the genesis of a particular 'point of view,' which mainly arises in the absence of the 
dense social texture which Brooks believed made American writing look anaemic in comparison 
with European. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, as Kazin argues in the "Preface" 
to Procession, the American self was free to pursue its own destiny, unrestrained by theological 
or political orthodoxy: a circumstance realized nowhere else in the Western world. More 
importantly, the American selfs progress coincided with a growing sense of tremendous power 
being generated by a society under construction. Power in America went hand in hand with the 
spiritual enfranchisement of the free individual, and Donoghue plays down this aspect of 
American cultural history when he criticizes Kazin's 'biographical' method for its reliance on 
"relation." Kazin bases himself on a seminal passage about the significance of Henry Adams's 
historiography, a ploy whose validity Donoghue very much doubts: "But how can relation be 
assumed, by Adams or by Kazin? Relation isn't an unmediated function of nature: it is, 
supremely I almost say, a cultural act."4 It is, and it is one undertaken by Adams as well as 
Kazin, who is hardly concerned to put in place a particular liberal-progressive cultural ideal 
through a careful matching of 'lives in letters' the way Donoghue assumes he does. Rather, 
Kazin uses the gradual decay of the American selfs sense of its universal force as an index to 
the drama of the single, self-reliant individual seeing his traditional sway over society reversed. 
This relation — the 'living' space each individual seeks to wrest from his immediate environ-
ment with whatever spiritual means at his disposal — is Kazin's major objective in Procession. 
It is a normative concern, spanning the ironies of both history and the modern personality as the 
modernist perspective that Donoghue hews close to as well as the belief that literature does not 
take off from experience so much as it is constitutive of it. Richard Ellmann, for instance, in 
"The Nation's Conscience," finds Procession's organizing principle to be Kazin's mood, "which 
might be described as the malaise of the [nineteen-Jeighties," with American consciousness 
shattered by the liabilities that go with the exercise of power. 
Procession builds from the growing conviction in modern times that the self-reliant American 
individual no longer dominates the social experience and that instead the power shaping a 
vibrant and aggressively new society is slipping beyond his reach. Donoghue endorses Kazin's 
analysis as a socio-intellectual and historical fact, but faults him on his understanding of the 
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literary processes modifying and mediating that fact. He shares, for instance, Kazin's normative 
interest in the literary experience of the Twenties, which was in effect the culmination of 
an attitude "inseparable from the vitality, ingenuity, and openness to new experience that had been 
the mark of an American elect since the days of the Puritan migration and that helped... to bring 
about the American Revolution and... our literary independence." An American Procession is... 
Kazin's history ofthat attitude, the forces that defined it, and the reasons why it could not survive 
in our "ghastly... pitiless century..." 
But Donoghue does not subscribe to Kazin's corollary view, viz. that the defeat ofthat outlook 
equals a crisis of mind. As a case in point, he recalls Kazin's observation in the "Postscript" to 
the 1955 edition of On Native Grounds that modem American literature, with "the early 
Faulkner, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald," had lost its ability "to carry the whole weight of our 
society." The aristocracy of the mind — an aristocracy because of its cultural leadership — lost 
its hold on public events and resorted to fugitive forms of consciousness. The new society 
eclipsed it, creating wholly new forms of social and political power. This new calibration of self 
informs Kazin's revaluation of radical Romanticism. With society being transformed at a rapid 
pace into the formidable Other that the transcendentalist-Emersonian "Oversoul" never managed 
to encompass, Kazin pictures the plight of the American writer, "who is always reaching out 
into this strangeness to say what things are really like — this man cannot feel the kind of old-
fashioned force, the tonic resistance, that writers felt when the world had a more secure charac-
ter for them, when it was still solidly there, for them to change."5 The groundnote for his 
observation is a major reversal in American intellectual and cultural history, particularly the 
inroads upon the radical-libertarian political and ethical philosophies during the century follow-
ing 1830, the era Kazin constructs his argument from. His aim is to delineate possible, and in 
large part historically vindicated, avenues for the American individual's spiritual deliverance. In 
almost every single instance, this involves some measure of heroic defiance on the part of the 
individual writer: indeed, society itself had become a formidable antagonist. In order to retain 
the traditional sense of the self, the individual writer found no point of reference save other 
writers similarly borne along by the irreversible tide of social change. "Relation" comes natu-
rally, then, as a cultural act to the élite resisting their impending fate as outcasts. For them — 
the much-appraised "alienatoes" in American literature, or modernists avant la lettre — it was 
a way of redefining the mainstream where the old one disintegrated under the adversary claims 
of popular democracy. 
Kazin's interest in "relation" being philosophically neutral probably occasioned Donoghue's 
severity with him. Donoghue faults Kazin's juxtaposition of Eliot and Adams on the grounds 
that it is rather "factitious": 
Adams is made to testify to the beginning of the end of America's confidence in itself, and Eliot 
to the next phase ofthat dismalness. But this involves ignoring the precise criticism Eliot proposed 
of Adams, and the particular ground of his rebuke. What Eliot pointed to was an alleged defect 
of sensibility on Adams's part, that sensory power and intelligence in him were not continuous — 
'4here is nothing to indicate that Adams's senses either flowered or fruited: he remains little Paul 
Dombey asking questions" — but not some terrible cultural or symptomatic fate attendant upon 
the end of an era.6 
Admittedly, this was certainly not what Eliot proposed in his review of Adams's autobiography 
on 23 May 1919, but it does suggest the quality of Kazin's concern with the nature of the 
human condition from his historical vantage point in On Native Grounds, when he first explored 
the increasingly tenuous hold of American writers on their native experience. Of course, at the 
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time, he did so primarily in the light of the faith in progress of the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, but his analysis of the growing discrepancy between modern man's imaginative 
capacities and the tools at his disposal for wielding power took on a gruesome aspect against the 
background of the mechanized murderousness of contemporary totalitarian ideologies. Pro-
cession features Eliot as more successful than Adams in designing artistic strategies compensat-
ing for his personally felt and acute sense of alienation. Eliot in his review of The Education is 
the self-assured artist inviting Adams, as it were, to make his 'philosophy' as "sensuous" — true 
to the life of the emotions — as Eliot's own poetics aimed to. Kazin refutes Donoghue's claim 
that Adams, unlike Eliot, was not capable of devising a philosophy of historical existence. In 
"Prologue 1918: Old Man in a Dry Month," he argues that both viewed their "relation" to 
history with creative irony. To project their personal fates onto a larger, historical canvass, they 
cultivated a covert but finely tuned, "fruiting," sense of self, with each of them deeply aware of 
the tragedy of existence and committed to redeeming his individual plight. Both ultimately 
sought to establish a conjunction of history and self, making history the theatre of the forces that 
had disrupted their private lives. As representatives of the political and cultural élite, however, 
they believed they suffered at the hands of populist democracy, which links both Adams and 
Eliot, as creators, to a particular historical consciousness shaping the world to the needs of their 
private selves. Yet, as a point not conceded by Donoghue, Eliot, in "Gerontion," had pressing 
personal reasons for discrediting the historical realm, casting it in images of universal decay and 
replacing it by a deep religious desire for a God-ordained human destiny resolving the world's 
discord in an inclusive symbol of truth. Kazin traces the effect of this conviction on Eliot's 
projected sensibility. He would argue that a world was made to go to ruin to explain the 
personal misery of one T.S. Eliot, who saw history as "nothing but human depravity." Adams, 
by contrast, considered the vicissitudes of History his lodestar in his quest for "Unity." In 
chapter 18 of The Education, "Free Fight (1869-1870)," a passage from which turned up in dis-
guise in Eliot's "Gerontion," he described how very early on he acquired the sensuous equip-
ment, more fully so than did Eliot, to deal with a world on which, to all intents and purposes, 
God had reneged and which was now for the artist to make meaningful. 
In Adams's historical work, "relation" as a method reveals the American mind looking for 
tools to understand American energy — and so suggests the predicament of consciousness in 
modem times — much as Eliot's conviction elicits the tragedy of the future. Kazin makes 
Adams the steward of American selfhood: politically dispossessed, he yet regained centrality 
through a superb web of consciousness. Eliot absolutized his culturally dispossessed state, and 
he felt that the hurtling progress American society witnessed had no bearing upon any redemp-
tive fate whatsoever. In both writers, "relation" involved the use of the past to put the present 
into perspective, the great difference being that Adams believed, however modestly, in the 
capacity of renewal at work in the American experience; Eliot believed it had run its course and 
gone whoring after false gods. 
The promise of some undisclosed destiny looming just over the horizon marks the writers 
heading Kazin's procession. Donoghue notes with acerbity that 
the larger story of American literature since Emerson had become a legend, a myth of endless 
grandeur, in Kazin's mind; and... in such a legend, the mere limitations and defects of a writer 
cease to matter. But I can't explain... why some few writers, Eliot, for instance, are grudgingly 
given the benefit of the myth, and some, notably Pound, are driven out of it.... 
[Apparently,] An American Procession is Kazin's narrative; it professes to discover the history 
of the American experience, with literature as main evidence. The hero of the narrative is History 
itself. But since personifications are so hard to manage, Kazin has identified History with Henry 
Adams, who understood the power he could not control. 
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The reproach of overlooking a writer's "mere limitations and defects" for the sake of a particu­
lar narrative purpose has quite a long standing in Kazin's case. His critics have often pointed to 
his relative neglect of the role form plays in practical criticism, relying instead on insights 
gleaned from such disparate fields as psychology, morality, history and sociology. Instead, Kazin 
is eager to relate the full scope of a particular writer's sensibility — which is more revealing of 
this writer's magnitude than the combined inflections of his work — to the singlemost important 
fact in American history, viz. the native experience taking its shape from a society revolution­
ized by change. Procession features Henry Adams to argue how tragically complex an 
American's relation with History is destined to be, particularly when compared to the exhilar­
ation of Walker's protagonist scaling the walls of his circumscribed existence. This may be the 
substance of legend, as Donoghue claims, but Kazin would certainly not endorse it as such. 
Legend deals in timeless patterns of experience and hence does not describe Procession, for that 
book pursues a resolution within actual history. Moreover, it deals with progress, not in the 
secular-liberal sense but in a moral-aesthetic. Adams was a prime witness of moral-intellectual 
systems in America — including the political — fracturing under the impact of social revolution 
within a lifetime. He had himself indicated that only a prodigious effort of the intellectual will 
could keep the American mind abreast of American energy. Donoghue believes that any such 
accomplishment is to be realized only in the aesthetic realm, and so denies Kazin's working 
hypothesis of a disclosable historical telism: "The Education of Henry Adams... is... the 
'recognition scene' of a story which rushes toward its catastrophe. In that book, consciousness 
leaps to an ironic ъгп-«г of its predicament, the only alternative being bewilderment."7 But 
Adams, Kazin claims, stuck to a residual faith, however tenuous, in the power of the human 
mind to make sense of historical events and to live accordingly. In a passage of The Education 
which Kazin highlights, Adams features the mind contemplating evolutionary models of progress 
countervailing the multiplicity of modem history. He does this with the self-consciousness of the 
Historian in the care of a lost science. The Education's mood, therefore, is not ironic so much 
as chastened. 
Donoghue is mistaken about the scope of Kazin's thesis, whose purest expression he discerns 
in the following passage: "Only the historian, with the whole scale of development open to him, 
could do justice to the gradually overwhelming concentration of power in modem times — 
above all in America, the 'modem' country... In the full consciousness of so much growth and 
change, the historian became equal to history."8 He believes that this is not so much Kazin 
speaking as Kazin mimicking — for the purpose of rendering "relation" as a process involving 
the full intellectual recognition of the diversity of individual fates within public history — 
Adams's ironic outlook. Nor, as Donoghue admits, is Kazin writing an apologia in the Adams 
vein for a self-conscious cultural élite resisting the barbaric hordes of a levelling political 
democracy. Instead, Kazin explores avenues of deliverance amid the oppressive burden of 
historical complication. That the Education was essentially a fugitive project would indicate that 
Adams understood that the spiritual route he professed to go was possible but problematic, and 
available only to very few. Kazin identifies this as a useful spiritual heritage. 
The historian may have a natural command over his material, but he is wholly powerless to 
change history. In "The Historian at the Center," Kazin drew a careful distinction between the 
art of historiography and the modem historian's liability to a major occupational hazard: a 
penchant for the intellectually unified design. Contemporary American historians, Kazin argued, 
are "deficient in ideas" or have no "real point of view," and tend to make up for that by 
devising a particular "formula." But an effective literary device cannot take the place of politics, 
not even among jaded intellectuals. Arthur Schlesingers historiography, for instance, reflected 
a consciously dramatic strategy, giving undue prominence to F.D. Roosevelt as the mind at the 
centre. It exemplified the liberal's wish to become intimate with power, and as such, 
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Schlesingers point of view is not Adams's, in The Education, who was motivated by the 
experience of a decaying tradition of excellent minds in government. For one thing, Schlesinger, 
too, had been working from an awareness of the void. 
Henry Adams is not the supreme mythmaker in Kazin's procession that Donoghue suspects 
he is. In fact, Kazin believes The Education brings an ideological point of view to bear on 
American experience, although, unlike liberal historiography, it speaks for radical dissociation 
from the power that alters 'the world,' whose mad chaos it deeply distrusts: Adams is a 
defender of "the past [as well as his past] against the future."9 No custodian of a mythically 
unified world before the onset of modernity, Adams is an intellectual radical in the tradition of 
the Enlightenment. He sought to replace the endangered Adams family tradition of political 
excellence by a new synthesis and found it in the image of power as change, of the mind 
stressed beyond capacity to comprehend the drama of society being transformed by the forces 
of science, technology and modern democracy. "Relation" thus compels a revaluation of origins, 
casting history as retrospective order rather than prospective entropy. In this respect, Eliot and 
Adams had more in common than Donoghue warrants. 
Adams's autobiographical effort was therefore to devise inclusive metaphors rolling back the 
modern tide of multiplicity to project "the truth that cannot be fitted in." The matrimonial 
tragedy that befell him was cause for despair, but The Education is testimony that he was 
tentatively developing some unifying strands in the development of the American experience. 
These were deeply personal in origin, cohering around images of cultural dispossession and of 
gradual retreat from a native belief in a manifest historical destiny. Adams stood out as a 
modernist avant la lettre in the sense that he, unlike the modernists of a later date, continued to 
believe in the capacity of the human mind to lend significance to the madly fragmenting 
historical scene. 
An American Procession: The Birth of American Selfhood 
When, on 20 October 1968, Kazin privately reflected on Hannah Arendt's introduction to Walter 
Benjamin in that week's issue of The New Yorker, he marked the ethos of Arendt's set as a "cult 
of contemplativeness and inaction" aiming to "make the [philosophical] definition[s] come out 
right for themselves, not for others. They were transcendentalists without a movement, utterly 
solitary & pleased to remain so."10 The exclusiveness of both their philosophical position and 
their self-styled cultural authority formed a significant contemporary parallel indeed with the 
Transcendentalist frame of mind. Both moved uncomfortably within the "social compact," the 
one on account of its belief in an august national destiny unfolding, the other to seal its retreat 
from the mob ethos in political democracy. Both were in pursuit of a different world, both paid 
tribute to the Emersonian faith in the primacy and authority of the inner world of consciousness. 
In that sense, they were apt to ignore the political significance of public action and, vice versa, 
to accept the symbolical value of the imaginative act as a political statement. 
Kazin's initial involvement and gradual disillusionment with Arendt's philosophical work — 
which he believed was her elected theatre for a literary as much as a personal identity — 
reflects his dissatisfaction with the growing discrepancy he had observed in American writing 
between form and content, viz. the moral conviction of a possible historical telos and the 
aesthetic dissipation of historic exigency. This split in the American mind developed when 
Manifest Destiny fell on hard times, heralding a fierce struggle between national promise and 
an ironic awareness of history. It promoted the historical dualism of twentieth-century liberali-
sm, with its reflex nostalgia as a panacea for contemporary crisis. Accordingly, Kazin presents 
Procession as "a secret history of the U.S." It explores the genesis of the liberal experience 
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through cultural processes that have generally been made to serve ideological purposes in 
interpretations of history. In particular, it focuses on the apparent irreconcilability of the 
Romantic individualism of the American experience with the ultimately political nature of the 
society the 'free' nineteenth-century individual had envisaged. What Kazin insists on — and 
what the Transcendentalists could not live up to — is that history, and society, exists as a moral 
reality fit to be entered into as an act of faith and developed to include the democratic experie-
nce: "The secret of my book [viz. Procession], the compelling energy behind [it,] will be my 
love for these writers and for their native experience." That was to be the substance of Kazin's 
study, whereas he defines the aesthetic element in the development of the American experience 
— the referentiality of the act of "relation" — with a prudent degree of eclecticism: "The 
'purpose' of history, like the 'purpose' of anything, is to satisfy the hungry gnawing consciousn-
ess: the mind is at the centre + that is all that is at the centre. But how 'natural' to identify this 
mind with 'God.'" Nevertheless, this suggests a split between the historical reality and the 
mind's effort at representation that Kazin does not allow to persist. He stresses "political ideas" 
as determinants of society: "In any event, my procession is a celebration of freedom and a study 
in its fortunes. My procession is a secret history of the U.S. — of the Am. heroes and intellec-
tuals at their best.... [it is] against tyranny." Procession includes a political statement: 
The theme is political: the tragedy of the individual mistaking himself for the cosmos — the 
tragedy of the "bootstrap myth," the self-starter as the self-promoter — the tragedy of the indi-
vidual let entirely loose, and so mistaking his actual horizons — the tragedy of nature unfettered, 
"pristine" — even (or above all) the tragedy of so much unfettered communication waiting for sth. 
substantive to enter it. Every man a "medium" + a transmitter." 
"Nature unfettered" was the theatre of personal consciousness for the nineteenth-century 
American romancers who, as Kazin points out, had a "legendary sense of self' and freedom but 
who were invariably too insecure of their relation to 'the world' to be able to capture it as a 
novel. For the novel, he holds, dramatizes this relation and comments on the way the self copes 
with its limitations. This is to a large extent a moral act: 
The Novel really began with the discovery of the "the world" (the real world), as opposed to the 
microcosmic world that is the individual self writ large. The novel began with the discovery that 
the individual was not a clue to the world — a symbolic key to it — but only one of many actors 
in it. Self and world are not the same. 
Contemporary fiction pursues this process of discovery to the extreme of the "fabulous" world 
supplanting the writer's experience of the actual. But Kazin's concern is to suggest the quality 
of self that nineteenth-century writers employed to explore, and strengthen their hold of, their 
existence. He combines the religious and aesthetic realms when he reasons that 
... the solid given world [is] the third element (like a language whose words we use) that in every 
transaction between man and man supplies the meaning. The mistake is every [sic] to think of any 
isolated part of the historical process as equal to the world. The idea of the modem age, of 
progress and revolution, etc. The "world" starts from what precedes and succeeds the human 
condition, and what supplies the means by which to understand it. The "world" is when man 
ranges himself against what is constant in human nature, unchangeable in the very nature of his 
body and his mind, constant in the contrast between his mortality, changeableness and difficulty 
of understanding — with what is immortal and that is the great language he occasionally picks up 
for his own dark use. 
The world is not "society."12 
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Metaphysically, 'the world' forms the nearest analogue to society, but they overlap only 
partly. Kazin believes that "our once integral conceptions of the human" have yielded to the idea 
of power, and twentieth-century man in search of an alternative to the nineteenth-century faith 
in historical progress rather encounters dispossession and alienation precisely because his 
relation to society has changed so dramatically.13 Procession investigates this change, tracing 
its development via Whitman's wide-ranging identification of the self with society as an 
instrument for historical deliverance to the modernists' intensely aesthetic conception of selfhood 
originating in the fear of social dystopia. 
A Modern's "Postponed Power" 
Kazin bases American "national" literature squarely on the Emersonian heritage of "a religious 
revolution" in consciousness. He distinguishes two major periods: the first, prior to the Civil 
War, including the transcendental idealists (Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman) and the great 
romancers (Hawthorne, Poe, Melville), and the second, following the First World War, compris-
ing the modernist poets, novelists and critics — Eliot, Pound, Hemingway, Dos Passos, 
Fitzgerald, Edmund Wilson, Kenneth Burke — "too many for me to do justice to in a book that 
ends with the 1920's." The "literary century" in question also encompasses "our great realistic 
novelists" — Mark Twain, Henry James, Theodore Dreiser — as well as Stephen Crane and 
Emily Dickinson, who achieved their creative successes in the intervening era. Moreover, Kazin 
perceives a natural limit to his study in the dissipation of "the free spirit of the modems... by 
war, depression, political ideology, academicism, 'post-modernism.'" But above all, he is 
concerned with "the revelation after the First World War... of the 'postponed power' among 
those who had been 'modem' before their time — Adams, Melville, Whitman, Dickinson" (AP, 
xiii). 
Procession features the idea of "modernism." Though the cultural and historical outlook of 
modernism is shot through with pessimism, Kazin believes it makes particular resources 
available to the individual to argue the possibility of a redemptive destiny. Modernism's chief 
pursuit has been to fulfil the promise of life as "possibility of renovation, reform, revaluation 
beyond all mere social change." This is an inclusive quality of mind, forming a natural parallel 
with what Irving Howe considered "a politics concerned with the idea of society," the "genetic 
myth" underlying liberalism.14 Procession offers a revaluation of modernism, antedating its 
origins, while anticipating dealing with those elements of the American experience that sparked 
off Edenic nostalgia as a predominant motif in the history of American political ideas. The 
"Preface" to Procession credits Alexis de Tocqueville with the perception that "democracy was 
the revolutionary proposition of the time," lionizing the individual. Tocqueville equally noted 
the perils of such self-reliance: 
Americans acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt 
to imagine that their whole destiny is in their hand. Thus not only does democracy make every 
man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants, and separates his contemporaries from him; 
it throws him back upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the 
solitude of his own heart. (AP, xiv) 
Kazin plots the process whereby the identity of the isolated self expresses itself as a political 
proposition. Cushing Strout, moreover, has argued that in American literature there has been a 
persistent failure to adapt to the immediate historical setting, and he quotes Tocqueville's 
observation that American — democratic — literature favours "passions and ideas" and pictures 
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"man himself, not tied to time or place, but face to face with nature or with God." This solid-
ified the Romantic typos of American literature. Similarly, Auden's New Year Letter of 1942 
held the American literary tradition to be "much nearer to Dostoïevski than Tolstoi." The 
stalwarts Auden mentioned, notably Hawthorne, Melville, James and Eliot, were about to 
become a staple in Partisan Review's fashionable cultural criticism. Lionel Trilling, Richard 
Chase, Marius Bewley and Quentin Anderson further developed the theme of the "abstractness 
and generality" of the democratic imagination in America, which preferably took its cues from 
Hawthomian romance. The vicissitudes of this particular canon in American literary criticism 
are by now well-documented, but the point worth noting here is that Quentin Anderson, much 
in the vein of Partisan Review, established a certain association between Hawthorne and James, 
describing the latter as "the bearer of an exemplary neurosis," who followed Emerson and 
Whitman in dramatizing "the dispensability of that world of the self and the other, or rather, the 
necessity of making it subordinate to the world of the undivided consciousness." For Anderson, 
the traditional interpretation of the American literary tradition as an unresolved polemic between 
high-brow and low-brow varieties of experience "come[s] full circle with a vengeance." 
Moreover, he perceives a greater degree of similarity between Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter and 
the novels of Jane Austen, George Eliot or Trollope than to "the late James." Society emerges 
as a hard naturalistic fact, no longer the Transcendental mind's idea of a pluralized self as an 
Other.15 
Many critics have dismissed the concept of "society" as irrelevant to the historical develop-
ment of American literature, but Kazin insists that "society," dramatizing 'the world,' is the 
necessary backdrop to the American selfs tragic growth towards self-awareness. Philip Rahv's 
"paleface" was for a long time the chief purveyor of the dominant American literary currency, 
of, in Auden's words, "parables [and] symbolic settings for a timeless and unlocated (because 
internal) psychomachia," epitomized by James in his late phase. Kazin's thesis in Procession, 
and the method he uses, claims that the American self became gradually aware of and engaged 
the pluralist historical reality in which it found its being, awarding this greater urgency than the 
search for the universalia of the internal life. Procession joins Strout's call for a revaluation of 
the historical aspects of American literature: 
The time has come to emphasize the fact that loneliness and symbolic settings, either before the 
Civil War or after it, have not been in conflict with profound literary attention to historical 
realities and social issues. Our classic writers, in fact, pioneered in exploring many of the same 
questions that would occupy our post-Civil War writers.16 
Procession argues the mental transferences occurring within individual sets of writers, but it 
focuses on the inclusive metaphors of the public realm which these writers either intentionally 
explored or represented in the peculiar quality of their minds and their personal fates. This 
suggests that any purely aesthetic interpretation of the literary tradition is inadequate and 
associates the creative stature of the individual writers it deals with closer with the genetic myth 
of American exceptionalism — and particularly its fundamental belief in the residual ability of 
the American self to tap sources of self-actualization unaffected by obstructions to American 
progress in the public sphere. Kazin's point is that history did interfere, and that it was even a 
major influence on the development of American consciousness. 
I have indicated that the idea of politics itself is a subject in Procession. Kazin links it to 
selfhood, which he, like Strout, believes is a political fact. Both take this political dimension to 
be the most fully expressed by what Strout thinks the historically nostalgic criticism of Ameri-
can society. Conceding Trilling's point that the contempt of American writers for their society 
arises not so much from their despair about an ideal future as from '"disgust with the very idea 
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of society,'" Strout emphasizes that American political novelists are motivated "even more often 
[by] an idealized memory of what it [viz. society] once was." Strout links up with Howe, who 
used an expanded definition of politics, and claims that the definition of the political novelist 
must include even "writers whose books seem to express a final revulsion against politics," such 
as Adams's Democracy, Twain's The Gilded Age and Dos Passos's U.S.A.: "The anguish in 
these works arises from a feeling of betrayal, a sardonic result of their encounter with [the 
historical effect of] the traditional political idea of American exceptionalism." The issue these 
writers faced — and one that both Strout and Kazin wish to pursue — is whether the tradition 
of the new republic based on sterling political virtue could be continued. By the same token, 
Kazin uses their work to defuse what Strout describes as the modemist literary culture of 
dystopia "dehistoricizing literature and fictionalizing history." Twain, for one, had apostrophized 
Jefferson's and Lincoln's views on America's special destiny, while Adams had conceded that 
Washington was "like the Pole Star [and] alone remained steady, in the mind of Henry Adams, 
to the end." They had recorded how history threw grit in the political workings of American 
exceptionalism, "dissociat[ing] Americans from these earlier modes of political life."17 
Irving Howe, in "Literature and Liberalism," believed that American literature was capable 
of reconciling images of human limitations as expressed in The Federalist Papers, for instance, 
on the one hand and Edenic nostalgia on the other. Unity could not be achieved, but worldly 
realism and historic nostalgia might entpr into a relation of "complicity and tension." Howe 
specified this relation as follows: "The sturdiness of a stable liberal polity allows literature the 
freedom to 'transcend' it and even oppose it in the name of higher values." This attitude of 
qualified assent to the emergent socio-political reality underlies Procession. It, too, addresses the 
question of a purposive social ordering of the native experience, tracing its history from the 
Emersonian autonomous self to the State as the dominant force in the contemporary social 
matrix. It is "against tyranny." Howe postulated a dialectic between the need to transcend 
society by "leap[ing] beyond the edge of society itself' — which is in itself a denial of the 
historical reality of liberal political ideas — and the admission that the State cannot be ruled out 
of existence and will set limits to individual liberty. The transcendent impulse central to 
liberalism is initially apolitical, largely conveyed by the anarchist ideal, but it became political 
through its inquiry into the rationale of and justification for the State. The dialectic therefore 
involves the very social and historical tenets of liberalism itself, for even as the dream of 
paradise is a staple feature in 
the imaginations of our nineteenth-century writers, they must live in a society Madison hoped to 
form, Jackson to reform, and the expansion of American business to transform.... an America is 
being created that frustrates both the dream of a new Eden and the political ideas of a liberal 
democracy. Neither in practice nor thought can our writers find a way of coping with this 
disenchantment.18 
Not as social reporters, perhaps, but as artists they did pursue viable resolutions to this dilemma. 
Procession argues how the burden of their experience predisposed individual American writers 
to become annunciators and critics of the new realities they encountered. America was set up as 
a moral as well as a spiritual experiment, and they found themselves unable to account for the 
contradictions it generated. 
One major contradiction manifested itself in the nature of democracy, "the American selfs 
despair." Tocqueville's political analysis of democracy spotted the self-division and historical 
anomie deriving from the rudimentary social vision of radical Romanticism. Democracy was 
"the revolutionary proposition of our time" (AP, xiv) and also dangerous, because it assigned 
powers of self-determination to every single individual. Self-reliance made every man his own 
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prophet and oracle, blurring the totality of human effort. Another inherent contradiction comes 
out as the animosity between past and present, with the total politicization of the present leaving 
the past a myth. The most vitiating contradiction, however, also in the political sense, is that any 
redemptive historic destiny is finally to be sanctioned by the symbolic action of the private con-
sciousness only: 
The agonizing question behind the book — the question that really rose from the enslaved 
European consciousness — as with Lawrence: is freedom more than personal assertion, an art 
myth, as in the 1920s? — Hfenry] A[dams] assumes moraZ-individual continuity, though history 
explodes." 
Henry Adams: The Artist's Grasp 
Henry Adams plays a key role in Procession as a prime witness to the exponential growth of 
American political and technological power in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like 
Eliot, he was a scion of a cultural and political élite displaced from office by the levelling 
democratic forces which both believed they could control and contain only by imaginative 
means. He cultivated a stance as History's outcast. Adams's appeal to contemporary intellectual 
opinion is that he epitomizes the modem situation with its "nominalist insistence that 'modern' 
man is lost, that there is a peculiarly 'modern' crisis, that once there was an age of faith, but 
now.... [dots in original]" Adams is in the same class with Eliot and Mann, Kazin argues, 
antagonists of such "true believers" as Jacques Maritain, who believed man was disinherited by 
modem science and who blamed this on the eighteenth-century "skeptics." But Kazin, 
mimicking Eliot, saw in Maritain's brand of religiosity "a separation from history:... all is 
original sin... The great myth of the past, the secure age of belief. Dante. Dante. Dante."20 To 
Kazin, the modernist wish for an 'unconditioned' existence free from history's fever and fret 
reflects a political conviction that the American civic experiment and Manifest Destiny have 
become utterly adulterated. It essentially reflects a despair of democracy. Made at a time when 
there was a marked religious revival among American intellectuals, the above observations by 
Kazin indicate that Adams's relevance today lies in his refusal to resort to an inclusive set of 
symbols compensating for the inadequacy of traditional beliefs. Adams had pregnant personal 
experience of the vicissitudes of the political life, yet he resisted absolutizing modern man's 
lostness. He did not think the fate of the political intelligence at the hands of popular democracy 
signified the loss of tradition, but rather recast his own personal fate in history in terms of the 
pursuit of "Unity." Adams's autobiography defends the past against the present; The Education 
is an early statement of the aesthetic benefits to be gained by cultivating a view from the 
margin. Adams was not suspicious of the idea of "progress" so much as the form this took. He 
was a tragic instance of the citadel of political reason being invaded by the unruly democratic 
process; as a political mind, he tried to cope with entropie social forces by setting up a rival 
world in the service of "Unity." And "Unity" was emphatically the past. 
Self and History in The Education engage in a devious pas-de-deux, since, for all of his 
anxious positivism, Adams is clearly "personal." That is his legacy to the modern movement, 
Kazin holds, one which created a major dilemma: to what extent can the shaping mind presume 
to control 'the world'? Kazin's preparatory notes for the Adams section in Procession and 
several articles published in the late Sixties trace Adams's philosophical interest to a need to 
interpret historical sequence as causality outright, thus invoking the 'Iron Law of History' and 
turning necessity into a science. But it is Adams's mind, Kazin notes, and nothing else that 
defines and imposes this necessity. Only the Emersonian gospel relieves this note of causality. 
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Procession's design draws heavily on the possible synergy of discovered 'relations' and 
portrays the historic reversals of American literary selfhood. As a writer, Kazin admits he has 
a vested interest in its origins — vide Walker's protagonist — but he rather regards its compli-
cations primarily as a shift in moral orientation. This is a standing concern with him, which he 
registered as early as 1967: 
The theme that lies at the heart of everything I am trying to seize [and that has] haunted me ever 
since '43 — that is surely the basis of whatever is good in the Adams, James, Emerson to Dreiser 
book, i.e. the American-Puritan literary experience: the difference between the actors and the 
bystanders, the stage and the pit, the protagonists and the moralists, the revolutionaries and the 
commentators, Christ and the Christians... the alive and the merely watchful, the glowing act of 
love and all the ruefulness and interpretation thereof— that life consists in acts and actions, in 
performances and deeds, that too much of what I see [and] live gets pissed away in all the 
attitudes of the spectator. Oh, the intellectuals, the Jewish intellectuals, the commentators and the 
scribes, the wisdom of non-doing! Oh, the Trilling syndrome, the James syndrome, always the 
beast that never sprang from the jungle! 
- at a time when everything seethes with existence, with struggle towards a revindication of our 
human nature — "action," not merely in the work of art, but as a positive attitude towards life, to 
be one of the actors [...] fills one with the hope that life's thirst will yet be satisfied. [...] Fiction 
as symbolic action, Action as a necessary fiction. 
The question is whether, as in Trilling's case, the loss of a comprehensive historical synthesis 
to rely on did not actually remove the writer from history. This involves Adams, too, albeit that 
he was totally removed from social utopianism and was the heir of a continuous tradition of 
political reason destined to take office. He was a self-styled prophet, a main witness and a 
spectator indeed — as well as the subject — of the entropy apparently inherent in modem 
democratic systems of government. The doomsday aspect of his historical writing, prophetic in 
many respects as it was, clearly poised him for retrospective justification by later generations, 
thus making him a modernist avant la lettre. Kazin's criticism of both Adams and those 
'modernists' who cultivated a similar historical pessimism is that their writing sprang solely 
from a need to serve their individual autonomy, and that they were not willing to risk it for the 
socio-political emancipation of the democratic masses, that they chafed at the cultural expres-
sions of democracy. The extreme self-referentiality of Adams's work limited his usefulness as 
a model for the 'open road' of American selfhood. Kazin presents him as an artist of marked 
creative power, but this was so much bound up with Adams's cast of mind and personal position 
that what is actually self-consciousness poses as consciousness. Kazin's preliminary work for 
Procession marked this: 
Existence determines consciousness, not the other way round. The elemental facts don't seem to 
penetrate the American mind. There are conditions and issues, personal, social, cosmic facts... that 
determine what we think and what we do.... The antagonisms and contradictions they enforce in 
us become the form of our response... but our response does not change them.... It is an attempt 
to express us within the stated condition even more than it is an attempt to liberate us entirely. 
But Adams defining History as a defeating gridlock of causality was by no means receptive to 
the impact of forces shaping a new social reality in America. Whitman's genius was that he 
used the new society as imaginative space: "The point about Whitman is that the old self died 
and the new self came in... He was recreated by the new reality." Procession, however, deals 
with the past other than as the shrine of the 'Unity' whose loss Adams deplored so much: 
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I am haunted by some master ¡mage, for I am writing history, and history can exist by dint of 
image. This is what it means to resurrect the past. The master image is of difficulty defined: of 
some complex radical novelty to me[e]t: of the thinker's desperate need to think out the new 
situation. All images from the eighties are of crisis: i.e. is the human bean up to this? Can it 
define these new forces? And what will the outcome be like? The imagined but unimaginable 
future.21 
Adams was the instigator of "our [modem] idea of history," and as an intellectual pioneer in 
the field of speculative historiography he set a formidable trend. Procession, however, is 
designed for a different outcome from Adams's. Kazin's is most of all concerned to expose 
Adams's authoritative stance as an analyst of the contemporary socio-political situation for what 
it is: an intellectual coyness about the forces shaping it and his own relation to them. However, 
Adams is also a virtuoso exploiter of the society which he disowns. And Kazin notes this point 
with emphasis: there is ample documentation of Adams's refusal to accept the power of office 
even though it was repeatedly offered him. Thus, Adams fits in Kazin's typology of the 
modernist heritage: he is a "bystander [cultivating] the attitudes of the spectator," and certainly 
not a poet of romantic democracy.22 Wilfully in retreat from society, he felt free to prophesy 
its impending collapse in order to find support for his own personal misgivings about and his 
ultimate disengagement from it. His intellectual vanity formulated certain 'scientific' insights 
into the course of History, turning it into an aesthetic object. This created the drama justifying 
one superior individual character — "Adams" — to himself: it did nothing to provide a common 
shelter for the masses ridden down by the power drive of the world's first political democracy. 
Reality in America offers free scope to the "free man's worship," Kazin claims in the 
"Preface" to Procession, and freedom is the book's key concern. Bondage came from the 
"power-Leviathan" encroaching upon the autonomous self. Whitman negotiated the process and 
developed his social vision from it, looking for "the fusing explanation and tie — [...] the 
relation between the (radical, democratic) Me... and the (conservative) Not Me... (quoted in AP, 
xiv)" His quest, Kazin avers, "shows political imagination" (AP, xvi).23 Whitman's poetic 
amalgam of 'contraries' actually captured what Adams exposed as the 'determinism' of forces 
running amok. 
In a twin study — "Prologue, 1918: Old Man in a Dry Month" — which heads off Procession, 
Kazin contrasts Adams's faithlessness favourably with T.S. Eliot's faith. He argues that Eliot's 
work actually had a far more deleterious influence on modem historical faith than Adams's 
cynicism. Eliot dismissed the rationalism of the Enlightenment as responsible for the foibles of 
modern liberal society. A conservative by training and culturally elitist, he yearned back to the 
times before the dissolution of authoritative opinion, and found a remedy in the association of 
the individual self with myth: 
Not the bourgeois individual for civil society, competing in the struggle for existence with other 
individuals, which naturalists from Zola to Dreiser thought would be the Darwinian literature of 
the future, but the individual located in universal myths, the individual as a repository of the past. 
Symbolism, not naturalism: personal consciousness, not society as pictured for us by the historians 
and journalists, would unexpectedly dominate the literature of a century racked by world war, 
world revolution, the fiercest nationalism and tribalism. 
Adams may have had an 'armchair' commitment to social and political power, but Eliot, in 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent," saw fit to modify the entire concept of History and 
redefine the "pastness" of the past and its "presence" as the order retrospectively imposed on the 
past. Kazin opposes the resulting conflation of the past with personal consciousness both because 
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it dissolves the objective presence of history, and because it is the expression of a displaced élite 
seeking to protect its cherished perceptions from the inroads of history. That élite laid itself 
open to serious criticism when, during the twentieth-century interbellum and after, it joined 
movements in politics and radical social science that favoured totalitarian solutions: 
Intellectuals and writers turned everywhere to totalitarian Communism or Fascism and gladly 
assigned millions to death or sustained persecution. But the original basis of modernism, which 
was to reverse the modem age, to restore us to the ancient bond that Eliot called the sacred wood, 
was exactly and especially the aim that art could not accomplish.24 
Similarly, the modernist writers were entirely mistaken about the impact of the aesthetic 
modes of selfhood they envisaged: poets and novelists in the twentieth century "made no 
political changes except for the worse." They were 
modernists against modem life... apostles of modem art who disliked anything else in our century 
fand who] did not change anything: they became the Establishment. They became favorites of the 
academy because they alone seemed to promise all the old virtues identified with masterpieces: 
genuineness of inspiration, solidity of purpose, originality of form.... [Moreover,] they promised 
to last. 
Their aura of fatalism and their determination to reverse the burden of modernity set them apart 
from the values of American democracy, which they considered spurious and ineffectual. The 
contemporary epigones of the modernist movement, Kazin argued in 1977, have cultivated a 
similar sense of crisis and decay to promote the urgency of a cultural absolute that he considers 
barren and opportunistic: "The centre was not holding. The church was not holding. God was 
dead, especially in theology courses given by former Jesuits."25 
Eliot's own despair about the contemporary era as "an immense panorama of futility and 
anarchy" inspired radical doubt about the self as an instrument for order. Past forms exerted a 
constant criticism of modes of self-actualization in the present, making history as process equal 
to the dissipation of forms. Order, Eliot held, is expressed in history as tradition, and it was 
fully applicable to individual, personal development. And since the aesthetic faith in a fully 
shaped self was transmissible, Kazin studies the "relation" between the historical and the 
personal modes by juxtaposing Adams's and Eliot's notions of selfhood. 
Kazin's argument relies on Eliot's alleged borrowing of certain images of youthful sentient 
experience from Chapter 18 of The Education of Henry Adams. Eliot used these to his own 
purpose in "Gerontion." He had been self-consciously dismissive of The Education, claiming in 
his review of it that there was nothing in the book to show that the protagonist's senses "either 
flowered or fruited; he remains little Paul Dombey asking questions" (quoted in AP, 19). 
Attacking Adams, Eliot made light of Adams's sense of selfhood, suggesting that his own 
marital dolour and spiritual despair were to be attributed not to his own troubled character but 
to some inclusive public crisis. Kazin notes emphatically that The Education is really two books: 
its first part is "the history of a self," the second, which starts where the one cataclysm ever to 
strike Adams should have been mentioned but is not, viz. his wife's suicide, is a "philosophy of 
history" intended to explain his own "failure" at dealing with vulgar democracy.26 The change 
from the sensuousness of the protagonist's individual life to the impersonal logic of the 
'philosophy' was accompanied by major renunciations on Adams's part. These were evidently 
triggered by the loss of his wife, whose personal and intellectual — and no doubt sexual — 
charm had constituted the force of unity which Adams elegized in The Education. Marian 
Hooper Adams's radical act of renunciation, so Kazin argues, destroyed not merely Henry 
Adams's life but also his sense of society's inner cohesion and direction. 
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The relation between self and world, however, is too complex to take Adams's gloominess 
as a prophetic intuition of the world's impending fate. Kazin develops a number of clues to 
prove that Adams's 'philosophy of history' emerged from his wounded ego, and that personal 
deliberations were a decisive factor in Adams's tragic 'science' of society's progress. Marian's 
suicide in 1885 unhinged Henry's faith in the self as a dependable foundation of power and 
political intelligence, and he proceeded to document its apparent deconstruction in the decades 
after. But Kazin emphasizes that the 'philosophy' is not verifiable, and its genesis obviously 
extra-philosophical: "Marian Adams's death by her own hand was to become the supreme 
instance in Adams's life of the 'force' that can be exerted by a personal compulsion" (AP, 11). 
Kazin undermines the validity of Adams's wasteland philosophy through a pointed reversal 
of "entropy." The reversal involves Adams's mind — the seat of a sublime historical imagina-
tion, as Kazin will testify — rebuilding the image of "history" from a sense of the inevitable 
drama and conflict within society kept under control by the experience of harmonious personal 
relationships. For the fact is that Adams the connoisseur observer of the personal forces that 
build society actually cultivated the companionship of many social, political and intellectual 
notables, many of them women. This intrigues Kazin: if Adams was so close to the actual seats 
of power, then why did he prefer instead to luxuriate in the companionship of women? He 
suggests that this type of liaison kept Adams comfortably at one remove from the cumbersome 
responsibility of public office. Adams declined it because the world had apparently moved 
beyond the Adams family tradition of public reason. Adams was highly evasive about his claims 
to public office and, in Kazin's line of argument, as ironic in his historical thinking as was a 
later generation of twentieth-century writers given to similar historical despair. The companion-
ship of women, then, is Adams's recognition that emotional and intellectual — and sexual — 
satisfactions form the sustaining note of Society. We see the artist securing the validity of his 
inherited sense of tradition by creating a more receptive context for it. 
However, Adams's achievement, Kazin believes, is marred by his "style." "Style" is the 
subject of Adams's historical fictions, and fundamentally the stamp of a cagey and self-con-
sciously proud personality. By some principle of relativity, the effect of Adams's "style" was to 
postulate uncontrollable "acceleration" within a civilization he found increasingly hard to 
tolerate. Such degree of self-orientation involved insensitivity to moral issues in history: the 
outbreak of the First World War, for instance, signified little else to Adams but "the working 
out of a blind process." He never considered the new forces in terms of progress. And progress, 
Kazin insists, is the moralist's special interest in history. Adams's diagnosis, therefore, was 
radical as it was tendentious: "America of the nineteenth century, the America that had made 
nonsense of the 'eighteenth-century' Adams tradition of political reason in control of a wholly 
new society, now stood in Adams's mind for mechanical energy. It was the powerhouse" (AP, 
6). 
Adams's "style," an intellectual habit really, reflected his disbelief in history as "possibility." 
Kazin suggests that Adams was quite aware that he took a condescending view of existing social 
fact, and, in fact, homogenized the picture society offered. For one thing, 'multiplicity' must 
first be conceived before it can be harnessed by intellectual force. This is not historical science 
but the aesthete's love of the created object. So much intellectual self-consciousness leaves a 
mental stamp on existence: "The habit of 'exclusion,' which he said he had learned as a literary 
style at Harvard (it was in fact a family trait), had become his only style for life and thought" 
(AP, 7). These formed the polarities of Adams's meticulous dualism, which allowed him to 
devise a calculus of power on the basis of technological and social change. An expert student 
of war as a reflection of conflicting social systems, he ignored its victims. History was dyna-
mism and to be savoured only by those who shared his intellectual passion and its direction. 
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Adams appealed to spiritually afflicted postwar generations as a prophetic intellectual, Kazin 
argues, because of his "style" rather than his philosophy: 
Adams gives us an autobiographical excursus into history, and this has the quality of anecdote: we 
are less conscious of the story than of the man telling it. Adams is at the centre, and more 
particularly it is his style, his way of staying at the centre. Adams's closest friends, here described 
to readers who thus become his other friends, are those other selves of Henry Adams who convey 
his discriminations and accomplishments. 
The writer assumes centrality to control the development of his narrative; as a historical figure, 
however, he courts marginality. This is egotism mixing with "the instinct of exclusion," yet The 
Education 
is a unique social chronicle, a great history of an intellectual caste, precisely because it takes this 
"Establishment" as the centre of value, strikes at every point that essential love and admiration for 
a particular group that makes the literature of "society" possible. This is the positive side of his 
book... [Adams] loves "society," which means the leading group that furnishes the records of a 
society, as only the true novelists of manners, the true historians, courtiers, and gossips of power 
do. This was the great advantage he derived from being an Adams, an intimate of power. 
He loved as social fact what his .accomplished mind could not accept as excellence.... The 
Education [captures the workings of social power in England, yet] is even richer in portraits of 
American "notables," so many of whom were Adams's friends that the book seems to be linked 
together by names. But though [it] finally becomes the most brilliant suggestion of the hidden 
force moving American society, no connection is shown between these friends and the society 
which in fact they led. [This] explains why Adams, in spite of the facility with which he wrote his 
novels Democracy and Esther, never thought as a novelist does and could not have turned his 
memories into a novel.27 
What makes Adams interesting to Kazin is that he developed, however indirectly, a native sense 
of community and civic pride, even if this was conveyed through a particular social caste 
increasingly alienated from power. 
The case of Henry Adams puts a gloss on the antisocial strain of American thought, because 
the objective of his historic reflections was aesthetic rather than ideological or even scientific. 
He was concerned with the tradition of American society where other writers had been content 
to give melodramatic accounts of its hostility to the free self. Adams's autobiographical persona 
is less a historical actor than the projection of his intellectual reservations about the course 
history was taking: 
The Education of Henry Adams is the story not of a man bom out of his time, who lacked the 
science he needed to understand the nineteenth century; it is the story of an artist deprived of the 
sense of tradition around him that makes the art of history, and who then found himself unable to 
express the terms of his isolation and to believe that anyone, even this made-up "Henry Adams," 
could say just what his interest in history was. This, I believe, was style: the style in which so 
many aspects of the past came to him, from the Virgin at Chartres to the dynamo at the Paris 
Exposition of 1900. Style was the look of the historical process as it was appropriated by the 
savant as connoisseur. Style was development, panorama, the emblems of change that constitute 
our sense of time. 
Although Adams the artist pretended to counteract the 'multiplicity' presumably wrecking the 
public realm, he revealed no identifiable personal stake in history. His marginality was self-
inflicted, both in the autobiography and in life, and though Adams stated no reasons for his 
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carefully cultivated posture of retreat, Kazin suggests that Adams, like Eliot, pursued a 
"disconnection between the self and the modem world..." (AP, 20). Adams proposed a dooms-
day scenario for history to exonerate the slender achievement of the contemporary self in public 
affairs, his own not the least. Ideally, he identified the self— not his own but the Virgin's — 
with "Unity" eliminating "multiplicity."28 
In his biting review of The Education, T.S. Eliot responded to Adams the artist rather than the 
historian. Eliot, Kazin argues, had pressing personal reasons, besides his classicist education, to 
take an interest in Adams's dissociated sensibility. In an extended study of Adams, in Part Three 
of Procession, entitled "Ruling by Style: History and the Moderns, 1900-1929," Kazin deals 
with the heritage of modernism, delineating its full implications in the work of Eliot and Pound. 
"Style" in Adams, he concludes, typically made "the whole force of the past live in a single 
line." He developed "an astonishing sense of perspective" through a suggestive control of 
historical images. Eliot, in his poetry, developed a rhetorical strategy to a similar effect: 
... what makes "Gerontion" so impressive is that in the speaker's privation one does hear worlds 
revolving, one does see the stars. The Education astonished postwar readers by revealing a sense 
of the "failure" of America, bitterly insisted on by Adams, that the best-placed Americans were 
feeling. This would soon be interpreted as the modem failure. Eliot in "Gerontion" made his war-
besotted generation see history as nothing but human depravity. (AP, 20) 
Eliot's influence on the modem literary mind was to absolutize the destructive quality of 
historical change, the aesthetic standard intoned by the tradition, and the selfs modem pre-
dicament. Eliot's work suggested that the uncontrolled dynamism of the present eroded the 
values and the insights of the past, but Kazin shows that Eliot's view was in itself a break with 
a proven American tradition, since it laid the axe at the very idea of history: 
The young Henry James, afraid that a new country could not give a novelist the rich settings that 
Europe did, had said apropos of Nathaniel Hawthorne that it takes a good deal of history to 
produce a little literature. Forty years later Eliot was writing in "Gerontion" that "History has 
many cunning passages." History Eliot would soon discount in the name of tradition. History was 
an immense panorama of futility and anarchy. Tradition was religion. The self would not suffice. 
(AP, 13) 
This is the main charge formulated in Procession; Eliot's work as a poet and critic cut across 
native American optimism and progressivism and in fact aided its decline. But then Eliot was 
disowning America itself, even the historical realm. Kazin proposes to heal "the disconnection 
between [Adams's and Eliot's] self and the modern world" by tracing the increasingly complex 
experience of selfhood which had evolved prior to Adams and Eliot — but which they preferred 
not to develop further — and those that, coming after them, had to negotiate the scepticism 
bequeathed to them. 
Where Adams acknowledged the elusive power exerted by Woman, Eliot is seen as the 
victim of sexual alienation. Eliot had good reasons to distrust the emotional life, which he 
believed defied all order, and he considered the human individual too frail a vessel to harness 
disorder. Easily convinced on the eve of the First World War that the nineteenth-century faith 
in progress was dead, he despised the romantic philosophy that had spawned it, concentrating 
on the stable, impersonal values of classical tradition instead. In the sustained ineffectuality of 
his persona Prufrock, for instance, Eliot enunciated a deep despair of history in general and the 
future in particular. He demanded that life cohere in a manifest ontology and put so much 
emphasis on the patterned meaning of literature that he denied the self any significant role in it: 
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[Adams's] preoccupation [with self] haunted Eliot emotionally: the prisoner in his cell was to 
declare the highest aim of literature an escape from emotions and personality; escape from the self 
became the great theme of a religious striving that was more striving and cultural piety than it was 
belief... 
The prisoner in his self... is there because he chooses to be there. He is different from his 
pitiful age. {AP, 15, 16) 
The conservatism of this is obvious: Eliot was interested in history only as tradition, and 
distrusted progress. The corollary was that all those who presumed to tinker with the national 
historical destiny were lacking in personal culture. 
This certainly includes Whitman, whose literary persona was at right angles with Eliot's 
"distrustful political soul." Adams was more appreciative of the sentiment of social transcen-
dence Whitman poeticized. Its open eroticism reminded Adams of his own intellectual courtship 
— if it was at all limited to that — of many young brilliant women in his circle. Adams the 
self-styled "failure" prudently kept from absolutizing his exile within the self. Thus, he escaped 
"sexual martyrdom, a familiar Christian forfeit, a distrust of woman that trembles through every 
reference by Eliot to a woman's hair" {AP, 16). And sexual desolation, as Kazin suggests 
Adams must have understood, is an index to much more comprehensive dislocation. Kazin's 
analysis of the different modes of selfhood in Adams and Eliot — "the Puritans born half a 
century apart [yet] artistically two ends o'f the same thought" {AP, 19) — formulates a distinctly 
American equivalent of the European tradition of the novel of manners, which, by default of 
social texture, America never had. It criticizes the American political and artistic élite for its 
rigid intellectualism and its distrust of the native experience, while it evokes the historical 
potential of the 'lower' varieties of experience. It was these that Whitman based his creative 
personality on. 
Yet, for all of his artistry in rendering the social context of his intellectual interests, Adams, 
too, proved a lion in the path of the transmission of creative social values: 
Adams, citing Whitman as the only artist "who had ever insisted on the power of sex," omitted to 
say that Whitman found democratic America the correlative of his sensuous energy. Whitman the 
old believer, the "sweet democratic despot," thought of democracy itself as a form of sex. It went 
without saying that sex was a form of democracy. Adams and Eliot emphasized the defeat of both. 
{AP, 20) 
Together, they represented a revolution in the postwar historical sensibility, generating disbelief 
in the romantic, native faith in purposive historical modes of being. Kazin concludes that their 
achievement as an influence on the national mind largely reversed the Emersonian tradition of 
using the personal voice as a revolution in human affairs. The sequence of writers he discusses 
in Part One, "The Self as Power: America When Young, 1830-1865," shows how they con-
tinued the Emersonian heritage, modifying it to cope with "the existential fact seeping into the 
framework."29 
Ralph Waldo Emerson: Society of One 
Emerson's orphie sense of selfhood, Kazin argues, owed much to his position outside formal 
religion. The nineteenth century, as Nietzsche professed, had killed God, replacing Him with 
imaginative forms of spiritual energy. In America, these were associated with the civic ideal of 
the radically free, self-determining individual. This concept came naturally to the American 
mind convinced of the nation's historical exceptionalism. Emerson was tempted to think of 
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himself as a "prophet," and the visionary aspect of his private religion of man naturally 
extended to the millenarianism of several contemporary movements: "He was a clairvoyant, a 
throwback to the great ages of faith who, by identifying faith with the individual soul's gift for 
faith, addressed himself to a future of miraculous 'self-actualization,' as the young Karl Marx 
called it" (AP, 28). 
Kazin develops his thesis around a number of defects of the Emersonian heritage. So absolute 
a faith in the self as both the occasion and interpretation of the entire universe makes him an 
antagonist to history and the workings of society. Emerson discounted history because it 
presented the inevitable limitations of the single individual. "'Society' was a problem." This 
formed the basis of an overriding intellectual conceit whose hazards were as real as the promise 
of self-actualization: "His real life was 'poetic,' ceaseless thought. 'Life consists of what man 
is thinking of all day'" (AP, 28). Conversely, civic and political reality became unreal. 
Having trouble making a distinction between self and world, and overrating himself as 
Representative Man, Emerson miscalculated the effect of his communications on his audience. 
Even in his own time, "self-reliance" was often modified to become crass capitalism. Kazin 
stresses that Emerson was often misunderstood and misinterpreted. Particularly since most of his 
audience were in the old Protestant tradition of "the sainthood of all believers" (AP, 34) and, 
like him, estranged from doctrinal Christianity, Emerson's teachings tended to magnify the 
individualistic strain in the humanistic religion he preached. Liberation from dogma and 
superstition easily developed into the conviction of the individual as potential Superman. 
It certainly had its repercussions in the modern intellectual climate. Radical Romanticism put 
a similar philosophical emphasis on the primacy of mind, continuing Emerson's view of the self 
as a perfect instrument for gaining total access to the "world": 
The Greeks may have discovered that the "world" replicates the human mind; Emerson lived this 
fact without philosophy's sense that perception can be duplicitous. The "soul" or "mind" had for 
him such total access to reality that it virtually replaced it. Nature is there to serve man. Mind is 
everywhere the master. The soul as pure perception, pathway into All Things, became for 
Emerson the universe as an "open secret." (AP, 36) 
Emerson's conviction, and the way he conveyed it, forms a prickly dilemma in the Emersonian 
heritage because of the persistent dichotomy of self and world that was to become a staple of 
modernist thought. His assumption that the "soul" equals style made it possible for him to locate 
it at the centre of the cosmos. Literature, the raison d'être of style, thus assumes priority over 
experience, and so Emerson presides over the "innocence" which has long been a familiar trait 
in American thinking. "History" in the twentieth century, however, has paled the radiance of the 
Emersonian self: 
The connection between faith and creativity is now so dim that we jealously wonder what Yeats 
meant when he said that "belief makes the mind abundant." Emerson himself no longer fortifies 
a free personal religion. God is dead even for Allen Ginsberg. Emerson may have helped to kill 
"self-reliance" in religion by dispensing it too confidently from his own subjectivity. (AP, 39) 
Emerson's philosophy made no allowance for the disharmonies and contradictions of'the world' 
which more than occasionally disturbed his serene Olympian mood. This certainly reflects on his 
present-day stature as the initiator of a truly American view on the power available to the 
individual freed from institutions. 
Kazin holds that Emerson's real significance for contemporary readers was — and is — that 
he "possessed the gift of faith... in an increasingly faithless world." He had the genius to 
convince his audience that the promise of perpetual self-renewal he felt within himself included 
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them as well. His sense of his own auspicious destiny spanned his environment and the nation 
as a whole: 
Emerson as an eponym for freshness, discovery, openness, for all that was hopeful in his country 
and his century, has survived his actual message because people can still take from him the 
cardinal theme: a brave beginning... The thrill, the positive exultation in all the early writings, lies 
not in any delusion of great intellectual originality but in the primacy that he shared with Nature 
and America itself. 
America itself was the original. The confrontation with it by even the most seasoned men — 
explorers, missionaries, worldly philosophers and cynics — made things new... the constant raid 
on the vast emptiness made a person of Nature for even the practical and the superstitious. 
America's "first men of literary genius" (AP, 40) found their country a natural extension of the 
self and more capable of defining a cosmic destiny than actual society. This seems to corrobor-
ate the traditional conservative criticism of the dominance of the antisocial strain in Emerson's 
work and his reliance on 'the inner light' of Romanticism, but Kazin stresses that Emerson's 
self-reliance was a natural corollary in an era of unprecedented social change and democratic 
development, "the hard new boisterous times of democratic emergence." In a sense, the age 
produced him rather than that he presided over it. He must have found it outrageous to see such 
powerful social energies move beyond any spiritual sanction from the dominant Puritan religion, 
as he must have feared their premature dissipation without any corresponding transcendent space 
to fill: "Not to see that Emerson's life work began in a religious crisis that he shared with the 
age, that the stream of his writings began because by leaving the church he felt that he also had 
a solution for others, is to miss Emerson's central need to overcome all scepticism" (AP, 41). 
A full five decades before Adams was to conceive of entropy as a force in History, however, 
Emerson became aware of major obstacles to America's grand destiny. The great slave debate, 
amongst other things, proved that his view of 'the infinitude of the private mind' was tragically 
compromised at least for many black Americans deprived of political equality. Moreover, he 
admitted to Carlyle, he doubted that the average countryman's spiritual make-up matched the 
nation's glorious destiny. Democracy was a problem because of its base material; mob senti-
ments and mediocrity circumscribed the private mind's 'infinitude.' Emerson nevertheless 
simply expected his countrymen to come up to his level: "As it would turn out, America was 
not an idea in Emerson's mind. His difficulty was with the application of his favorite ideal. The 
'active soul' was not easy to fit in with so much aggressive self-interest" (AP, 45-6). Complex 
social reality is not allowed to mar the meticulous design of Emerson's mind. "Society" was 
patently not a correlative of the "soul," and the drama "society" generated was hard to match 
with Emerson's Unitarian transcendentalism. In fact, Emerson was addressing a theological 
society rather than the motor of disruptive social change which is the subject of literary naturali-
sm. 
Emerson was the thin end of the wedge in splitting American consciousness, and in fact he 
aided the development of the American selfs duality. This polarity was later designated by Van 
Wyck Brooks as "high-brow" versus "low-brow" and the dominant strain in the native experi-
ence. But what Brooks described as different social types Emerson, showing his indifference to 
social fact, hoped to unify within the free individual. His religious vision had a distinctly social 
application.30 The tendency of certain literary thinkers, following Emerson's cue, to cultivate 
the life of the mind rather than participate in the hustle-bustle of emergent democracy put a 
premium on individual perception rather than purposive collective experience. But Kazin 
believes that Emerson's significance lies most of all in the nature of the release he holds out to 
the American individual self: 
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Emerson liked to say that "Life consists in what a man is thinking of all day." Melville's Ishmael, 
who did a lot of thinking at sea, snapped back in the opening of Moby-Diet. "Who ain't a slave? 
Tell me that." ''Life" for Emerson was indeed nothing but what the "great man" is thinking of... 
Spirit for the transcendentalists was the dream of a world entirely responsive to oneself. 
"Immortality," though improbable, is real, because what is constant in life is consciousness, from 
which we cannot separate ourselves. But our difficult relation to things is the philosophical 
problem that the Romantic philosopher waved aside in favor of a rapturous self-affirmation. 
"Power" — the crucial aspiration in Emerson — meant the individual's own profound sense of 
himself, the highest, freest, most abounding consciousness. (AP, 47) 
But how much the American savant was the gateway to both Romantic heroism and existen-
tial loneliness is clear from the line of literary thinkers who professed their spiritual kinship with 
him: Carlyle, Nietzsche, Camus. Carlyle was rabidly antidemocratic, Nietzsche promoted the 
twilight of all gods, while Camus's work features the totalitarian state as the logical corollary 
to the individual's drive for autonomy. Emerson's faith originating from absolute self-trust kept 
him from seeing that "society" may be developing according to a purpose all its own. Nor did 
he understand that "life" — like "society" — inherently resists patterning and rather unfolds 
from a multitude of contingencies triggered separately and interacting. Social processes in the 
nineteenth century, Kazin observes, typically involved physical expansion and raw power, 
making a mockery of individual autonomy and gravitating towards a politics of material gain 
rather than spiritual. 
Emerson owes his towering stature to a secularizing age which Kazin believes pressed for 
material salvation preferably by technological means. Emerson only reluctantly admitted to any 
contradiction between the "soul" and society. To him, the moral law prevailed; history — 
largely born of social conflict — merely represented the intermittent failure of total obedience 
to man's divine destiny. Reason, as the took it, was Absolute and Sublime, and it transcended 
the mere 'Understanding' that occupied itself with "the America that would survive half slave 
half free" (AP, 53). It ignored contradictions because it was indifferent to social fact. History in 
action was presumably but the expression of a defective humanity; it took Emerson a long time 
to begin to acknowledge the impact his society had on him. 
When he did, he proved to be a slow but dedicated learner. Daniel Webster's implication in 
the Compromise of 1850, and hence in the Fugitive Slave Act, taught him a political lesson 
about the relations between the 'free' individual and the State. More and more, the successive 
chapters of Procession argue that the State was to become the reality from whose impact the 
'free' American individual was to derive his image of existence: 
Emerson was soon resigned to the lack of perfectionism in this ever more driven society. The 
"double consciousness" that he kept during his still-exalted flights was to keep him always curious 
about a world that every day contradicted his inner world. But why did he never write a book 
about American life and manners as sustained as English Traits (1856)? English Traits is remark-
able among Emerson's works for being a book; it is worldlier, shrewder, wittier than anything else 
by this God-intoxicated man. The subject, for once, was all outside him. (AP, 54) 
To achieve realism, Emerson needed to perform an epistemological manoeuvre that he was 
not quite capable of. His conviction of the immanence of the Divine in the individual freed from 
formal religious constraints put him in a bind. A radical Romantic, he ventured to dispense with 
a realistic backdrop for his self-actualization: 
The poet-prophet-clairvoyant-hero was more than a spokesman for the divine; he was the living 
proof that God could be realized in every man. Although he professed himself bored by Hegel, 
277 
Emerson was in the stream of German Romantic philosophizing that led Hegel to affirm that God 
is not God until He comes to consciousness of Himself. Where but in man? While Representative 
Men and English Traits show Emerson's appreciation of great men as historical actors, he saw 
nothing in Hegel's insistence that men acting on history, bringing it out, are working out God's 
own passage to self-knowledge. History is only biography, Emerson thought. He did not show 
how men create history. (AP, 57-8) 
Emerson believed that persons of superior spiritual force internalized history. To Kazin, this 
denied the drama of oppositions that forms the reality that people prevented by the force of 
circumstance from 'thinking' themselves 'free,' people of different spiritual outlook and material 
means, must of necessity share with one another. Emersonian libertarianism was ill-placed to 
strengthen the civic-democratic persuasion, and Emerson never managed to define his own 
personal freedom in terms of someone else's. He found "the masses" positively distasteful, 
possibly comprising a few potentially 'authentic' individuals but otherwise invariably benighted 
by mob sentiment. Strikingly, so Kazin notes, Emerson totally miscalculated the influence 
President Lincoln was to exert over the divided nation by steadfastly proclaiming its Providence. 
He actually relished the Civil War as proof that ideas form the texture of existence and make 
it consistent. Post-Civil War society made his views untenable, and he became aware that "for 
every seeing soul there are absorbing facts, — I and the Abyss." He took it that most modem 
social energies ran counter to his vision: 
Without quite registering the fact, the later Emerson was thinking like any other space-mad 
American. The open road, so easy for an American to call his own, was more akin to his sym-
pathies than the historical world of sin and error. This was Emerson's real gift to the untamed 
American visionaries who came after him. (AP, 61) 
But Kazin suggests a parallel that extends beyond these visionaries. The complication and 
divisions of social and historical existence are as unpopular today as they were to Emerson. 
Modern American artists and thinkers have found the "open road" peculiarly inaccessible, and 
Nature disinclined to satisfy their Romantic egotism. Finding the "Me" and the "Not-Me" 
irreconcilable antagonists, many of them have tended to take up Emerson for their own benefit, 
mistaking the gesture of retreat for self-reliance. They have attempted to achieve personal 
redemption by creating an aesthetic antiworld to offset their fears of social forces running amok. 
Henry David Thoreau: Fear of the Social Compact 
The effect of Kazin's sustained technique of "relations" is to elicit a composite yet consistent 
figure — a historical self — whose objective force is mediated through narrative criticism. He 
suggests that Thoreau's eminent practicality as a carpenter, for instance — Thoreau constructed 
the wooden box that still today holds his fourteen-volume journals — extends to the uses of the 
personal knowledge contained in Thoreau's writings, views so absolutely held that they amount 
to a moral theology. 
Thoreau's moralized version of life had one overriding aim: to point out the necessary 
transcendence of a conditional existence. To mark that Thoreau's work is not easily assimilable 
by us today, Kazin observes that Thoreau's moral demands on life probably "helped to kill 
himself." The demand for moral perfection involved the individual man, man in society, and 
Nature at large. Thoreau certainly saw Nature as the perfect "Other" who would be infinitely 
responsive to his demands. However, he 
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always ended up with himself alone. His journal became the most unflagging example... of a 
man's having to write his life in order to convince himself that he had lived it. Thoreau came to 
shape his life by the fiercest control words could exert. He hoped these words would be taken for 
his life. He was the first reader he had to convince. {AP, 64) 
Kazin argues that such a degree of economy imposed on life's processes is unrealistic. Assessing 
Thoreau's contemporary stature in the 1950's, Kazin mainly noted his diarist's self-conscious 
acumen of thought, reflecting the "moralistic-religious tendency" to control experience rather 
than allow oneself to be guided by it. He saw in Thoreau's work a major attempt at 
"deliverance, ... consecration [and] rededication." In this respect, he was with Melville and 
Whitman, who also sought to recast life as "individual religious experience." During the Sixties, 
Kazin was to criticize the "homelessness" of Thoreau's religious impulse and, by 1978, he came 
to a dismal conclusion: "How easy, alas, to unpoliticize society completely, to feel that others 
simply violate us by not being our duplicates?' Much of Thoreau's appeal, he believed, had to 
do with his stature as the purveyor of a literary attitude. And in 1963, he objected to Sherman 
Paul's interpretation of Thoreau's work, finding it altogether too reverential to Thoreau's 
stylistic sleight-of-hand. 
Thoreau's heroic will to achieve the absolute porousness and plasticity of Nature through 
writing made him a model to twentieth-century modernists. He wrote prose as "ultimate 
sensation," Kazin observed, and relied on "a true mystic'"s concern with immanence. Nature 
was the Absolute Form, the prized noumenon, to capture; Thoreau indeed succeeded in 
"marrying the self to its object" {AP, 64).31 To that end, he literally sought to create himself. 
Nature furnished harmony, stability, Reason disclosed. Its cycles did away with pastness and 
drew the future into the present. To emulate it in writing and so achieve unity with it was equal 
to a release from the 'historical world of sin and error.' This amounted to the desire for perfect 
self-communion, and kept out the inassimilable and the untoward, particularly 'society.' In this 
respect, Kazin hints, Thoreau set the tone for a generation of post-World War I writers who for 
more objective reasons wished to keep their own counsel and be exempt from all public 
arrangements. 
Thoreau's real heritage is the conviction of a morality in human affairs so unmistakable and 
pure that it disclosed itself in prose rhythms bearing a distinct resemblance to nature's perfect 
design. Yet, as Kazin indicates, the transcendental view cannot remedy the tragic complexity of 
social relations: Thoreau was tense even with fellow-transcendentalists such as Emerson. Nor 
were his literary naturalist's insights altogether self-generated: he was a devout student of past 
knowledge. Kazin would have us know that Thoreau's private experience elicited the historical 
parameters of existence that the visionary Thoreau denied. Nature was so compliant to the 
inspired observer's mind that it made experience predictable, offering full confirmation of the 
individual's cherished identity: 
It was ease and hope and thought such as no family, not even another writer, would ever provide. 
Why all this? Because Nature seemed consistency, order, system. It answered to man's fondest 
wish, that the human mind and the "Not-Me" outside it reflected each other in perfect harmony. 
To Kazin, however, Nature, and possibly God as well, rather reveal themselves as what is "most 
unlike us" {AP, 68). Thoreau used his flinty personality as a militant assertion of "pure morality, 
pure love, pure creation" {AP, 69). He believed himself capable only of fitting in with Nature's 
providential design. But there is also death, Kazin insists, and it must not be denied. Thoreau's 
need for a totally transparent relation to Nature reflected his wish to blot out the unanticipated 
actualities of the historical world, and was an exercise in auto-intoxication: 
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Nothing untoward, nothing really "personal" was allowed to break through. Style accomplished the 
perfect pastoral of the century... This sweet American myth, man and Nature in perfect congress, 
was Thoreau's fulfilment. (AP, 69-70) 
Written in this vein, Walden is "a meticulously manufactured altarpiece" (AP, 69). It gives 
shelter to those sensitive twentieth-century minds who indeed could not face their world without 
a shudder. Thoreau's performance is not the philosopher's but the illusionist's: Walden is 
sustained by a high note of Romanticism feeding on a totally self-contained morality. Kazin 
therefore concludes that Thoreau was not interested so much in "knowledge" about the world 
as turning the latter into the object of a love idyll. But this dualism mocks the fate of those 
who, as victims of Fascist and Communist totalitarianisms in the twentieth century, were 
eminently not free to pursue any "correspondences" in Nature. Thoreau mistakenly believed that 
his aesthetic will could replace the individual's transactions with the public world. He stubborn-
ly kept the latter at bay, showing a merely tangential interest in society. In 1969, Kazin 
observed that Walden's youthful vision admitted "death" more easily than "defeat from the 
social compact."32 At a time of large-scale protests against the political establishment's support 
of the Vietnam war, when youngsters idolized Thoreau's principled opposition to the social net, 
Kazin warned that Thoreau had no adequate perception of the State's hold on the individual. In 
particular, Thoreau failed to anticipate the tragedy of life under totalitarianism. He had no 
affinity with the modern political tradition, as indeed he had virtually no experience of politics. 
In 1978, a decade after the last major revaluation of Thoreau's stature, Kazin observed that 
Thoreau's politics were among "the most moving things in American history." There was much 
use in the Sixties for Thoreau's antisocial vision as the classic expression of resistance to the 
political "system," yet his appeal derived from an essentially contracted view of the human 
condition: "Students recognize in Thoreau a classic who is near their own age and condition. AH 
his feelings are absolutes, as his political ideas will be" (AP, 71). For the State was to dominate 
twentieth-century public experience much as the belief in historical progress had dominated the 
nineteenth. Thoreau rejected any close association with society at large on the strength of his 
belief that only the ecstatic communications obtained from a rigorous control of private experi-
ence could evoke and maintain "the real thing in life," and this was to be achieved only in 
writing: he believed that "a word can entirely equal an experience" (AP, 70). Historical circum-
stance could only detract from this. A skilled aphorist and literary journeyman, he deliberately 
constructed "the myth that in such [written] cleverness a man could live" (AP, 72). Kazin puts 
this overt desire for an 'unconditioned' existence into relentless perspective: 
That is youth speaking. Only youth thinks that it can "live deliberately," that a man's whole life 
can be planned like a day off, that perfect satisfaction can be maintained without friction, without 
friends, without sexual love, with a God who is only and always the perfect friend — and all this 
in relation to a piece of land and a body of water on whose shores one practices the gospel of 
perfection. Only the individual in the most private accesses of his experience knows what a 
"perfect" moment is — it is a unit too small for history, too precious for society. It belongs to the 
private consciousness. (AP, 73)" 
Thoreau anticipated the "weightlessness" cultivated by certain twentieth-century literary 
thinkers and conspicuously enacted by radical activists in the Sixties. Lionel Trilling, in 
''Sincerity and Authenticity: A Symposium," referred to "weightlessness" as "the great sin of the 
intellectual." Trilling was concerned with the modern existentialist tradition, which concentrates 
on intensities of being, rather than any form of belief or redemptive view of existence, as 
instruments for suitable ego ideals. It favoured Dostoevsky, Joyce, Lawrence and Gide, for 
instance, over Cardinal Newman's defence of the old humanist tradition of reasonableness and 
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its respect for "the conditions." Trilling construed Newman's Essay in Aid of a Grammar of 
Assent as a viable, and preferable, alternative to the untempered irrationalism of the great 
modernists. Their work deprived the modern self of a stable grounding in a defence against the 
shifting fashions of culture and the socio-political environment. To Trilling, the autonomous self 
required a strong base in convictions of a religious nature, though not quite religious conviction. 
Dostoevsky, Joyce et al. had abandoned these, fuelling the modernist impulse to parodying "all 
notions that consort with religion — the notions of salvation, of the shaping of a life which can 
be approved, and so on." The resulting outlook, he concluded, was fraught with negativism and 
antisocial attitudes. The disengagement involved a reduced sense of the reality, not only of the 
world and other persons, but also of oneself.34 The modernists did not establish any disclosable 
moral design to life and instead modelled themselves after the vatic function in a culture without 
bearings. They were not primarily concerned with Victorian civic virtues but wished to manifest 
their superior ego strength against any backdrop. Like the Romantics, they presented themselves 
as formidable antagonists of existing social and moral traditions rather than as natural extensions 
of these. 
Kazin believes Thoreau is a milestone in the antisocial imagination in America and a 
precursor of the modernist mind. This is particularly owing to Thoreau's hypothetical immunity 
from — and self-righteous rejection of — the most incontrovertible fact in the modern experi-
ence, viz. the emergence of the all-powerful State. Thoreau judged its actions solely by the 
exquisite, integral design of his own moral vision of Nature. He reinforced the duality of self 
and society developed by the Romantics, refusing to believe in the actual existence of any real 
social antagonist. Actually, he failed to see that his own airy moral standards would shatter in 
the presence of any real political conflict: 
He never knew what the struggle of modern politics can mean for people who identify and 
associate with each other... 
"Civil Disobedience" stirs us by the urgency of its personal morality.... But despite his 
compelling personal heat, he tends to moralize all political relationships and to make them not 
really serious... 
Thoreau's creed is refreshing. But anyone who thinks that it is a guide to political action at the 
end of the twentieth century will have to defend the total literary anarchy that lies behind it. (AP, 
75-6) 
Thoreau's repudiations in life, Kazin argues, transferred to his work: the totally aesthetic finish 
of Thoreau's projected self denies the reality that obtrudes from without. 
Like Thoreau, the modernists were presumptuous about their relation to 'the world.' They 
shared his disgust at society's failure to conduct its affairs with the same degree of economy 
they used in managing their individual versions of reality. Yet, as Kazin reminds us, these 
offered but a contracted view of emergent reality in America. Thoreauvian moral radicalism and 
the aesthetic ideal of individual integrity proved misleading beacons in twentieth-century 
America. All Thoreau could offer John Brown was indignant "words," not political argument. 
To Thoreau, action came to consist of just "words," the highest reality the modernists assigned 
to life. This was a very poor guide indeed to an adequate conception of selfhood in the modern 
era: 
... the cost of nonviolence — which Thoreau returned to as his gospel — is so great in the face 
of the all-powerful twentieth-century state that Thoreau, who once in his life was astonished by 
the power that was not his individual spiritual power, does not help us in the face of the state 
power which we supplicate to for the general "welfare" and dread for snooping into our lives. 
Thoreau did not anticipate the modem state. He distrusted all government...(AP, 80) 
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Through his exclusive identification of power with the non-self, Thoreau initiated the modem 
progressive loss of "integral perceptions of the human."35 He was responsible for the growing 
dissociation of self and society among later generations. 
Nathaniel Hawthorne: Genius of Dark Necessity 
Congratulating him on the occasion of "your Hawthorne introduction," Kazin's brother-in-law 
Daniel Bell once wondered whether Kazin could not have made more of Nathaniel Hawthorne's 
commonly ignored "historic sense." Though Bell was no novice to radical historicism, his 
inquiry was more than offset in incisiveness by Philip Rahv's written communication to Kazin. 
Rahv anticipated that American literary history might possibly not include Hawthorne: "Nothing 
can be sillier than the attempt of critics like Matthiessen and Chase to present Hawthorne as a 
kind of Salem Dostoevsky... no doubt the Zeitgeist emphasis on sin and evil finds in Hawthorne 
what it puts there." More than thirty years later, Kazin was to confirm Rahv's analysis of the 
contemporary literary situation in a review of James R. Mellow's Nathaniel Hawthorne in His 
Times (1980), entitled "A Genius of Dark Necessity." Kazin wound up the review with an 
remark affecting the writer as much as it did the biographer: "Mr. Mellow's delightfully 
readable chronicle... testifies to an understandable yearning for a period that seems intellectually 
more comfortable to live in than our own."36 
Just prior to Rahv's dismissal of Hawthorne, in 1948, Kazin had still argued that Franz Kafka 
owed a lot, artistically, to Hawthorne; by 1966, he significantly modulated his praise, stating 
that much criticism of Hawthorne was "blind to the historical situation." In an article that same 
year, Kazin focused on Hawthorne's inability to compel interest in the twentieth century, noting 
that he was a classic whose meaning to modem literature had yet to be established. He thought 
Hawthorne had been less of an influence on twentieth-century writers than Melville, Thoreau, 
and "even Emerson." Two rare examples, however, stood out: Eliot and James. Upon James's 
death in 1916, Eliot had noted the "Hawthorne aspect" in some of James's later books, particu-
larly in The Golden Bowl and The Sense of the Past. It derived from a strong general motive in 
the writer's life, viz. the "grip of the past," being the hold it exerts over all of us.37 Hawthorne 
built his sense of the past on the New England mind's penchant for moral introspection, for self-
confrontation and self-examination. It reflected his conviction that all the past was about 
violation of the human order and therefore founded on guilt. Collective human experience was 
tragically flawed, he assumed, much as he himself was afflicted with private solicitude in his 
relations with his wife, his audience, his own social set, and even a fellow mind and writer like 
Melville. 
Ignored by his appointed audience, Hawthorne apparently quite by his own consent abdi-
cated from any vital concern with the present and instead concentrated on the past as moral 
order, however brittle and mysterious. This set him apart altogether from Transcendentalists 
such as Emerson, who, in the wake of defunct Puritan religion, assumed that God dwells in us 
as pure religious and moral imagination. Hawthorne, by contrast, felt implicated personally in 
the past and pursued an obsessive symbolism to the effect, suggesting an intricate design capable 
of resolution. But the "romances" he started to work on during his last phase as an imaginative 
writer had no clear theme. To Kazin, there is a Faulknerian quality in the hold the past has over 
Hawthorne, who "dimly recognized that his themes were the turbid past baffling the present" 
(AP, 81). 
But much as his imaginative studies failed to clear up the design of the past, so it proved 
elusive in Hawthorne's actual life. Kazin marks the profound crisis to which Hawthorne fell 
prey upon the outbreak of the Civil War. Nothing in the past had prepared Hawthorne for this 
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latter-day version of the Apocalypse. He experienced it with personal fear and, unlike any other 
New England writer, political helplessness: "The past, usually nearer to Hawthorne than 'the 
Present, the Immediate, the Actual,' was coming apart in his mind even before the guns made 
it unreal" (AP, 81). More particularly, as Kazin points out, Hawthorne was personally destroyed 
by the discrepancy between the past as a moral system and the apparent lawlessness and chaos 
of the present. The artist's mind was unravelled by society's disorder: 
The war was a violation and destruction of what little order there was around him. With his usual 
melancholy dependence on time past as more real than the present, he felt himself sinking into 
some general confusion.... The war was his despair, chawing everything up for a national ideal 
Hawthorne did not believe in. (AP, 84) 
Hawthorne's commitment to the literary life, as it turned out, could not make up in human 
understanding and sustaining emotion for the cost of isolation and marginality. It promoted a 
highly stylized version of "the power of blackness" that clinched his removal from the American 
political process. For in a real sense, as Kazin suggests, Hawthorne's symbolism became a 
personal obsession. In his stories, he explored ideas rather than engaging a particular situation 
through dramatic development. He turned existence itself into a moral mystery. This was 
typically not so much resolved as its full extent revealed during a climax. Steeped in ancestral 
Puritanism, Hawthorne could not believe that a nation would go to war over an issue such as 
slavery, as if humankind were empowered to bring about 'higher purpose.' For all of existence 
was wholly in God's management and predestined, and all that man could hope to do was to 
approximate "some 'higher' meaningfulness and moral purpose" (AP, 86) in the form of alleg-
ory. This reflected the individual's experience of God: everyone was directly and individually 
accountable to God. Nothing was allowed to interfere, certainly not the affairs of society at 
large. Between them, God and the individual generated all the experience that was worth having: 
Solitude was not exclusion from society but the conviction of a life incessantly moralized... 
So much solitude lived in anxious self-confrontation and self-study meant a totally interior life. 
Consciousness could become an infliction. It finally did to Hawthorne, ... who had to balance his 
characters' incessant mental striving against their high sense of purpose... The crux of the matter 
was that his people were always so alone; they felt damned. And so did he... To be that much 
alone was to be in contradiction. (AP, 86-7) 
Emerson, at any rate, was convinced that it killed Hawthorne. 
The moribund Puritan faith bequeathed to believers a sense of life's purpose no longer 
provided by actual life and human passion. Allegory provided the luminous halo of meaning 
informing the destiny of all mortal souls. Hawthorne refused to see that this moral order could 
be a purely human construction: 
The memory of so much "order" and purpose, once set by the supreme mind that created the 
universe, remained with people long after the sacred connection had vanished. The life once lived 
as allegory could disappear into history, becoming fragments to be put together only in a story. 
(AP, 87) 
The quality of that past mode of life survived as legend, as moral tales, not history. In 
Hawthorne's case, it was the New England tradition of the past as human sinfulness and guilt. 
His relation to it was instantaneous and unvarying: the past both represents and incurs guilt. Its 
gridlock imparts to the present an unmistakable quality of fatality, determinism, 'dark necessity.' 
Accordingly, it baffled Hawthorne to see the nation undertaking a violent settlement of the issue 
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of slavery: he himself thought it futile for human beings to interfere with the 'dark necessity' 
and instead relied on what he considered the inscrutable but simple operations of divine Provi-
dence to cause this evil to "vanish like a dream" (quoted in AP, 84). 
So, to Hawthorne, the moral issues over which the Civil War was fought implied a gross 
miscalculation of man's importance in the moral scheme. He assumed that much human action 
is ill-conceived, badly carried out, if indeed at all significant. The war furnished the catastrophe 
of some universal moral flaw projected and intensified by the past. The flaw could be traced to 
the human character or some rascal act, or a badly managed conflict of interests, or the divided 
loyalties caused by ancestral ties, but it could never be pinpointed, let alone corrected: 
What is special in Hawthorne is the belief that even though no moral order may exist, the 
responsibility for it has fallen on the sinner himself. So his relation to it in faithless times is 
problematical, endlessly difficult.... There is nothing to guide us in this "forest" (a refrain in 
Hawthorne) but the heart. 
Hawthorne emphasized that the acts of the heart, viz. the passions that control human conduct, 
have historically been independable. He therefore used "the past, not the future, [as] his opening 
to the imagination" (AP, 88), effectively disqualifying all civic and political concerns about the 
future. In "A Genius of Dark Necessity," accordingly, Kazin attacked Hawthorne's ingrained 
political conservatism and wilful intellectual isolation. 
Kazin believes Hawthorne's tenuous hold on the present, which was perhaps even more 
marked in life than in writing, was a subtle achievement in "consciousness." As a throwback 
from religious orthodoxy, Hawthorne maintained intact the spiritual framework previously 
associated with religious revelation, authoritatively "suggesting] uncertainties where there had 
always been God's truth" (AP, 90). His stories centre on an incontrovertible metaphysical fact 
which the past — as fate — passes on to the present, while its symbolic trappings do not easily 
translate into the present. Kazin points to a persistently elusive quality about Hawthorne's 
"mind"; the images it produced may be 
as ungraspable as those figures and odd details of design in Gothic cathedrals, those knotted 
images in Elizabethan plays, which are so much the style of another period that we cannot 
assimilate them, however cleverly we explain them. There are writers far more removed from us 
in time who reach us more directly than Hawthorne does.3" 
Hawthorne intentionally cast the past as situation, and not as drama, for that would require 
resolution in history. The Scarlet Letter proves his total and effortless identification with the 
moral and religious quandaries of seventeenth-century Boston. It furnishes images of the past 
that we relive as "present psychological and human infliction..." (AP, 90), not the source of the 
human condition. But then 
Hawthorne has not, like Eliot, been torn from the past; he is clearly afraid of it. It is more of a 
"ghost" than Eliot knew. There is in Hawthorne's best stories a subtle removal from the past he 
has called up. He just cannot sever himself from it. Puritanism is America's Middle Ages... 
This evidently compromises Eliot's attempt, in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," to bring 
"certain" — and Kazin clearly suggests a bias here — past works into the daylight of present 
consciousness. Hawthorne's work in particular is "not easily assimilable by us..." (AP, 91).39 
What neither Eliot nor James included in their appreciations of the "Hawthorne aspect" was 
how absolutely counterproductive it was to the development of literary realism in America. Eliot 
argued that the "tradition" communicates its immediacy as style. Kazin, among others, criticizes 
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this concept as historically defeatist. He perceives a clear line from Hawthorne via James to 
Eliot. James's fascination during his late phase is with the self-scrutiny of his fictional characters 
brooding on a situation whose complexity they may at best hope to convey — by elaborate 
symbolic means — but not change. His characters are emblemata of contemporary consciousness 
in their constant alertness to some comprehensive scheme sprung on them by the past. Literary 
realists and satirists of the New England mind were to scorn as stuffy Hawthorne's rendition of 
the self-questioning, the debate of so many claims within the human heart, that goes on all the 
time. 
Hawthorne's great subject was, indeed, the sense of guilt that is perhaps the most enduring 
theme in the moral history of the West — guilt that is the secret tie that binds us to others and to 
our own past, guilt that all the characters in these stories accept and live because guilt, theologi-
cally considered, is human identity. In guilt is the great rationale of human history, as Hawthorne 
knew it; in guilt alone is there a task for man to accomplish, a redemption of the past and promise 
of a future.40 
To twentieth-century readers who have become disenchanted with history, Kazin points out, 
Hawthorne's absorption in the inner life has offered a truer picture of the moral dimensions of 
existence than has their own era. Social anomie and the progressive decay of religious values are 
strongly linked to this search for a clear-cut polarity in the moral life. Eliot, as a self-conscious 
cultural alienato, was particularly interested to see the spiritual meanness of modem times offset 
by the subtly wrought mental symmetry in the lives of Hawthorne's main characters. But this 
vast exchange of spiritual knowledge in the dramatic encounters of, typically, merely two 
persons, Kazin charges, implied that Eliot "was really upholding the peculiar isolation on which 
so much American literature rests" (AP, 93). 
Walt Whitman: The Defeat of the Sacred Ego 
The remarkable fact of Walt Whitman's writership, as Kazin sees it, is that sixteen years after 
having put out Leaves of Grass, Whitman was "still seeking to create his reputation as the first 
great modern poet" (AP, 127). Within that span, Whitman had passed through various stages of 
literary selfhood to equip himself to deal with the sweeping changes ushering in the "modem" 
era. No other American writer had evinced a similar ambition to be a public influence. He 
wanted to "see himself politically, to be the poet of the people and to act the poet in public..." 
(AP, 104). He used the history, mood and experience of his time and age — and most of all the 
national tragedy, the Civil War — to shape a mythopoeic self. 
Kazin's cameo descriptions of a self under construction show that Whitman managed to 
harmonize contradictions on a prodigious scale within one single person. He achieved the 
modification of the naked, self-contained Romantic ego, symbolized by his braggart posture in 
the daguerreotype included in Leaves of Grass (1855), to develop into a public figure profound-
ly in tune with the tragedy of the besieged Republic. Whitman's persistent mysteriousness to his 
environment, and even to himself, is axiomatic with Kazin: it reflects his identification with 
incipient reality's formlessness, viz. democracy coming to consciousness of itself. The "self-
sufficient form of a dream" rendered in Hawthorne's tales recedes before Whitman's protean, 
inclusive identity as a latter-day Everyman and a "modern." 
More than a paradigm of the democratic identity, Whitman represents a radical remoteness 
of the self from the traditional clerical culture that fostered Hawthorne, James, Eliot. He did not 
see history as entropy or determinism, and considered the present — the medium he thrived in 
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— as a workplace uniting the openness of the future to the purpose staked out by the past. 
Kazin's analysis of "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" argues that 
the passage from shore to shore, from present to future, becomes the passage through appearances 
to the true reality.... Which is what we crave most — not to complete the journey but to under-
stand why we have undertaken it; not to make an end but in the perfect middle of our life to 
hover between two worlds, our present selves in time and immortality... 
Whitman's greatest longing was for "unity".... his ideas presuppose the sacredness of the 
American union... (AP, 109) 
Whitman's self overcame American writers' typical lack of a nourishing relationship with their 
environment and turned his identification with the national cause into the essence of his 
writership. In 1968, as if to mark his own contribution to the social radicalism of the era, Kazin 
singled out Whitman rather than a contemporary as the "new social self." This was precisely 
Whitman's 'modernism,' a quality Kazin had hinted at as early as 1953: 
... this writer... has long been, not merely my poltergeist, but my stay. Whitman gathering and 
regathering his book [viz. Leaves], the book. There is the real drama of his role to his country, 
that he should be not merely the poet, but that the whole public and sacramental career should 
finally rest on a book... it was not only a book he was creating, it was a career. And always it had 
to have an ideal direction, an ideal format.41 
Whitman's 'modernism' developed from his identification with Death — of the hard, separate 
self— as "the greatest possible 'idea' in his mental existence" (AP, 111). As early as 1944, 
increasingly aware of the predicament of intellectuals in wartime, Kazin had noted that Whitman 
tended to become the battleground for a moral-cultural absolute, which certainly also comprised 
the problem of nationality. He rejected this, stating that Whitman possessed an extraordinary 
"inner vision," one profoundly at odds with programmatic and doctrinaire national ideals.42 
Since God Himself had died in the nineteenth century, Whitman was in a position to 
"spiritualize death to his heart's content" and did, linking it to "the heedless cycle of mass birth, 
mass production, mass extinction" (AP, 111). These suggested the paramount conditions of 
'modem' life; the 'modern' made him slough off his originally "lonely ego" and place himself 
securely at the centre of the Union's cause. 
Of course, in 1983, the idea of American national identity was less obvious or defensible 
than it was in 1942, when On Native Grounds was published. Nationality then was problematic, 
though considered a remedy for assorted cultural ills. In the contemporary era, however, there 
has grown a keen awareness of the limitations that the world at large — particularly the State 
as the prime mover in human affairs — has placed on the individual sense of selfhood. This has 
given short shrift to the Emersonian-Romantic "infinitude of the private mind" and has brought 
up for revaluation Whitman's radiant identification of selfhood with the national cause. 
Here Kazin undertakes an act of revisionist literary historiography. He argues that James's 
requirement of "social thickness" was retrospectively satisfied by Whitman's loving and unique 
portrayal of President Abraham Lincoln as an unrecognized Redeemer wholly in the service of 
the nation. In Lincoln's case, death — his death — particularly in its bearing upon the Union, 
testifies to the genius of Whitman's poetics, much as Whitman's poetic stance catalyzed hopes 
of realizing a redeeming social vision. Kazin's description of Whitman's forays across wartime 
Washington — the seat of the Administration under siege — evokes a 'modem' sense that the 
public mind is giving way and that society needs affirmation of its common experience and 
purpose. Whitman's metaphorical "leaves of grass" found a suitable counterpart in the creative 
mechanisms of basic democratic life reasserting themselves under the impact of the violent 
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controversy over slavery. Washington in 1862 was the smithy of the modern, experimental 
American democratic self, and with the onset of the Civil War Whitman succeeded in matching 
his own poetic persona with Lincoln's emerging public authority. It was a wide open recognition 
of the contradictions the self was capable of spanning, with Whitman exploring these as the 
transcendent dimension of the national experience, much as the nation itself gradually came to 
recognize its manifest destiny in the political career of the once-despised and supposedly 
shiftless Lincoln. Lincoln brought the Union to full consciousness of its potential and its limits: 
firmly rejecting slavery, he "would not alienate the vast pro-Union majority that was not yet 
ready to approve emancipation. His concern for the Union dominated every moral and constitu-
tional issue" (AP, 113-4). Kazin suggests that the book of experience itself creates a vital sense 
of purpose. In Lincoln we do not get 'the law' passed down according to tradition's 'higher' 
values: life rather takes its direction from the integral humanity — the "leaves of grass" — 
asserting itself. Lincoln acquired a vibrant sense of selfhood and national purpose through his 
ability to suspend his executive prerogatives and to refrain from replacing the reality of the 
troubled democratic experiment with a moral-political doctrine. The nation that was to sanctify 
him after his death came to respond to his cautious but persistent mind during his lifetime 
because it understood his harrowing dilemmas. 
To Kazin, Lincoln's total commitment to the Union, transcending all factional ideology, his 
willingness both to express and lead the nation, supports the case for "realism" in American 
literary history. The Civil War caused Whitman to recognize Lincoln's example, making the 
sense of a purposive reality harmonizing American contradictions his theatre of consciousness. 
Unlike any other American writer preceding him, Whitman succeeded in aligning his private self 
with the public environment. He indeed incorporated the Other in his self, giving direction to 
the national experience: "Until the war released him from having to create his own legend, 
Whitman had proclaimed himself in transcendentalist fashion the author of his own fate" (AP, 
116). The war experience and his charged personal observations of mass suffering "smash[ed 
their] way past all the pretenses of his lonely ego" (AP, 117). 
Drum-Taps (1865), as Whitman himself remarked in a letter to his Washington friend 
William D. O'Connor, to a large extent dispensed with the emotional abandon of the first three 
editions of Leaves. Arguably, he realized that he was discovering a reality principle whose 
reliability outstripped any the isolated self could offer. In Drum-Taps, Whitman's imagination 
no longer pursued inward harmony and instead entered the world, taking that for an object of 
discoverable harmony: "He, too, wanted to be part of the American Union." In fact, he assumed 
total identity between his personal destiny and the nation's through "the pending action of this 
Time & Land we swim in." The erstwhile exceptional sexual prankster aiming to seduce young 
New York fellow omnibus workers by means of his poetic invocations to "comradeship" and so 
fulfil his dominating ego turned into a compassionate observer of the nation at large in its 
starkest diversity and became a supreme realist in the inclusiveness of his reporting: 
Whitman's sexual fires — the urgency behind his prewar poems and his seeking connection with 
everything that was "Not Me" — were being damped. In his profound solitude he had created the 
identity of his life with a book [viz. Leaves]. He now saw the hammer blows of war on the 
soldiers around him... War the concussion of young men on each other, a terrible parody of the 
dreamy love play Whitman had celebrated... All this was humbling to the sacred ego founded on 
sexual showmanship. (AP, 118) 
The 'death' of Whitman's so-called sacred ego signified his recognition of those bearing the 
brunt of war. Much as the war reflected a nation in search for a single but pluriform identity, 
so the transition confirmed for Whitman the validity of personal and universal metaphors of 
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regeneration. The most significant, Kazin suggests, was his growing belief that the civic realm 
was itself a striving organism, a protean identity assuming substance under the impact of reality: 
"Thanks to Abraham Lincoln, Whitman at last made perfect connection with his countrymen... 
Lincoln the perfect chief and the sacred tie of the American people that he created by dying" 
(AP, 119). 
Whitman's prose memoranda of the Civil War, Specimen Days, give us Whitman as the 
meticulous recorder of surpassing 'specimens' of modem, democratic reality: 
In Specimen Days Whitman indulges in romantic speculation — so strange to our generation — 
that nature may join in the drama, express martial energies, and be sympathetic to man's 
"purposes".... [Yet, the book was far from realistic in other respects:] The wounded soldiers with 
whom he made no special friends, and on whom he freely bestowed kisses — do not talk to 
Whitman; they form the chorus to his patriotic arias.... The wounded seem exactly alike; one can 
tell that Whitman formed no deep personal relationships in the hospitals.... [His] emphasis on the 
"average" [and] his passion for documenting the masses [expresses his distinctly] modem taste. 
... This is the war book not of "realism"... but of experience. (AP, 122) 
And experience, all told, is an account of the selfs encounter with 'the world,' the Not Me. 
Whitman's importance lies in having created that setting and given it to his countrymen as the 
fulfilment of a public life. Yet, a residual romanticism asserts itself. Whitman clearly made a 
claim on the social experience: he believed it should be capable of reconstructing itself in the 
way he cast himself in a new role when the war made irrelevant the self-consciousness and ego-
building of his literary career in New York City. But Kazin believes precisely this was a moral 
dimension soon to disappear from the literature of modernity: 
[In Specimen Days] We are on the threshold of the modem mass world, where people have 
become as numerous as leaves of grass and are easy to ignore. Whitman ignores nothing and 
nobody; he is no cold "realist".... [Whitman had a supreme] belief in sacrifice, death as fulfilment 
of nature... (AP, 123) 
This sense of death as a necessary requirement in reporting the conditions of modem mass 
society — of the selfs realization being interpreted in terms of its relations with 'the world' — 
reflects a decisive stage in the development towards selfhood for our time which is the subject 
of Procession. 
A Romantic, however, Whitman failed to bring the paradox of the democratic identity to bear 
on the reality of his day and age. The protean homo Americanus Whitman apostrophized 
increasingly turned out to be, as the age slipped into the Great Barbecue, the captain of industry 
using reality to satisfy the profit motive. The resolution his poetry strained for did not material-
ize within American society. Kazin points out that during Whitman's later phase, when he cast 
himself in Democratic Vistas as the poet instructing the race and as a cultural critic, there is a 
marked discrepancy between the national culture and Whitman's prescriptions for it: 
By the standards of modem realism and modern poetry's alienations, Whitman had created himself 
a "supreme fiction" and had replaced America with the most lovable fantasy. But Whitman's 
thinking... identified the supreme fiction not with the imagination's desperately asserting itself over 
an unfriendly world but with ideal development. In the end, poetry for him was not subjective at 
all. It was Nature itself, operating within reality to bring it to an ideal conclusion. (AP, 125) 
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Herman Melville: Voyager of the Mind 
Undaunted by the elusive character of the literary life in America, both Whitman, in Leaves, and 
Melville, in Moby-Dick, tried "to put existence and cosmology together" (AP, 95). Yet, the 
equation worked out differently. Melville eventually struggled with a tragic awareness that 
Nature was totally unsympathetic to man's striving and that man's rank in it was ignoble. This 
undermined Whitman's clarion call for the 'new social self: 
Whitman opens the door to the world and Melville just as resolutely closes it. [Melville is 
interesting for the] many phases he goes through, [and for the ] inconsistencies that stay with him 
from book to book. Whitman says he goes through phases as emergent evolution... [dots in 
original] Melville, that sometimes poisonous plant, [represents] the almost evil growth... of that 
cunning desperate mind in all directions. Trying to break free, where Whitman portrays himself 
as the ascending angel of freedom, moving through the planes of being as Osiris, Christ, and 
finally the redeemer Abe Lincoln... Melville thinks and jabs his way past hindrances set by 
"culture."43 
Melville heads off "Part Two: Modern Times, 1865-1900," which deals with the increasing 
pressure felt by American writers during the second half of the nineteenth century to forge a 
mode of selfhood more in accordance with the experience of their day. The era typically 
features in American literary history as the rise of "realism," investigating the complex identity 
of social processes, and "naturalism," a radical philosophical interpretation of reality. Yet, to 
Kazin Melville harks back to Romanticism. When preparing The Inmost Leaf, in 1956, he 
formulated a key requirement for any form of the literary imagination to be significant: "... the 
real test for the imagination... is whether it regards imagination itself as a clue to reality, 
whether it is self-transcendent." Classified by Kazin as one of the great alienatoes, together with 
Rimbaud and Camus, Melville failed the test. Kazin actually blamed him for depicting Man as 
in "a perpetual state of war against things." In the modern situation, however, 'things' are 
vacant, representing the void, and the writer uses his imagination to create substance. Too often 
this has been the only tangible compensation for man's loss of faith and his "nominalist 
insistence that [he] is lost," giving rise to a religion of aesthetic consciousness. Kazin's journal 
notes for 26 March 1956 suggest in what respect Melville was a liability: 
... with my last breath I shall affirm that there is a reason, and that it exists in the nature of things, 
and that it is a superficial, a materialistic ambition which, by suffering inevitable defeat, leads us 
to praise the imagination in despite of things... This is where the romantics went so wrong, by 
saying credo qua absurdum as if the absurdity referred to the whole nature of things instead of the 
face of things... 
It is axiomatic with Kazin that the imagination must be used as a clue to reality, or else it is 
arbitrary, "an aristocratic accident" at best. Ideally, it is a spiritual gift whose purpose it is to be 
"objectively meaningful" everywhere in this world, akin to the "soul." Kazin had trouble 
reconciling Melville with the spiritual mission behind American reality set out in On Native 
Grounds. Even during the Seventies, when he published preliminary versions of the Melville 
chapter in Procession, he still doubted Melville's real achievement in terms of modern con-
sciousness.44 
The bust of Antinous dominating the entrance hall to the Melville home is significant in 
Kazin's interpretation of Melville, and so is Melville's failure to obtain public office of any 
standing despite the booming mercantilism after the Civil War. Antinoüs's unrequited love for 
Hadrian is reflected in Melville's persistent effort to capture and define reality as truth, though 
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it insistently disclosed itself to him as protean and relativist. His quest rather threw up a 
proliferation of "ambiguities," actually the expressions of a tormented intellectual personality 
and the stamp of deep-seated existentialist alienation. 
As a model for American selfhood in modern times, Melville presents a compelling yet 
doubtful figure. His initial success and subsequent critical neglect illustrate the tragedy of 
writership in America. Recognition for Moby-Dick came only from Nathaniel Hawthorne, and 
even that was possibly not unstinted. Melville's use to Kazin lies in his defiance of the hostile 
literary environment: 
Some uncanny drama seeped into his life, as if from his books. The drama was to mark his revival 
in the next century. All his terms became absolutes as he pushed some personal quest after an 
unnameable goal.... At the peak of his life, the end of 1851, when... his Berkshire neighbor 
Nathaniel Hawthorne... praised Moby-Dick, Melville burst out to the elusive self-contained 
Hawthorne, the perfect Other he would never entirely reach, "Lord, when shall we be done 
growing?.... Leviathan is not the biggest fish; — I have heard of Krakens." (AP, 134-5) 
The hubris and psychic urgency were balanced by his sense of the world's misalliance with the 
intellect. Commenting on his failure as a professional writer, he submitted that '"Truth is 
[commonly seen as] the silliest thing under the sun. Try to get a living by the Truth — and go 
to the Soup Societies... Though I wrote the Gospels in this century, I should die in the gutter'" 
(AP, 136). Melville's alienation from the cultural environment reflected a culture deeply 
estranged from its own "soul" and integrity. There are many elements of intense emotional and 
psychic crisis in his personal background, to be sure, but his own neglect by society surfeited 
with the conventional mentality of the successful merchant and the aristocratic classes convinced 
Melville that the Creation was somehow flawed. Moreover, he assumed that his own mind was 
the fittest instrument for recovering its original purposes. 
Kazin interprets Melville's career in terms of America's romantic rendez-vous with its own 
august destiny.45 The dominant theme in Melville's consecutive works is Western man's 
cultural complacency upset by the primitive elements in society and nature: "His underlying 
antagonist was the conventional in white middle-class America and its Christianity" (AP, 139). 
Nature to Melville, however, meant something entirely different from the inborn moral laws 
which Emerson postulated as the crux of human nature. Melville's voyaging, in the development 
from Typee to the Piazza Tales and Billy Budd, marked the unsettling absence of any authorita-
tive principle of enlightened human conduct as well as the unmitigated contradictions within the 
human situation. Authority figures seldom feature in Melville's work, and if present, they are 
deeply compromised. Melville's work constitutes one single journey which extends far beyond 
the youthful expectations of American romantic expansiveness. The voyager, naturally curious, 
becomes the prototype of the wanderer and the exile, the intellectually disinherited existentialist 
isolato: 
Melville's significant imagination captured well the highs and lows of manifest destiny in its time: 
the exuberance of discovering the "world" and the disgust of sharing in the imperialist grab that 
made Melville's great voyage possible. No other American writer served such an apprenticeship.... 
The literary class was still homogeneous and unaware that it lacked muscle. Social power was in 
other hands. Melville on reading Emerson: "To one who has weathered Cape Horn as a common 
sailor what stuff all this is." (AP, 141) 
Melville cultivated intellectual homelessness as a reality principle. Ahab's frantic hunt for 
Leviathan matched Melville's own turbulent inward growth. Upon returning to the shore, he 
found, metaphorically, that the land did not offer the fundamental and stable values whose 
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absence had struck him while at sea. His headlong inner development eclipsed the majesty of 
American empire, whose birth he had witnessed as a sailor. Its most significant outcome was to 
postulate a non-hierarchical structure for nature and to use this as an ontology. Melville believed 
that the spheres of nature, and by implication the very aspect of reality, are in discord. A 
fledgling writer, "Melville's experience before he was twenty-five... created his basic image: the 
inconclusive nature of reality, man forever driven back on himself as he seeks a fixed point" 
(AP, 141). 
The constant discovery of layer within layer of reality made Melville "a Darwinian by 
intuition" (AP, 141). His narrative forays featured reality preying on itself through a series of 
deceptive and worrying appearances, illustrating the killer instinct in nature. He recorded 
America's grabbing, youthful, expansive bid for empire encountering the individual mind's 
metaphysical search for an identifiable stake in the universe but instead getting caught in 
irreconcilable contradictions. This, as Kazin indicates, was certainly a personal thing with 
Melville, a streak of his character. It filtered into Melville's philosophy of existence, creating an 
absolute dichotomy between the doer (Ahab) and the thinker (Pip): 
Moby-Dick is the product of a powerfully crossed mind — imitating the bursting century, 
expanding America, the manifest destiny out of which it came. It is an epic of mixed motives, of 
unyielding contradictions.... Ahab's dream of perfect freedom demands total mastership. Yet he 
admits himself subject to predestination in all things. It is "Nature's decree." Man and nature must 
fight each other up and down the watery world. (AP, 143) 
The mind pondering the heroic tragedy of human action establishes the fundamental rhythm of 
the American literary experience. It is not so much protean as a fixed duality interweaving the 
repellent strands of the human condition: "The extraordinary rhythm [of Moby-Dick] is the 
wave-like pull, forward and back, between the expansive human will and the contraction of 
necessity... The mind naturally thinks itself free, but necessity is the deeper rhythm of things" 
(AP, 144). The disruptive, Darwinian element always lies just below the surface. There is, 
however, no amalgamation possible of the discordant perspectives of action and reflection, of 
experience and the writer's effort at reconstituting it; they must perform continuous inroads 
upon each other's spheres. Contemplativeness in the American scene is left to "its sensitive 
consciences, its lonely metaphysicals and seekers after God" (AP, 145), constantly driven within 
an inch of destruction by immemorial Nature "as it was in the beginning, without man, God's 
world alone..." (AP, 144). Thus, the very idea of selfhood would seem to be divided against 
itself. The almost sexual polarity at the centre of Moby-Dick — Ahab's masculine aggression 
versus Ishmael's passive, receptive, contemplative stance — represents the "different sides of 
Melville — the androgyny that American writing suffers in respect to American power" (AP, 
145). Reality in America is a rampant, self-directing process generating few if any countervail-
ing processes. It may be held off solely through a metaphysical manoeuvre, an act of the 
imagination. Ahab's vision of absolute control wrecks the ship and its crew alike, except 
Ishmael, whose role it is to report the adventure — as story — to posterity. Ahab's undoing 
testifies to man's tragically inconclusive struggle to dominate the reality he is part of. Moreover, 
it shows that power is itself destructive of the standards by which to gauge reality. It never takes 
the shape of an identifiable principle of authority within a stable hierarchy. Reality rather 
unfolds within itself and challenges definitive interpretation. Moby-Dick, Kazin observes, is a 
"metaphysical poem" rather than a novel.46 
Ishmael surviving the PequocTs destruction, Kazin argues, suggests the resilience of a 
predominantly literary mind grasping for an ordering principle in default of the Calvinist God. 
The whale, however, emerges as the tyranny of naked existence stripped of supernatural 
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sanctions. Reality resists analysis and is impossible to pin down: "The real struggle of the book 
was to create a great body of fact, learning, and humor around a theme ultimately nihilist" (AP, 
146). Reality remains void except by the effort of the imagination to grasp its design. Melville, 
according to Kazin, is a prodigious exegete of the modern human condition: 
The Pequod is condemned by Ahab to sail up and down the world in search of a symbol. And 
everyone but the necessary narrator will die in the attempt; such is the burden on the mind seeking 
an Other in our narcissistic existence. The "world" seems to be easy to grasp but never is. Man 
continually mounts the world in its appearance as Nature but never really joins it. The failure is 
what torments us. It kills the illusion that we are part of what we see. (AP, 147) 
Kazin believes that Melville-Ahab's hunt for an extractable meaning is a significant weakn-
ess. Ahab is idea rather than man, and the whale actually a willed metaphor by which we 
challenge our perceptions. Moreover, Ahab's fanaticism inspired the twentieth-century audience 
to capitalize on the general intellectual doubt that motivated Melville. Kazin formulates his 
charge using the terms for a particular 'relationship,' viz. that between Melville and Hawthorne. 
He clearly suggests that Melville's youthful storminess and his vision of the world's radical 
inconclusiveness may have alienated even that "genius of dark necessity," Hawthorne. No 
written record is left of what passed between them intellectually: Melville in due course 
destroyed Hawthorne's letters to him. Kazin finds a clue, however, in Sophia Hawthorne's 
confession to her sister Elizabeth Peabody that she used to find it amusing "to sit & hear this 
growing man [Melville] dash his tumultuous waves of thought up against Mr. Hawthorne's 
great, genial, comprehending silences" (quoted in AP, 148). Hawthorne mentally eclipsing his 
admirer Melville's Promethean daring proves to Kazin that the latter found less of a home in 
existence than the former. By Kazin's interpretation of the tragic grandeur of naturalism, a tragic 
discipline, Melville's Darwinian perspectives fail to meet the central requirement of tragedy, viz. 
to define — with "grave exhilaration" — the "possible." Melville never found "new worlds of 
actuality" between the limits declared by the naturalist view.47 He predicated selfhood upon the 
apparently irreconcilable contradictions of existence, turning these into absolutes and making 
existence itself seem divided against itself. Kazin claims that there is much in both Melville's 
career as a writer and in his personal life to suggest that he was incapable of accepting the terms 
of existence. On a personal level, Melville became a recluse and an embittered alienato by 
choice; as an American, he had a persistent vision of the national destiny turning sour. For 
Melville was obsessed by his Calvinist conviction of man's cast-off state. He wrote to 
Hawthorne that he considered himself the embodiment of "a certain tragic phase of humanity," 
adding that he believed "the Godhead is broken up like the bread at the Supper, and that we are 
the pieces" (quoted in AP, 154, 147). The "infinite fraternity of feeling" he felt existed between 
himself and Hawthorne , however, did not extend to humanity at large, so he found. The 
Godhead had evidently receded from Nature, leaving it a tabula rasa for thinkers and visionaries 
to fill in. What emerged was a realm of fierce oppositions, with every layer of reality carrying 
its own negation: "The beast always in view is emptiness, the deception inherent in the mere 
appearance of things" (AP, 155). 
Kazin notes that if Melville the man and writer did not make much of a figure in the late 
nineteenth-century literary situation, he was to be a prodigious cultural presence in the twentieth: 
... the resurrected Melville... who surfaced posthumously with Billy Budd (and much more 
besides), seemed anything but peaceful, was still endlessly dramatic. Melville may have been 
ditched by his own century; he became important to the next because he stood for the triumph of 
expression over the most cutting sense of disaster, negation, and even the most ferociously 
unfavorable view of modem society in classical American literature. Melville to many another 
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"isolato" in the next century represented the triumph of a prisoner over his cell, of a desperado 
over his own philosophy. (AP, 157) 
What was denied him in life, he retrieved in writing. To a certain extent, he sought immunity 
from life writing. Anticipating the twentieth-century literary sensibility, the "ambiguities" central 
to Melville's cosmos were to inspire later generations of widely divergent backgrounds. They 
explain, so Kazin claims, why Melville was — and is — readily seen as a 'contemporary.' 
Melville's admirers have included Hart Crane, Lewis Mumford, Jean Giono, Charles Olson, 
W.H. Auden, Cesare Pavese, E.M. Forster, and Benjamin Britten as well as Sam Melville, a 
revolutionist for Black Power who died in the storming of Attica State Correctional Facility in 
1971. Melville's "capacious intellectual personality" was a veritable icon and wreaked havoc on 
established values, viewpoints, orthodoxies, if not consciousness itself. He was to be enlisted in 
the conservative reaction during the Fifties against the Popular Front liberalism of the Thirties. 
But Kazin wishes to emphasize the abiding multiplicity of Melville's message: "Which of his 
many voices speaks for him κονν?" Arguably, he adds, that may have been Billy Budd, where 
the exercise of authority takes precedence over the loyalty of filial relationships. Arguably, 
because from book to book there is a rapid shift of angles on existence, and The Confidence 
Man shows the very duplicity of reality. There is one dominant parameter in Melville's thought, 
however: "... the tormented subjectivity — shows the same problem — to find truth that would 
not disappear from voyage to voyage, from book to book" (AP, 159). And the special relevance 
of Melville's work to the twentieth century, when so many Americans saw their transcendental-
Romantic notions of self and selfhood fall apart, Kazin had already conveyed in the late Fifties. 
In a review of Richard Chase's Herman Melville: A Critical Study, he had attacked Chase's 
attempt to tum Melville into "a moral imagination for the 'New Liberalism.'" Chase's interpre­
tation was proof that Melville's quality of mind had become rare in the political age. Kazin 
concluded that "Melville was not a liberal: he believed that reality was not susceptible to a 
political interpretation."4' 
Mark Twain: The American Experience Taken Raw 
In his contribution to the 1983 joint conference of the Netherlands American Studies Association 
and the European Association for American Studies, "The Grandeur and Misery of Realism," 
Kazin suggested that he rated Mark Twain higher than Henry James because Twain represented 
"the power [of] a new environment."4' This comparison spans the extremes of the American 
literary situation in the late nineteenth century, even if both writers maintained a complex 
relation to American life. For one thing, James was an eminent literary purveyor of the "social 
thickness" whose absence from the American scene Hawthorne had deplored, while Twain's 
glorious career as a best-selling author was offset by the tragedy of his personal life and his 
increasing antagonism to the mainstream in national affairs. Both writers featured a style alto­
gether personal; Twain's, however, was more directly the natural result of his need to dissemi­
nate his hard-won and troubling insights, reflecting "'irréligion,' skepticism in all things, 
dissolution in any direction of the eternal verities..." (AP, 182). 
Echoing W.D. Howells, Kazin calls Twain a "creature of circumstance," suggesting that he 
was native American realism personified. The contrast with James, a contemporary, was 
obvious, and James tried to patronize Twain by calling him primitive. They had widely different 
sensibilities and differed on the kind of sanction they derived from them: 
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... growing up with the country, as James never did, absorbing its unrest, its extremes of poverty 
and wealth, its crudest lust for power and position, [Twain] naturally identified himself with the 
many Americans who were forever fighting it out, just barely keeping their heads above water. 
James gave primacy to his own impressions; this made Europe sacred as the favorite source of his 
impressions. Mark Twain's first book, The Innocents Abroad (1869), typically took him to Europe 
and other holy places as a destroyer, the "American vandal." 
Arguably, Twain was totally without metaphysics. He was averse to reading fiction, at any rate, 
and preferred "fact books." This explains the great divide between him and James, who ident-
ified viable modes of selfhood with the meticulously shaped literary design. The conflicting 
strains of the contemporary cultural situation, so Kazin points out, became manifest in these 
men's "contraries of storytelling, of form, of literature itself, while retaining their parity as 
individualists" (AP, 185). Both renegades from organized religion, they found totally different 
substitutes for it: James cultivated a deeply imaginative European tradition of social manners, 
while Twain developed an abrasive distrust of "sky-blue transcendental Yankee idealism" (AP, 
183). Much of his popularity and worldly success as a literary performer had to do with his 
unremitting exposure of human nature. Kazin unites these extremes: "In the end both came to 
what James called 'the imagination of disaster' — James because his conservative 'tradition,' 
sacred Europe, was as corrupt as anything else; Mark Twain because nothing failed him like 
success." Consistent with the themes of alienation, Kazin states that James tried to find in 
"society imaginatively considered" what he "despaired of finding in lasting affection" (AP, 185). 
Twain, by contrast, whose frontiersman's unsparing social analysis provided the well-to-do 
middle class back East with a fig leaf for their own moral discomfort, was eminently placed to 
meet with general recognition and material success. To the adoring reading public back East, he 
was the frontier's fastest mouth and a sardonic critic of the frontier community's foibles and 
pretensions, and so he affirmed the Eastern establishment's complacent sense of superiority to 
the Western rank and file: 
By contrast with the Romantic will to absorb the world into oneself, Mark Twain made the world 
laugh as he exposed the rawness and deceitfulness of human nature. He softened the awful truth 
by enjoying his own performance so much. There was nothing to fear — not yet. Mark Twain 
darkened only as the century did. (AP, 184) 
The Twain chapter is of course also a contrastive study of the American writer's relation to 
the contemporary culture. James essentially kept apart and pursued a career as a literary figure 
in England, not caring much for recognition — or the lack of it — back home. Twain, on the 
other hand, identified so closely with the hardships of the country — and the country with him 
— that William Dean Howells, a very good friend and Twain's biographer, was right in more 
than one sense when he called him "more dramatically the creature of circumstances than the 
old Anglo-American type" (quoted in AP, 187). For Twain was to a large extent shaped by 
circumstances rather than shaping them. Twain experienced break-up firsthand, and not solely 
because his beloved wife and daughters died. He identified with the commercial ethos — the 
motor of social mobility and the playground of so many diverse ambitions — with, in his own 
words, "the calm confidence of a Christian with four aces" (quoted in AP, 182). Yet, like 
Lincoln during the Civil War, he was never in control of events. Unlike Lincoln, he even 
doubted there was a God. His version of the 'death of God' was a despair arising from his 
realization that America's destiny was to a large extent certainly not manifest and very likely 
not promising: 
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Turning his friend into '4he Lincoln of our literature," Howells slighted an important aspect of 
Lincoln: his rationalism, objectivity, fixity of purpose. Lincoln never had a personal God; as he 
admitted in... the Second Inaugural, "the Almighty has His own purposes." This represented to 
Lincoln not chance — but a divinity which he recognized was beyond personal desire... 
Mark Twain's world was all personal, disjointed, accidental. He was indeed, as Howells said, 
the "creature of circumstances." And so were his characters, which made them creatures of chance 
in a world more skeptical than had been seen before in the literature of "God's own country."... 
[Twain's] genius lay in accumulating episodes; he turned life into a stream of facts and pictures... 
without overall meaning, without ideology, without religion. (AP, 188-9) 
James never incorporated the contradictions of American conditions in his creative self; he was 
essentially outside them and could not penetrate them. Yet, he was unambiguous about the 
creative returns of his aesthetic, whereas Twain, in life as well as in art, seems never to have 
been quite sure whether he was in or out of the game. He was both spellbound and frightened 
by the American "epic of progress" (AP, 188), and in his disillusionment, as Kazin argues, 
anticipated the twentieth-century Southern fiction of "poverty, meanness and estrangement" (AP, 
189). 
Separating Twain and James is the issue of literary selfhood. The work of both is testimony 
to a certain necessity about, or even in, writing. But does the design extend from the life or the 
imagination, from the man or the artist? Twain hedged the issue and created Tom Sawyer. Style 
— which is the identity Tom creates through his rhetorical gift — comes naturally to this youth 
marked for his gift of persuasion and his naive romantic knack for building a fantasy world 
rather than having to cope with the real one. Insofar as Twain wrote 'fact books' — and there 
is evidence that Tom Sawyer relies in large part on Twain's own youth — he avoided having to 
get it in whole: "The forty-year-old who composed Tom Sawyer in 1875-76 was far from his 
boyhood poverty and the old Southwest but not from the vehement uncertainties that were... a 
mark of his character..." Twain himself compared the book to a "hymn"; no doubt, Kazin 
argues, because it uses "a setting almost mythic in its selective use of the past" (AP, 193). Kazin 
lists other aspects of Twain's life to indicate that Twain was becoming the prototype of the 
American experience becoming divided against itself. Twain's career, he suggests, was the 
culmination of the American selfs indeterminate identity. Once settled among 'the quality' at 
Nook Farm in Hartford, Connecticut, to enjoy his popularity to the full, Twain fretted with guilt 
over his escape from the run-down, backward, bigoted and violent Hannibal, in Missouri. The 
culture bred a need to dissociate the present from the past and Twain was a perfect illustration 
of this. Tom Sawyer, was 
a story to be told at a comfortable remove. [Tom's] archness befitted the benevolence of middle-
aged successes toward their younger selves, of urban leaders toward the old farm and rustic 
village. Heavily Victorian Americans could feel that America was still young. (AP, 196) 
Tom Sawyer epitomizes a culture only reluctantly coming to self-knowledge. Compared to Pearl 
in Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter, for instance, Tom Sawyer is naive and indifferent to the deeper 
springs of human nature: 
In Tom Sawyer Mark Twain was not yet ready to disclose the deep as well as the bright side of 
a Mississippi River boyhood. He celebrated boyhood as a state sufficient unto itself, almost 
entirely removed from the contingencies of the adult world. It is removed from the looming 
sexuality of childhood and adolescence. (AP, 197) 
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Hence, Kazin concludes, it restricted the use of the imagination so strictly to the wishes of 
boyhood that "from one point of view it is unreal..." (AP, 198). Reality — and realism — came 
in with Huckleberry Finn. 
Huckleberry Finn comprises what Kazin believes to be a viable philosophy of selfhood in 
America. First and foremost, the book's objective is freedom. Huck undertakes his Odyssey 
down the Mississippi for the purpose of procuring Jim's freedom — from the legal interpreta-
tion of slavery — and establishing his own — from the more subtle tyranny of small-town 
mores. Unlike Tom Sawyer, it is not the literary act that enslaves the protagonists, it is reality 
itself pounding in on them. In Huck Finn, circumstances are closing in. The book's great 
subject, as Kazin asserts, is "freedom," not just from a state of legally sanctioned non-identity, 
as in Jim's case, but certainly also from the forces of culture and circumstance which keep Huck 
from forming an autonomous identity. Their encounter with the world downstream the 
Mississippi acts like a powerful reality principle. Commanding little besides the democratic 
Everyman's prime resource — plain wits — Huck becomes an effective dissolvent of the new 
ways. His presence on the banks of the southern Mississippi coincides with trenchant manifesta-
tions of the bigotry of American life, its murderous feudalism in particular. Huck Finn is a 
ferocious attack on the betrayal of elementary democratic values by encroaching 'culture.' Huck 
is essentially a defender of humane vision from the aggressive cultural ideologists and intolerant 
doctrinaire visionaries that dominate the riverbank communities. He is at bottom a destroyer of 
such fictions, companion of those who have the power to disbelieve them. 
Huck's exposé is trenchant historical — perhaps even antihistorical — criticism. His initi-
ation into the adult world suggests the complication of native liberalism's nostalgic view of 
cultural genesis. Huck is constitutionally unable to formulate any grand design for life or 
intellectual theory of human nature: all he has is his smartness. "But the smarter the boy, the 
more fatalistic he is; he knows who runs things" (AP, 207). That quality establishes a firm link 
between the protagonist and his creator. Huck's — and Jim's — increasingly automatic response 
to a world that seemingly spells nothing but trouble suggests to Kazin their genius for coping 
with life in a totally hostile environment. Their situation reflects the human condition in modern 
times, of which Twain had first-hand experience. Kazin believes that it is Huck's style that 
redeems the harshness of his existence. Not history, as he had assumed in On Native Grounds, 
but selfhood is the designated realm of self-actualization: "The sense of necessity that only 
bottom dogs know is what gives such unmediated, intellectualized beauty to the style. Mark 
Twain, fully for the first time, knew how to let life carry out its own rhythm" (AP, 209). 
Assuming continuity between the rhetorical aptitude of Twain in Hartford and Huck's instinct 
for survival, between the autobiographical and the fictional as complementary strategies, Kazin 
postulates another dimension in the book, particularly in the writer's relation to it: the increasing 
complexity of the American's fate and the despair of a positive outcome. To Twain as to Huck, 
'culture' proved a failure, indifferent in one case and hostile in the other. Culture failed as a 
guide to life in America, for Huck gladly turns his back on it and resorts to his instinctual 
humanism, while Twain suffered a cutting loss of his loving identification with the Frontier 
experience that had brought him literary fame; the instability of the American economic system, 
culminating in the 1893 Panic, turned Twain's Paige typesetting machine into a business failure 
and bankrupted him. The national experience actually proved more indifferent or even hostile 
and destructive than the feudal system Twain-Huck encountered down the Mississippi. 
To mark the extremes of the national ethos, Kazin compares the exhilarating technological 
and intellectual spectacle — which fascinated Henry Adams — provided by the World's 
Columbian Exposition in Chicago, 1894, with Twain's personal fate due to the failure of the 
Paige project. The Exposition was perfectly representative of the nation's self-image except that 
Twain 
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should have exhibited himself at the fair, Mark Twain was a greater testimonial to the Columbian 
Exposition than any of the industrial exhibits. He had grown up along the frontier, moved west 
with it, turned himself into its representative character even when he mocked its legend of endless 
promise. [Twain recorded] its brawling energy, its background of violence, its readiness for make-
believe [and in due course] was to feel himself both America's favorite and "God's fool." 
... The human critter, "the damned human race," as Mark Twain liked to thunder, was the root 
of all evil. As his affairs failed, as his wife and most of his children died, as the sweet old 
roughness of the frontier became a lost world to pursue, Mark Twain was faced, Lear-like, with 
his own hypertrophic ego dominating everything except his native terror. In the last years of his 
century, this all-too-representative American, the old derelict, God's fool, experienced a savage 
homelessness in the good old United States in its new world of empire. 
He was to live it all... (AP, 252) 
As Henry Adams, Kazin shrewdly observes, never needed to. The intellectual-statesman could 
afford to limit his interest to the Exposition grounds and ignore abundant evidence of capitalist 
crisis in the city that hosted it. Twain never even got round to seeing the Great Fair, having 
more pressing business to attend to. As the 'representative' homo Americanus, he was as much 
a loser as the city proletariat towards the tum of the century. Chicago, epitomizing social crisis, 
was the prime source of inspiration to contemporary realists and the occasion for social analysis 
to many liberal intellectuals such as Florence Kelley of Hull House. The Fair offered an elusive 
image of stability. Adams drew philosophical inspiration from it, whereas Twain's personal fate 
— as that of the masses Kazin identifies him with — illustrated the entropie forces wrecking the 
system. Twain lived the risks of his history, Adams just travelled and sampled. If Twain's 
proper place was at the Fair — as exhibit-A — he surely symbolized a divided nation. Adams's 
speculative consciousness versus Twain's record of raw experience suggests the developing rift 
in the American metaphysics of self. 
The resolution of Kazin's Twain chapter takes the form of a coda attached to the chapter 
entitled "Chicago and the 'East': Dreiser, Adams, Mark Twain," with the East-West dichotomy 
suggesting the polarities of selfhood in America. If, as Hawthorne, James, and later also Trilling, 
claimed, the social substance of an American novel was the litmus test of its artistic signifi-
cance, then Mark Twain's work was a tragic failure. His own vision of society did not grant 
him immunity from it. The really tragic dichotomy — and one Twain failed to negotiate, too — 
was between the West as promoting the most intense interplay of selfhood and 'reality' — 
hence the cradle of American realism — and the East as the medium for a variety of diffracted 
mental perspectives on personal destiny. There is no doubt that Kazin considers Twain's a major 
predecessor to F. Scott Fitzgerald's vision of selfhood: 
Innocence was of the West, it was childhood, newness, the great legend of American beginnings. 
It was real things. But destiny was in the East, where abstractions took over and broke the 
innocent heart that was trying to enlist them to the human order. (AP, 254) 
Kazin is convinced that the historical tropisms of the native experience argue a centre of gravity 
that lies east of Eden, not in it. He had himself, in On Native Grounds, broached this theme of 
the historical complication of the American literary experience. Although true to — indeed, a 
"creature of' — circumstances, Twain in his late career personified the hubris of the aesthetic 
will that was to mark the modernist frame of mind: 
The writer's old glory in his own mind had become an island consciousness, man alone with his 
own mind, a solipsism all too familiar in the skepticism that marked the end of the century.... In 
the end, Mark Twain's incisive hope, his only paradise, was that he alone would in imagination 
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rewrite the world. If ever man lived a dream, it was Mark Twain when he came to the end of his 
dream. (AP, 255) 
Henry James: "The Terror of August 1914 Was Still Inconceivable" 
Kazin's assessments of Henry James have displayed the typical vacillations of mainstream 
American literary criticism on the subject. In On Native Grounds, he addressed Van Wyck 
Brooks's interpretation of the Jamesian heritage. He defended James from his imputed neglect 
of the native experience, claiming that Brooks had largely used James to prove his thesis. By 
stressing James's interest in "manners" at the expense of "morals," Brooks had produced 
"something grotesquely unrepresentative of James's style and mind." To stress James's real 
achievement, Kazin quoted from a letter of 1872, in which James claimed that it was "a 
complex fate, being an American..."50 
It was precisely that quality that sealed James's supreme interest to the Partisan Review 
critics. And Kazin's call, in 1945, not to constrain James within a rigidly national pattern of 
experience was made in the context of his review of F.W. Dupee's The Question of Henry 
James. As he had indicated in On Native Grounds, James's achievement required a correction 
after decades of disparagement by the "literary patriots," as Kazin dubbed Brooks c.s. Yet, he 
held, there was no cause for dragging it into a discussion about 'normalcy' in the American 
experience, as some literary critics did: 
There have been many, less socially courageous than Parrington and less sensitively concerned 
with the problem than Brooks, who have disagreed that James' art is "absolutely its own justifi-
cation." There have been those who are always so distracted by "the problem of the American 
writer" that they have never been willing to see that perhaps there is none — except, that is, for 
him to be himself, and thus find a more deeply human and perceptive self to be. 
There was no reason, Kazin argued, to lock James in competition with Whitman, Jefferson, 
Lincoln and Twain as the 'representative American.' James, in fact, was so devoted to his craft 
that "he honors us in America far more than we have honored him." He may have been lacking 
in spontaneous affirmations of democratic life, but he was invaluable to national literary history 
as "a symbol of the free intelligence."51 
In the introduction to The Question of Henry James, Dupee had declared James immune from 
the artistic hazards of expatriate life, and explained contemporary aversion to his art in terms of 
the general wish "to keep our literary image comparatively simple, comparatively faithful to our 
democratic professions." He held that, contrary to the liberal diagnosis of James's work, it was 
based on experience and he was not a "romantic" seeking to produce evasive, solipsistic 
interpretations of life. Dupee believed the liberals' "a priori notion of realism, confined to social 
realism of the naturalist variety, kept them from perceiving James's devotion to the realistic 
principle. His view of reality was refracted through an extraordinary sensibility and further 
transformed by the demands of his conception of the art of fiction." This was particularly 
evident in James's essay on Hawthorne, and Dupee concluded that James — unlike many other 
American writers — had been redeemed as an artist because he had acknowledged the formative 
role of culture in literary work: "It needs a complex social machinery to set a writer in 
motion."52 Thus, Dupee articulated the mainstream of Partisan Review's cultural criticism. 
Kazin's admiration for James was more grudging, and only at a fairly late stage did he grow 
convinced of the contemporary uses of the Jamesian sense of selfhood. In 1948, he observed 
that James betrayed a stultifying lack of interest in general ideas; in 1955, that his contemporary 
status as a cultural hero was preposterous, since his writing showed no link with the "new 
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writing." The publication of volumes II and III of Leon Edel's biography of Henry James, in 
1962, may have been a watershed, for Kazin wrote a sympathetic review exploring James's 
wholly intellectual passion for capturing life. The 1969 Bantam edition of The Ambassadors, 
finally, featured an introduction by Kazin making Lambert Strether representative of James's 
preference for the life of thought over direct sensuous experience, yet praising James for his 
masterful domination of his material.53 
Kazin emphasizes that the material independence of the James family largely protected Henry 
from the type of determinism associated with an existence dominated by the business ethic. 
Henry could actually afford to settle in Europe and so explore the creative opportunities of the 
European setting for the American artistic mind. One objective of James's life as an expatriate, 
Kazin suggests, was to secure optimum conditions for the imagination. James's imputed flight 
from the hardships of his native environment — which was an axiom of liberal criticism — 
served to create an image of Europe as the most complete analogue to and extension of the 
artist's mind. In fact, so Kazin argues, James's wholly literary existence elicited a stark contrast 
with the domestic opportunities for an American metaphysics of self. 
As a devoted Swedenborgian, Henry James Senior had been obsessed with selfhood, which 
he tended to see as the autonomous but lonely individual's struggle to achieve a social definition 
of identity. Kazin believes this definitely involved a risk: 
The elder James's problem, which descended on all five of his children... was spiritual 
homelessness, a fervid need not easily understood by others to make attachments to a higher 
consciousness than his own. He was a natural believer who assured his son William that he had 
never known a skeptical moment. But his God was in no sense an external spirit; it was the divine 
principle working itself out in humanity... 
... Real selfhood [, James Sr. believed,] comes from God — and God is the redemption of man 
in society. (AP, 213) 
The higher consciousness exacted too much of his children. They had been brought up to see 
life as a wholly mental existence. They "lived in words" {AP, 214) but experienced Senior's 
ideas, and ultimately not solely his, as a prison. Yet, Henry and William derived considerable 
emotional integrity if not personal wholeness from their ability to restore in their work the 
equivalent of their intellectual faith. That transfer was to be both their faith and redemption: 
Their mental life — so intense that it became in truth a spiritual world — was the root of their 
being. This was their self, not like anyone else's; so much inner life was their despair and 
vocation. "Self isolated them. It became their main subject matter. 
William certainly also undertook his philosophical work on pragmatism in the conviction that 
it could cure his "sick soul," while Henry, excluded from the full range of commonly available 
social experience, devoted his life to the novel, because that "appropriated the endless subtlety 
of human relationships" (AP, 215). The mental fixation, however, as Kazin argues when dealing 
with James's later novels, was to be a peculiarly Jamesian liability in modem literature. For the 
principle of intellectual authority prescribing relevant attitudes to and interpretations of exist-
ence, particularly if that wore a neurotic cast, was to be followed by critical exegetes of the 
modernist canon such as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound. They, too, were to have trouble reconciling 
their "selves" with the early twentieth-century environment. And like James, they invested 
heavily in literary strategy to mitigate the impact. 
Kazin argues that Henry's total absorption in the dramatic texture of any particular situation 
had to do with his need to keep his creative effort free from the impact of "ideas." His preferred 
environment was pure consciousness, which he identified with the novel. His aesthetic theory 
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provided a sanctuary from the intellectual visions his father imposed. To some extent, Henry 
considered it the sole expression of his personality. 'Self thus became closely identified with 
the aesthetic will. The "ideas" James mistrusted, however, are philosophical-intellectual state-
ments of the individual's inescapable involvement with 'the world,' and Kazin drives this point 
home. James had perfected his need for capturing the implications of a situation through a 
grammar of images as early as the Civil War, yet the national catastrophe left no mark in his 
novels. Nor did he formulate a political opinion on the conflict. Though he admired George 
Eliot, Balzac, Zola, Turgenev, he misjudged the origins of their personal crises and their social 
and political commitments. James died in England during the Great War, possibly due to the 
distress of actually hearing the German guns wreck Reims cathedral. He had had no political 
intuition whatsoever of the political catastrophe in the making, and characterized the War as a 
horrendous "betrayal of the whole fool's paradise of our past." The Jamesian self was predicated 
on an extraordinary degree of inwardness and self-communion: 
For the New York edition (1907-09) of his collected works, James rewrote his earlier novels in his 
elaborate later style (itself a form of critical commentary) and composed prefaces to each of his 
principal works and to many of his best stories... he recounted how the "situation" came to him, 
where he walked thinking it out, where he set down to write it, and how this specific work fitted 
into his master strategy of the high art of fiction. In the end, he confided to Grace Norton, he 
thought of writing a preface to his prefaces. (AP, 217) 
'Self became the object of "total [aesthetic deliberation and] devotion, accomplishment, form" 
(AP, 218). James derived his ego-sense exclusively from his aesthetic effort, and Kazin notes 
that there is an obvious discrepancy in James's literary effort between the means and the object. 
The young James was convinced that he could convey his aesthetic views if he identified them 
with the drama of moral consciousness.5,1 He built from Hawthorne's insight in the sense that 
he relied on dramatic strategy in fiction to articulate the social forms that Hawthorne had 
indicated were lacking from the American scene. When he reviewed Howells's A Foregone 
Conclusion (1875), he put it thus: "Civilization with us is monotonous, and in the way of 
contrasts, of salient points, of chiaroscuro, we have to take what we can get." At age 24, James 
was convinced he could correct this defect in the native culture, and he located the American 
genius in the nation's "unprecedented moral vigor" (quoted in AP, 221). As Kazin reminds us, 
the latter fell short of James's requirements, tending towards intolerance rather than chiaroscuro. 
James had anticipated this in his biography of Hawthorne, albeit persistently within the frame-
work of the private consciousness. Kazin condemns this as a policy of the cyst and raises a 
crucial literary-historical issue: "Why did James not see a subject in the aggressiveness of 
American society?" (AP, 221-222). He is likewise shocked by James's observation, made a mere 
fourteen years after the federal government quashed the Confederate rebellion, that in America 
there was "no State, in the European sense of the word (quoted in AP, 222)." 
The Emersonian origins of American selfhood were now clearly disintegrating. Emerson's 
faith in the American "soul" as some "shadow divinity," a feature of the democratic homo 
Americanus in the aggregate, had changed into "consciousness pushed steadily back on the 
individual himself... seeking an outlet and finding it in the inner world of other personalities" 
(AP, 222). And this was largely because James had written off his humdrum and socially 
innocent native country as a possible source for the imagination. English culture, by contrast, 
did offer that intricate and rich variety of personalities in the study of which the aesthetic self 
achieved substance and focus. 
Kazin claims on the basis of his analysis of James's later novels, and The Portrait of a Lady, 
that the chiaroscuro provided by the European cultural setting produced a rather defective type 
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of moral consciousness. James addressed a superior society based on the choice perceptions of 
equally superior, generally leisured upper-class individuals, and he typically located his heroes 
in the richest possible settings, permitting them to give free rein to their imagination. He 
believes this provided a clue to the problem of selfhood. Cultivating sensitive personalities, 
James assumed he was bringing out the "hiddenness" of personality. 
Kazin focuses on the essentially static quality of James's cultural canvass to bring out the 
flaw: 
James's "discovery of Europe" was that its virtù, its preciousness, was enough to frame a charact-
er, to release a story. By contrast, the bareness of American settings had been a special irritant to 
him.... James seems to have had ail Europe to himself. No wonder he was to fix on a character's 
"point of view" as the structure of the novel, and that what had begun as a limitation of experi-
ence he was to tum into a base of operations. 
This was a Europe of imagination indeed, all tradition and background for the starved Ameri-
can senses that could now find in the touch of history, in any street, long-sought opulence for the 
mind. James's style grew prodigal whenever he drew a European setting. It shows a mind 
perfectly pleased, silky in its pietas toward the cherished object. (AP, 224) 
James's aesthetic relied on the creation of a central intelligence, the total grasp wielded by one 
single individual. In addition, Kazin perceives a particular sexual pattern in the roll call of 
power figures in James's fiction. In most cases, they are European, or Europeanized, males 
using spirited, self-assured American heroines in their designs. Isabel Archer, in The Portrait of 
a Lady, "embodies the note of 'relation' that made society real" (AP, 226), and goes on to 
suggest that, by the same token, it sponsored corruption. The American heroine's freshness 
constitutes an alien element in the European social tradition of her 'benefactors,' who treat her 
as "a case under consideration." That habit of consideration on the part of the European 
characters turns out to be hard, calculating psychological intrusion positioning the heroine to 
their best possible advantage. Such is the nature of the European tradition of manners that 
Isabel, introduced to Europe by millionaire Americans and exploited there by corrupt Americ-
ans, "is led and misled every inch of the way by considerations that depend on European beauty, 
European ritual." The 'European' morality of manners breeds novices and 'ingénues'; it is self-
seeking and vile. Gilbert Osmond, who uses aesthetic perceptions as an aggressive act of self-
interest, makes constant reference to the comprehensive "esthetic soul of Europe itself' (AP, 
227) to consciously manipulate Isabel. 
Kazin's exposure of the habitual social coercion of others by certain characters who base 
their conduct on aesthetic considerations is an indictment of modernism. It is also a defence of 
the indispensable native component in any tradition of manners. He comes out in favour of the 
American tradition: 
[Isabel's] moral crisis... is James's classical moment, his tie with the virtuous tradition he left in 
America. Isabel recognizes that "the first gentleman of Europe"... with inhumanly prefect taste, is 
outraged by her freedom of mind and is trying to destroy it. Since the Portrait in its beauty of 
surface and scene, its investiture of old Europe as civilization, is in great part a "consecration" of 
the esthetic ideal, James's association of spiritual wickedness with a total esthete shows how 
"native" his sense of good and evil remained. (AP, 229) 
Kazin suggests that the extraordinary sense of purpose about James's aesthetic theory must have 
included an open admission of the human excess and bad faith necessarily involved. So much 
Art must have something to feast itself on. James himself, for one, cultivated this type of 
exchange between his life and fiction: the ubiquitous sense of intrigue and suspicion creates a 
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world wholly "contrived and wrong... We are beset by the dominating image of a 'portrait,' both 
as virtù and as the deception inherent in social appearance.... The bystanders, the onlookers, are 
merely virtuous; action and sin are synonymous" (AP, 227-8). A similar androgynous attitude 
to self-definition affected James the writer. 
The central component of Kazin's objection is his own notion of just what "ideas" in 
literature represent. Contrary to James, who was interested in developing the "means" rather 
than the "object," he believes they embody experience. Ideas rarely find a place in America, 
Kazin observed as early as 1942; they do not form a tradition in American literature. T.S. Eliot, 
upon James's death in 1916, had indicated that James had "a mind so fine that no idea could 
violate it." Analysing Eliot's view, Kazin concluded that presumably James's mind had been so 
free of paltry concerns and commitments that it functioned as a pure instrument of truth: 
But how much it did not include! To see how vain Eliot's remark is, one has only to test it against 
Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Nietzsche, Melville. At least two of these writers, Tolstoy and Melville, were 
not so "intelligent" as James, if it is only intelligence one asks of a writer. But there is a purpose 
in intelligence beyond being "fine"; it is one that uses up ideas rapidly, but can never be above 
them. That purpose is to be so finely woven, of all that life is for others as well as for ourselves, 
that nothing can violate us.55 
Ideas define the reality of our relationship to others; in literature, they focus our experience of 
the Other. For an American artist deploring the lack of European social institutions in the native 
setting, as was the case with James, the most prized object becomes "society" itself. That is why 
Kazin holds Gilbert Osmond up to a standard of social norms. Osmond's ideal community of 
shared sensibilities and interests turns out to be small, self-seeking élite interested in little else 
but defending their own sense of distinction. Such are the fruits of a wholly aestheticized life. 
Kazin proceeds to assess James's magnum opus, The Golden Bowl, on the basis of the power 
drive securing the aesthete's centrality to his society. A totally self-contained and self-referential 
artefact, the aesthetics of 'taste' — which is meant to serve as the foundation of a wholly 
enlightened and ennobled society — is a smokescreen for distrust, greed, duplicity, and 
crookedness. The inherent dynamics of the social paraphernalia which James wanted so badly 
to transfer to the American scene is seen to create thoroughly reprehensible personalities. Kazin 
recalls The Golden Bowl's protagonist Adam Verver reflecting on his European actions that "it 
was all, at bottom, in him, the aesthetic principle, planted... where it fed almost wholly on the 
material directly involved, on the idea (followed by appropriation) of plastic beauty, of the thing 
visibly perfect in its kind" (AP, 232). He dismisses the notion that all life is capturable in 
aesthetic formulae. Ideas are not recipes for aesthetic representation: they are the outcome of the 
individual selfs dramatic encounter with the 'world.' Using the method of "relation," or 
juxtaposition, Kazin drives this point home in the chapter following his assessment of James, 
which sandwiches Henry Adams, another "esthete" in search of an ideal society, in between 
Theodore Dreiser and Mark Twain, both of them significantly less convinced of the individual's 
power to control his fate in society and driven by experience. He calls The Golden Bowl a "fairy 
tale," totally disconnected from the contingent realm, though he spots a redeeming feature: 
James's great achievement in this last novel was to make "personality" triumph over the accumu-
lation of experience. With this he demonstrated a distinctness of and fascination for personality 
that became increasingly dim in twentieth-century fiction after him, as a clinical psychology 
replaced every traditional sense of uniqueness. For James, the individual soul is still the product 
of the most finespun relationships, can be put into motion only in a civilization that values persons 
in the most delicate assortments and combinations. (AP, 233) 
302 
James was ignorant of history, however. The outbreak of the Great War and the havoc it 
wreaked took him totally by surprise. It brought him to the forced recognition that as an artist 
he had traded in an irrelevant currency, even if this did meet the requirements of his own 
imagination. He had believed that complex aesthetic perceptions are a breeding ground for the 
"greatest personages possible" (quoted in AP, 234) and that their elevating insights would leaven 
society at large. In the modem era, however, society, and more particularly the State, would 
shatter all but the most resilient personalities. Thus, Jamesian selfhood is at odds with the 
libertarian variety Kazin pursues in "the imagination of society" which is the object of study in 
Procession. In a diary note, Kazin takes his cue from Philip Rahv and denies that James's 
aesthetic objects are historically viable: 
Rahv's suggestion that James expressed civilization's "dream of itself' means that J. is not dealing 
with "society" status alone but with a dream indeed / of a civilization — an organic model of 
"excellence" and human ambition. The land of consideration is the domain of ambition, socially 
considered. The moral excellence of the Transcendentalist mind was individual. 
A civilization in J.'s image can only be an historic entity — another beautiful chapter in the 
shining annals of "History." History thus very different from "progress" or "perfection." The key 
is San Marco as the drawing room of Europe.56 
Henry Adams: The Impact of an Aesthete's Quarrel With History 
The very title of Part Three of Procession, "Ruling by Style: History and the Moderns, 1900-
1929," addresses the spiritual-intellectual divisions and dilemmas facing American writers in the 
early twentieth century and the aesthetic solutions the "moderns" proposed. The inscriptions 
taken from Melville, a proto-modem, and Joyce, the figure-head of the modem movement, 
however, serve to show that these solutions plied a self-defeating relativism and damaged the 
human landscape." 
Henry Adams in particular imparted momentum to the modemist claim that modem history 
exposed the futility of nineteenth-century hopes of social melioration and man's ultimate 
perfection. Adams, by virtue of his thorough political training and august family background, 
was so used to identifying himself with the national centre of power in the fledgling democracy 
that he naturally equated his own intellectual experience with "History." Being an Adams and 
privileged, he assumed he comprised all — American — history. Kazin claims he did so only 
at the expense of enormous repudiations of self. 
"History," as Adams creates it, invites exegesis, Kazin claims, and definitely requires a 
didactic framework for its interpretation. Kazin provides this, focusing on Adams's need to 
recreate history ("History") as literature. Adams believed this would compensate for his bitter-
ness at having been sidetracked by the real thing. Electoral defeats suggested that popular 
democracy did not tolerate the Adams family temperament, and Henry could never accept the 
classical republic of his great-grandfather John Adams and grandfather John Quincy Adams 
being wrecked and "tum[ed] into the 'powerhouse' now commanded by greedy little men" {AP, 
278). The exegesis bears on the thematic contrast of the past and its lasting imprint on Adams's 
sensibility, and the present, whose vulgarity was a let-down to Adams and stoked his bittern-
ess.58 But already Kazin warns of the catastrophic ways in which the past, conceived as the 
determining force of "sequence," may invade the present. Springing The Education on his 
audience, Adams unmistakably exploited a double perspective: he formulated scientific claims 
about history at a time when, under the impact of widespread political crisis and global war, the 
libertarian and progressive heritage of the French Revolution was exposed as a liberal illusion, 
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then offered himself as an "eighteenth-century type" to the predominantly conservative and neo-
medieval climate after the Great War. Thus, as Kazin points out, he performed a quantum leap 
in the history of the American mind: 
He outdistanced John Hay and William McKinley to become the contemporary of T.S. Eliot and 
Ezra Pound. Like Whitman, Melville, Dickinson... Henry James and... Thomas Eakins, Adams was 
to seem a sacrifice to one century but a glory to the next. (AP, 179) 
Kazin suggests that The Education was a ploy to make the contemporary era palatable to this 
eighteenth-century philosophe, and that Eliot recognized this literary strategy and used it 
himself. Adams secured his "postponed power" by arguing the necessary unity of history, using 
"sequence" to extrapolate his past to the present. His imagery, which is a hybrid of 'scientific' 
assumption and social fact, was totally fit for the purpose. 
Adams's unmistakable intellectual ambition as a historian virtually created the American's 
idea of History. It is an astonishing literary idea comprising a collective experience. But Adams 
was distinctly not a novelist, and though he produced a host of historiographical works and 
essays, most notably the History of the United States of America during the Administrations of 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (1889-91), as well as two novels, these "are virtually 
unread even by the literary public" {AP, 281). The irony is that The Education did have a 
profound literary impact. Whereas the 'study of the Jefferson and Madison administrations 
postulated an urgent national destiny based on orderly development of society directed by 
supreme political reason, The Education gloated over the unbridled forces transforming society 
and took a misanthropic view of the future. Though a proponent of the nineteenth-century belief 
that literature "in the grand manner" is equal to any subject, including history, even Adams 
doubted that the impact of science and technology on modem society could be grasped by either 
literature or history. Such was the evidence of his "education" (and his "failure"): he suggested 
the world was getting beyond him and everyone else. He solved his dilemma by straddling it: 
The Education, though it insinuates his "failure" to become a great political figure in the Adams 
tradition and declares him an "eighteenth-century" type thrust into the savage world of modern 
American capitalism and technology, succeeds as a work of history because Adams can present the 
actors of history while turning his not being one of them into a philosopher's disinterested virtue. 
Adams as a writer triumphed through his ability to suggest both the greatest possible intimacy 
with history and his disdainful removal from it. (AP, 283) 
The result, Kazin believes, was a peculiar interdependence of self and history: few American 
intellectuals have left "this much connection in our minds between a single personality and 
history" (AP, 282). 
Adams presented a highly elusive self, however. Kazin dubs him "the willing tool of his own 
imagination" (AP, 283), crafty at "editing" the facts of his life. History in The Education is 
invariably used to portray Henry Adams as a "type." Actually, he was irresistibly drawn to 
explaining history in the light of his own personal "failure," turning himself into a case. That 
failure was a fable, Kazin points out, since there is widespread agreement now based on ample 
documentation that Adams was by all means eligible for public office and would have been 
given it had he chosen to accept it. In point of fact, however, Adams "could not dominate the 
pressures of his own imagination." The fatefulness he cultivated in The Education definitely 
went beyond the general intellectual exhaustion in the fin-de-siècle: the uncontainable acceler-
ation of history was presumably to be the ruin of all the "best people." His image of history as 
based on "sequences" naturally implied that the human mind was losing grip on the forces 
shaping modern society. But "sequence" simply meant development from any previous stage, an 
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a posteriori observation, Kazin reminds us, and had little to do with historical causation as a 
logically defensible argument carrying the general public's consent. It was itself a literary ploy, 
satisfying the mind's aesthetic need.59 
Adams had written the History of the United States from the conviction that the national 
destiny could become the subject of scientific history, measurable by quantitative law. His "habit 
of exclusion" rigorously eliminated anything untoward from the design. Basically, he conceived 
of the History of the United States only when the returns were in: his longitudinal view of 
history down from the Ancients to the predicament of one "Adams" in the contemporary age 
convinced him that the design was evident, that it was calculable, and would fulfil itself. This 
created the illusion of objectivity. Yet, Adams's "subtle purpose [in the History] was to show 
how all [of the political leaders it deals with] — with Jefferson, the chief victim of his illusions, 
at their head — were swept by a force, national destiny, that they could not control" (AP, 288). 
So Adams's real subject as a speculative intellectual was not science but "force." Such force 
could presumably be harnessed by sterling philosophical minds such as John Quincy Adams's 
or his grandson Henry's. Henry's President-forebears, however, were not re-elected after their 
first term, indicating that their flinty philosopher's minds in power never adjusted to the political 
expectations of the democratic masses. Similarly, Henry's 'scientific' law of history — as a 
form imposed on American history — was too rigid a concept to encompass the national 
experience. Its effect was to keep self and history apart. 
In the History as in The Education, Henry Adams "was no spectator." He is himself an agent 
in the power game he professes to study objectively. And it is Kazin's view that he used major 
resources of self to secure this role. This showed in Adams's cultivated stance as a historian, the 
only person "with the whole scale of development open to him [and able to] do justice to the 
overwhelming concentration of power in modem times..." (AP, 289). It also showed in his 
conviction as an Adams — a family trait — that he was intellectually at the centre. A statesman 
manqué, he claimed to have an unrivalled sense of America's grand political destiny. Yet, his 
thinking about history was deeply personal, geared to explaining the fate of a single, marked 
individual: himself. His speculative work is totally devoid of the social and moral interest that 
marks the work of fellow historians and revolutionary social thinkers as J.S. Mill, Tocqueville 
and Marx. Most of all, Adams's motives in The Education are revealed by derogatory reflections 
on his supposedly deficient character vis-à-vis the family tradition. His "history" 
begins with an ironic celebration of the Adams family tradition to which Henry felt himself 
inadequate. The most famous theme of the Education is that those who should lead by force of 
intellect, culture and tradition are no longer in charge. But before he comes to this, Adams makes 
it clear that the exalted offices identified with the family were too much for him, a bom artist in 
his response to color, architecture, and music and in his inordinate emotion — an undersized 
sensitif unable to compete in the coming race of the century. (AP, 291) 
Kazin exposes the myth of Adams's "failure." It serves mainly as a contrapuntal literary 
device to point up the unrivalled quality of the mind — its breeding, background, vision — that 
conceived it. In fact, Adams was out to create a sense of a tragic élite "frustrated and maddened 
by ordinary political reality." He felt that "mind" was no longer at the centre controlling social 
and political development. Thus, he effectively singled himself — and his class — out from 
popular democracy, making himself the spider in the web of modem historical consciousness. 
Adams combines a decline of historical faith and a failure of the political will resulting from a 
limiting view of personal relationships as fate. He virtually established the dissolution of the 
age-old connection between the American self and history. The point is essential to Kazin's 
argument: Henry Adams's total absorption in his own, independent self represented a radical 
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break with the American mainstream Protestant tradition of the selfs accountability to some 
inscrutable, inner authority. John Quincy Adams still wrote his diary "for the eye of God and 
for posterity, as a vindication of self ' (AP, 293). Henry, by contrast, manipulated the publication 
of his autobiography, reserving its vision for a rather exclusive group of intellectuals and 
withdrawing his own self from public scrutiny: recounting to his friends "all that he is willing 
to tell of his education had replaced the good opinion of the public, which Adams never 
solicited, and that of his grandfather's God, who has entirely lost personality and no longer 
addresses the creation in human words" (AP, 294). 
For all of Adams's effort to the contrary, questions of self pervade The Education, Kazin 
argues. Adams, a born artist and semiti/ unsettled by a heartless new world, tried to gain a 
foothold in it by pitting his own compulsive "reasoning" against modern "chaos." The most 
subtly personal considerations actually feed into the so-called objectivity of Adams's historical 
"science."40 He felt he could locate history's centre of gravity, but he actually reduced his 
(near-)contemporaries to mere historical actors in a charade with no outcome. This reflects the 
historical theorist's superiority to his material. Kazin accordingly exposes the dual view of 
Adams's aesthetic posture: "The law that he had sought in the money markets, in the materialis-
tic physics so soon to dissolve after Adams's death, made up the web in his tortured mind, with 
its unlimited sense of 'acceleration,' from which he did not wish to flee. Nemesis would justify 
him" (AP, 296). He condemns Adams's extrapolations from history. They deny the family's 
intellectual and political heritage, which provided a much surer basis from which to influence 
the future. They do, however, reflect Adams's need to be exonerated for his personal status as 
a "failure." "Reasoning" was Adams's attempt to bring all history to bear upon his individual 
life and so explain its withered promise. The eighteenth-century Protestant found in the nine-
teenth century that predestination no longer worked, and so replaced a wrathful God with an 
inclusive historical framework suggesting inevitable decline and entropy. This was in itself a 
blatant assertion of self. In addition, Adams's excellence in many areas and his status as a 
connoisseur in both America and Europe made him relish a sense of authority and power. The 
'victim' of history is actually its most reputable and formidable insider: in his many roles and 
occupations, he saw history being made. He could have joined in had he wished to. Kazin 
believes Adams was actually well-poised to become a social novelist, but his social observations 
are intellectually self-serving and mainly serve to advance his own position as the expert of 
modern "failure": 
How gleefully Henry Adams ticks off his failures. But the pride is unmistakable; no one else knew 
enough to recognize the insufficiency of his education. No one else was in a position to fail so 
grandly, to fail so much expectation, to fail in so many distinguished fields and important places. 
(AP, 298) 
Even if the Adams caste is still "the symbol of disinterested professional intelligence, 
scholarship, and tradition in a commercial society [embodying] a standard even if it no longer 
rules as a power" (AP, 298), its social experience and actual conduct showed some rather 
surprising features such as sexual and racial liberalism, political jadedness, commercial ignor-
ance and political radicalism — Henry's own interest in Das Kapital — not to be found in The 
Education. These Henry managed to ignore completely, inconvenient as they were to the drama 
of a particular quality of mind he tried to evoke. It was definitely a mental prerogative of the 
Adams circle that it should not have been put off by even a potentially unsettling degree of 
pluralism within its own ranks. The point of Henry's social chronicle, Kazin emphasizes, is to 
present his friends and associates "as the friends of his ideas" (AP, 299). This reveals a discrep-
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ancy in The Education: it deals with an ostensibly hidden force moving American society but 
it does not show any "connection ... between these friends and the society which in fact they 
led" (AP, 301). The absence reveals Adams's real motives for writing The Education. Kazin 
argues that these were deeply personal rather than historical or scientific. Adams was driven by 
an artistic need to compensate for the loss of the eighteenth-century roots of the world which 
was led by his idols John Adams and John Quincy Adams. Kazin is evidently not concerned 
with Adams the historian so much as with Adams the artist. This new emphasis does not involve 
any disparagement of Adams's power. It does, however, put Adams's vaunted world-historical 
panorama in a different perspective. For Kazin is convinced he presents a unique case, revealing 
more about the literary situation in nineteenth-century America than about the contemporary 
political-intellectual climate: 
The Education of Henry Adams is the story not of a man bom out of his time, who lacked the 
science he needed to understand the nineteenth century; it is the story of an artist deprived of 
having around him the sense of tradition that makes the art of history and who then found himself 
unable to express the terms of his isolation or to believe that anyone, even this made-up "Henry 
Adams," could say just what his interest in history was. This, I believe, was style... Style was 
development, panorama, the emblems of change that constitute our sense of time. It was the 
perfect detachment, with "all history" for [a] subject, that perhaps only an American could feel 
about all "their" history, that only a millionaire scholar, luxuriating voluptuously in inaction, could 
adopt as his portion: the almighty spectator. (AP, 303) 
Thus, Adams qualifies as a proto-modernist. To be termed a stylist in the above sense by Kazin 
is certainly to earn ambiguous praise. As early as 1967, Kazin had taken issue with the 
"spectators" and "bystanders" in the moral history of American writing and come out in favour 
of the "actors."61 These, he reasoned, though often held hostage by the inevitable consequences 
of their acts, at least possessed the moral fibre to assert life in the teeth of their predicament and 
so extracted clues to their redemption from it. The former usually fell prey to a withering 
intellectual relativism. 
Style in Adams is equivalent to consciousness, Kazin holds. Adams's subject matter is so 
intimately bound up with his sense of perspective that historical content yields to an angle on 
historical development. Adams no longer saw the peculiar quality of certain historical episodes 
within a rigorous concept of causality or a plausible mode of contingency; he rather treated it 
the way a painter does "an object in space" (AP, 304). He made a profusion of compelling 
historical images cohere in a concentrated argument about the extraordinary acceleration of 
history — which existed most unambiguously in Adams's own mind — and the pace of 
historical turnover. The effect of this in The Education was "to make the whole force of the past 
live in a single line" (AP, 305). Most significantly, Kazin uses Adams's application of 
Darwinian evolution to 'historical' consciousness to show the expert handling of cultural images 
to form a historical 'fact.' Adams's success, Kazin stresses, depended on his ability to master 
images which as literature had been received by a particular audience. He goes on to expose 
this 'society' as a myth: 
"Community of thought" is what Adams meant by society... To enjoy the Education, later readers 
must feel that such a society exists, as literature, and that one belongs to it as one belongs to the 
society of Pride and Prejudice, The Golden Bowl, A la recherche du temps perdu... Society for 
Henry Adams, as for all traditionalists who identify it with their real or ideal memories, is the 
union of those who share a culture — not always at the same time, perhaps, but they recognize it 
in each other when they do share it. We now see what happens to the "novel of society" in 
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revolutionary times, when whole classes and races hitherto not regarded as fully human suddenly 
assert themselves, and the famous "community of thought" on which society has so long prided 
itself turns out to be the ideal of a tiny elite, one that it has possessed only in forms of ritual. (AP, 
306) 
The Education, he concludes, is a soured intellectual's rear-guard action on behalf of a type of 
society that has become extinct, and of which Adams, and possibly only he, has expert knowle-
dge, and which he wishes to resurrect. It is the embattled elite's defence against the claims of 
popular democracy and the manifestations of contemporary culture. It also constitutes a major 
act of dissociation, because, not being a novelist and therefore incapable of taking personality 
for a subject, Adams characteristically tried his hand at history. But history is about public 
worlds, not private, Kazin objects. Adams desperately needed to shroud himself in his own 
version of history, because he had no personal explanation for his wife's suicide. The "tortured 
historian" switched to the 'science' of history, and the crisis never broke through the surface of 
The Education. Adams exerts rigorous control over his subject. And this, Kazin points out, may 
be Adams's abiding value for after generations: that he tried to calculate, if not anticipate, the 
future from his personal ideal of the ordered, intact and stylized past. 
For the future was compellingly real to Adams because the past was. If you think history naturally 
falls into a design, then you must anticipate how the story may end. 
For Adams history was not just the past; it was the rhythm of "order rigorously consequent."... 
So large was the sweep of Adams's historical imagination that he wanted to see the whole shape, 
history as one great form, stretching from the past to a possibly calculable future. He wanted to 
determine the whole story at once... This intention belongs not to science but to art. So forceful 
a sense of style needed the future to complete the past. (AP, 309) 
In an essay entitled "American Gothic," published in 1989, Kazin analyzed Adams's personal 
motives for writing Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres, the companion piece to The Education. 
The two books supposedly form Adams's 'autobiography.' Kazin recalled the introduction to the 
1913 edition of Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres written by Ralph Adams Cram, which stated 
that Adams's objective had been to bring back the world that built Chartres Cathedral. Cram, 
incidentally, was also an architect passionate about the Gothic style and had been involved in 
the completion of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine on New York's upper West Side. Cram's 
vision — to reinstate the Cathedral's original Romanesque-Byzantine style which had been 
eclipsed by Renaissance classicism and the Protestant revolution — has far less of an appeal to 
the contemporary audience than does Mont-Saint-Michel, Kazin argues, for the Cathedral is still 
unfinished, while its intended medieval style has succumbed to the demands that fiercely 
multiracial and multicultural New York has made on the building, which is now mainly a site 
for ecumenical worship far removed from the "Unity" that fascinated Adams about the religious 
society of the thirteenth century. The current spiritual mission of its staff is little else but the 
timid liberalism of aiding the poor.62 
Henry Adams would probably have relished such evidence of modern entropy, Kazin 
believes, but more important, was Cram right in seeing Adams's Mont-Saint-Michel as an 
"exercise in faith" analogous to his own hopes of reinstating Gothic in the twentieth century? 
Kazin explodes this reading, claiming that Adams's need for the thirteenth century was cultural 
rather than spiritual. Adams at Harvard had even been the expert in the natural development of 
medieval law, while Harvard itself was becoming "soft on the Middle Ages." He was not a pre-
Raphaelite "seeker after lost paradises," Kazin concedes, but the intellectual climate around the 
tum of the century, in America as in Europe, was marked by the revival of a special interest in 
the Middle Ages, of an aesthetic turn to the Church. And though Adams, Kazin adds, never 
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believed in "churchly deliverance," Mont-Saint-Michel shows nothing of the imperious sense of 
social and economic fact that he had wielded in his American histories, substituting for it 
contemplations of Gothic architecture, the art of sculpture, the ethics of chivalric love, Aquinas's 
theology, and the symbol of the Virgin. She was utter "intellectual fantasy," Kazin believed, but 
Adams identified her so strongly with the artist's gift that she becomes in fact Henry Adams 
creating a culture to match his taste.63 
Adams the artist and initiator of a highly calibrated consciousness is also Kazan's subject in 
Procession. Kazin's procession includes writers whose authentic and creative personal imagi-
nation suggested their commitment to the religious aspects of their individual experience, but 
Adams, he asserts, merely had an anthropologist's interest in religion or that of a "comparative 
religionist."*4 Adams did not believe in revealed truth or salvation, not even the aesthete's 
preferred route to it. And precisely this makes him the consummate modern artist to Kazin: 
Adams believed in "mind, achievement, talent, genius, the flights of superior intellect, the 
victories of spirit." These alone transcend "the fragmentation and dissolution of earthly experi-
ence." Adams's symbol of the "meteor mind" flashing through space, then, signifies to Kazin 
the extraordinarily fertile mind of another historian-artist who, like himself alienated from a 
sustaining sense of tradition, seeks to head off the proliferating ambiguities and contradictions 
of modem life. In Kazin's case, that struggle is dramatized in the conclusions of Writing Was 
Everything (1996) and A Lifetime Burning in Every Moment: From the Journals of Alfred Kazin 
(1996), and will feature in the Epilogue. But the recognition applies fully to Procession, too, 
which as a book of experience created by purely literary means not only takes its cues from 
Adams's structural narrative resources but also invokes a myth of American consciousness.65 
In Procession, Kazin's sensibility seeks to act on American literary consciousness as the "meteor 
mind" leaving its conspicuous, scintillating trace is space like the prophecy or portent of an as 
yet unborn and possibly terrible beauty. Kazin is not smug about the chances of delivering that 
unborn reality, but he is prepared to go all the way on the strength of his intensely personal, 
artist's conviction: 
It is this, where Adams closes his book on the stupendous achievement of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
that comes out in the triumph of Thomas's mind over his system, over the Church his system 
helped to buttress. The mind naturally classifies and positions its thoughts, and so unites. The 
mind labors in a climate of unity whether it wants to or not. And calls that unity whatever it will. 
In the thirteenth century, "God"; in the age of entropy, chance, random occurrences, systematized 
meaninglessness, its name for Adams was "chaos." But men are driven to seek unity, in letter, 
name, symbol, by the very nature of the mind. So what a tragedy for culture if the civilization 
surrounding mind is wholly without form or plan or belief in anything except material advance-
ment! This can lead thoughtful men back to the Middle Ages. To recover even the conscious wish 
for unity can drive a man to write about the thirteenth century at the beginning of the twentieth.66 
The difference is that Kazin feels no need to escape into religiously unified epochs; he writes 
about the nineteenth century at the end of the twentieth. 
On T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound: Modernism Is Not Our Only Tradition 
Kazin holds T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound responsible for squandering the Emersonian heritage of 
the religious inspiration available to the freeborn American individual. He cultivates a carefully 
modulated tone of disagreement with the terms of Adams's philosophy alternating with respect 
for the latter's artistic genius but he condems Eliot, and even more so in Pound, outright the 
type of sensibility they sponsored. 
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To Kazin, Eliot's troubled personal development is an exposé of Emersonian "self-reliance." 
Continuing a family background and an inherited cultural psychology, Eliot clearly despaired of 
the power of the private self to enact a typically American aptitude: reconstituting the tradition. 
Yet, he displayed this American gift most forcefully outside his native country, in Britain, 
working with other than native material, viz. the European literary tradition. Eliot was not after 
self-reliance and his high-strung sense of personal limitations committed him to a compensatory, 
innovative poetic strategy: 
Whatever Eliot's reasons for staying on in wartime London, his defiance of his family in St. Louis 
seems to have surprised him. This was the first significant act of his bookish life and highly 
introverted character. Though Eliot turned out to be more traditionalist than his family, a great 
believer in institutions as long as they were British, his move to England was a rebellious Ameri-
can act that parallels the "infidel" Emerson's leaving the church. 
Eliot was so far removed from the kind of conviction that had inspired Emerson that "even in 
his twenties" (AP, 311) he was forbiddingly conservative and favoured Irving Babbitt's hatred 
of romanticism at the expense of William James's affirmative psychology. He strongly identified 
with the family's sense of mission and its Puritan exclusiveness. The father, who was to cut him 
off without a penny for moving to England, held socially reprehensible views, but several 
women in the family showed a penchant for social action. Eliot did not endorse them, and his 
Harvard poems mildly satirized both their work and the genteel tradition of the Boston Evening 
Transcript, showing "a fear of experience outside the tradition" (AP, 312). In his Virginia 
lectures, in the 1930s, he he went so far as to express open racial prejudice, claiming that 
reasons of "race" and "religion" combine to make a wholly Christian society desirable. 
Kazin argues that the "unknown and isolated" American civilian T.S. Eliot staying on in 
wartime London "was making his protest not only against family and background but against 
America itself. More than he realized, it was America's essential secularism and uplift he was 
rejecting" (AP, 313). Contemporary London actually furnished the most suitable background to 
Eliot's search for a therapeutic style. Europe falling to pieces reflected his own personal trial. 
Culturally traditionalist and intellectually removed from mass democracy, he was also sexually 
troubled, for his marriage to Vivien Haigh-Wood, "an Englishwoman of unstable temperament" 
(AP, 311), was a public failure. This, together with his literary work at night after a day's 
clerical drudgery at the bank, caused mental breakdown, and Eliot came to see existence as 
unremitting trial and personal hell, with evidence of dissolution on all hands.67 The personal 
life was a wasteland which he sought to relieve by immersing himself in the suprapersonal 
themes of literary material. Literary images were meant to heal the disruption of the contempo-
rary scene, which was visible enough in London. To this end, Eliot relied on his extraordinary 
capacity for capturing sensory experience, collecting sensations "from the history around him." 
He made London "the perfect state for personal expression" (AP, 314). 
The Waste Land, Kazin states, provided the framework and myth of a "fallen world" to give 
meaning to Eliot's personal woes. He believes it furnished an image of Eliot's orthodoxy rather 
than a literary education. Whereas he ultimately warms to the implications of Henry Adams's 
style as the quality of the latter's concern with history, he distrusts the effect of Eliot's, for that 
promoted "the sense of being trapped between an almost vanished tradition and an eroding 
present." More insistently than anyone else, Eliot used the war as a suitable "metaphor of the 
whole modem period" (AP, 317). His disillusionment was monumental in its presumptuousness, 
Kazin charges, and the tremendous impact of his poetic machinery turned his historical outlook 
into an absolute statement on the dissociation of past order and present chaos.68 This naturally 
related to many people to whom the war spelled the 'chaos' they experienced individually and 
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which they were eager to remedy. In the final analysis, Kazin rejects Eliot's claim of a new, 
poetic order for being based entirely on the associative logic of "primitive emotions": "Decade 
after decade The Waste Land represented 'an attitude toward history' that went deeper than 
Hemingway's In Our Time, Spengler's The Decline of the West, Robert Graves's Goodbye to All 
That. More and more fashionably, Eliot's modernist poem came to represent the human failure 
of modern civilization" (AP, 319). This was a sweeping reversal of the radiant faith in the 
human individual expressed by Emerson, who had died a mere five years before Eliot was bom, 
as Kazin reminds us. It illustrated perfectly the volatility of historical faith in America. 
Eliot in due course displayed a marked contempt for democracy, disdained the "swarming 
creatures," and showed a fierce longing for authority. Kazin suggests that Eliot's fear and 
distrust of his own individual self may have been altogether justified, for Eliot was out of touch 
with the masses and the democratic experience, made solitary by his politics as by his 
"priggishness." Lacking Whitman's genius for identifying with the common folk, he "never 
responded to the sense of possibility recurrent in democracy" {AP, 319). Eliot aimed to expose 
self-reliance, the very foundation of Emersonian selfhood, as a poor guide to meaningful action 
within the contemporary context of 'chaos.' Like Emerson, Eliot 
made the perilous journey to faith all on his own. He, too, was a natural "isolato," and American. 
But unlike Emerson, Eliot could not trust his isolation and selfhood. Needing God, he settled for 
authority. "Authority" was what Europe alone could supply— in the form of culture. (AP, 319-
20) 
Kazin emphasizes that Eliot's poetic fear of the self was consistent with his view of the 
historical sense in "Tradition and the Individual Talent." This marked Eliot's total removal from 
the powers available to the Emersonian soul and stressed his faith in the universal claims of 
tradition. Any action undertaken or idea entertained in the present, Eliot argued, must be totally 
accountable to whatever aspect of the past it bears on: "for order to persist after the 
supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered..." (quoted 
in AP, 320). This is magnificent in its hubris, Kazin observes, and most significantly also 
typically American. A knack for world-historical evaluation has certainly been an American's 
birth-right, Kazin concedes, but Eliot's definition of the historical sense conveyed an extraordi­
nary intellectual sentiment which few Europeans, reasoning from a totally different grounding 
in experience, would care to endorse: 
No European, no seasoned Catholic intelligence, could have delivered such a paean to the past. No 
one inheriting Europe's religious wars and its many cultural divisions could have believed for a 
moment that "the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and 
composes a simultaneous order."... 
... Only an American — and this in 1919 — could have wished any "existing order" to be 
"complete." (ЛД 320-1) 
Ezra Pound never undertook a journey to religious faith, replacing it by an arbitrary faith in 
History as communication between great minds. Only they, presumably, have a grasp of what 
will last. Pound's was not merely the American expatriate's hatred of commercial society, nor 
simply a revolt from modem civilization's drive to dominate nature. He rather assumed primor­
dial forms of energy could be tapped by excavating the roots of poetry in "an ancient world in 
Asia even more than [in] pagan Greece and Rome." Pound's madcap associationism would lead 
him helter-skelter from paganism via polytheism to Chinese, Greek, Latin, "even American!" 
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The objective was to have the man-poet speak with the authority of the gods. There is more 
than mocking censure in Kazin's observation that "Pound easily separated himself from 
America, for he did not regard nature as inherently different from oneself, as something to 
manipulate. He would not suffer from the bourgeois ignorance of the sources of vital energy, 
from the recurrent mental fatigue ultimately due to the split between subject and object" (AP, 
323). As in Adams's and Eliot's case, Pound's real impact as a poet relied on style. He pro-
posed to do without intellectual argument. If he had any, it was instinctual. Words were "fossil 
poetry," and he was to extract a philosophy from their development across cultures. His instinct 
for tracing and grasping their connections bordered on auto-intoxication, and its corollary was 
excessive self-confidence and a totally idiosyncratic view of historic precedent. Pound actually 
identified the writing of poetry as the only significant type of action in the historical world: 
The mystery Pound touched was the secret of style — not, as he eventually thought, the damnable 
tendency of history to lapse from some great tradition or model furnished by Confucius, Dante, 
John Adams. Pound became the great exemplar and teacher of modernism by restricting it 
(whether he knew this or not) to a matter of style. And he was on safe ground as long as he 
insisted on its energy, its physicality. (AP, 325) 
Kazin argues that Pound, like Adams, was after an inclusive concept of history; Pound, how-
ever, rather believed that the "real Muse is History — but History buried in words..." (AP, 326). 
He wilfully pursued an antithesis to the world of historical fact. Accordingly, Hugh Selwyn 
Mauberley is a monument to Pound's self-conceived didactic role, representing "a totally 
fictitious authority in the minds of the audience" (AP, 328).69 
A similar misconception drives the Cantos, the epic poem Kazin uses to blast Pound's 
reputation. Pound himself defined epic as "a poem including history," but Kazin wryly adds that 
"History turns out to be anything that interests Ezra Pound" (AP, 328). Kazin considers them a 
stunning piece of bravado, a feat of associative genius, wholly conducted by the shaman in 
possession of the ancient lore of language. The effect of Pound's febrile forays into ancient 
cultures, Kazin points out, is to de-contextualize the historical settings he visits. Historical 
causality goes by the board, and so, for that matter, does morality. The poetic method of the 
Cantos does not enhance existing reality so much as show contempt for it. To Pound as to other 
modernists — Kazin mentions Joyce and Picasso — this came as a necessity of life: they took 
"their endlessly inventive hand as the measure of reality." Pound imposed his in the Cantos, 
carried on by "verbal self-stimulation" (AP, 329) and not in the least worried by his very real 
isolation as a result of his reclusive life in Rapallo, Italy, feeding on Fascist information. Their 
historical logic is no other than the order of Pound's quotations, memories, references, images, 
but Kazin reminds us that it is just this historical pastiche that virtually created a industry among 
Pound's critical elucidators, whom Pound never ceased to instruct. Kazin points out that the 
Cantos are Pound's "diary" and no more than "the record of his amazing reading" (AP, 331); 
they represent a wholly arbitrary view of history. But what he condemns most of all is that in 
the wake of the debacle of the great nineteenth-century visions of history, Pound's acolytes have 
been eager to pick up his "feats of association" to engineer their own kind of historical 
sequence. And they have mistakenly associated this with authority.70 
Kazin charges Pound — and Eliot — with having exerted a deleterious influence on the 
contemporary historical sense. Emerson had had a religious conviction that the "self-reliant" 
American could project moral order into the world; Eliot and Pound denied any existed. Instead, 
they offered a highly selective and relativistic picture of history, suggesting this was all the 
history that was necessary: 
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Eliot told us that the order of the past is transformed by every new work; everything past becomes 
an aspect of present taste. The great effect of "Eliot-Pound" was to abolish among the literary all 
historicism and to coerce the whole past into fashions of the present. African masks are viewed by 
the museum crowd as a stimulant to Picasso's roving imagination, Confucius the perfect teacher 
becomes the metaphor of the 'Vise ruler" in Pound's myth of the perfect society, Jefferson is a 
counterpart to Mussolini, and his great hero John Adams becomes absolutely meaningless in the 
so-called Adams Cantos, 62-71... One of the marks of... the culture vultures who pace the modem 
museum gathering impressions, who expertly compare one recording with another without 
knowing how to read music, is the lack of attentiveness that Pound's ransacking method invites. 
(AP, 331) 
The result of this attitude is not sanctioned by common experience. Pound did not wish to be 
lumped together with "the bullet-headed many." He was contemptuous of contemporary demo-
cratic generations, because these had supervised the dispersal of primal energies available to 
early societies. Whereas Adams, who definitely had personal reasons to feel alienated from 
history, philosophized about it and cultivated a pose of detachment, Pound was 'Visibly torm-
ented" by it. He took the reverse route from Joyce and "moved from the withinness of the poem 
into the terror of twentieth-century history. Yet the terror is not the authoritarian state... 
[emphasis added]" For Pound — as to some extent also Eliot, Joyce, Lawrence, Yeats, Mann, 
Pasternak, Mandelstam, Woolf, Proust, and others — looked to an authoritarian politics such as 
Mussolini's to restore society to its primal, tribal order "identified with art by conservatives and 
sought for society by fascists."71 The classical past inhered in perfect language, every vestige 
of which had drained from the present except, of course, from the social programmes of 
Fascism. 
Kazin's case against Pound rests on the extreme distortions of both the historical and moral 
orders Pound's poetic method invites. Pound, he believes, in due course became a travesty of 
the once typically nineteenth-century faith in the poet as the unacknowledged legislator of the 
democratic tribe, a Whitmanesque bard leading his people "from history as blood and tears, 
mere history, to the delectable mountains" (AP, 333). Eliot scaled the heights and found 
authority, allowing him to produce the mellowing mysticism of the Four Quartets. Pound's 
idiosyncratic interpretations of certain bits of historical material, by contrast, were morally even 
more outrageous than the 'facts' they allegedly referred to. In "The Fascination and Terror of 
Ezra Pound" (1986), Kazin refers to material produced by Pound that has so far had a restricted 
circulation and probably been officially suppressed. It includes Pound's radio broadcasts for the 
Axis powers in wartime and his book Jefferson and/or Mussolini: "L 'Idea Statale: Fascism As 
I Have Seen It (1935). When, in 1973, Kazin quoted from these speeches in a magazine article, 
the Pound estate threatened to sue him. It was obvious then, as it must be now, that Pound the 
poetic energizer of our unconscious, collective language found no parallel in Pound as a social 
seer. That side of him was morally repugnant. But Kazin trains his guns most of all on the 
obscene hypothesis in the Cantos that the Second World War was actually a clean-up operation 
staging "poor yitts paying for / a few big jews' vendetta on goyim." European Jewry allegedly 
atoned for the sins of the Rothschilds, though Kazin has no trouble showing that the Rothschild 
family history in wartime features outstanding examples of political and moral courage. In the 
Pisan Cantos, Pound likens the executed Mussolini to a "twice-crucified" Christ and the 
liberated Italians of the post-Fascist era to "maggots... eat[ing] the dead bullock." Pound once 
defined modern epic as "things explaining themselves by the company they keep." The 'things' 
in his verse kept very bad company indeed. Kazin redefines epic as "a book of action (always 
a hope to Pound) unifying a race through the chronicle of its wars, sacred places, gods." But the 
"quotidian" never got into the Cantos, Kazin points out, presumably because there was "no 
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actual life around him [during his splendid isolation in Rapallo] for Pound to respect." Pound's 
epic consciousness, which fed his poetic will, was limited to his own sense of the "fundamental 
frailty" of poetry, whose energies he had a masterful command of. "The social application of the 
modern novel [, however,] meant nothing to him." Pound considered the only true history to be 
the kind of epic he produced. That was an unsatisfactory model even for fellow poets such as 
Tate, Auden, Lowell and Jarrell, who remained "indifferent," while it left Yeats "baffled and 
irritated." As a historical or civic intelligence, Pound was a disaster and a moral poison. Kazin 
stakes out his place in the American procession as follows: 
Pound failed himself, not the masses who never really knew or cared about History as enchant-
ment, idol, sorrow, trap — the history that only intellectuals can afford to worry about.... Tempus 
loquendi, tempus taciendi was one of his favorite sayings.... And indeed he had much to be silent 
about. Pound spoiled his own dreams. But the anticlimax of his old age should not blind us to the 
radiance with which he started. Pound was the last to believe that the poet does have authority. 
His manic power reminds us why Plato feared poets and wanted them out of the perfect Republic. 
(AP, 333)72 
In 1986, Kazin stated the case even more directly: 
Pound was a convinced fascist. The cruelty and death of fascism are an essential part of his epic 
and cannot be shrugged away in judging his work. Pound recognized his epic hero in Mussolini 
because fascism, like Ezra Pound, had few abiding social roots and was based on an impersona-
tion, like Pound's, of a mythic personage ["brava gente"]. Pound was a racist, a defender of racial 
persecution, indifferent to the obliteration of fellow artists. These were not personal aberrations but 
part of hierarchic beliefs into which he grew by long years of alienation from his country and 
from the people around him. Pound was a fascist in a period when everything turned against the 
humane spirit of pre-1914 Europe in which modernism began. 
The growing tendency of our century is against that spirit. Nowhere is it more striking than in 
the museum of modem literature...73 
Dreiser and Faulkner: The Power of Society and History 
Dreiser the man and artist was so much formed by the national experience that he became 
creative without even being aware of a particular aesthetic point of view. He offers a significant 
variation on the naturalistic doctrine of necessity, relying primarily on the creative plasticity of 
fact. Kazin uses the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago to illustrate the kind of 
metaphysics that impelled Dreiser. In different ways, the Fair was an index to Dreiser's, 
Adams's and Twain's sense of selfhood. To Dreiser, it embodied the crucial role of opportu-
nities generated by modern society. The heroine of his novel Sister Carrie was stupefied by her 
impressions of Chicago — where "every human aggression was closer to the writer's eye" (AP, 
237) — when she arrived there at age eighteen. Chicago itself was virtually synonymous with 
the Fair: the concentrated effect of American reality in the making on Carrie's personal destiny 
emulated the most self-conscious of aesthetic designs. Kazin argues that there is complete 
identity between Dreiser the artist and his protagonist Carrie, suggesting that Dreiser was the 
first American novelist to write wholly from experience. Unwittingly, Dreiser avoided the 
classical dichotomy in American literature between self and the Other; Carrie is wholly a 
"construction of society" (AP, 243), not of the social 'thickness' Hawthorne and James had 
postulated as indispensable to mature literature but of reality taken raw: 
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Chicago in the nineties, the most disturbed period in American life after the Civil War, was 
Dreiser's destined subject, as it was for other Midwestern writers. He did not choose it, as Henry 
James chose so many things to write about. Chicago seemed to choose him — which was what 
Dreiser felt about every circumstance in his life, every plot in his fiction. He was the first 
American novelist to invest the big city with such a hungry, avid sense of power... 
Dreiser's images of the city have a lasting hold because he described the most familiar objects 
in a great city as if they were foreign to him. The pathos of distance became his fictional per-
spective, the medium in which his most affecting characters move. Every appearance of the 
modem city became single, hallucinatory, painfully distinct with that first impression of a new 
world. (AP, 237) 
Carrie is the earliest statement in American literature of destiny as power and society taking 
over from the self. She proves that much of the reality we think we create and control is a 
mirage and must be regarded with caution. 
The section on Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy, which links up with the earlier section 
on Sister Carrie and its creation of personality as a construction of society, complements the 
"Eliot-Pound" chapter. Its major effect is to expose the socially anemic imagination of the 
literary movement led by Pound and Eliot. Kazin calls An American Tragedy (1925) an 
"anachronistic" (AP, 353) novel, suggesting just how much it was out of step with the free play 
of mind that marked the spirit of literary invention at the time. 
An American Tragedy was a bombshell in a world dominated by experiments in style. Its 
substance is its lumbering but inexorable narrative, Kazin argues, though its subject matter was 
distinctly non-Twenties: it was reality crushing "Art," confronting Americans with a new social 
logic. The fate of its main character, Clyde Griffiths, is a yearning for acceptance by society that 
contrasts sharply with many a modernist's wish to flee from it and build a world elsewhere. 
Clyde commits a crime to enable him to realize his dreamy social ambitions, and he has none 
of the existentialist hubris of the Dostoevskian, marginalized, intellectual hero flouting conven-
tional morality. His act is not a triumph of the will — a modernist claim to distinction — but 
an expression of the dreamlike and fatal attraction that modern society can exert on individuals. 
Both in the history of its genesis and in its content, An American Tragedy is about the social 
concept of class, not the modernist's defence of the individual, unique personality. It hinges on 
an interest in 'the system' itself, witness Dreiser's fascination with the capitalist Frank Algernon 
Cowperwood in The Financier (1912) and The Titan (1914). Dreiser presents society as 
character and as vortex, without committing himself to any politically activist programme. He 
was not bothered by a liberal conscience, and his fundamental insight is that society is not so 
much created by men as that it creates and shapes them, winners and losers alike: "The back-
ground of all his work... was his sense that injustice makes society possible. It was another form 
of the carnage that sustains nature" (AP, 338). And like Darwin's, it was a bold, creative vision 
of the larger forces moulding us. Dreiser's respect for a Darwinian interpretation of fact, Kazin 
claims, saved him as effectively from the obsessions of his personal life — his incorrigible 
libido and low self-esteem — as Eliot's carefully modulated and irritable sense of maladjustment 
did to save him from his. His social sense was so total in its ambition that it presented a 
rigorous ordering of material similar to that promoted by Eliot's preference for the constraints 
inherent in tradition. 
Lionel Trilling's "Reality in America" inspired the critical reaction in the Forties against 
Dreiser. Kazin's introduction to The Stature of Theodore Dreiser: A Critical Study of the Man 
and His Work (1955), however, had reclaimed the spiritual dimension of Dreiser's work. He 
argues that Dreiser's genius was beyond social amelioration and rather belongs to a native 
tradition of 
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writers and painters [who] were "naturalists" only in the stark sense that the world has suddenly 
come down to them divested of its supernatural sanction. They were actually obsessed with the 
transcendental possibilities of this "real" world.... In their contemplative acceptance of this world... 
they were actually not in the tradition of political "liberalism" but in that deeper American strain 
of metaphysical wonder which leads from the early pietists through Whitman to the first painters 
of the modem city.74 
This aspect of transcendence was ignored by Trilling, who held Dreiser virtually responsible for 
solidifying American liberalism's distrust of the life of the mind. Kazin, however, makes it 
central to Procession's concern with the historical permutations of American selfhood. That 
theme also surfaces in An American Tragedy, whose hero was brought up by his bigoted parents 
to see the world as a totally spiritualized realm. This carried over into Clyde's social ambition: 
once he has experienced the allure of the city, he tries single-mindedly '4o replace his freakishly 
religious childhood with the standard American life of external success" (AP, 340). Clyde's 
classically American faith in the inner life shifts to a different object, viz. the life of society, 
and in Kazin's reading is actually a watershed in the moral history of American writing. An 
American Tragedy is a case history of American religious idealism being superseded. Its social 
logic, Kazin claims, is really Clyde's compulsion transferred to the narrative. This is as reveal-
ing of Dreiser's creative vision as it is of the failure of the modem American self to find a 
spiritual resolution to its disillusionmenfwith the limitations of social existence: 
Dreiser's reasoning is that a man has no escape from the social net if he totally accepts its values. 
Clyde incorporates everything meretricious and fatal to himself because, as in his evangelical 
youth, he has never been anything but obedient, a creature of other people's ideas. He may seem 
to transfer his loyalties from his parents' God to the idolatry of Sondra Finchley [his desired 
society girl] and everything money-wise and sexy that she represents. But he still has no mind of 
his own. He never puts up a single value of his own against everything he dumbly embodies. He 
is engulfed by ambitions and fancies that personify the society he has never thought to question. 
Dreiser's hatred of organized religion is the key. Religion no longer has anything to do with 
individual promptings of faith, has become just social convention. (AP, 341) 
No doubt, Kazin believes Eliot's intellectual following faces a similar hazard. 
Elsewhere, Kazin has noted that the decline of religious faith in recent times has been 
important mainly for the culture it leaves behind. It was religiously tormented minds such as 
Eliot's whose rigid traditionalism disdained the creative dimension of the modem democratic 
experience. Clyde Griffith's equally high-minded family are blind to everything but his lapses 
from conventional propriety, ignore him once he is in jail awaiting trial, and so seal his fate. 
Moreover, Clyde's dreamlike resolve to murder his real love Roberta once she has become 
pregnant, its clumsy execution and his bitter surprise at the vicious consequences of his 'act' — 
like Hurstwood's unpremeditated theft in Sister Carrie — shows that "we are faithless at heart" 
(AP, 344). To Kazin, An American Tragedy proves that the decline of the religious sense of self 
has destroyed every belief that we can base history on the morality of our actions. Clyde's 
passiveness contrasts violently with the aggregate energy of society that irresistibly drives him 
to the electric chair. Nevertheless, Kazin voices a proviso: 
The proprieties, everything pertaining to social control, finally lock Clyde in. Dreiser has not the 
slightest doubt of his case. The book is an extended, monumental demonstration (not a defense) 
of a man who had no choice because he never made a choice. What makes the demonstration so 
convincing is Dreiser's peculiar inability, as with Hurstwood and Carrie, to imagine alternatives. 
Every detail performs because Dreiser cannot be distracted. He was awed by his material. (AP, 
342) 
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Dreiser exerted less creative control over his material than should have been possible to an artist 
seeking the redemptive design of history. He failed to explore any alternatives to the unsparing 
concentration of his narrative line, replacing history by society and depriving his protagonist of 
an identity in history: 
An American Tragedy was a triumph of method. The method succeeded through its total projection 
of a distinct point of view. Society was now everything. Hence man as man, the soul of man, man 
in his freedom, was still to be misunderstood by a society just as steeped in materialism as Clyde. 
Man as the dupe of society is outside himself— like Clyde Griffiths, who went to his death still 
not knowing who he was and what he had done. (AP, 345) 
That elusive identity was more vivid to Faulkner's mind, who had virtually internalized history 
through his avid absorption in the story of his declining family in the poorest state of the Union. 
All of history was present to him, since from his earliest days, "Faulkner still lived the heroic 
and defiant past" (AP, 346). It was composed of the raw self-assertion of the original settlers, 
the remoteness and isolation of the Mississippi community, and racial discrimination carried on 
in the name of God. To people so sensitive to the breakdown all around them, the past wore a 
special aspect: 
Faulkner lived with sacred history like a character in the Bible. Yet God's promise to His people 
had been withdrawn. Forced to live in the past, Southerners were kept from prolonging it. What 
remained was the "imperishable" story, one that Faulkner felt condemned and privileged to write. 
Only by writing could he save his awareness and extend it. Among so many failed and desperate 
Southerners in the "silent South," he was isolated by being a writer. He was to project his 
menaced sensibility onto many defeated and violent Southerners. (AP, 346-7) 
What we see here is the writer as a redemptive and heroic figure in a community unable to 
break through the mould of their past and release it to the future. Faulkner's very ability to 
conceive of a future, and to suggest its necessity, was proof of the type of moral vision that 
Kazin believes continues the Emersonian faith in the self-reliant individual. 
Both as a person and as a "poet," Kazin observes, Faulkner was indistinguishable from 
Southern history. This certainly set him apart from Eliot, who effectively excluded himself from 
native Americanism. As a further point, Eliot's missionary drive cultivated a charmed circle of 
historically disillusioned and culturally sensitive fellow-minds eager to accept his view of 
tradition as law. Mississippi, by contrast, forced Faulkner to develop his literary gifts in 
isolation: even the aristocracy shunned native literature, reading only British authors: "Romance 
consoled the South until the 1920s." Kazin shows that, remarkably, Faulkner's development, 
despite his undemocratic "rejection of] all virtuous paths to prosperity" (AP, 348) — Faulkner's 
was a lumpen aristocracy — and the muddled genesis of his first three novels, had a logic all 
its own. His brinkmanship in style and subject matter, which culminated in The Sound and the 
Fury (1929) clearly evolved from the earlier work. Faulkner's genius was to explore the limits 
of his imaginative abandon; though he felt bound to certain themes, he "was always shifting his 
point of view." Eliot never cared for new perspectives to his view of the human condition. In 
the shifts of perspective that make up The Sound and the Fury, we see Faulkner registering "his 
constant growth within himself' (AP, 349), like Melville, shifting in order to transform himself 
and so approximate some image of truth. 
Each single character in The Sound and the Fury reliving and recounting the past includes 
more of its poignance and fatefulness and so brings it to consciousness. The book appropriately 
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ends with an image of Dilsey's triumph on Easter Sunday. Faulkner's technique humanizes and 
redeems the past as it creates the moral authority of the author. Faulkner's working perception 
that life equals inescapable breakdown yet works out in some poetic affirmation. When all the 
hatred, revenge, recrimination and antagonism of the Compsons has subsided, Benjy's idiot 
mind reconstitutes the shattered family life to the design of his yearning desire. His disjointed 
accounts provide a string of one-dimensional pictures which taken together transcend the 
family's decay and make it "bright with life, thrilling in its actuality." This novel has a special 
bearing upon history and the past, Kazin argues, because the Compsons "live time, they do not 
just live in it" (AP, 352). It is driven by the force of memory and compulsory reminiscence that 
any action may interrupt but not stop. Quite the contrary, I would argue: action enhances the 
actuality of the scene, which is then reworked and reassessed by a heightened consciousness that 
expresses itself as style. 
The Sound and the Fury certainly shared in postwar secular man's total loss of illusion and 
his sense of "the fatal ordering of things." Style, "our true Prometheus" (AP, 353), the fabled 
1920s belief, was expected to correct this. Style in The Sound and the Fury is reflected in the 
insistent drive of each Compson pressing to find a resolution to his own haunted consciousness 
of things. It is totally different from the disillusionment underlying Eliot's High Church culture 
and selective social register, reflecting Faulkner's belief that he could wrest history's secret from 
his "little postage stamp of native soil" (quoted in AP, 354), which he kept packing with cycle 
upon cycle of Compson outrage and frustration. The resolution is not in the theme, which Kazin 
stresses is highly elemental and "foreclosed," but in the manifold perspectives brought to bear 
on it. As a creator nursed in the skeptical Twenties, Faulkner saw the novelist "not as an artist 
capable of finishing anything but as a gambler playing for higher and higher stakes" (AP, 354). 
It was not Christian salvation Faulkner aimed to achieve, for he believed man had but one, 
cynical antagonist, the "Player": 
The potent and redemptive figure in Faulkner's mythology is the novelist. The novelist gambles 
his talent against the silence surrounding us. He pits himself against vacancy and unreality, 
replacing the silence with a world organized by himself alone. 
Faulkner liked the word "immortality." He meant the novel that lasts... It was an ambition still 
fundamental to writers of the twenties, who could not conceive of immortality anywhere else. 
Faulkner was amazing. The novelist was his hero. He meant the novelist, not himself. (AP, 355-6) 
Hemingway: A Tough Age and Its Tools 
Kazin on Hemingway is so fascinated by the self-consciousness and self-driven quality of 
Hemingway's writing that he puts it wholly within the context of the bold new painting that 
emerged at the beginning of the century. In a number of respects, he considers Hemingway the 
ultimate stylist, with "style" carrying associations of a different type of energy invested in its 
creation than had been the case with Henry Adams, for instance, and Faulkner in particular. 
Unlike Faulkner, Hemingway as an expatriate gleaned his experience from far and wide, 
travelling to the danger spots of the Western world to record the destructiveness of the new 
century. The violence shattered many convictions and world-views and raised fundamental 
doubts whether truth was worth pursuing or even available. Hemingway's genius was to show 
the American artist's undiminished mastery in an age of declining faiths. 
The Hemingway chapter is significantly titled "Hemingway the Painter," suggesting that there 
is a difference between the painter's vision and his tools and the writer's strategies for establish-
ing the truth that lasts. Hemingway trained himself in Gertrude Stein's salon, where he 
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sharpened his artistic sense on "new theories of perception [and] common physical materials" 
(AP, 366). As an artist, Hemingway was definitely indebted to Stein, though she was herself 
mainly interested in the psychological interpretation of painting. The daring and radicalism of 
painters like Cézanne and Matisse, whom she was to make famous in America, as well as the 
sensuousness of their work, however, put Hemingway on to the recognition that painting 
far more than writing suggests the actual texture of human happiness. [He saw in it] a promise of 
relief from civilization, a touch of the promised land... Again and again in his work this often 
cruel writer shows himself to be an unabashed American romantic positively melting in the 
presence of BEAUTY. (AP, 370) 
Hemingway's instinctual and to a large extent willed intimacy with the destructiveness of the 
modern age, Kazin argues, made him determined to find such relief. His painter's education 
certainly stood him in good stead. He had a dominant desire to be free, viz. being in control, 
even in the direst of circumstances. Style in Hemingway's hands was the ultimate resource 
certain gifted persons recognized in their personal lives when negotiating even the most forbid-
ding threats to even their physical integrity. This was "grace under pressure." Its focus was a 
personal code, or ethics, that would save the individual when some cataclysm threatened to undo 
him; its aim the inviolability of the self. He sought to maximize the opportunities for art — his 
art — in the world. This required that he seek out the violence, and, deliberately identifying his 
life with his art, he registered the century's cruelty in the flesh. Hemingway "commanded] 
experience" (AP, 358), meaning that he invariably pictured the self in the same antagonistic 
relation to 'the world,' and was positively attracted to violence. It was a conscious strategy with 
him to elicit the trials that required a deliberate posture of stoic acceptance to live through, 
which made him responsible for the view of the world in all its aspects as a continuous 
onslaught on the self. Kazin believes this served his epic sense not only of the self but of 
himself. Hemingway's sportsman's boast in The Green Hills of Africa (1935) that he knew what 
he wanted and that he got it all the time was "the mark of a special time and of a particular 
ego" (AP, 359). Hemingway's selfhood, Kazin implies, did not meet the world halfway. 
Kazin concedes that Hemingway's interest in the "real" and the "concrete" may actually have 
reflected his wish to project his artistic sense of consciousness as it works on the irreducible 
reality of the world: "Not many writers have... emphasized the angle of their particular con-
sciousness so that our experience of their work becomes as elemental as their own grasp of 
existence" (AP, 360). Hemingway actually reduced existence to the experience he appropriated 
and hammered into place for maximum clarity and effect. Thus, the lieutenant-colonel in A 
Farewell to Arms, who has lost contact with his troops, brings off a tremendous feat of moral 
determination when he begs his interlocutors to be shot immediately because "the questioning 
is stupid" (quoted in AP, 361). He 'saves' merely himself, not civilization. The stoicism of men 
"in our time," Kazin points out, does not necessarily 'save' anybody but the artist himself. As 
a personal politics, the code did not avail even an exceptional artist brought up on the tradi-
tionally American view that the public world "was pushing him and everyone else toward an 
abyss": 
Of course the code did not survive into the thirties, the Hitler-Stalin era, and still another world 
war. What in the twenties was pronounced with so much startled self-approval as a form of 
conduct was really a lean, wary style of writing, Hemingway's style. This thrived on '4he disasters 
of war" but somehow saved a few exceptional people from destruction. It was all the law and all 
the prophets. (AP, 362) 
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The code was a poor substitute indeed for a viable politics. It shrunk politics to the scope of the 
single individual. 
The Hemingway individual is the typically insecure male who intuits "the intolerable pressure 
level in life, personal and political." Even his sexual identity is under threat, witness Lady Brett 
in The Sun Also Rises. Kazin suggests that one of Hemingway's major artistic drives may have 
been his fear of sexual vulnerability, which Kazin believes is very much "a universal condition" 
(AP, 363). The world's discord had entered the self, and Hemingway never forgave the world 
for doing so: "His easy claim to American power — especially over his own life — was 
constantly being limited and denied. The self remained intact. But wary, very wary, it had 
premonitions of war after war." Hemingway's vulnerable self projects its internal tremors 
variously on "society, the body politic, the 'world'..." (AP, 364). He successfully transmutes and 
mythologizes his insecurity and fear, using that peculiar inversion of values inherent to life 
under a totally different dispensation. But the fear was very much a generational thing, Kazin 
points out, and the art it inspired a personal reflex rather than a redemptive vision. The violence 
surrounding, even battering, Hemingway convinced him that he was close to the fault lines in 
contemporary culture and society. To record these reinforced his epic consciousness of himself. 
Hemingway's art thrived on the sense of emergency. 
What developed as a personal need to control his experience turned into an authoritative 
image of the destructive nature of the new century. "It is [therefore] absurd to separate 
Hemingway from his work," Kazin states, because his artistic vision depends wholly on "his 
own fascination with violence and terror as a central political drama." As such, Hemingway's 
art was timely, in tune with the ghastly political violence the twentieth century opened on. The 
point remains, however, that Hemingway was "a soul at war" (AP, 365) and founded a widely 
accepted, deleterious belief in the artist as the 'world"s antagonist. In the final analysis, his 
embattled sense and his pugnacious artistry reflected a contraction of the American's native 
Romanticism and, most of all, a total lapse from Emerson's belief that the 'world' could be 
appropriated as a human attribute. Thus, Hemingway's theme illustrates the final dissipation of 
the Emersonian heritage: "The rugged old individualist had somehow known from the beginning 
that the coming century was going to be war on the individual" (AP, 372). 
"Retrospect 1932: The Twenties and the Great American Thing" 
Though John Dos Passos's trilogy U.S.A. is widely considered to be the culmination of Twenties 
avant-garde literary experimentalism, Kazin believes it is spiritually consistent with the Depres-
sion era that saw the publication of its instalments, in 1930, 1932 and 1936 respectively. In June 
1932, writing a preface to Three Soldiers, first published in 1921 and soon to be reprinted, Dos 
Passos fondly remembered the tremendous energies of liberation at work "in the spring of 
1919." Those hopes would be extinguished within a decade. The year 1919, Dos Passos 
believed, had marked the "great illusions of our time," whereas in 1932 social radicals' 
appointed mission was "to deal with the raw structure of history now... before it stamps us out" 
(quoted in AP, 375). Dos Passos merely recited the radical canon about postwar "romantic 
garbage," and Kazin detects in this a significant mismatch of his unrestrained libertarian 
experimentalism with the radical doctrine that alone constituted political virtue in the Thirties. 
The artist Dos Passos had a special relation to history, Kazin argues, because it made him. 
Woodrow Wilson's war "saved Dos Passos and his friends Cummings and Edmund Wilson from 
being safe and bored at home" (AP, 378) while its public rhetoric ostensibly provided them with 
a cause. Dos Passos was just another dissatisfied and adventurous upper-class chap from Choate 
and Harvard who enlisted in the Norton-Harjes Volunteer Ambulance service to feast his gift for 
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observation in situations where the official civic virtues were most obviously in decay. He was 
certainly a devout convert to the 'cult of experience' which his generation pursued to repudiate 
their stifling background in native, bourgeois morality and patriotic uplift. To a mind such as 
this, Kazin believes, the experience of the Great War naturally came as "just material for a 
book." Dos Passos clearly went to Europe to find the largest possible setting amenable to 
literary experiment, not in support of a political programme based on a moral condemnation of 
the mass slaughter being perpetrated there. 
Kazin charges that this wholly mental perspective was entirely limited to the postwar 
generation of American expatriates in Europe. They mistakenly believed that their experiments 
in art and personal conduct could set the tone for a devastated civilization: 
... the sense of things opening up everywhere as 'guys climbed out of their uniforms' helped to 
promote the irretrievable memory of the 1920s as a golden age for modem art, free expression, 
and American individualism. The century was new, Americans were still such a new factor in the 
world that they seemed even new to themselves. One thing they took for granted: America was 
unique. For those bom in the last decades of the nineteenth century and now prepared to take over 
the twentieth, the buoyancy and confidence displayed by so many Americans at large were 
irresistible even to Europeans. (AP, 379) 
Their break with historic precedent was phenomenal. So was their sense of self, which in fact 
became a form of hubris eclipsing the tragic component of the selFs relation to the dominant 
culture. Gerald Murphy, Man Ray, E.E. Cummings, Virgil Thomson, Gertrude Stein and 
Margaret Anderson, among others, definitely cultivated a mythical perception of themselves as 
the culmination of history. It was a perception that only their set in Paris in the 1920s could 
afford, being "undistracted by children, anxieties about money, political despotism, racial 
persecution" (AP, 380). Kazin asserts that their prodigious self-confidence — holding a promise 
which O'Keeffe was to call "the great American thing" — was to prove a brittle defence indeed 
against the dominant forces of the new century. The elite projected it on themselves; it was 
entirely self-generated. 
As a political mind, Dos Passos was unstable in his judgement. He soured on Marxism and 
out of a thorough distaste for commercial society turned to Jeffersonian and agrarian democracy. 
These suited his bruised class sense best, but as political ideals they bore no relation to actual 
society. He was "always more 'agin the system' ihanfor anything in particular except personal 
freedom and the 'working-class stiffs' whom he tended to romanticize" (AP, 381). This was to 
be U.S.A.'s leading sentiment. Its clamorous experimentalism, too, was out of step with the 
times, Kazin explains, for it held no promise of a better future for its protagonists. Although the 
manifold invented perspectives suggest that U.S.A. is "the work of many American minds" (AP, 
382), all it accomplishes is a picture of mass society as a prison-house for the individuals 
comprising it. Only the actual historic figures of the "biographies" come in for assent, though, 
as Kazin notes, radicalism is not a strong sentiment among them. Radicalism with Dos Passos 
is a dead issue. U.S.A.'s fictional characters, some of whom are of the radical persuasion, are 
mediocre, futile, forgettable. The tonic edge of U.S.A., its stylistic dash and irony, its gay invent-
iveness, finally reflected Dos Passos's own practicality in getting down the sweep of the national 
existence in our century. The people are just case histories — as more and more Americans are 
to themselves. (AP, 384)" 
Dos Passos's U.S.A. created a picture of history possibly as powerful as Henry Adams's in 
The Education. Continuing the effervescent iconoclasm of the Twenties, Kazin argues, Dos 
Passos contributed to the allure of "the great American thing." That thing "was peculiar to the 
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openness and stress of American life" (AP, 384), Kazin insists, and was perhaps most convinc-
ing as a way of "capturing the million alternatives of experience in America" (AP, 382). It was 
in fact just as much an invention — Kazin calls it a "contraption" — as the inventions that 
made the careers of the "biographies." History in U.S.A. is about getting the "simultaneous 
frames of existence" (AP, 384) into the picture; it does not dramatize any distinctly personal 
dilemmas. What it creates is a record of mass opinion in the setting of mass society distinctly 
without spiritual leaders. Its voice records clichés, not the felt individual human plight. The 
Unknown Soldier in 1919 is an Everyman who registers the degradation and contemporary 
hollowness of American ideals, which is proof that U.S.A. is "an epic of the mass society that 
has replaced 'our storybook democracy.'" It contrasts with books such as Emerson's Representa-
tive Men, Whitman's Leaves of Grass and Melville's Moby-Dick, which had been borne along 
by the seminal American myth of the democratic individual as hero: 
Unlike those great romantic texts of what Whitehead called the "century of hope," U.S.A. does not 
raise any of its characters to hero. Dos Passos's subject is the degradation of democracy into mass 
society, of politics into sociology [, of mastery into drift]. His conviction is that the force of 
circumstances — call it the State... — is too strong for the average man, who may never rise 
above mass culture, mass superstition, mass slogans. (AP, 386) 
This was to prove a fatal contraction of American selfhood in modern times. U.S.A. records the 
decline of the Emersonian fundamentals of American historical faith; self-reliance as a politics 
of moral inspiration and Whitman's celebration of the "Ensemble" have yielded to the "energy 
of disenchantment" and the totalitarian grasp over individual lives exerted by the political 
system in power. In Dos Passos's cosmogony, democratic man has become the average man, 
who succumbs to the ruthless mechanisms of society. The only saving grace left is a posture of 
principled dissent: 
although the subject of his book was democracy itself, democracy had meaning for him only 
through the superior man, the intellectual-elect, the poet who can never value what the crowd 
does. The philosophy behind U.S.A. was finally at variance with its natural interest, its subject 
matter, its greatest strength — the people and the people's speech. U.S.A. turned out to be a book 
at war with itself.... Not a single character Dos Passos imagined mattered to him in the slightest. 
When he was through with the radical mood, he was ready for no other American mind and hero 
but Thomas Jefferson. Mass society now equalled America — and modem America was Dos 
Passos's adversary.... Dos Passos wrote like a stranger in his own country. (AP, 387) 
Fitzgerald: A Romantic's Love for His Country 
Owing to bad eyesight, Second Lieutenant Fitzgerald never made it to Europe to fight Mr. 
Wilson's war. He had to forgo the 'cult of experience' that many of his generation pursued to 
provide a basis for their creative work, making him a special case in many respects. That did 
not harm him, Kazin believes, because Fitzgerald at home was soon to personify the most 
cherished vision Americans had of themselves. His audience came to see his work as a comment 
on his life; in fact, his earliest appeal was as a personal legend. "His very disharmonies were 
national," Kazin observed in his introduction to F. Scott Fitzgerald: The Man and His Work 
(1951). Both as an artist and in person, Fitzgerald managed to bind himself to the national 
experience: 
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Everything about him was on our most picturesque national scale. It was as if the growing self-
confidence and the unashamed veneration of wealth had suddenly met in this son of genteel 
poverty from St. Paul. In those days Fitzgerald seemed to have come out of the Middle West, 
Princeton, the prom halls and football stadiums wrapped in all the rich colors of American wealth 
from McKinley to Harding, hungry for every privilege and daring every disaster, ready to satisfy 
the usual American craving for a novelist who would be one "of our own," thoroughly in the 
national life, and responsive to all its popular idols.76 
Kazin believes two factors determined Fitzgerald's role in the national consciousness. The 
first is that the critical reception of his work was occasionally harsh, even malicious and 
disdainful. There was a strong tendency among critics and fellow writers to point out 
Fitzgerald's 'weaknesses' to him and to deliver 'constructive' criticism. And though much of 
that criticism in the Twenties was "admiring but frivolous... probably no other writer, except 
Whitman, has been made the occasion for so many banalities on the tendency of life in the 
United States." Like Whitman's, Fitzgerald's work arguably thrived on the interaction with the 
tender spots of the national identity, particularly in his case the idea of failure. In the 1951 
essay, Kazin doubted the use of much "constructive" criticism of Fitzgerald, targeting his 
heroes, who "grow progressively more alone" from novel to novel. This was the exhilaration as 
well as the poignance of identifying to such an extent with the national experience: "Far from 
giving up his world [like Proust] — and where would he have been without it? — he was about 
as metaphysical in his tastes as Franklin D. Roosevelt — he could never make up his mind... 
whether he was Jay Gatsby... or Dick Diver... or Monroe Stahr..." Kazin concluded that the 
"fear of awareness and aloneness is in our culture."77 This is worked out in Procession, where 
he identifies a second reason for Fitzgerald's remarkable presence on the national scene. 
Fitzgerald possessed a "burning" sense of self, which he shared with many other American 
writers. American novelists in the twentieth century, Kazin points out, have usually been 
dismissive of one another. Edmund Wilson and Ernest Hemingway supported yet patronized 
Fitzgerald, irked by his rising star. Fitzgerald's career as an artist and as a man, however, was 
so firmly rooted in the fizzy and reckless romance of the jazz age that he felt "unlimited, sacred 
to himself' (AP, 388). The Twenties were an era when many hopes, for artists as well as 
ordinary citizens, appeared about to be fulfilled; it was noted for its "dreamlike extensions of the 
self' (AP, 390). Fitzgerald achieved a level of intimacy with the national scene unrivalled by 
any of the literary expatriates of his generation, who gladly traded it in for the presumably more 
creative European environment. He absorbed its brightest promises and its fiercest despairs. He 
created Jay Gatsby — and himself·— as "his own Platonic conception of himself." The Platonic 
dimension permitted Gatsby — and not just him but also his creator and his audience — to 
imagine a state of being untarnished by the excess, the bad faith, the evil and the secret corrup-
tion of the era. Fitzgerald supremely created America to itself and furnished its collective, 
unifying metaphors: "Not only did he become a legend as writer, man, and frantic lover of his 
own wife; Gatsby and Tender... sank so deeply into the national consciousness that they came 
to seem not just 'personal' but an allegory as well as a scenario of American fortune" (AP, 
389). 
The artistic fusion, however, came at a cost. The "extensions" Gatsby — and certainly also 
Fitzgerald — pursued showed an inverse relation to the actual burden of experience. Behind the 
image of two young women in The Great Gatsby "buoyed up as though upon an anchored 
balloon" is New York mafia boss Meyer Wolfsheim, whose cufflinks are made of human 
molars. It cost Fitzgerald in terms of more than just emotional capital to balance the two realms, 
or rather to keep reality from crowding out the dream. Kazin believes Fitzgerald's genius was 
to have based his personal faith on a willing suspension of disbelief about the moral direction 
of the national experience. He kept open the American promise in the face of its undoing, and 
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as The Crack-Up was to show, this applied as much to himself as to his fictional heroes. 
Fitzgerald's Platonism was actually a desire for purity bordering on innocence: 
The ultimate loneliness of Gatsby pursuing his impossible dream was Fitzgerald's unmistakable 
omen of what so much illusion, so much "unlimitedness" — in the mind alone — did to that 
precious sense of self that was one's whole life and every resource. 
But as Fitzgerald also made clear in his books, he had been bom into an age that assisted every 
possible illusion. Just as he was the central subject and best historian of his personal drama, so his 
instantly found an audience that, like his wife, seemed a correlative of himself. (AP, 389) 
Unlike the modernists, Fitzgerald craved American, social status. He identified with the 
contemporary scene, which the modernists distrusted and discounted in favour of mythic 
versions of the past. He was in pursuit of "dreamland," which was New York rather than his 
native St. Paul. St. Paul was the West, still dominated by simple frontier values and what its 
nascent literary consciousness was pleased to call "realism." It also spelled poverty. New York 
represented the complexity of accumulated history, the promise as well as the waste of human 
aspirations. It was "the pleasure capital, the fulfillment of all possible dreams in St. Paul" as 
well as Fitzgerald's artistic home. New York blacks had white chauffeurs driving them to their 
appointments: "For Fitzgerald all paradoxes were just spectacles. The name of the American 
dream was New York" (AP, 390). It was in New York that Fitzgerald came into the big money, 
fuelling his ambitions. What Emerson believed were the "infinitely repellent particles" of the 
American experience and the American social compact, Fitzgerald reconciled within the frame-
work of compelling personal vision (or even a creative personal compulsion). 
Fitzgerald's attraction to the age, Kazin concedes, was complex. He was beyond the well-
documented provocation and denunciation which in the literary Twenties put an end to the 
dominant Victorian ethics and provincialism. His real subject matter penetrated behind the tinsel 
and specious hype of material riches to the very real personal crisis which was a gauge of the 
larger cultural crisis. What he gained was a sense of values restored in the teeth of the era's 
worship of mammon, its mischievous egotism in all walks of life and its unconscious bad faith. 
Fitzgerald, Kazin asserts, was the first American to rely on a deeply imagined personal universe 
and to rebuild a coherent national tradition after the "break" in the old under the impact of 
Eliot, Pound, Hemingway, Dos Passos. 
Most of all, Fitzgerald transcended the scepticism of his generation about America. Unlike 
Walter Lippmann, H.L. Mencken, Sinclair Lewis, Dreiser, Hemingway and Dos Passos, he 
"loved America and attached himself to its myths" (AP, 393). At the same time, he was 
painstakingly faithful to the doubleness of the American dream, feeling both in and out of the 
game. This fascinated his American audience, who had by no means given up on their native 
romanticism. Fitzgerald attempted to achieve what the "epigoni of the modem movement [, 
who] featured the ironic personality," dismissed as utter human foolishness, viz. Whitman's 
belief that the poet's soul may well go halfway to meet that of his nation. He brought out the 
unifying and transcendent strains of the national experience. Contrary to the modernist hero, viz. 
the 'new intellectual,' who viewed any visions of self with scepticism, he did away with 
alienation and distrust of the world and invested heavily in it, psychically as well as emotional-
ly. His relationship with the world bore the marks of his tender and expectant love for Zelda as 
well as their lifestyle as a couple, which was a charged-up version of the élan vital of the age. 
To Kazin, ultimately, this was an American writer's saving grace: "The importance of 'vitality' 
was that the world rewarded it" (AP, 394). Fitzgerald in the Twenties was a national emblem 
of hope: he emancipated the American self from its historic, moral and cultural constraints, and 
gave it a dreamlike confidence in its unlimited possibilities like he did Gatsby. 
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So much expectancy of and belief in fulfilment in an open world, Kazin argues, is equal to 
creating the American "soul" that D.H. Lawrence, in Studies in Classic American Literature, 
marked as the genius of American liberal democracy, and to the "truth" Hemingway, in "The 
Snows of Kilimanjaro," had claimed no longer existed. Fitzgerald relied squarely on his personal 
experience to lead him to the truth; truth was still available to him as it was not to Hemingway, 
who went through tremendous repudiations to create an art but never secured an identity in the 
native experience. Except for the legend they jointly support, however, there is no identity 
between Fitzgerald and Gatsby. Gatsby is so romantically oblivious to the exigencies of the 
actual world that he is more an idea than a character. Kazin marks this disposition of mind as 
a distinct cultural asset: Gatsby is "an idea of the everlasting self-creation that Americans have 
mastered" (AP, 396). Fitzgerald himself described this as "a willingness of the heart" such as 
sanctifies "the graves at Shiloh" (quoted in AP, 396) and the memory of "the country boys 
dying in the Argonne for a phrase that was empty before their bodies withered." After decades 
of rejection of the native scene, Fitzgerald "alone among the fancy minds and skeptics of his 
generation became a writer to love" (AP, 396). He transcended the polarities of intellectual 
opinion about the national life as well as his generation's historical despair, and became a 
defender of the Whitmanesque ethos in complex and violent times: 
Fitzgerald the perfect "representative man" of the twenties accomplished something that no one 
else did at the time: he included America in his romanticism. It was not just literary fame, love for 
woman, and other accomplished goals. It was his crowded, sprawling, disordered, pointless-
seeming country. (AP, 397) 
Coda 
The figure of Fitzgerald looms large against a twentieth-century background that has increasing-
ly become the antithesis of freedom and individuality. Writers of the Twenties, "generally 
upper-class," were the remnant of the old Puritan spiritual élite, whose relation to revealed truth 
had also involved fundamental issues of selfhood. Emancipated, they showed the "vitality, 
ingenuity, and openness to new experience" that was the correlative of their "ancient belief in 
freedom at all costs" (AP, 395). They were in the tradition that had established America's 
political independence in the eighteenth century and its literary in the nineteenth. Their heritage 
in the twentieth century, however, has come under heavy fire. The moral-political content of 
democracy has drained away, and the effect of "the century of the common man" has mainly 
been to deprive him of his freedom. The human condition after the Twenties has come to be 
seen in a radically different light. Indeed, Hannah Arendt's analysis of "the banality of evil" in 
modern times has signified a radical departure from the hopes and possibilities Americans have 
traditionally associated with liberal democracy: "Before the Great Depression, Hitler, Stalin, the 
new Technological Revolution, the Holocaust, [it was] the heartlessness of mankind [that] was 
taken for granted, not 'the banality of evil'" (AP, 394). Too many writers in the Twenties and 
after — in Procession and elsewhere, Kazin mentions Eliot, Pound, Yeats, Evelyn Waugh, G.K. 
Chesterton, D.H. Lawrence, Céline, Hillaire Belloc, Wyndham Lewis — came to renounce civil 
democracy in favour of totalitarian political systems. They extinguished the light passed on by 
the stalwarts of Kazin's procession, who today face an even fiercer challenge: 
Modernism [as he had described it in On Native Grounds; not as "its own tradition," which has 
dominated literary criticism since the Twenties, but] as the expression of an élite that believed in 
nothing so much as freedom and venerated nothing but the individual personality would soon 
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dissipate into the modem American passion for equality — perfect, total, and continuous between 
the sexes, classes, races, creeds. (AP, 395) 
Such have been the reversals of political liberalism in our time.78 And sadly, Kazin notes, 
modernism has bequeathed us nothing but its memory. 
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Epilogue: The God before Modernism 
At the Books Abroad Golden Anniversary Symposium at the University of Oklahoma on 28 
January 1977, Kazin read a paper dealing with the dwindling prospects for the masterpiece in 
twentieth-century literature. He related this to the apparent illusion of poet-intellectuals such as 
Goethe that man in the aggregate was capable of '4otal perfection" making him der gebildete 
Mensch. But modem history had seen unsettling instances of passionate intellectuals who 
"confused [their] piety about great writers with [their] ability to transform society" — Kazin 
mentioned Lenin, Mao, Castro, Mussolini — and subjected millions to the terror of such 
perfection, exacting total obedience. The remnant of writer-intellectuals still to believe in the 
possibility of perfection, he said, have tried to live their ideal in the flesh, as a wholly personal 
philosophy, and these have included "independent radicals and God-seekers on the left" like 
Simone Weil, Ignazio Silone, and Albert Camus. They formulated extremes of moral purity, 
however, apparently aiming for no less than "sainthood." The only writers to have benefited 
from the ancient Enlightenment ideal of total perfection, Kazin claimed, have been "the victims 
of, and witnesses to, totalitarianism," like Silone, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Osip and Nadezhda 
Mandelstam, Isaac Babel, and Boris Pasternak, "who have understood that without some ideal 
of perfection there is no shield from modem despotism." The masterpiece as the embodiment 
of perfection, however, had proved to be a by no means easily transmissible object, though 
literature departments tended to institutionalize it as a standard for their teaching practice, 
identifying it almost exclusively with the achievement of twentieth-century modernism. What 
began as the New Criticism — a movement among poet-critics to explicate the technical novelty 
of modemist poetry — had become the norm in literary pedagogy. Exegesis had brought a 
plethora of analytical approaches to the work at hand, sacrificing its unique universe to "the 
idiosyncrasy and the dogmatism of the instructor."1 The work — not excluding the masterpiece 
— became subsumed in personal interest, in the case of William Blake, for instance, obscuring 
Emmanuel Swedenborg's influence on "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," promoting wholly 
arbitrary interpretations of Hamlet as an Oedipal case, and making Emily Dickinson the 
trailblazer of modem feminism. 
Such relativism of literary standards, which Kazin believes is actually a cultural ideology, 
had made it increasingly hard to remember the single, unified vision — "our once integral 
conceptions of the human" — originally behind great works of art. This was brought about by 
the professional middlemen in the colleges and publishing, who first academicized, then 
popularized modernism, making extravagant claims for its cultural vision: "Unlike Eliot, Pound, 
Stravinsky, Joyce, who were conservative in everything except their talents, the intellectuals as 
a class and mass believed that modernism applied to everything in their lives and to the 
reordering of society. What an illusion!" Indeed, the communis opinio had evolved that the 
modernists furnished a highly suitable cultural analysis to shore up their ailing age, and ours. 
But Kazin holds that modernism was actually "a technical breakthrough in language, style, 
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form" of an essentially conservative cultural élite averse to liberal democracy, democratic 
politics, and mass taste.2 If this was true of the Twenties, when modernism thrived on the 
experimental spirit of the age, the distinction is all the more imperative in the Eighties, when 
traditions have become notoriously perishable, when intellectual culture generally thrives on 
rapid obsolescence, and when the State has become a despotic presence even in traditional 
democracies. Kazin has noted that the lack of some centre to hold on to has become axiomatic 
with us, and that there is a need to restore a stable, unifying framework to contemporary 
perceptions of the human condition. But the fact is that the modernists are lionized as social 
thinkers, a quality which, being artists, they never aspired to. Evidently, Kazin wrote, a dissocia-
tion of sensibility has occurred vis-à-vis the modernists: having incorporated their technical 
repertoire in its own sensibility — their "language of freedom and experimentation" — the 
contemporary audience has naturally moved on to equally radical innovations in "the spirit," the 
philosophy and "the reasoning behind certain fundamental [modernist] achievements..." The 
spiritual substance of modernism, however, was far less radical than its technical-experimental 
ethos, and its outlook was fundamentally at odds with the democratic-egalitarian experience. For 
there has been an ideological movement afoot lately, Kazin argued, that believes all cultures to 
be inherently equal and all persons equally capable of producing art through authentic emotional 
release in the act of expressing their personalities. It believes there is an element of democratic 
justice in this. The modernists, however, were suspicious of romantic lavishness and emotional 
abandon. They were generally upper-class members in possession of a "consciousness that was 
sacred" to themselves, using this as a basis for a rear-guard action to stem the increasing frag-
mentation of society and to roll back the modern age. They were not interested in the demo-
cratic individual's right to self-determination and self-actualization, but rather opposed the 
secular forces released by liberal democracy and the modem nation-state. They were great 
sticklers for authority, tradition, ritual, and believed the politically enfranchised, ambitious 
secular self to be profoundly inimical to these. And most notably, Kazin claimed, they envisaged 
an imaginary, ideal society based on the medieval-Christian sensibility that most of their 
contemporary proponents would definitely not care to live in. Not that the latter are terribly 
exacting in their values, Kazin holds, for society at the end of the twentieth century has become 
identical with a humankind "so numerous and innumerable and voracious," all its racial, sexual, 
and political constituents so wildly asserting themselves, as to have "returned, morally, to a state 
of nature."3 
The dissociation of sensibility I spoke of originated from the application of the modernists' 
basic ideas to the proliferating disorder of late twentieth-century society. This has been a 
fundamental mistake, says Kazin, because 
The original basis of modernism... was exactly and especially the aim that art could nol accomp-
lish. Which was why the idea of the masterpiece as a teacher and inspirer of humanity, a force for 
change, died out. 
The basic reason why we in the last twenty years of this century cannot believe in masterpieces 
is the failure of conservative and reactionary thinkers — modernists all: Eliot, Lawrence, Pound, 
Yeats, Mann, Pasternak, Mandelstam, Woolf, Proust, et cetera — to affect the modem age that 
they hated so bitterly. 
The reactionary political and social views of several of them have now been amply documented, 
and Kazin has certainly made valuable contributions in this regard, presenting them as essential-
ly traditionalists ill-accustomed to liberal society. Even though they represent an evidently 
attractive alternative to our anxious civilization "obsessed by its vulnerability" through their 
belief in the achieved subtlety of form as the "thing in itself," equally venerated by Eliot, 
Hemingway, Wallace Stevens and Paul Valéry, the example of Louis-Ferdinand Céline has made 
328 
clear that "even in the late 1920s the real problem of literature was to surmount disintegration 
by expressing it fully." Language itself in the modem age has come unstuck from its ancient 
power, which Pound capitalized on, to guide untutored man. Céline exposed modern man's fond 
illusion of total mental freedom in relation to the world to be lived in and acted upon, and 
Samuel Beckett extended this radical skepticism about the adequacy of language to express the 
anguished human condition by inventing "verbal equivalents] of silence." To Kazin, these 
writers have established that "language in our time is an effort, not a rhetorical triumph; it is a 
confrontation, is not and cannot hope to be an example of that self-confidence once known as 
'style."" 
The conviction of the radical insufficiency of language has been a long-standing one with 
Kazin, and was first outlined in the "Postscript" to the 1955 edition of On Native Grounds, 
where he explained the new vogue of certain American writers in postwar Europe in terms of 
W. H. Auden's impression that they "had wrought their own way through language." American 
epic literature of the nineteenth century in particular yielded the image of great philosophical 
interest to the Europeans, of "man's awareness of himself moving through an utterly new 
situation." In the postwar years, however, the American writer had been constrained to making 
solitary raids on the inarticulate, hoping to dissolve the world's "strangeness" and to establish 
insights from his precarious sense of the true nature of things.5 
Kazin's disappointment with postwar writers' failure to establish a rapport with their 'world' 
and so gain a creative hold on their experience led him to undertake a revaluation, in An 
American Procession, of a succession of nineteenth-century writers — thinkers first and 
foremost6 — whose unrivalled sense of selfhood signified a moral-philosophical framework 
promising salvation through expanding consciousness. Mark Shechner has made a case for Kazin 
the Melvillean "isolato" ecstatically seeking connections with the ancient genius of American 
writing by facing the conclusive evidence of his own heart and mind. By Kazin's own account, 
Melville forms the centre of gravity of Procession, and Kazin has on several occasions praised 
Melville's almost nihilist hubris and willingness to be driven back upon the mind's despair when 
trying to fix its relation to Nature. More particularly, Procession makes an ulterior attempt to 
secure a redemptive vision — of a supreme consciousness of both self and its inextricable 
relations with the Other — through an extraordinary devotion to language, straining against its 
envelope to reach "a precision of definition and perfection of style." But Kazin does so from a 
radically different perspective than the modernists, who saw language as unified consciousness 
countering the fragmentation of modem culture. Kazin's stylized narrative criticism rather makes 
it the nearest analogue to experience, and the experience he seeks to invoke is that of the 
classically tragic American self towards the end of this "ghastly century" overseeing the epic of 
its growth and concluding that it continues to be baffled by the divisions of life in the modem 
era. At the end of Writing Was Everything (1996), Kazin exclaims "But where — how — is the 
writer to be found who will have the inner certainty to see our life with the eyes of faith and so 
make the world shine again?"7 
It is this deficit, too, that marks A Lifetime Burning in Every Moment: From the Journals of 
Alfred Kazin (1996). Much as Procession sets up a myth of American consciousness in order to 
"explain it from within," so the resolution of A Lifetime Burning presents a self questioning its 
secular progress — documented in a series of three "personal histories" — and turning inward. 
The theme of Kazin's quest has become religious. And is creative still. Marshall Berman's 
review of Lifetime has noted its polyphonic structure, with Kazin's style increasingly resembling 
that of the modemist writers "letting the voices resound and interact, not demanding resolution, 
just letting go." Not demanding it, perhaps, but certainly anxious for it. Lifetime is an aging 
critic's burning desire to achieve faith in a lifetime of struggle, to command supreme attentive-
ness to the mystery of being, of existence. Several commentators have indicated that Lifetime is 
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the result of fairly heavy editing by the author, and Robert Alter has even called it a "composed 
self-portrait." Having studied Kazin's notebooks for the period 1933-1990, I can testify that 
Lifetime has indeed been organized around a distinctly religious sensibility, which I assume has 
formed its major point of interest for Alter, who is a specialist in Jewish religious literature. The 
question of religion, or rather faith, does dominate the later sections of the book, and Kazin 
often turns to prayer as the peace available through the heart's final reconciliation with the 
contrasts of existence, but I would not endorse Alter's claim that the function of writing to 
Kazin is "before all else a vocation in the strictly theological sense." Lifetime presents a 
religious vision, but Kazin remains first and foremost a secular skeptic with a personal meta-
physics of redemption. He managed to avoid the ideological position-taking during the postwar 
intellectual debate on ethnic and "affirmative" Jewishness. Starting Out argued that the issue of 
identity was a complex one to the aspiring young writer from Brownsville, and that it involved 
Emerson, Nietzsche, Blake, Whitman, even Lewis Mumford — all of them emancipated from 
and indeed antagonists of orthodox, organized religion — perhaps even more than it did Buber 
and Maimonides. With a touch of the histrionic, Kazin calls himself at one point a "miserable 
schismatic."8 
Kazin has always been leery of orthodoxy, whether ethnic, religious, or political; his sister 
Pearl Kazin Bell has called him "the most unorganizational man I know." Lately, but most 
conspicuously since the Israeli invasion of the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps near Beirut in 
the early Eighties brought about the slaughter of some 1,600 refugees in the name of Israel's 
security, Zionism, the national religion of the State of Israel, has filled him mainly with moral 
outrage. Alter extrapolates Kazin's 'theological' sense from the latter's observation that writing 
is "the one steadiness I have" in a life heavily marked by crises and drenched in anxiety, or 
"Angst." The burning moment where all life coheres in a flash of inspired knowledge, however, 
is one that Kazin does not seek purely for himself; he is fascinated by the extraordinary 
persistence of the Jews, politically, sociologically and otherwise, and considers himself part of 
that tradition of continuity. He attributes their persistence to their presence historically as an 
unsettling, even revolutionary force, an anomaly surprisingly occupying the centre stage in 
modem politics, science, philosophy, art, and theology. The Jewish agonists in Lifetime — 
Kazin prefers the term to "hero" — include Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt, Franz Kafka, Saul 
Bellow masterfully constructing his protagonists' situation in Herzog, Spinoza, Rosa Luxemburg, 
Mark Rothko, Delmore Schwartz, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and Jesus of Nazareth. Pushed to 
the edge in actual civic-political life, most of them have become epigones of modern conscious-
ness within and outside the Christian-moral tradition, while the others have been focal points of 
Kazin's sensibility, too. The Jewish people has been a formidable spiritual presence in his life, 
and this observation serves to put into perspective Alter's claim that "Kazin's books repeatedly, 
stridently, deliciously affirm his identity as a Jew, but it is interesting to observe that the 
affirmation ofthat identity is virtually irrelevant to the religious vision of A Lifetime Burning."9 
Lifetime records Kazin's rapid unfolding towards the inmost leaf, whose texture was antici-
pated by Writing Was Everything. It is the resolution — a lament really — of a writer bearing 
witness to six decades in literature and politics. His ambition, now incorporated in his religious 
desire, has turned inward and he sets out to recover on his own the faith ostensibly and radically 
lost from the contemporary writer's resources. Extending the method of exploring interacting 
sensibilities applied in Procession, Lifetime brings a peculiar personal and achieved — it has 
proved itself equal to a succession of great literary minds in the earlier book — consciousness 
to bear on the experience of Kazin the writer-critic, the Jew and citizen, the American romantic 
and modern skeptic: "What has been central to my own experience as a writer bom a Jew? The 
need to move from constant apprehension to a sense of exaltation, from a certain burning sense 
of reality to that unconquerable belief in the transcendental that... is also the great binding force 
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of Jewish history." There occurs a repossession of the dynamic elements that compose the 
author's still incomplete identity — Walker's protagonist impressed by the geometrical configu-
ration of the cables of Brooklyn Bridge cries out "Papa, Papa, where are they taking me?" — 
and "with the passage of time, the 'native grounds' seem increasingly to become personal 
grounds, the Jewish past a recurrent theme in the secular present, the Holocaust a touchstone 
providing moral clarity elsewhere."10 So there is the most intense desire on Kazin's part to 
become independently creative in the way that his secular — and not just Jewish — agonists 
are. He knows this requires a retrospective reintegration of his complex, cumulative experience. 
He has already abandoned his secular liberal belief in the linear progress of history and now 
aims to assuage the anxieties of his private self on the deeper levels of consciousness. 
Like Henry Adams's in Procession, that quest is essentially self-referential. Kazin is fascin-
ated, for instance, by the great physicist Werner Heisenberg's observation that man carries the 
image of himself to the outermost limits of space, meaning that science is basically anthropom-
orphic, a reflection of the mind seeking order. Like History in The Education of Henry Adams, 
so science, mind, Nature, and 'the world' are ultimately metaphors of consciousness, and so is 
God. A major insight Kazin has gained from his analysis of modem consciousness is that this 
prisoner is in his cell because he chooses to be there." The greatest obstacle to modern man's 
freedom of mind — that prized Emersonian heritage and prime instrument for personal redemp-
tion — has been his tendency to prefer mind over integral experience, certainty over creative 
doubt, theories of human nature over history. Henry Adams illustrated this tendency but his 
artistic sensibility saved him from succumbing to it. Procession's myth of American conscious-
ness, as Mark Shechner has observed, focuses on Adams as its moral centre but the point is that 
Kazin the author-historian is indistinguishable from Adams. Procession definitely includes its 
author in the epic of the national consciousness. Kazin himself has been a major witness of the 
entropy in twentieth-century culture, following in Adams's footsteps as a rebellious sensibility 
taking on the age. 
But the "composed self-portrait" reveals its design primarily through the identifications Kazin 
makes, and these resist the mythic. A journal entry for 20 March 1983 states that "'Yeshua,' 
that myth of my boyhood, has been utterly savorless and meaningless to me for a long time 
now." Yeshua has come to be associated too much with the nostalgic, cultural Socialism of the 
Kazin family depicted in Walker, inspiring visions of fraternal humankind mediated by 
Beethoven's rapturous "Alle Menschen werden Brüder," but historically ineffectual. Yeshua has 
been superseded by more deeply realized states of being, partly in response to the cruel irra-
tionalities of the Socialist future, though still concerned with the unitary personality. Lately, 
Kazin's fascination has not been limited to modem skeptics such as Adams and Twain, but has 
included "those who 'believe' because it is absurd" and who have opposed their individual 
religious visions to the multiple disintegrations of modem consciousness.12 This development 
has been noticeable in Kazin's publications over the past fifteen years or so; an integral account, 
however, is to take the form of a book, entitled God and the American Writer, scheduled for 
publication this year. The notebook material for this period is rich in cues about the book's 
theme and content. These have involved the nineteenth-century rhapsodists Emerson and 
Whitman as well as the "isolatoes" Melville, Dickinson and Poe, the twentieth-century religion-
ist T.S. Eliot, the modernist poet Wallace Stevens, the writer-playwright Samuel Beckett, and, 
most importantly, the psychologist William James. 
James's star rose fast with Kazin. Whereas in 1950 The Varieties of Religious Experience was 
still dismissed for presenting religious "pluralism as the indiscriminate couplings of psychologi-
cal affinities," a journal entry for 30 May 1955 spoke of "the really prophetic quality of the true 
artist individual." In 1953, Kazin praised Ralph Barton Perry's work on William James. And in 
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the late Seventies, he recognized James as "Emerson's true successor at the end of the century," 
which confirmed James's standing with him. Around 1983, Kazin planned a major project on 
James. It fell through, however, on the publisher's requirement of more biography and less 
philosophy. As yet, the main public records of Kazin's recent fascination with James are the 
passages in Procession and a review of Jacques Barzun's A Stroll with William James (1983). 
Together with the notebooks, however, these provide sufficient material to support the claim that 
Kazin's interest in James rests on this individual selfs extraordinary will to achieve salvation 
on its own, its willingness to engage "in life and thought, the manifold opportunities and 
eventually the philosophical conundrum of the free self."13 In Kazin's view, James is a believer 
and religious in the sense that the individual personality attains a state of grace independent of 
the gospel dispensation of a revealed morality. Such secular faith is possible to persons whom 
James himself called the "twice-born," being individuals in possession of a spiritual gift which 
Kazin in a journal entry for 5 July 1982 claims is "the key to (modem) immortality." He 
associates this with the original meaning of revolution in America, viz. the imaginative oppor-
tunities for Old World man newly liberated from secular and religious despotism to create an 
individual destiny consonant with his desire for renewal. Modern immortality as Kazin sees it 
is open to gifted individuals sensitive to the profound opportunities for the transcendent in their 
lives. 
James's willingness to undertake the journey to faith independent of any external authority 
is the key to Kazin's fascination with him. James presumably erased every last vestige of 
dualism from his moral framework; he was interested in the religious self, not religion. Beyond 
theology, he was not after unification with God, nor was he interested to know the mind of 
God, in which he differed significantly from the Jewish mystics, for instance. James "is in 
psychology, to the end." He saw himself and his circumstances as exceptional, inventing a 
philosophy from his insight into the psychological drives of the individual pursuing moral 
knowledge and presenting this as Pragmatism: 
The pathos of James's life as well as the tragedy — trying to locate in the self (that American 
theater), that wilderness, the possibility of a future juncture between man and God... The 
Emersonian correspondence broke down because it rested on words... James's hope for a congruity 
rests on the powers of the self. And of course he is his own best advertisement for same. 
What James called "religious experience," not God, is an instant thrust of knowledge revealing 
his inward genius for seeing the moral universe as an open road. His philosophy of 
"pragmatism" aimed to relieve the mind from relentlessly feeding on itself and to root it in the 
inherent tragedy of experience. James's was a pluralist universe, its outcome determined by the 
individual's "will to believe": "Not the absence of vice, but vice there, and virtue holding her 
by the throat, seems the ideal human state." He conveyed a vision of an indeterministic, 
anthropomorphic universe, a profound statement of Man's essential union with Nature, even 
though this was a rhetorical achievement, the mark of his class in his time. Kazin holds that his 
message to faithless times mired in determinist thinking was and is unmistakable: positivism is 
a myth and "'objectivity' is itself an hypothesis so long as it does not include us, does not 
bespeak our hopes and fears. Every theory is ultimately an image of the observer."14 
William James is thus a significant thinker in the procession of American "God-intoxicated" 
individuals and architects of the native sense of selfhood. As a philosopher, he epitomized the 
New World spirit by giving the mind hands and feet and rooting it in actuality, showing the 
individual self undertaking continuous acts of thought to yoke the world to its own sense of 
itself. But James "was a phenomenon, not a model," says Kazin; he was remarkable for the 
quality of his thinking and the spirit in which he conducted it, but he left no "body of thought 
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that we can turn to as we do to Nietzsche's." James used thought to make the axis of reality 
coincide with his personal life, but his success may have been more a matter of rhetoric than of 
a deeply engaged philosophical statement about modern man's condition: 
What we get from Nietzsche is a counterphilosophy to Platonic-Christian stasis, a constant rebuttal 
of the historic illusion that the world stands upon or in any way represents a moral tradition. 
Nietzsche is a poet-philosopher like the pre-Socratics, one who not only locates the primordial 
elements as truth but identifies himself with them in the audacity of his style. For all his opposi-
tion to system building, his love of aperçu comes across to his readers as a quest for truth, 
because Nietzsche cannot bear to represent to himself anything that is not truth. James is experim-
ental, "personal" in the American way; he is forever asking the world what it can do for him and 
how it may save him. 
Thought was indeed serious to William James just to the extent that it enabled him to save 
himself. Maybe it did. Nietzsche could not save himself at all. 
Even so, Kazin's concern with William James far outstrips the genius of America for an 
empirical morality. James is a notable reminder at a time when so many people are still anxious 
to follow Eliot to the foot of the Cross, as Kazin says, that "the life of religion... has been not 
the 'logic' of theology, but rending human experience." That quality brings him in close 
proximity to Kazin's latter-day condition, marked by a pressing need "to be relieved of so much 
'self' exposing him, as a Jew and a literary intellectual, to the destructive violence of contem-
porary culture.15 
This only approximates the resolution he seeks towards the end of Writing Was Everything, 
however, where he voices a high note of tragedy about the modem writer's calling, a lament for 
truth to be made accessible. Nor is William James the presiding dignitary in God and the 
American Writer, whose thematic narrative is to run from Emerson via Tolstoy and James to 
Freud, including Melville, Poe, Dickinson, Wallace Stevens, G.B. Shaw, Nietzsche, Eliot, and 
Thomas Hardy. This is the line of succession — '4he 19th с internalization of God" — 
reversing God's death in the nineteenth century to the inspired recognition, which James 
certainly shared, that "The Kingdom of God is within you." The Romantic-Revolutionary era 
located the eighteenth-century idea of "Nature" inside the self, making God "man's idea of his 
own imaginative possibilities." Tolstoy predicated perfect sympathy with his fellow men upon 
this, whereas Freud absolutized man's intemality: he "naturalized, biologized [and] 
psychologized this self." Next in the succession would be Sartre, who in Nausea sought to 
relieve modem man's nausea with having become "a truly self-enclosed entity," to actualize it 
and join it again to the external world. Finally, the book would include Samuel Beckett, who to 
Kazin is "the only truly 'religious' writer of our time," because, as Eliot said apropos of 
Beckett's In Memoriam, his doubt makes him religious.16 
Even in its as yet highly fragmentary and incomplete form, God and the American Writer 
records its author's wish — which he believes is gaining urgency and drama towards the end of 
the twentieth century — to be inspired by a passage from the great mathematical logician Alfred 
North Whitehead's Science and the Modern World stating that "the fact of religious vision, and 
its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism." Writing Was Everything 
gives a synoptic view of an established line of writers whose awareness of their spiritual 
predicament in a crumbling religious culture made them agonize over "the need for a world-
historical view that would express the diminishment if not the loss of God": Emerson, Thoreau, 
Melville, Whitman, Dickinson, Camus, Kafka. They were alert to the devaluations and 
fragmentations produced by their society threatening to put out "the sense of history as an 
ongoing spiritual effort." Kazin at eighty-one claims that only two American novelists have 
understood the radical evil of the century: Saul Bellow, who "asks the right questions about our 
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fate," and Flannery O'Connor. The evil was given an ominous context in Hannah Arendt's The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, which invoked the "sense of an ending," of a new dark age in 
history. Kazin has typified this break-in-the-tradition as no less than a "revolt against all 
preceding humanisms." He believes it to be his bounden duty as a writer, thinker and individual 
to oppose a vision of integration and unity to dissolution. Subsequent journal entries for 13 and 
21 July 1986 register this: 
... the real courage required of me at my age and in my present condition is to confront uncert-
ainty. That is the only possible location of renewal. Uncertainty as the real "metaphysical courage" 
that is the theme of The Almighty [the original title for God and the American Writer] (Hardy — 
Dickinson — Melville — Beckett). To believe in the divine force of the creation of the universe 
— and of its continuing creativeness — to believe in "nature" (and not, as the orthodox do, in 
miracles) — to trust to the universe and not to man as the center and reason for being. 
[The Almighty is about faith:] ... there is a faith that says that faith finally arises by the very 
nature of perception, no matter how sardonic and unbelieving that perception seems to itself... 
some ultimate unity exists, because of the way man sees it as well as himself... 
Faith in modern times, he was to reason on 27 April 1987, requires acts of individual curiosity 
and heroism. "Queequeg holding up that candle in the midst of the almighty forlomness is the 
key... the Almighty is always in the individual consciousness..."17 
Lately, a prime and eloquent witness to the violence of the age has been Czeslaw Milosz. 
Teaching at Berkeley in 1969, when Kazin was there as well, and writing poetry in English, 
Milosz captured Kazin's mind. His book about his indebtedness to William Blake, The Land of 
Ulro (1984), is an account of his own exile in the inhuman material world — equating Blake's 
Ulro with America in the 1980s — from which only the spiritual imagination may provide an 
escape. But Milosz's analysis is not just contemporary and uses the American setting as sym-
bolic for a more universal and historical type of spiritual bondage. A survivor of the Nazi 
occupation of Poland, he served the Communist regime as a diplomat but preferred to publish 
a book about his experience under the title The Captive Mind. Poetry and the history of litera-
ture to Milosz very early on had a different function from their traditional status in the West. He 
plies "a West-East axis in his poetry" based on contrasting human experiences, claiming that the 
extreme circumstances of political repression under which Polish poets have had to work — 
lately during the state of emergency in the 1980s — have imparted an expressive power to them 
unrivalled by their American counterparts, who, in Milosz's perception, have never had to rise 
to the occasion and who consequently wallow in introspection and artifice. To Milosz, the 
individual poet achieves his expressive, personal genius only when he shares in the historical 
crises of his community and of the encompassing civic order. This presumably lifts his aliena-
tion. Kazin disagrees, noting that Milosz's Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard University 
in 1982 were marked by "a Slavic vehemence and political importunity" unfamiliar to American 
poets generally. Milosz, he claims, "misunderstands our alienation." In the 1990s, there is a 
superlative "Russian" quality of terror and instability about the American experience involving 
poverty, racial conflict, drugs violence, crime, homelessness and massive, technology-induced 
redundancy.18 There is ample breeding ground for the "Russian novel" in America: "Nowhere 
are writers so influenced by issues. But if they are alienated, and many profess to be, they are 
alienated not from society but from social thinking, of the kind that is content to curse dead 
white males and rejoice in the loss of tradition." In this respect, they resemble Milosz, who in 
a 1981 interview praised Simone Weil's pure sense of good and evil, a distinction which he 
believed Western civilization was rapidly losing. He was looking for an answer to what he saw 
as "an internal erosion of religious beliefs." In Kazin's view, that process is by now far 
advanced on American soil, where the communal ethos in life as in literature has been replaced 
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by extremely individualized, personalized versions of experience. The professedly "most 
religious nation on earth" is so only in a statistical sense: "Milosz is important not because he 
lectures us on the European agony we did not experience, but because of the example he sets 
as poet and teacher. Poetry to him is profoundly a recall, depends on what is left of faith..." We 
will continue to rely on faith to minister to our condition, for despite the vast knowledge we 
have acquired in science and technology, philosophy, psychology, "the world remains as strange 
to us as it ever was." Faith may provide the inner certainty — which Milosz defines as "a 
shining point... where all lines intersect" — to make sense of it all: 
Inner certainty is the hope and prayer, the absolute strangeness of believing, even in so destructive 
and fanatical an age as ours, that one's writing is important. The Polish poet in a burning city 
could not be sure anyone would survive to read him, but he wrote anyway. Morally and imagina-
tively, he could not live without the connections writing makes, without believing in his heart that 
somehow, somewhere, despite the cruel wisdom of the age that nothing is less probable or perhaps 
less desirable, all lines do intersect.19 
That pattern is highly elusive, and the task of elucidating it incumbent upon those of a 
certain moral sensibility and with a tragic historical sense. For the experience of this century 
remains beyond the imagination of mankind, Kazin believes. There are overwhelming historical 
odds against the connections he seeks, and he has come to see himself as a split sensibility: 
Like most intellectual Jews I am a 19th century man, still occupied with the prophecies of the 
twentieth century rather than with the actualities I have lived through, continually stumble through, 
and in my ignorance of science and apocalyptic nationalism and the kinds of mind capable of 
performing the Holocaust, Katyn Forest, etc. I feel like one of those Faulkner characters who 
prays that life may stand still for a moment, for only a moment, that the reel may go backwards. 
As a Jew and a writer, Kazin feels marked by "the division that runs through life," which he 
believes was most cruelly exemplified by the events in Warsaw in 1943, when the Ghetto 
burned and the Jewish victims jumped to their deaths while their Polish fellow countrymen 
cheered outside the ghetto walls. That division has pervaded modem existence in a material and 
political as well as intellectual, moral and spiritual sense. The rift between actors and spectators 
can be morally debilitating, as Kazin professes from his own experience "as a critic of other 
people's books, as a tiresome moralist [and] as a spectator." The passiveness of mere commen-
tary and interpretation, he concludes, will not bring the Kingdom of God any closer; it takes a 
primary act to do that. And this is exactly what literature, rather than science, is eminently 
suited to do. Unlike science, it cannot and need not progress, because its subject is "the enigma, 
the inaccessibility of the human condition." Kazin the writer perceives wide-open vistas of 
opportunity in this regard and identifies with the superlative heroism of Henry James's calling: 
"The mere spectator transcended himself by plowing to the depths... the exceptionality of his 
own condition."20 
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Jones, Stanley Kaufmann, Steven Marcus, Robert K. Merton, Edward Said, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
Barbara Probst Solomon, Aileen Ward, Michael Wood, and Paul Zweig. New York Times Book Review 
(June 25, 1978), 56. Kazin was stunned and felt humiliated by the onslaught: "... but the truth is that 
there is not a single line about Trilling that I would take out of my book or apologize for. I knew that 
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the Columbia acolytes would organize this demonstration against me, but I did not expect that so many 
'old friends' would join in. Anyway, I feel exposed, and very much alone at the moment." Journals, 26 
June 1978. On 11 November 1983, at a party for William Phillips's memoir, he had "the indistinct... 
impression that the long boycott of me at Columbia is over." 
9. Kazin, Journals, 28 and 30 June 1962, 23 May 1964. 
10. Morris Dickstein, "Lionel Trilling and The Liberal Imagination" Sewanee Review, 94 (Spring 1986), 
331. 
11. Kazin, On Native Grounds, pp. 371, 378, 379. 
12. Kazin, "Dreiser," New Yorker, 25 (February 26, 1949), 91; Kazin, "American Naturalism: Reflections 
from Another Era," in Margaret Denny and William H. Gilman, eds., The American Writer and the 
European Tradition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950), p. 129. 
13. Kazin, "J.T. Fan-ell, 1904-79," New York Times Book Review (September 16, 1979), 30. Kazin 
believed Farrell's autobiographical writing differed markedly from his own by not achieving some basic 
sense of liberation: "Farrell kept returning to the youth from which he could never believe he had fully 
escaped.... When I read 'Bernard Clare'... I understood that Farrell was reliving every old struggle as if 
he had never triumphed at all. He had triumphed, though it was not possible for a man with his bitter 
experience and sardonic view of American society to believe this. One of his favorite observations was 
from Chekhov: What other writers take for granted, the writer from the lower class pays for with his 
youth." In his "Commemorative Tribute to James T. Farrell" before the American Academy and Institute 
of Arts and Letters in 1980, Kazin mitigated his view somewhat: "There is great residual power in a 
book [Studs Lonigan] that gives shape and meaning to the life that so many Americans have lived 
unconsciously.... Farrell got his audience to see the 'destinies' of Americans as a social creation not 
always recognized by Americans themselves." 
14. Kazin, On Native Grounds, pp. 375, 409. 
15. Ibid., pp. 414-5. 
16. Also see Haim Genizi, "The Modern Quarterly: 1923-1940: An Independent Radical Magazine," 
Labor History, 15 (Spring 1974), 202, 203, 210-11. Edmund Wilson, who had joined the staff in 1932 
together with Max Eastman, called in 1934 for "translation of communist ideology into American terms." 
Eastman, however, came out strongly in favour of ideological anti-Stalinism. "In a statement of policy 
which was designed to clarify the magazine's new approach, the editors combined both views; they 
denounced communist dogmatism and recommended tactics that would Americanize Marxism." Genizi, 
210. 
17. See Kronenberger, "The Thirties: Frayed Collars and Large Visions," Atlantic Monthly, 217 (January 
1966), 79-81, Richard Pells, [untitled], Wisconsin Magazine oj'History(Autumn 1966), 60-1, Chametzky, 
"Boats Against the Current," Midstream (January 1966), 75-7, Arnold Beichman, "Dybbukism and the 
American Intellectual," Spectator (April 4, 1966), 441-2, and Leo Marx, "A Literary Radical," Commen-
tary, 40 (December 1965), 118-23. 
18. John P. Diggins, Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 274ff, on "Niebuhr and the Ironic Mode of History." 
19. The man in question is Max Nomad. 
20. Also see Diggins on the sources of Eastman's radicalism. In On Native Grounds, p. 404, Kazin 
suggested that the natural history of Eastman's convictions was more than likely an indication that the 
depression had also affected the culture itself. He called Eastman's The Literary Mind: Its Place in an 
Age of Science (1931) "a literary man's contemptuous valedictory to literary men..." 
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21. At the time, Kazin lionized Dewey and believed he "speaks with the security and serenity of a 
vanished world. I think... of... the moral achievement that constitutes his life.... If he is not the peer of 
William James, he is more than any other native philosopher the man whose whole career has been a 
continuing happiness for the rest of us." Kazin, A Lifetime Burning in Every Moment: From the Journals 
of Alfred Kazin (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 6, 6-7. 
22. Letter to Edmund Wilson, 19 October 1960, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale 
University. 
23. Sidney Hook thought Kazin described his quarrel with Eastman over the nature of Marxism with the 
air of the novice to radicalism. In Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1987), p. 1SS, he addresses a common sin in the history of intellectual radicalism, viz. the 
tendency among the survivors to produce "deceptive self-characterizations." He specifically mentions 
Kazin's Starting Out as a claim to "a radical intellectual past for which there is no public record 
whatsoever or traces in the memories of the activists of the period." More devastatingly, Kazin allegedly 
"reconstructed his political past to make it fit the prejudices of the current literary Establishment." 
24. Kazin, Journals, 2 May 1959. These observations occurred as notes to reading André Malraux's 
Man's Fate and D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover. Reading these books, Kazin claimed that he 
sensed the dual capacity of "the revolutionary and the religious radical." 
25. Kazin, "Blake and the Human Image," New Republic, 115 (September 16, 1946), 329-30. 
26. Kazin, New York Jew, pp. 23, 43-4. 
27. Dwight Macdonald, "Kulturbolschewismus is Here," Partisan Review, 8 (November-December, 
1941), 442-51. 
28. Kazin has frequently observed that all dynamic theories of history, "by the very momentum of 
thought itself," must lead to extremes. Kazin, Journals, 1959 [n.d.]. 
29. Basically, Kazin was did not tolerate the extremist positions from the contemporary political scene 
being transposed to literary discourse, and the chapter on "Criticism Between the Poles" in On Native 
Grounds thus was first and foremost a statement against all extremisms. Vincent B. Leitch, in American 
Literary Criticism from the Thirties to the Eighties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 107, 
reasons that Kazin's dislike was raised by "the intellectual and moral retreat institutionalized by their 
[viz. the Marxists' and formalists'] enterprises." A contemporary note was voiced by Lionel Trilling, who 
guessed at the ideological motivation for the chapter: "I admire Kazin but I suspect him of using his 
emotions and his ideas to get himself into suitable positions. I wrote to Tate... that it seemed to me that 
Kazin wanted to balance his anti-Marxism with something, and so constructed a formalist monster which 
he could attack, and thus stay admirably in the middle. I'd predict of Kazin, who has certainly cut a 
notable swathe with his book, that we are not going to get very interesting ideas from him, not seminal 
ideas certainly." Trilling, letter to John Crowe Ransom, 10 December 1942, Ransom Family Papers, 
Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee. 
30. Letter to Glenway Wescott, 13 January 1949, American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters: 
"...there is a long essay on William Blake published in my Viking Portable Edition of Blake that 
represents me now more exactly than the first book [On Native Grounds]." 
31. Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope: An Intellectual Autobiography (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1982), p. 150: "Modernism, as Georg Lukacs observed, despairs of human history; it 
abandons all ideas of linear development or progress; it even falls back, in more extreme instances, upon 
notions of a universal condition humaine, a rhythm of eternal recurrence, or even a blockage of the entire 
human enterprise. Yet within its own realm modernism signifies ceaseless change, turmoil, reaction — 
these, indeed, are among its defining characteristics. The more history comes to be seen as mired in 
endless crisis, the more must art take on a relentless dynamism — as if Hegel's 'cunning of reason' had 
been expelled from its high place as motive force of history and exiled to culture." 
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33. Kazin, "He Found a World of Imagination," New York Times Book Review (January 2, 1957), 1. 
34. Kazin, "The Bitter 30's: From a Personal History," Atlantic Monthly, 209, (May 1962), 84-5; Letter 
to Malcolm Cowley, 6 May 1962, and letter to Kazin, 18 May 1962, Newberry Library, Chicago. 
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following: "I have written so much about him, and only last week wrote an honest tribute to his writing 
for the Yaddo Celebration, so all I can say this morning about a man I was never friends with, with 
whom I had more than my share of trouble — what a presence in my life! How much space and time 
he occupied!" Journals, 29 March 1989. In "The New Republic: A Personal View," New Republic, 201 
(November 6, 1989), 80, Kazin gracefully suggested a trade-off, stating that "I admired his gift of clear 
style far more than I did his support for the Moscow Trials," adding that Cowley "later repented for all 
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35. Malcolm Cowley, "The 1930's Were an Age of Faith," New York Times Book Review (December 13, 
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Kazin's contribution to the symposium entitled "What is a Liberal — Who Is a Conservative?" in 
Commentary, 62 (September 1976), 72, on James Bumham and Irving Kristol. 
36. Kazin, Starting Out, p. 50: "Those writers of the Twenties, whose faces on book jackets were so 
"'interesting,' picturesque and comfortable, somehow made books as if they had always lived in books; 
from childhood on there had been a protective membrane between them and the surly crowded streets; 
they had tidy lives, and so could afford to despair of the universe at large." 
37. Ibid., pp. 12-3: "When you thought of the typical writers of the Twenties, you thought of rebels from 
"good" families — Dos Passos, Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Cummings, Wilson, Cowley. What was new 
about the writers of the Thirties was not so much their angry militancy, which they shared, as their 
background; writers now came from anywhere.... It was a time of such endless storm, of such turbulence 
every day of social crisis, that the drama of the depression and of Hitler coming to power was immedi-
ately documented for me in the savage unleashed hope with which the banked-up experience of the 
plebes, of Jews [Albert Maltz, Henry Roth, Daniel Fuchs], Irishmen [Jim Farrell], Negroes [Richard 
Wright], Armenians [William Saroyan], Italians [Pietro di Donato], was coming into American books." 
Kazin recalls the personal circumstances that made writers of Robert Cantwell, James T. Farrell, Edward 
Dahlberg, Albert Halper, Daniel Fuchs, Henry Roth, Richard Wright, John Steinbeck, Erskine Caldwell, 
Nelson Algren, and Henry Miller. David R. Peck, in '"The Orgy of Apology': The Recent Revaluation 
of the Literature of the Thirties," Science & Society, 32 (Fall 1968), 371-82, also lists the following: 
Tess Slesinger, Dalton Trumbo, Tom Kramer, Edwin Seaver, Thomas Bell, Edward Newhouse, Mike 
Gold, Josephine Herbst. 
38. Kazin, On Native Grounds, pp. 373-4. 
39. Kazin, "Young Critics Assess Yesterday's Giants," New York Times Book Review (June 6, 1937), 5. 
40. Kazin, "Young Critics," 5. He believed they differed from the older generation on four major points. 
First, the old guard had not understood, and even "falsified," "the nature of the conflict between the artist 
and society." Secondly, their conviction of living in a dying world had resulted in a preciosity of literary 
consciousness. Third, they were so disgusted with America that, strictly speaking, they had lost all sense 
of a native intelligence. And most of all, in the vanity and disillusionment of their literary egotism, "they 
could not keep up with the changes that were taking place all over America." This was the thrust of 
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Louis Kronenberger's bittemess about Mencken, Robert Cantwell's severity with Lewis, and Lionel 
Trilling's disappointment with Willa Cather's later work. 
41. Richard Chase, The Democratic Vista: A Dialogue on Life and Letters in Contemporary America 
(New York: Doubleday, 1958), p. 161; Kazin, "The Critic as Creator," Horizon, 4 (July 1962), 100. 
42. Jules Chametzky, "Boats Against the Current," 76; Kazin, Journals, 23 May 1864; Louis 
Kronenberger, "The Thirties: Frayed Collars and Large Visions," 80; Joseph Epstein, "That Mean, 
Fermenting Decade," New York Times Book Review, 70 (October 24, 1965), 48. 
43. Leo Marx, in "A Literary Radical," Commentary (December 1965), 120, 121, speaks of a "moral 
fable about the proper limits of the intellect in a political age" and of Kazin being a "radical critic of 
radicals"; Kronenberger, 80, sees Kazin as a "dissenting dissenter" and states that "in Kazin [the literary 
man] was unsubmergible in the political."; On Native Grounds was explicitly based on this premise: 
"There was no doubt in my mind, when I began the book, that American writers were to a fault believers 
in a more equitable order..." (Draught version of "Preface" to Fortieth Anniversary Edition of On Native 
Grounds, Berg Collection.) 
44. Kazin, Journals, 8 February 1960. 
45. Kazin, On Native Grounds, p. 379. Kazin spoke of the "democracy of authorship," stressing its 
native, non-ideological nature: "the compulsion of these men to write of the life of the working class was 
rooted in the memory of their own life in it." 
46. Kazin, "The Art of Call It Sleep," New York Review of Books, 38 (October 10, 1991), 15. 
47. Kronenberger, 80. 
48. Kazin, A Walker in the City, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951), p. 8. 
49. Kazin, Journals, 27 June 1955: "Psychology is the belief of those who have no belief as ideology is 
the method of those who have nothing to think about. Silone said it in that Encounter piece, A Choice 
of Comrades, and surely it is this quality in S. that always makes him so lovable; as it is this, again, that 
I went to in Simone Weil (and I notice that Silone does, too); that I cannot find in someone like 
Niebuhr; that I find so utterly missing in so many of my friends and colleagues.... Probably Judaism, 
which was passed on to us, and in the most formalistic fashion possible, never in its losing meant so 
much to us as our socialism, for we were never so conscious of losing Judaism, and, so far as I am 
concerned, I did not lose it but retained the best of it in deliberately passing beyond it. But Socialism did 
have the quality of a belief, in the number of unconscious attachments it included — to the 'oppressed,' 
to Europe itself as the umbilical continent of our socialism, and to 'solidarity.'" 
50. Sherman Paul's observation, in Repossessing and Renewing: Essays in the Green American Tradition 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), p. 286, that "in Sophie's determination to have 
love, he [viz. the author] also learns that one is justified in rebbelling in behalf of a full and joyous life, 
that liberation is a necessity of spirit, that there are depths deeper than those of politics, existential 
abysses, and a moving power in love that may be greater than that of politics," seems to me to underesti-
mate the element of tragedy. On the matter of using bourgeois culture for radical purposes, Kazin took 
off from Edmund Wilson's phrase, in Axel's Castle, on Proust: "I lived in [emphasis added] the Heart-
break House of capitalist culture, waiting for it to stand accused by all writers worthy of the name. I 
looked to literature for strong social argument, intellectual power, human liberation. If anyone had 
bothered to point out the inconsistencies in my intellectual affections, I would not have been ashamed" 
(SOT, 5). 
51. Kazin's account of Cowley's editorship at New Republic suggests that Cowley was actively exploit-
ing the contemporary intellectual temper, which was favourably disposed to activist radicalism. In that 
sense, Cowley's fondness of Malraux was predictable. Kazin has his doubts about Man's Fate, which he 
considers flawed but which nevertheless roused the radical temper, coming as it did when there was a 
great need for "a great historical myth" (SOT, 20). Something was overlooked in the fascination with the 
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heroic self-sacrifice of Communist intellectuals in the Shanghai crisis of 1927, namely the fact that their 
self-abnegation included their inability to realize their revolutionary ideals in the flesh. Communism 
affected people, particularly revolutionary intellectuals, in ways which Malraux did not always wish to 
examine. He thus sinned against the principal tenet of Marxism, being man's moral resurrection after the 
revolution. This showed that Malraux "thought of the Revolution as self-help in the minds of intellectual 
visionaries like himself' (SOT, 21). Kazin believes he used the intellectual Communist's placebo to rid 
himself of his "inner skepticism, the guilt of his intellectual pride, his unconscious bad faith" (SOT, 22). 
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revolutionary conscience, we get "oppression, misery, and injustice [taking] on a luminous quality and 
[becoming] guarantees of response, the ground of human value" (SOT, 25). This clearly states Kazin's 
preference. 
52. Corcoran is the pseudonym for a classmate of Kazin's in highschool. Personal communication, 
November 1996. 
53. Kazin believed that the Jewish intellectuals' involvement in secular radicalism was heavily mortg­
aged. The complexity of their relations with it only increased with the exhaustion of Leftist ideology in 
the Fifties, when former radicals were forced to reconsider their role in the movement and found out that 
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54. A historical tautology may be implied here. Kazin adds that, "believing that the Jews, and especially 
Jewish intellectuals, had a mission to humanity, I never wondered why Jewish intellectuals particularly 
were hated by the Nazis. We were a moral ferment; easy to kill off, but an unsettling influence." 
55. New York Jew, pp.14, 14-15. Kazin called Franklin D. Roosevelt "our favorite non-hero." Ibid. p. 15; 
That awareness was fraught with ambivalence, however: 
...we and our friends seemed to ourselves a particularly vulnerable, anxious, trouble-laden generation. 
We were in a great hurry to get out of college, to get married, to work past the many doors that 
seemed closed to us.... We... whose intellectual lives were dominated by crisis... had, in fact, never 
known the famous freedom of the twenties and now had to pick our way through so many lies — we 
were not, to put it mildly, a serenely confident or light-hearted group. Anxiety was a human condi­
tion we took for granted. (Kazin, "Richard Hofstadter, 1916-1970," American Scholar, 40 [Summer 
1970], 398.) 
56. The later picture, in New York Jew as in other sources, brims with irony and punches not quite 
pulled.; Kazin, "Richard Hofstadter," 400. Also see Daniel W. Howe and Peter E. Finn, "Richard 
Hofstadter: The Ironies of an American Historian," Pacific Historical Review, 43 (February 1974), 17-21. 
57. Kazin, "The Confidence of FDR," The New York Review of Books (May 20, 1971), 3: "Our only real 
criticism of the New Deal, indeed our only basic interpretation of it, rested on our finespun Jamesian 
analysis of, our love-hate relationship with [Franklin D. Roosevelt]."; Kazin, "The Historian at the 
Center," in Contemporaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 417; Kazin, "Edmund Wilson on the 
Thirties," in Contemporaries, p. 406; Ibid., pp. 420-1. 
58. Leo Marx, "A Literary Radical," 122: "When read as a moral fable, Starting Out in the Thirties 
proves to be a remarkably sustained attack upon all abstract thought. Virtually every incident in the 
book, whether it occurs in Kazin's private life or in the world of public events, is made to reveal the evil 
inherent in the unfleshed idea." See Arnold Beichman, "Critic Grows in Brooklyn," Christian Science 
Monitor, 57 (December 2, 1965), 136, who holds that Kazin is "abstract" on politics, Jules Chametzky, 
"Boats Against the Current," who comments on the failure of the later chapters, Frederick Ewan, "The 
Thirties, Commitment, and the Theatre," Science ά Society, 32 (Summer 1968), 301, and Sidney Hook, 
Out of Step, pp. 155-6. 
59. Peter Davison, letter to Kazin, 18 January 1965, Berg Collection; Josephine Herbst, letter to Kazin, 
9 September 1965, Berg Collection; Eakin, 49; Kazin, Journals, 27 February 1962, and 26, 25 and 19 
January 1960. 
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60. Marx, "A Literary Radical," 122; Kazin, "Does Anyone Remember the Thirties?" Saturday Review 
(October 13, 1962), 19. 
61. Kazin, "The Critic as Creator," Horizon, 4 (July 1962), 100; Kazin, Journals, 8 July 1962 and 18 
May 1962. 
NOTES TO INTELLECTUALS: FROM THE ASHES OF POLITICS 
References to The Inmost Leaf: A Selection of Essays are to the 1955 edition (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovitch) and appear in parentheses in the text. 
1. Josephine Herbst called Walker "almost pure Hindu." Letter to Kazin [n.d.], Berg Collection. Steven 
J. Rubin, in "First-Generation American-Jewish Autobiography and Cultural History," included in James 
Robert Payne, ed., Multicultural Autobiography: American Lives (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1992), p. 185, attributes Walker'i achievement to the complex resources of self it musters: "Kazin 
revisits his past in order to relive it, to experience in adulthood the world he has with some ambivalence 
left behind. [Walker does not offer] social doctrine but... self-interpretation, a recreation of a life..." He 
states that the encounter expresses "the central conflict of belonging versus independence, of alienation 
versus assimilation [, which] has not been resolved as is again expressed in... later works [Starting Out 
and New York Jew]." Other commentators have ascribed Kazin's elusive strategy of self to his reluctance 
to commit himself to any fixed position. Mark Krupnick, for instance, in his "An American Life," 
Salmagundi, 44-5 (Spring / Summer 1979), 202, notes with a touch of sarcasm that "the problem of the 
missing self persists in New York Jew." 
2. "Under Forty: A Symposium on American Literature and the Younger Generation of American Jews," 
Contemporary Jewish Record, (February 1944). The symposium was included in Theodore L. Gross, ed., 
The Literature of American Jews (New York: The Free Press, 1973). 
3. Kazin, "My New Yorks," 29. Particularly Fiedler's complaint that Walker "obstinately refuses to 
become a novel" ignores the fact that it is a book of experience, and a very personal one at that. 
4. Bloom, p. 139; Kazin, '"New York Jew,'" in B. Rosenberg and E. Goldstein, eds., Creators and 
Disturbers: Reminiscences by Jewish Intellectuals of New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), p. 197. 
5. Ibid., pp. 197-8, 194. 
6. In his account of the emergence of American-Jewish liberal intelligentsia, Alexander Bloom notes that 
the initially universalist character of their radicalism had blunted their ability to respond to the existential 
crisis that was the legacy of the Holocaust: "Their sense of universalism, so appropriate for their 
intellectual notions, left little room for the expression of Jewish themes or even for much comment on 
the Nazi anti-Semitism prior to the war. Given Hitler's anti-Semitism and the dislocation of Jews, it is 
remarkable how rarely the pages of Partisan Review and the various other writings of the New York 
Intellectuals contained references in the late 1930s to the persecution of the Jews." Bloom mentions 
Kazin's "In Every Voice, In Every Ban" as the principal exception. Kazin himself was shocked to see 
his own initial resentment about liberal acquiescence during the war confirmed, and particularly to hear 
that such laxness of response had been widespread among fellow Jewish radicals. Yet, he did not find 
it very difficult to account for such objectionable conduct: "Let's face it... If these intellectuals had gone 
on a great deal for stuff about the Jews and the war, the way, for example, the Jewish press did, they 
would have seemed a good deal less 'American,' 'less assimilated'.... they were very proud of their 
radicalism, people like Rahv and the others, they thought of themselves as super Lenins and Marxes. 
They had the most fantastic conceit about their ability to master the world situation." 
7. Kazin, Starting Out, p. 4. 
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8. Gross, p. 357. Podhoretz, in "Jewishness& the Younger Intellectuals: A Symposium," Commentary, 
31 (April 1961), 306, claimed that "the editors in their introductory statement announced that their 
intention was to cast light on the question of whether there was any important difference between the 
work produced by American writers of Jewish descent (who had only recently become 'full participants 
in the cultural life of the country') and that of their 'Christian colleagues'" (included in Gross, p. 471). 
9. Lionel Trilling, "Under Forty," in Gross, pp. 358-9, 360. 
10. One of these commentators is Bloom, p. 22; Kazin, "Under Forty," pp. 390, 391, 392. 
11. Alexander Bloom, The New York Intellectuals: The Formation of the Community, PhD thesis, Boston 
College, 1979, p. 274; Bloom, Prodigal Sons, p. 148. 
12. Clement Greenberg, "Self-Hatred and Jewish Chauvinism," Commentary, 10 (November 1950), 426-
33; Some of Kazin's books, notably Starting Out and New York Jew, are regarded as standard works on 
the political power drive of the deradicalizing intelligentsia since the Finies. He has remained a formi-
dable critic ofthat group, witness "Saving My Soul at the Plaza," New York Review of Books, 30 (March 
31, 1983), 38-42. 
13. Kazin, Journals, 26 July 1948; Kazin, "The Jewish Writer and the English Tradition," Commentary 
(October, 1949), 367, 368. In this connection, Kazin privately commented on Milton Hindus meeting 
Céline. He admired Hindus's move, granting that his dilemma must have been "terrible": 
H.'s pamphlet is a harrowing illustration of... with bowed head & clenched lips, trying to do justice 
to the artist and to neutralize the oppressor, the Jewish intellectual has to perform so many functions 
at once. His own respect and prof[fjerred love are turned against him... [It is an almost superhuman 
feat]... by being continually forced into this contradiction, the Jew wears the great burden of history... 
the burden is one we must accept... it is a prophetic burden.... We bear witness to something greater 
than the genius-attacker himself: we point to the essential principle he in part denies. 
And this, too, this cleaving function on the part of the intellectual, is what men like Eliot 
and Greene & Céline hate in us. That we are without "orthodoxy" frightens them.... (Journals, 4 June 
1949) 
14. Kazin, "Living with the Holocaust," 6: "To be a Jew under the Nazis was horribly to be a center of 
their concern and in some way — though people would not admit this — to hold the center of the stage. 
Whether as apostle or victim, the Jew was at the center." 
15. Delmore Schwartz, "Under Forty," Commentary, 7 (1944), 14; Kazin, New York Jew, pp. 24. 
16. Ibid., p. 25. Note that Walker's narrative persona shows no trace of such stylized melodrama. There, 
the act of walking creates moral space and possibility. On the occasion of Schwartz's collection of short 
stories The World Is a Wedding coming out, Kazin elaborated on his uneasy relation to the experience 
projected in them. He felt "put off by their over-conscious simplicity which I attributed to a certain nasty 
irony... [Kazin sees them as "moral fables":] there is something repellent about them — an excess of 
manner, an abysmal lack of vitality." He found them just about missing in narrative quality, but 
grudgingly handed it to Schwartz, admitting that part of his suspicion did not relate to Schwartz's ability 
as a writer: "...the greater thing to seize here is the lesson of how much my resentment of the PR-group, 
my unending fear of their scom, has led me astray." He conceded that Schwartz "is a real poet." 
(Journals, 28 August 1948); Kazin, New York Jew, pp. 26, 50. 
17. William Barrett, The Truants: Adventures Among the Intellectuals (Garden City: Anchor Press / 
Doubleday, 1982), p. 214; Bloom, The New York Intellectuals, p. 11; Kazin, Journals, 7 December 1975 
and 18 January 1975. 
18. Kazin, "Kafka, Twentieth Century Man of Sorrows," New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review 
(April 13, 1947), 23, 3. 
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19. Kazin, "Delmore Schwartz, 1913-1966," in New York World Journal Tribune/Book Week (October 
9, 1966), 1, 17, 18. 
20. Kazin, '"New York Jew,'" 209. 
21. Kazin, "Delmore Schwartz," p. 18. The concept of agon has been a major concern with Kazin: 
"Pascal Agonistes — Johnson Agonistes — Nietzsche Agonistes — the thinker as wrestler — who am 
I becomes what values can I be said to embody, to articulate, to liberate out of myself?" (Kazin, 
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is also the "residue of human quality beyond the reach of cultural control" that Trilling believes 
makes possible an opposing self." (Paul, 271) 
The first half of the statement offers more insight than the second. Kazin has always been rather 
suspicious of aesthetic modes of selfhood resisting the push and pull of historical existence, nor has he 
ever declared himself committed to defining an 'adversary' imagination to oppose the existing culture. 
A comparison of Kazin's and Trilling's treatments of William Dean Howells, in On Native Grounds and 
The Opposing Self respectively, is instructive. (See Morris Dickstein, Double Agent, p. 154). In Leaf 
Kazin was rather concerned to generate maximum attentiveness to the absolute truth of modem man's 
condition. This certainly involved religious awareness, but not necessarily morally redemptive interpre-
tations of the works under discussion. In 1952, trying to produce a piece on her for the New Yorker, 
Kazin confessed feeling a tremendous need to identify with Simone Weil, though he was painfully aware 
of "the human faults... in her" (Journals, 2 January 1952). Kazin dedicates a substantial section of 
Writing Was Everything (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) to her, repeating more than forty 
years after first reading her that he was absolutely struck by her wonderful observation that "attentiveness 
without object is the supreme form of prayer." This spelled the tragedy of modern man having to wait 
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Eliseo Vivas, R.P. Blackmur, Francis Fergusson, Alien Tate, and Philip Rahv. The list certainly testified 
to the editor's ideologically heterodox approach and Kazin's willingness, as the recent author of what 
was widely seen as a book containing a "native" if not nationalist thesis, to be associated with it. Indeed, 
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exemplary, expressive sensibility and ignored the moral complexity of James's international experience 
Kazm never managed to get his contribution into Kenyon Review's special issue, however, because he 
left for Europe as an army reporter (Marian Janssen, The Kenyon Review (¡939-1970) A Critical 
History [Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 1990] pp 99-101 ) 
27 Philip Rahv, "The Cult of Experience in American Writing," Partisan Review, 7 (November-
December, 1940), 412-24 Rahv asserted that Henry James, "by exploiting in a fashion altogether his 
own the contingencies of private life that fell within his scope was able to drive the wedge of historical 
consciousness into the very heart of the theme of experience ", Kazin, "Critics at the Feast of Henry 
James," New York Times Book Review (December 2, 1945), 4, 39-41, Ibid, 41 
28 In "Portrait of a Lady," New Republic, 199 (August 29, 1988), 41, a review of The Letters of Edith 
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different professional perspectives on life "One wonders how much her [Wharton's] worship of Henry 
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29 Gay Wilson Allen, in William James A Biography (New York Viking Press, 1967), ρ χι, claims 
that William James sponsored the notion of a "mehonstic universe " 
30 Kazin, Journals, 21 April 1962 
31 He may be said to represent the transition from the first to the second of the historically consecutive 
stages distinguished by Irving Howe in "The Culture of Modernism," The Decline of the New (London 
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this was not an intellectual abstraction, but a personal, intimate, and urgent problem, all the more 
urgent because it involved his relations with his adored father To Tom Ward he confessed during this 
spring "I have grown up, partly from education and the example of my Dad, partly, I think, from a 
natural tendency, in a very non-optimistic view of nature, going so far as to have some years ago a 
perfectly passionate aversion to all moral praise, etc — an antinomian tendency, in short I have 
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religious) conception of 'free will ' For most people, no doubt then as now, the doctrine of free will is 
not a personal, intimate, fateful problem But for William it was " 
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point how deeply the mind of man impenetrates and shapes the objects he studies 
47 Kazin, "Introduction" to The Stature of Theodore Dreiser A Critical Study of the Man and His Work 
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NOTES TO HISTORY INTO FUTURE: CONTEMPORARIES 
References are to the 1962 edition of Contemporaries (Boston: Little, Brown) and appear in parentheses 
in the text. 
1. Also consider Kazin, "The Idols of Our Democracy," New York Herald Tribune (Books) (April 6, 
1941), 9: "Lincoln is more than our greatest hero, he embodies the purest imaginative achievement of 
our race." In later years, Kazin, who studied history before taking a degree in literature, was to remain 
fascinated by Lincoln's moral genius in securing his political power base during the dark days of the 
Republic. He has been unique in linking, in An American Procession, the emergence of the fledgeling 
nation struggling with the issues tearing it apart to the visionary and persistent power of Lincoln's mind, 
celebrated by Whitman as a supreme poetic subject and the purest expression of Romantic democracy. 
Significantly, Kazin's review οι Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, J 832-1858. Speeches, Letters, 
and Miscellaneous Writings; The Lincoln-Douglas Debates, and Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and 
Writings, 1859-1865. Speeches, Letters, and Miscellaneous Writings; Presidential Messages and 
Proclamations (New York: The Library of America, 1989), in New York Times Book Review, 94 
(December 10, 1989), 3, 39, is entitled "A Forever Amazing Writer." It presents Lincoln as a great poet 
of the national experience through his total involvement in the issues threatening to wreck the American 
democratic experiment and his "moral and intellectual gift for leadership. Without the Civil War Lincoln 
would have had no need to rise to the universal vision of Gettysburg, the overall sense of history in the 
Second Inaugural" (Ibid., 3). Lincoln comes out as a truly creative thinker and historical mind: "...the 
war President by the force of his pen kept the North together" (Ibid., 39). 
2. Kazin, Journals, 30 May 1962; Allen Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York: Scribner, 1950); 
Journals, 23 October 1952: "In Lincoln alone did democracy realize the tragedy." Louis D. Rubin Jr., in 
"'Theories of Human Nature': Kazin or Warren?," Sewanee Review, 69 (1961), 502, disagrees. He claims 
that the war laid the basis for the strong pragmatic bent of American thought and permitted political 
action to be "something other than burning moral logic." Rubin's opening pulled no punches: "Is the 
American Civil War over? Has it even begun? More to the point, will Alfred Kazin ever accept William 
Faulkner and Robert Penn Warren, or will he continue to conduct a fruitless lament that Theodore 
Dreiser could not become the Great American Novelist?" (Rubin, 500) He proceeds to analyze the effect 
the War had on the "ideological opposition" between Legalism and Higher Law: 
Warren proposes that the War was a working out of a process that produced, in Hegelian fashion, a 
synthesis, a common-sense, pragmatic approach to experience, and that this was the ideological 
outcome of the War. It is an intriguing theory upon which to venture an explanation of the ideologi­
cal foundations of modem America, one that not only does not ignore but indeed is built on the chief 
development in American thought since 1865: pragmatism. This... is the heart of Warren's Civil War 
meditation, and it is odd that Kazin, who has been so concerned with the literary manifestations of 
the American mind, fails to concede its possible usefulness. For does it not, among other things, go 
far toward explaining the phenomenon of Mark Twain? And does it not give a clue as to why 
American literary naturalism, from Dreiser onward, has been so ideologically "impure," without the 
rigidly mechanistic, behavioristic attributes of French naturalism? Does it not, furthermore, help us 
to understand the writers of the 1920's, for whom the impact of another War, one which did not 
resolve ideological and social issues, seemed to destroy their faith in a pragmatically workable 
society? For if we conceive of the pragmatic solution not as an ever-viable, ever effective resolution 
of ideological conflicts, but simply as what Warren implies it is — a kind of compromise, a deter­
mination not to become impaled on the thorns of ideological arguments carried to their logic extremes 
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— then we see it as a device for expedient, workable social organization, valid for as long as the 
ideological considerations will stay thus compromised. (Rubin, 503-4) 
3. Sherman Paul, in the essay on the early installments of Edmund Wilson's Patriotic Gore, in Repos-
sessing and Renewing: Essays in the Green American Tradition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer-
sity Press 1976), p. 276, claims that Kazin was confronting "the issue of ideology and imagination." 
4. Indeed, "open-endedness," viz. democracy's 'open road,' was also central to Lincoln's political vision: 
"In stressing as the main article of belief the paramount importance of keeping slavery out of the 
territories, Lincoln was saying that the true meaning of liberal democracy is to leave things truly open-
ended, not to presume (as the slave power did) that they knew in advance, to the very end of time, 
basing their belief on phony theological but all too believable ideas of hierarchy, superior race, etc." 
(Kazin, Journals, 6 October 1989) 
5. Kazin, "Young Man, Old Man," 39. 
6. Journals, 5 May 1953. "Infliction of the past; constant concern with memory, review, making the past 
live again. The shorter the time before you, the clearer the extinction of a tradition of which you did not 
become completely conscious until this moment, when you see yourself losing it, — the heavier, the 
more compelling the burden of the past. The future is a myth, a dream. The past alone becomes fully 
real, has meaning, can be organized. But, oh — how much time one spends on that past... precisely 
because it is a whole we seek, a design."; Paul, p. 276. 
7. But Kazin has frankly admitted that the author oí Axel's Castle, The Triple Thinkers, To the Finland 
Station, and The Wound and the Bow "was my intellectual hero." See "Zeal For the Hidden Detail," a 
review of Edmund Wilson The Forties, Atlantic Montly, 251 (April 1983), 126. 
8. Letter to Edmund Wilson, 9 June 1950, Yale University Library; Letter to Kazin, 10 June 1950, Berg 
Collection; Kazin, New York Jew, p. 65. 
9. Letter to Kazin, 13 April 1962, in Elena Wilson, ed., Edmund Wilson: Letters on Literature and 
Politics, 1912-1972, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), p. 627. 
10. Kazin, Journals, 19 September 1961. In "The New Republic: A Personal View," New Republic, 201 
(November 6, 1989), 79, Kazin called it "the perverse introduction [Wilson] had tacked on to his great 
book on the literature of the Civil War..." He recalls Bruce Catton, the widely respected author of 
"dramatic" books on the Civil War, spotting Wilson's weakness: "That man knows everything about the 
Civil War except why it was fought." See Kazin, "The Generals in the Labyrinth," which is a joint 
review of books on Generals Grant, Sherman, and Alexander, New Republic, 204 (February 18, 1991), 
62. Wilson had staked everything on the Unionists' insatiable power drive, never admitting that slavery 
was a very real and embarrassing moral issue in the minds of both Unionists and Confederates. 
11. Journals, 19 and 20 September 1961; During an interview with Raymond Rosenthal and Moyshe 
Ducovny, Kazin expressed his belief that "man's mission is greater than his history." Kazin, "Oral 
History Memoir," p. 8, William E. Wiener Oral History Library, The American Jewish Committee, New 
York; New York Jew, pp. 245, 246, 248. No matter how much he took Wilson to task, Kazin still handed 
it to him: "Patriotic Gore... contained in passing the most profound considerations on literature in 
America I had ever read." 
12. Kazin, New York Jew, pp. 246, 247, 248. 
13. The journal entry for 22 December 1965 shows Kazin's view that this sentiment itself constituted a 
veritable tradition among the American cultural élite: 
Adams — Eliot — Wilson —> history — poetry — "criticism" — the Puritan-Brahman-patrician 
builders of "world spirit," and the sterility of their wasteland. Eliot is the key to Adams, to the sexual 
sterility and the historical architecture, to the conscious sacrifice of instinct and the fantasy of "unity" 
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... invaded by "multiplicity" ... all these Puritans, trying to compose life by throwing forward stepping 
stones of thought. 
Hegel the supreme Protestant bard — the phenomenology of spirit. 
14. Kazin, Journals, IS June 1961. 
15. Irving Howe, "Literature and Liberalism," in Edward Zwick, ed., Literature and Liberalism: An 
Anthology of Sixty Years of The New Republic (Washington D.C.: New Republic Co., 1976), pp. xvi-
xvii, xxii. 
16. Some comments on Kazin's use of the term "the modem" are in order, and I refer to the counter-
tradition proposed by Paul Levine in "American Bards and Liberal Reviewers," Hudson Review, 15 
(1962 / 1963), 96. He states that the tradition of "realism" in modem literature which Kazin traces in On 
Native Grounds (Emerson - Twain - Dreiser - Carl Sandburg - Robert Frost) has an equally distinct 
counterpart in the sequence Faulkner - Eliot - Djuna Barnes. "Indeed, it seems significant that the writers 
who serve Kazin's thesis least have served American literature best: James the Anglophile, Hemingway 
the expatriate, and Faulkner the provincial all seem less to the point of On Native Grounds than do 
William Dean Howells or Hamlin Garland or Theodore Dreiser." 
17. Consider the journal entry for 13 November 1968: "The point about Whitman is that the old self died 
and the new social self came in: he did not see the war as either holy (Emerson) or evil-war (Thoreau). 
He was recreated by the new reality. He is the bridge between the old America and the new." 
18. Kazin, "Postscript" to 1955 edition of On Native Grounds, p. 410. Also consider Kazin, "The Critic 
as Creator," 102: "... the novel of society, as written by such masters as Dreiser and Dos Passos, seems 
to me the strongest form [of the novel] we have." In addition, see Kazin, "The Useful Critic," Atlantic, 
216 (December 1965), 73: "I share much of [these writers'] belief in the ideal freedom and power of the 
self, in the political and social visions of radical democracy." (A revised version of this article, retitled 
"To Be a Critic," was included in the New and Revised Edition of Contemporaries [New York: Horizon 
Press, 1982], pp. 1-18.) 
19. Kazin, Procession, p. 16; Kazin, Journals, 7 December 1956. 
20. Ibid., p. 410. 
21. Irving Howe, "This Age of Conformity," Partisan Review, 21 (1954), 15, 16, 17; Richard Chase's 
narrative persona Ralph, in The Democratic Vista, p. 30, ventures "the proposition that in our time there 
is a general drive, in all segments of our culture, toward some sort of middle ground of taste and 
opinion, a general desire for passivity and rest and conformity, a fear of the turmoil of the mind, a 
longing to escape conflict [and] to assuage all the vivid contradictions and anomalies that in the past 
have engaged the American mind. The leading image of the day is a sort of mystic centrality, an 
equability of mind.... The search for a middle way of culture is in certain radically significant ways a 
denial and abandonment of the cultural ideals of the American mind of the past..." 
22. An outstanding example is Richard Chase's "liberal" Melville. 
23. Kazin, Journals, 16 May 1970. Kazin went on to note that "the malady is the split of the individual 
—> he really has no sense of the social process..." And in "The Seriousness of Robert Penn Warren," 
Partisan Review, 26 (Spring 1959), 312-3, he observed that Warren's "point of view... is an attempt, 
through an ideal conception of poetry, to reclaim the Christian, sacramental vision of the world destroyed 
by scientific materialism."; Ibid., 316. 
24. Mark Krupnick, Lionel Trilling, p. 119; Trilling, "Wordsworth and the Rabbis," in The Opposing 
Self, p. 128; Krupnick, p. 122; Ibid., p. 125: "In the fifties he turned from the spectacle of his ardent 
young men [Sorel and Rastignac and 'their American progeny' Henry James and Fitzgerald] to bestow 
his blessings on the 'moveless' and sexless: aged mothers, Wordsworthian solitaries, and assorted 
instances of being-without-will in Lawrence, Faulkner, and Hemingway. We have only to compare the 
complementary essays on Henry James. The 1948 essay on The Princess Casamassima celebrates youth, 
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beauty and a young man's initiation into the glories of high civilization; the essay, only five years later, 
on The Bostonians allies itself with inertia and Thanatos at the expense of energy and Eros."; Trilling, 
"Preface" to The Opposing Self, p. xiii. 
25. Ibid., p. 139. The comparison is the more pregnant since Kazin, too, was to explore the finally 
irreconcilable opposites of the liberal ethos in Fitzgerald's Gatsby. Evaluating the cultural permutations 
of the American self in An American Procession, pp. 396-7, Kazin arrives at Fitzgerald's fiction as the 
only sustainable transcendent version of the self in modem times: "Gatsby was not a character but an 
idea of the everlasting self-creation that Americans have mastered... [Fitzgerald] included America in his 
romanticism."; Trilling, "Preface" to The Opposing Self, p. x; Krupnick, p. 124. 
26. Mark Krupnick, pp. 156-7, has noted the following: "Trilling offers no single, concise definition of 
his key terms. But we may say, in general, that sincerity, the older ideal, involves being true to oneself 
within the context of a shared morality. It assumes the existence of positive values outside the individual. 
Authenticity, on the other hand, tends to be antisocial or at least antinomian. It is private and subjective, 
emphasizing individual experience as the sole source of value. Moreover, the only experience that 
matters is the experience of oneself, the more intense the better. What is good is what enhances the 
individual's sentiment of his own being. Sincerity had been the antidote to the duplicity and dissembling 
we find in the Renaissance court and in such fictional characters as Shakespeare's Iago and Edmund. 
Authenticity arises as a response to a later culture in which the sense of self has become fragmented and 
attenuated. It is the answer to the death of the spirit depicted by modem writers like Joyce and Law-
rence." The concept of "biologism" reflects the principle of inertia within in a distinctly psycho-cultural, 
Freudian schema which Trilling explored in the Fifties to counteract the destructive dynamism of modem 
radicalism. It was first used in his 1953 essay on Henry James's The Bostonians, and expressed itself as 
a moral-cultural revaluation of conservative attitudes correcting a culture "sick from the hypertrophy of 
the radical will" (Krupnick, p. 124). Gravity, stability, and permanence came to be positive values per 
se. 
27. Kazin, Journals, 14 June 1957. 
28. Lionel Trilling, "William Dean Howells and the Roots of Modem Taste," in The Opposing Self, p. 
184. Krupnick, p. 101, points out that in the book club introductions that Trilling wrote in the course of 
the Fifties and in the longer essays "he is in retreat from radicalism in all its forms, cultural and political. 
The fact that all but one of the essays in The Opposing Self 'concern nineteenth-century authors suggests 
his retreat from modernism; and his praise of middle-class life and middle-class values in general 
suggests his retreat from politics."; Krupnick, p. 131. 
29. References are to Kazin, "Rome: A Meditation on Keats," 1976, included in Contemporaries: From 
the 19lh Century to the Present, New and Revised Edition, (New York: Horizon Press, 1982), pp. 298-
309. 
30. Also consider Kazin's rather caustic remark in "The Self as History," Contemporaries (New and 
Revised Edition), p. 413: "Here [viz. in America] the self, the active, partisan, acquisitive self, bom of 
society, is forever remaking itself, but not in the direction that Keats called 'a vale of soul-making.'" 
31. "For the non-fiction writer, as I can testify, personal history is directly an effort to find salvation, to 
make one's own experience come out right. This is as true of Edmund Wilson in his many autobio-
graphical essays and notebooks as it is of James Baldwin, Malcolm X, Claude Brown. It is even true of 
straight autobiography by fiction writers. Hemingway's account of his apprenticeship to letters in Paris, 
A Moveable Feast, is an effort to save himself by recovering an idyllic past." Ibid., p. 416. 
32. See Kazin, "Instinct for Tragedy: A Message in Black and White," Chicago Tribune Book World (8 
October, 1967), 1, 22 (a review of William Styron, The Confessions of Nat Turner), and Kazin, Bright 
Book of Life, pp. 226-9. 
33. Kazin, "Woman in Dark Times," New York Review of Boob (June 24, 1982), 3, 4. 
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34. Tony Judt's "At Home in This Century," a review of Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 
¡930-1954, and Carol Brightman, ed., Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and 
Mary McCarthy, 1949-1975, in New YorkReview of Books (April 6, 1995), 9-14, contains an unsparing 
view of the personal inconsistencies in Arendt's philosophical position on the Jewish identity: "In order 
to understand the complexities of Arendt's relationship to her own, and her people's Jewishness, it is 
crucial to remember that she was, after all, a Jew. Like the German-speaking Jews of Prague, Vienna, 
and other cities of the old Empire, the Jews of Germany were different from the Jews of the East, and 
they knew it and felt it. They were educated and cultivated in German, steeped in German Bildung, and 
quite lacked the difficult and distant relationship to the dominant language and culture that shaped Jewish 
experience in Russia, Poland, and elsewhere in East-Central Europe. They certainly knew that they were 
Jews and that their non-Jewish neighbours and fellow citizens knew they were Jews; but this did not 
diminish their identification with the idea of German-ness.... This deep sense of her own German-ness 
is invoked [by several commentators] to account for the care Arendt took in her study of totalitarianism 
to divert attention away from the distinctively German sources of Nazism and make of it a general 
'Western' or 'modem' deviation. This seems likely; Arendt never really confronted the fact that the 
worst persecutions, of Jews in particular, in the modem era took place in Germany." (Judt, 10.); Mrs. 
C.L. Clearney, 21 April 1961, Berg Collection. She was responding to Kazin's "Eichmann and the New 
Israelis," Reporter, 24 (April 27, 1961), 24-5. (Included in Contemporaries, pp. 442-7.) 
35. Irving Howe, Margin, p. 275; While strong intellectual dissent from Arendt's thesis was voiced 
straight after the publication of the Eichmann piece in the New Yorker, a major fracas erupted at a public 
forum in New York in 1963 sponsored on the occasion by Dissent. Irving Howe, in Margin, pp. 273-4, 
claimed that the event split the New York Jewish intellectual community permanently. Kazin was 
outraged by the sheer amount of personal and intellectual animosity levelled at Arendt at the time — the 
journal entry for 19 October 1963 mentions Irving Howe and Lionel Abel in particular — and jumped 
to her defense, supporting her as a person not her thesis. Two days later he reflected that "my affection 
for Hannah has always been fundamentally a longing to be totally convinced — instructed — by her 
absolutes." He had been on very good terms with her ever since she arrived in the United States as a 
refugee from Nazism — "her astonishing expressiveness as an expounder was already inseparable from 
her charm as a woman" ("Woman in Dark Times," 3) — and had helped her get Origins published. It 
was only during the 1963 free-for-all that he began to realize what a "dangerous and glib concept... the 
'banality of evil' was [and] that she [Arendt] had taken very great liberties. [Arendt's critics] knew 
exactly. Hannah was the prisoner of German philosophy, which traditionally trivialized evil people as 
lacking the mentality of German philosophers. The same arrogance is found in Marx, who of course 
made worse use of it than Hannah Arendt." (Bloom, Prodigal Sons, p. 330.) "Woman in Dark Times" 
may be seen as Kazin's final statement on his relationship to Arendt. The assignment took some mental 
preparation and soul-searching: 
Much concerned with Hannah ever since the NY Review asked me to review the Young-Bruehl 
biography [Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World]... Thinking over our whole strange and truncated 
friendship over the years, the volatility as well as the nobility, the conceit and the vulnerability, the 
Prussian egotismus and soulfulness, the real love of God, I realize that her fond quotation from 
Augustine, "Love means that I want you to be," is more than ever my firmest and most grateful 
connection with her. It is this concern with being, and her fright in the Nazi experience of not-being, 
of all our not being, that I remember best... And of course her fame as a teacher and exponent of 
political wisdom in the American context. How grateful we all were to her, how much her crisisf-
]thinking seemed to us something altogether new and deep in our lives — McCarthy's addiction to 
her, like the addiction of so many, really based on our political anxiety... Which Arendt shared with 
an intensity beyond us, but which she complemented with her extension of anxiety into thought 
relatively scarce in the pragmatic day to day ad hoc American contest. 
Her judgments became pretty ad hoc too, but she could always put them into a wider and deeper 
context... The friendships based on political anxiety — on the sense of fright... The usual academic 
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spectatoritis was outside of this — she never achieved a "new science of politics," anymore than 
anybody else did, but she did offer us who were frightened a new vista — couched in the language 
that took its inspiration from the extensiveness of German idealism. (Kazin, Journals, 27 April 1982) 
The preoccupation with Hannah day after day — the Eichmann book begins disagreeably — the tone 
of... condescension — our "pariah" Jew [Arendt] did not like official Jews like Hausner the prosecut-
or. But what a good student H[annah] always was — the marshalling of evidence is most impressive. 
An important point in her correspondence with [Gershom] Scholem — the "collaboration" she objects 
to was only after 1939. But weren't the Jews even more hapless then than they had been before [?]. 
Hitler had threatened the Jews with extermination in the event of war. 
The major point always: her fear of parting, of a "Break" — the past as in some sense an ultimate 
value. Moving around the great thinkers meant connection with the past. 
Banality of Evil left out the horrible contempt for the Jews — squashing them like bugs ·— that 
points up the real character of these "normal" bureaucrats. H[annah] not at her best when she 
discusses "Banality." (Kazin, Journals, 29 April 1982) 
36. Judt, 12; Kazin, Journals, 29 April 1982, states that Arendt's literary technique kept her from 
becoming a responsible historian: "Nor was she a historian — she did not account for a sufficient 
number of causes. Again and again satisfied herself... by quoting some philosophical epigram — or just 
quoting."; Judith Shklar, "Hannah Arendt as Pariah," Partisan Review, 50 (1983), 67. Morris Dickstein's 
description of Kazin's style in An American Procession bears a remarkable resemblance to what Kazin 
himself considers to be the distinguishing mark of Arendt's Heideggerian sensibility: "In his method, 
Kazin is more phenomenologist than formalist, looking at the grain of the wood rather than the shape of 
the building, listening for the rhythm of a writer's perception before it crystallizes in finished 'works.'.... 
The relentless inwardness of Kazin's readings can seem oppressive, repetitious. Not content to explicate, 
unwilling to simplify, he provokes his readers to pluck at the heart of a writer's mystery.... [Kazin] fuses 
biography and criticism to treat books as evidences of character, the written traces of a writer's personal 
destiny. This is relentlessly personal criticism, focusing on character as enacted in language." (Dickstein, 
Double Agent, pp. 107, 108); Kazin, "Woman in Dark Times," 3-4, 6, 3, 6. 
37. Ibid. Irving Howe, in Margin, p. 272, very aptly noted that two Eichmanns coexisted in the public 
mind after his capture in 1961, and that the Eichmann "about whom Arendt wrote was the Eichmann on 
display at the Jerusalem trial." 
38. Richard M. Cook, "Dwelling in Possibility: Alfred Kazin's Procession," Michigan Quarterly Review, 
24 (Summer 1985), 487. 
NOTES TO "THE STARS DO NOT SHINE IN THE POSTWAR ERA" 
References are to the 1973 edition of Bright Book of Life: American Novelists and Storytellers from 
Hemingway to Mailer (Boston: Little, Brown) and appear in parentheses in the text. 
1. This is Kazin quoting Amos Oz on postwar American literary achievement during a public lecture on 
6 June 1987 in "De Balie," the Amsterdam forum for political and cultural debate, 
2. Journals, 22 March 1970. On 22 December 1972, he noted the following: "Sent back Bright Book 
proofs. Very happy about this... Never realized how clearly I saw the period in terms of the limitations 
of power — the ending of the too facile 19th. cent, dream... Power as nemesis; power as tyranny... — 
19th. cent, power — God turned into mechanical energy, man's will." Also consider Journals, 30 May 
1970: 
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... secularism is the effect of living in a meaningless world, not the cause, In the 20's the purely 
esthetic school, the religion of the word, placed all value in the individual... No doubt the 
bourgeois world seemed false to Hemingway, Margaret Anderson, etc... and art was a way of 
replacing this falsehood with the truth of art... But the deeper truth is that the middle-class 
individualism of Midwestern pioneers, entrepreneurs, businessmen, their marvellous self-confid-
ence... of their own strength and possibility, gave rise to a generation of esthetic pioneers and 
entrepreneurs... the confidence in the self, and the sense of making a world entirely out of the 
truthfulness of art... And this "created" world collapsed... Nothing seems to me more at the heart 
of my book than the present sense of the meaninglessness of the world... Out of whack... out of 
control... a fiction. 
Journals, March 1966 [n.d.] 
3. Robert Gorham Davis, "Writers at the Mercy of the Age," New Leader (May 14, 1973), 8, 9, 10. 
4. Peter Shaw, "The State of the Novel," Commentary, 57 (January 1974), 4; Journals, 11 May 1970; 
Kazin, "Our Middle-Class Storytellers," Atlantic Monthly , 222 (August 1968), 52. Kazin attacked the 
editors' 'Vapid moralizing," stating that 
Flannery O'Connor was not a liberal, and nice liberal comments are not to be drawn out of her 
mouth, for she never made any. She was a pitiless, ironic, fatalistic recorder of the fact that some 
original sin survives in every morsel of experience, that real experience usually has some violence in 
it, that this violence can only be described, it cannot be diagnosed or cured like an ailment. It is 
because the enduring injustice behind human life must be relived in art in order to be made bearable 
that readers of "Everything That Rises Must Converge" can enjoy its pitilessness, its irony, its 
severity. 
On p. 53, he voiced his own opinion of the works reviewed: "Loneliness, alienation, jealousy, moral 
pains all! Who can doubt that most American fiction is devoted to the moral pains of middle-class 
America, that it is just as domestic and realistic and unsparing as it was forty years ago in the pages of 
Sinclair Lewis, ninety years ago in the pages of William Dean Howells?"; Ibid. 
5. Ibid., 53. 
6. Shaw, 4; Malcolm Bradbury, "Liberal Dilemmas," review of The Commentary Reader, ed. Norman 
Podhoretz, and Alfred Kazin, ed., Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews (Third Series) (New 
York: Viking, 1967), New Statesman, 75 (June 1968), 842. 
7. Kazin, "Our Middle-Class Storytellers," 54; Cheever phrased it as follows: "Why... in this half-
finished civilization, in this most prosperous, equitable and accomplished world, should everyone seem 
so disappointed?" Quoted in Bright Book, p. 110. 
8. Bright Book's motto was taken from Melville's The Confidence Man; Bright Book, p. 3. Kazin's 
journal entry for 10 July 1970 focused on Robert Coover and Richard Brautigan: "The imagination of 
absurdity — ... the 'real' world has become impossibly banal. It does not answer. Reality is a played-out 
convention. The only 'reality' is the surprise in the human brain. Bored... because the systematic world 
proceeds by its own laws + these work by a corporate intelligence. The key to the imag. of absurdity is 
always the immanent sense of the unpredictable in all things. The 'real' world has sealed itself up — 
leaving the dream world more dependent than ever on its own resources."; Theodore Colson, Interna-
tional Fiction Review (January 1975), 71, 72; Kazin, "Young Man, Old Man," Reporter, 29 (December 
19, 1963), 34. 
9. Colson, 72; Josephine Hendin, "The Mind of a Man of Letters," American Scholar, 43 (Winter 1974), 
172, 173. 
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10. Shaw, 4. He lists Kazin's strictures on Walker Percy, John O'Hara, John Cheever, J.D. Salinger, 
John Updike, Saul Bellow, Bernard Malamud, Philip Roth, Joan Didion, Susan Sontag, Norman Mailer, 
and Truman Capote.; Ibid., 4, 6. 
11. Trilling was shocked by the contemporary directions in the literary and cultural situation of the 
Sixties. He regretted the widespread resistance to seriousness, if not to any moralizing intention, on the 
part of many contemporary writers. Their indulgence in parody of content and style he considered a 
tragic departure from the achievement of the early modernists. Contemporary students of literature, he 
observed, were increasingly inclined to ignore what he considered the profoundly antisocial impulse 
conveyed in the modernist canon. Instead, they responded to those ideas "with a delighted glibness, a 
joyous sense of power in the use of received generalizations." But several commentators have empha-
sized that Trilling himself did much to devise a pedagogy for the literature class and that he was in fact 
himself instrumental in the transformation of modernism into "received generalizations." (Trilling, "On 
the Teaching of Modem Literature," in Beyond Culture, p. 4) 
The profoundly adversarial temper of early modernism, spawned by a small cultural élite, had by the 
Sixties lost ground to an "adversary culture," virtually a new class, which fulfilled itself in parodying the 
aims of the historic minority culture. As the decade wore on, Trilling gradually became disenchanted 
with what he reportedly called "modernism in the streets." The anti-establishment temper of the new 
radicalism, he believed, politicized issues properly belonging to the highly speculative realm of literary 
appreciation. Trilling's stance in the Sixties may have been inspired by caution, an attempt to avoid the 
kind of polemicism that other intellectuals used as the medium for their commitment, yet it reverts to an 
old strain in his intellectual-cultural synthesis. He argued that the student rebels were acting out fantasies 
of identity: "For young people now, being political serves much the same purpose as being literary has 
long done — it expresses and validates the personality." In Trilling's later work, the gradual displace-
ment of politics by the self was visible throughout, culminating in Sincerity and Authenticity. Trilling, 
interview with Stephen Donadío, Partisan Review, 35 (Summer 1968), 386-7. 
12. Kazin, "Autobiography as Narrative," in A.L. Bader, To the Young Writer, Hopwood Lectures, 
Second Series (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 193. Also note: 
We have all suffered too much from society, we are now too aware of what it may do to us, to be 
able to dispose of it as literature.... In a society [, however,] where so many values have been 
overturned without our admitting it, where there is an obvious gap between the culture we profess 
and the dangers among which we live, the autobiographical mode can be an authentic way of 
establishing the truth of our experience. The individual is real even when the culture around him is 
not. (Ibid.) 
Kazin, "Whatever Happened to Criticism?" Commentary, 49 (February 1970), 62; Kazin, "Autobiography 
as Narrative," p. 192; Kazin, "The Literary Mind," Nation, 201 (September 20, 1965), 205; Kazin, 
Writing Was Everything (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 13; Kazin, "The Literary 
Mind," 205. Kazin was referring to Crane's story "The Open Boat." 
13. Kazin, "The Literary Sixties: When the World Was Too Much With Us," New York Times Book 
Review (December 21, 1969), 1, 3, 2. Kazin occasionally voices scathing condemnation: 
"Nonfiction," especially in the form of journalism between book covers, has become all too easy 
to write. There are all those doctors of medicine and philosophy — physicians, biologists, anthro-
pologists, ethnologists, psychoanalysts, epidemiologists — who have become doctors to our society. 
They have heard the cry of "Help!" and have rushed in to repair our sex lives, save us from DDT, 
to show us ourselves as the naked ape in the human zoo, to teach us about aggression among the 
lower vertebrates, to pinpoint the real murderers of John F. Kennedy. 
For every necessary popularization of the discovery of the double helix, there are also those 
unnecessary inflations and sentimentalizations of history that would have us shed still another tear for 
Nicholas and Alexandra and show us in hysterical detail just what a duty officer in outer Alaska was 
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eating at the moment that the awful news came in from Dallas. Therapists to our glands and mem-
ories at once, in a society so conscious of its "sickness" that apparently only reading certain books 
will enlighten and calm those over a certain age! For those below that age, occupying, rocking, 
marching, meeting, never seem to be alone except in the bathroom and so cannot possibly read much. 
(Ibid, 3.) 
14. In "The Literary Sixties," 3, Kazin indicated being struck by the "radical temper" which the 
promising young historians, Martin Duberman, Christopher Lasch, Eugene Genovese, and Barrington 
Moore Jr., formulated in response to that inadequacy.; Ibid; Kazin was frequently pointed out that 
exploiting the unbelievable and therefore "fictional" quality of their violence was a major component of 
the Nazi executioners* policy to dehumanize their victims: "Can the Holocaust be described? No, because 
as Arendt also noticed about totalitarianism, it has a fictional quality — it is a 'story' told by the 
monsters, not the least of whose cruelty is that they dominated the people they trapped as a storyteller 
does the invented figures in the story... And the Nazis did invent everything before the death factories 
began! They invented the devil Jewry, a totally innocent Germany..." (Kazin, Journals, 6 May 1985) 
15. Kazin, "The Literary Sixties," 18; Kazin, "Form and Anti-Form in Contemporary Literature," Barat 
Review, 4 (1969), 92, 93. Kazin illustrates how, as a result, many a great writer's socio-political views 
hardened: "This came out in the great Irish poet, William Butler Yeats, who did not hesitate to support 
the blueshirts in Spain when they were fighting the Spanish people during the Spanish civil war; it came 
out in T.S. Eliot's extraordinary statements defending the idea of a clerical state in his lectures at the 
University of Virginia and in his open support to anti-semitism at a time when such statements, to put 
it mildly, were in bad taste; it came out in Pound's scurrilous broadcasts; even Joyce, perhaps the purest 
and best of these writers, during the 1914 war serenely wrote his great book in Switzerland, accepting 
money from the British embassy to put on a play without the slightest concern whether the English won 
the war or not, and not because he was an Irish patriot."; Ibid., 94. 
16. Ibid.; Ibid., 95. 
17. Kazin, "The Literary Mind," 205.; Ibid. Also consider: "That is Blake's phrase, and Blake now 
means as much to us as Freud does. We exist in our minds, and if we hold fast against the dominating 
circumstances that our minds have built, it is only by finding imaginative recourse in our minds. It is 
symbolic that the hero of Saul Bellow's Herzog should be an analyst of the Romantic consciousness."; 
Ibid, 206. 
18. Kazin, "Whatever Happened to Criticism?", 60. "But as a result of the Nazi-Soviet alliance that 
unleashed the Second World War, the virtual destruction of Europe's moral legacy, the ever-increasing 
oppression after 1945 against every dissident in Soviet-occupied territory, some old radical intellectuals 
supported McCarthyism and many the cold war precisely because they still looked to ideology even when 
they had lost all political interest in everything except their disillusionment with the Russian Revoluti-
on."; Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid., 61; Kazin specifically mentions Auerbach's Mimesis, Walter Benjamin's Illuminations, Erich 
Heller's The Disinherited Mind, and Hannah Arendt's reflections on literature in Between Past and 
Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought. 
21. Kazin, "Whatever Happened to Criticism?", 61; Ibid., 62; Kazin, "Professors Are Too Sophisticated," 
Saturday Review, 54 (May 22, 1971), 26. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Journals, 21 April 1962. 
24. Kazin, An American Procession, p. 331. 
25. Kazin, "Young Man, Old Man," Reporter (December 19, 1963), 38. 
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26. In Kazin's view, Warren sponsored the modernist view of society as a trap: 
Macchiavelli is Warren's political oracle, but "illicit" sex seems to be the only misfortune of the 
State.... The gap between what Warren thinks of as the "ideal" and the "real" — between one fork 
of the "human radish" and the other — can be filled in only with bookish themes.... None of 
Warren's characters [in All the King's Men] dramatizes anything except [Warren's own] literary, 
moralistic, psychological conception of personal "motivation." (BB, 44-5) 
27. Walker Percy, "The Fallen Paradise," (1965). Quoted in Bright Book, p. 64. 
28. See Journals, 17 April 1957, on the concept of the rebel-hero: "It isn't... that man has ideas of 
change which he is afraid to express; it's more that his ideas are uncertain — i.e. they are criticisms, not 
a philosophy. He no longer shares in the old security of the rebel... the protester: his state is now anxiety, 
not anger. The self is now regarded as an end — we seek it for 'security.'"; Kazin, "The Pilgrimage of 
Walker Percy," Harper's, 242 (June 1971), 84. 
29. Kazin, "Fiction as a Social Gathering," Saturday Review (July 3, 1971), 20: "Of course, life has 
never been more 'symbolic' in the South than elsewhere. The region lent itself to metaphor because a 
remarkable group of writers, all essentially 'moral' and conservative, saw that the supposed values of the 
South were real only to them. They were able to describe in perfect rhythm, from within, a way of life 
that was passing. Well, by now 'their' South has passed all the way out. There is nothing more to elegize 
in Alabama than there is in the Bronx."; Kazin, "Pilgrimage," 84. 
30. On the subject of "the absurd," Kazin noted the following: 
... we had the sense of a world made totally the same, which it wasn't, and "absurd," that glib term 
for the rejection of society by those living tolerably in it. Albert Camus in Le Mythe de Sisyphe had 
meant by the absurd no more than what modem writers in the tradition of romantic individualism 
have always meant: the superiority of man to his naturally limited and frustrating experience. [D.H. 
Lawrence suggested that it] is natural for man to be rebellious against the terms of his life and his 
death, to be dissatisfied with everything but his own mind, to be an outsider and an overreacher — 
and thus to feel "absurd" to himself. But now society became "absurd," an untenable term but natural 
to a period in which the power of the state to make war, to destroy life on the planet, seemed more 
and more unmanageable. "War" had come to seem the normal, omnipresent condition of daily living, 
dominating a whole generation by the terror of its weapons and by the visible undoing, in the 
preparations for war, of those human loyalties and common values in the name of which war used to 
be fought. (Ibid., p. 83) 
31. Kazin, New York Jew, pp. 62-3. 
32. To Kazin, Slaughterhouse Five "deprecates any attempt to see tragedy that day in Dresden." 
Consequently, Vonnegut "has no politics." Bright Book, pp. 88, 89. 
33. O'Hara was "a social Darwinist of the most extreme kind, more removed from losers than anybody 
since the first John D. Rockefeller." Ibid, p. 110η. 
34. Esthetics and social reality clash: "The book reconstructs the scale of values so that it is not the ill-
treated Negro cadets but Colonel Ross, an elderly and altogether too sagacious judge in civil life now 
attached to the Inspector General's office, whose concern for the system rather than for the Negroes wins 
our respect in the end. This belief in 'society,' the country, the air force, is the reason for Cozzens's 
almost provocative illiberalism, and still reflects the dominating ethical point of view that novels of 
social rivalry used to take in America (BB, 102)." As a political metaphor, however, Guard of Honor is 
not an analysis of the contemporary liberal mind. 
35. Journals, 22 October 1949; Kazin's stance vis-à-vis Jewish orthodoxy is documented in the journal 
entry for 19 October 1948. On reading Martin Buber's essay on the Bible in Commentary, he wondered 
why "I can never read anything by one of these apocalyptic Jews without feeling that they are defending 
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a tradition rather than utilizing one: that they can fundamentally give us nothing new, because they are 
engaged in a soliloquy on the subject of their own history. [Yet, Buber gives an authentic and personal 
idea of religious experience.] So that, finding in him the best there is, I conclude that I am more alien 
to Jewish religion than I had thought I was."; Kazin, "Oral History Memoir," William E. Wiener Oral 
History Library of the American Jewish Committee, pp. 64-5. 
36. "History as destiny... or the dramatic theology of the Jews. We are not saved as a matter of course.... 
And we are not saved as individuals... The people is the protagonist of history..." Journals, 16 May 1973; 
Kazin, "Remembering Jewish History," Commentary (February 1964), 76. 
37. Kazin, "The Jew as Modem Writer," Commentary, 41 (April 1966), 37-41. Also included in as "The 
Jew as Modem American Writer, " in Theodore L. Gross , ed., The Literature of American Jews (New 
York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 37-41; Kazin, "The Jew as Modem Writer," 38, 38-9, 39. 
38. Ibid, 39-40; Kazin, "The Atheist Who Hears God's Voice," New York Times Book Review 
(November 4, 1973), review of Isaac Bashevis Singer, A Crown of Feathers and Other Stories, 1. 
39. Ibid.; Kazin, "The Jew as Modem Writer," 39. 
40. Kazin, "The World as a Novel: From Capote to Mailer," New York Review of Boob (April 8, 1971), 
29, 29-30, 30. The article was included in slightly amended form in Bright Book. 
A\.Ibid. 
42. Kazin, "The Literary Mind," 206; Kazin, "Imagination and the Age," Reporter (May 5, 1966), 34. 
43. Ibid. In "Mailer's Romance with the CIA," Dissent, 39 (Spring 1992), 279, Kazin suspected that the 
boisterous, intrusive persona of Mailer's new journalism and nonfiction novel "and all those other high-
strutting exercises in showing ordinary journalists how a real artist could turn the storm of available facts 
into art and history at once," suggested little else but a mere interest in '4he passing performance, not 
whatever it is in our culture that has the slightest chance of lasting." 
44. Ibid; Kazin, "The World as a Novel," 30. 
45. On 11 June 1969, Kazin wrote that he "realized the whole beauty of the world as a novel argument. 
When you feel that history is in 'decline,' that your society has had it so far as traditional patterns are 
concerned, then non-fiction, the 'world,' takes over — because of the seeming significance that can be 
given to the inflation of factual details.... When history becomes the study of the past, when the present 
is felt essentially to belong to the past, then details become symbolically important... the world takes over 
(rather than the individual imagination).... the world, in short, becomes history. The arc is formed. The 
world as a novel is history (the past) as a design.... And this is true of Mailer, the non-radical activist, 
as it is true of Capote..." 
46. Kazin, "The Literary Sixties, When the World Was Too Much With Us," New York Times Book 
Review (December 21, 1969), 2, 1, 2, 1, 2. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid.; The epithet would apply de rigueur to writers of the Beat Generation, particularly William 
Burroughs, though J.D. Salinger seems to qualify as well. 
49. Kazin, "The Literary Sixties," 3. 
50. Ibid.; Ibid., 18. 
51. Kazin considered the Nabokov chapter "my fifth symphony." Letter to Peter Shaw, 9 August 1971, 
Atlantic Monthly Press Archives, Boston.; Journals, 19 May 1956. He proceeded: "What troubles so 
many writers over a certain age is that the damned new world [viz. the welfare state] is already here..."; 
Krupnick, p. 142; Lionel Trilling, interview with Stephen Donadío, "Columbia: Seven Interviews," 
Partisan Review, 35 (Summer 1968), 354-92. 
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52. Nabokov, Speak, Memory, quoted in Bright Book, p. 283; Consider Kazin's journal entry for 24 
August 1981: "Nabokov has never understood the revolutionary psychology that is actually behind 
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69. Compare Kazin, "The Fascination and Terror of Ezra Pound," New York Review of Books (March 13, 
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individualist, and that outside of hi[m] is the mass. But the truth is that Dos Passos knows the masses 
only from the outside, and he has compromised with the real beauty of the historic novel [which 
concerns all persons equally]. The esthetic illusion is... that the artist can make an a priori judgment 
on his material rather than learn the significance of it from the actual working out. 
[Yet, U.S.A. offers] a provoking air of esthetic novelty, its 1920'ish air of attempting to deal... 
with the social phenomena that by now no novelist attempts to deal with en bloc. The great theme of 
advanced fiction in our day, the disintegration of the traditional idea of personality, the incompre­
hensibility of personality by traditional canons — this is not Dos Passos' line. His is the subjection 
of the traditional personality to social determinism: his theme is the personality become small, wistful, 
hopeless in the struggle with "society" — "society" being by definition that which limits the individu­
al, ... everybody — except the artist? 
76. Kazin, letter to Josephine Herbst, 31 October 1959, Beinecke Library, Yale University: "I understand 
so well your feeling of historical decline since the 20's, since it seems to me, who started out in the 30's, 
that only before then, in the days right after the war, of Mayakovsky and Brecht and Fitzgerald (whom 
I prize more & more, sorry not to agree with you, I think he's far subtler and longer-lasting than 
Hemingway), did man feel free to act."; Kazin, F. Scott Fitzgerald: The Man and His Work (Cleveland: 
World, 1951), pp. 11-2. 
77. "Introduction" to F. Scott Fitzgerald, pp. 14, 15. Compare ibid., p. 18: "... in a land of promise, 
'failure' will always be the classic theme."; Ibid., p. 15. 
78. But note Larzer ZifPs comments on Procession's liberal democratic outlook in American Literature, 
57 (May 1985), 323-4: 
... in An American Procession a major critic and historian attempts the... difficult task of making us 
see the familiar afresh rather than the currently popular task of having us recognize what is not 
familiar and has been unjustly neglected. 
Yet we must pause over this latter task, because it not only dominates contemporary thinking about 
literary history, but those who are attracted to it are impelled by liberal social views such as those 
with which we have come to associate Kazin. He makes, however, an important distinction. In 
reaffirming the canon he implicitly suggests that attachment to social justice and the aspirations of the 
dispossessed and unliterary does not mean that one must value works because they were written by 
the dispossessed; does not mean that if such works fail to meet culture's hard-won sense of literary 
tradition then we must redefine what we mean by literature so as to include them. Social pluralism 
does not require literary relativism. Rather it generates its own unique literary culture, one that is 
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attached to [an] older European tradition yet is sufficiently broad and colloquial to welcome all 
writers who would enter it regardless of their social origins or their political views The American 
procession is the intellectual assembly-point of the socially divided 
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Deze publicatie werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door de 
Hogeschool Maastricht 
De Hogeschool Maastncht is een instelling voor Hoger 
Beroepsonderwijs met acht faculteiten, 4 000 studenten 
en ruim 550 personeelsleden Studeren aan een van de 
faculteiten betekent het verwerven van Vakmanschap, 
Verdieping in het beroep en het ontwikkelen van 
Verbeeldingskracht Met deze dne V's tekent de 
Hogeschool Maastncht voor kwaliteit. 
De Hogeschool Maastncht omvat de volgende faculteiten: 
de Academie Beeldende Kunsten, het Conservatorium 
voor Muziek, Hoge Hotelschool, de faculteit Informatie-
dienstverlening en management, de faculteit Opleiding 
Tolk-Vertaler / Opleiding Onentaalse Talen en Commu­
nicatie, de Pedagogische Academie voor het Basis 
Onderwijs, de faculteit Sociaal Pedagogische Hulp­
verlening en de Toneelacademie 
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Alfred Kazin: Selfhood in America 
Veel Amerikanen plaatsen hun nationale culturele en literaire onafhankelijkheid van het moeder-
continent tegen het gegeven dat de sociale revolutie die in de laat-achttiende eeuw de politieke 
afscheiding van Groot-Brittannië bezegelde, het individu ook metterdaad een filosofisch raam-
werk verschafte voor een nieuwe identiteit ("selfhood"). De Founding Fathers verankerden een 
aantal radicale, democratische vrijheden in een grondwet voor de nieuwe natie, en verschaften 
het individu hiermee een morele en filosofische basis voor zijn vooruitgangsoptimisme. Dit hield 
nauw verband met de sterk romantische visie in Amerika op de maatschappij en de geschiedenis. 
De negentiende-eeuwse Amerikaanse literatuurgeschiedenis wordt dan ook gekenmerkt door 
schrijvers — ik noem Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, Herman Melville en Henry James 
— die een sociaal-poëtische of esthetische filosofie ontwikkelden om de creatieve dimensies van 
hun Amerikaanse beleving te peilen. 
Als zoon van Joods-Russische ouders die naar de Verenigde Staten waren geëmigreerd, raakte 
Alfred Kazin onder invloed van het radicaal-democratische gedachtengoed van de negentiende-
eeuwse Amerikaanse literaire traditie. In zijn memoire Starting Out in the Thirties (1965) schetst 
hij hoe hij tijdens de depressie van de jaren dertig het werk las van Friedrich Nietzsche, D.H. 
Lawrence, William Blake, Emerson en Whitman, en hen 'rebellen' noemde, voortrekkers van 
de vrije geest die een dialoog aangingen met het erfgoed van de goden. Het was toen al 
duidelijk dat hij de voorkeur gaf aan poëtisch radikalisme boven politiek engagement. 
In 1942 publiceerde de jonge Kazin een ambitieus literair-kritisch werk, On Native Grounds, 
waarin hij de ontwikkeling van de Amerikaanse literaire geschiedenis vanaf de Burgeroorlog 
nauw in verband bracht met de complexe en grotendeels onbegrepen morele omwenteling die 
zich binnen de Amerikaanse samenleving sinds 1865 had voltrokken. Zoals zoveel tijdgenoten 
met linkse idealen zag Kazin in eigentijdse gebeurtenissen in zowel de Verenigde Staten als 
daarbuiten het bewijs dat het doel van de geschiedenis zich snel zou openbaren. Zijn kritische 
waarden waren duidelijk daarop geënt, terwijl ook zijn Joodse spiritualiteit hem de overtuiging 
gaf dat de literatuur en de geschiedenis deel uitmaken van hetzelfde, moeizame proces van 
morele verlichting. 
Het links-idealistische wereldbeeld viel echter aan duigen, en in 1962 constateerde Kazin dat 
hij er ten onrechte vanuit was gegaan dat de wereld — en de Amerikaanse literatuur die hij 
trachtte te duiden — zich in vrijheid zou ontwikkelen. De twintigste-eeuwse totalitaire politieke 
ideologieën hadden dat verhinderd, zoals ook de teloorgang van Westerse tradities van dichterlij-
ke vrijheid schrijvers binnen en buiten Amerika een natuurlijk idealisme en persoonlijke over-
tuiging hadden ontnomen. Maar hoe moorddadig het stalinisme en fascisme ook waren geweest, 
en hoezeer ze de vrije geest ook hadden verkracht, Kazin bleef geloven in de mogelijkheid van 
een vrije, poëtische beleving en in de centrale rol van de scheppende geest. Hij refereerde in dit 
verband aan de geschiedenis van de Joden, die als geen ander de paradoxen van het moderne 
bestaan hebben ondervonden, en wier continuïteit als volk een van de grote mysteries en 
inspiraties is waarop hij zijn schrijverschap vandaag de dag baseert: "Wij [de Joden] stonden al-
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tijd in het brandpunt. De geschiedenis gebruikte ons om een prachtige ontknoping voor te berei-
den." Deze overtuiging maakte het mogelijk het cynisme en de onthechting te bestrijden in het 
werk van een invloedrijke generatie schrijvers zoals Louis-Ferdinand Céline, wier romanfiguren 
"étrangers" (vreemdelingen) waren die door de escalerende gebeurtenissen van de twintigste 
eeuw waren losgeslagen van hun traditionele moraliteit en de natuurlijke, menselijke piëteit. 
Uiteindelijk zou Kazin een kritisch exponent worden van het idee dat de geschiedenis en de 
literatuur een onscheidbaar proces van morele evolutie vormen. In An American Procession 
(1984) schetst hij hoe prominente Amerikaanse schrijvers van 1830 tot 1930 hun literaire ver-
mogens hebben aangewend om hun ambigue relatie tot de geschiedenis aan te geven of om zich 
tegen de dynamiek van de moderne geschiedenis te wapenen. Centraal daarbij staan Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, die als noviet met de kerk brak en een inspirerend romantisch-individualisme 
ontwikkelde, en Henry Adams, die voorbestemd leek om in navolging van zijn groot- en over-
grootvader het hoogste publieke ambt van president te bekleden, maar nooit de politieke arena 
betrad en in plaats daarvan zijn capaciteiten als historicus, intellectueel en schrijver uitbuitte in 
zijn autobiografie. Daarin presenteerde hij een aantal esthetische en filosofische reflecties op de 
moderne geschiedenis die haar voorstelden als een verzameling onpersoonlijke krachten die zich 
volledig aan de menselijke intelligentie onttrokken en waarover de mens dus geen enkele 
controle meer had. Kazin plaatst Adams's historisch defaitisme en diens reputatie als profeet van 
de moderne anti-utopie in een nieuw licht. Hij schildert hem af als een superb literator die 
historische beelden en filosofische concepten gebruikt om zo een levensvatbare traditie te 
ontwikkelen voor de scheppend kunstenaar in de moderne, ongrijpbare, destructieve wereld. 
Als literair criticus aan het eind van de twintigste eeuw identificeert Kazin zich sterk met de 
poëtische identiteit ("selfhood") van Henry Adams. De moderne geschiedenis en de grote 
politieke ideologieën die in naam van de nieuwe mens de oude knechtten en onderwierpen, 
vormden een radikale breuk met het klassieke humanisme dat ten grondslag ligt aan Kazins visie 
op de mens en de historie. De bevrijdende gedachte die de mens uiteindelijk zal verheffen, zo 
betoogt hij in Writing Was Everything (1996), zal niet worden geuit door een politicus, revo-
lutionair of filosoof, maar door een schrijver. 
Alfred Kazins literaire carrière behoort tot de rijkste in de geschiedenis van de Amerikaanse 
twintigste eeuw. Toen hij als Joods-Amerikaan van de tweede generatie op zevenentwintigjarige 
leeftijd On Native Grounds publiceerde — de eerste kritische historiografie van de Amerikaanse 
letterkunde vanaf 1865 — was zijn naam gemaakt. Hij zou als recensent, criticus, essayist en 
memoirist, maar vooral als schrijver per se, zijn carrière gestaag uitbouwen. Wat hem onder-
scheidt, is dat hij zich consequent onafhankelijk van het academische literaire establishment 
heeft opgesteld. Dit getuigt enerzijds van trots, anderzijds ontleende hij er als criticus zijn bui-
tengewone intellectuele moed aan. Voor zijn kritiek op Lionel Trillings interpretatie van de "lib-
eral imagination" en zijn verdediging van de schrijver Theodore Dreiser, wiens aanzien in de 
jaren vijftig mede door toedoen van Trilling nagenoeg tot het nulpunt was gedaald, verdient hij 
meer lof dan hij heeft gekregen. Zijn scherpe analyse van het links-radicale milieu van de jaren 
dertig en daarna in Starting Out in the Thirties — vooral zijn exposé van het groepsethos binnen 
de invloedrijke Partisan Review, met wie hij wegens zijn Joods-radikale achtergrond vaak ten 
onrechte wordt vereenzelvigd — was een controversiële, zeer kritische bijdrage aan de literair-
intellectuele geschiedschrijving. Erkenning voor zijn standpunten en methodiek heeft hij wel 
gekregen, zij het laat. Deze monografie wil daaraan bijdragen. Kazin zelfheeft met An Ameri-
can Procession een eigenzinnige en buitengewoon rijke herinterpretatie van de Amerikaanse 
literaire canon afgeleverd, die ook zijn tegenstanders zal hebben overtuigd van de reikwijdte en 
spiritualiteit van zijn kritisch perspectief. Zijn volgende boek, God and the American Writer, zal 
die ontwikkeling verscherpt in beeld brengen. 
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